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CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION 
If the effects of wind and air pressure combine with a high tide to give unusually high 
water levels this can lead to severe coastal flooding. This happened during a flooding 
event in early 1953 when more than 300 people died on the East Coast of England. 
Today these ‗storm surges‘ are seen as predictable flows of sea water that are forecast 
daily and linked to a nationwide warning system. The forecasts are run by the Met 
Office for the Environment Agency and use complex computer models produced at the 
National Oceanographic Centre – Liverpool, the successor of the Liverpool Tidal 
Institute (TI). In early November 2007, when the models predicted a sea level of a 
similar height to that of 1953 on the East Coast of England, the government‘s 
emergency committee COBRA met. In the end only a little flooding took place, as the 
wind and thus the height of the surge was lower than the worst predictions, but the 
event exemplifies the high levels of government concern about, and investment in, 
storm surge forecasting today. 
In 1919, when TI was established, ‗meteorological effects on sea level‘ as they were then 
known were not forecast on a regular basis. Indeed many, such as the late George 
Howard Darwin, deemed such effects to be unpredictable. These potentially 
catastrophic flows of sudden and unpredictable sea water were recurrent, yet out-of-the-
ordinary and irregular events. TI‘s researchers set out to change this. In 1959 a set of 
statistical forecasting formulae for storm surges was published by one of them and a 
warning system, using these formulae amongst other things, was forecasting such events 
on the East Coast of Britain. At this point TI believed they could predict surges, or at 
least as well as possible with current technology and methods. This thesis looks at how 
this rise in perceived predictability happened; something which has not previously been 
studied by historians. How were surges made (more) predictable by TI between 1919 
and 1959? 
One key aspect of how TI‘s researchers made surges more predictable was by 
introducing new practices of calculation, by which I mean that they introduced new 
methods, technologies and management practices to perform calculations. These 
practices of calculation produced particular chains of documents, i.e. sheets of papers 
with inscriptions on them linked to other such documents – an example of one link in 
such a chain could be the re-inscription of tidal gauge graphs into a table. TI‘s 
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researchers attempted to make disorderly sea water into predictable storm surges by 
first defining surges as the residual – the difference between observed and predicted sea 
level – and then constructing formulae to forecast such residuals. To produce the 
forecasting formulae they used particular mathematical, often statistical, practices. Their 
particular practices of calculation constituted surges as calculable and, eventually, 
predictable phenomena, in a contested and contingent process of constructing chains of 
documents.  
The construction of surge forecasting formulae by TI‘s researchers was closely related 
to the resource gathering and institution building they took part in, as well as the 
patronage given to them by those who wanted predictions of surges (and more generally 
increased control over nature). Debates over patronage were a key source of 
contingency in TI‘s work on storm surges which at times impacted on their practices. 
Another obvious contingency was the influence of major surge events in promoting 
work in the area, particularly in 1928 and 1953. TI also made choices regarding which 
practices of calculation to use and how to organise the documents and formulae they 
worked with. These choices were contingent on a range of issues such as the training of 
their workers, earlier work and practice, computational limits and specific demands 
from patrons. 
This thesis analyses the work TI did on understanding and forecasting meteorological 
effects between 1919 and 1959. Initially this work was done not to forecast flooding but 
to attempt to provide ‗corrections‘ to the published tidal predictions for the benefit of 
the Liverpool shipping industry, which was the patron of the work providing funding 
and other support. The primary concern of TI‘s patrons then was not with higher than 
expected water levels but with lower than expected water levels, which could lead to 
ships stranding. The work on meteorological effects was part of a programme of 
increasing the accuracy of tidal predictions using new practices of calculation, which 
was linked not only to the researchers‘ earlier work but also to the increasing size of 
ships and the impact of the First World War. As part of this work storm surges were 
defined as residuals, the difference between observed and predicted sea level, and 
statistical methods were used to try to make them predictable in Liverpool‘s port. 
The narrative traces the work done on storm surges at TI from its establishment to the 
late 1950s and how this was affected by various events and decisions. When fourteen 
people died in a flood event in London in 1928 the early programme of work changed, 
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shifting towards forecasting flooding. The patron of the work also shifted, towards local 
government, and in particular local authorities in London. During the Second World 
War a request from the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty (Hydro) for a 
storm surge forecasting formula led to renewed emphasis on statistical practices in TI‘s 
surge work. After the war, the work for the local authorities continued and, in an odd 
twist, the report that resulted from this work was printed in a very limited edition by the 
US Navy in the late 1940s. 
The 1953 flood event was another turning point for TI‘s work on surges. After this 
event central government became the largest patron of storm surge science and with 
this new patronage TI constructed statistical forecasting formulae that were taken up by 
the newly established warning system. In 1957 TI declared they had produced as good 
as possible forecasting formulae of the statistical form they had been honing for many 
years, and, after a couple of years testing, those in charge of the warning system at 
Hydro agreed. However, TI had already begun doubting the validity of their own 
practices and the formulae they produced a couple years earlier. At the same time a 
dispute with the Met Office regarding TI‘s methods for calculating the effect of the 
wind had broken out. After these two simultaneous events TI began arguing that if 
more ‗accurate‘ formulae were wanted for the warning system, shifts in their practices of 
calculation were needed, away from their previous statistical methods. They began one 
such shift in 1959, when digital computers were introduced into their storm surge work 
for the first time, which marks the end of the thesis. 
This thesis does two things. Firstly, it looks at the work done at TI, concentrating on 
how it performed its mathematical calculations. The researchers at the Institute were 
trained as mathematicians and one of them, Arthur Thomas Doodson (1890-1968), had 
worked with Karl Pearson, the statistician, and with anti-aircraft ballistics computations 
during the First World War. The other, Joseph Proudman (1888-1975), had studied 
mathematics at Liverpool and Cambridge universities. TI‘s disciplinary links were thus 
initially primarily to mathematics and mathematical physics. The thesis concentrates on 
one recurrent aspect of TI‘s work: mathematical research on forecasting storm surges. It 
also discusses some of their work on periodic tides. In particular, the thesis focuses on 
the practices of calculation used in the storm surge work, which were frequently 
statistical and computational. Much of TI‘s work was set within a particular tradition of 
mathematical analysis fostered at Cambridge and in particular a tradition of tidal analysis 
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with links to Pierre-Simon Laplace‘s work. At TI this tradition was developed together 
with new ways of organising and performing precision calculations, brought from 
Doodson‘s wartime work. The storm surge work depended on the use of computational 
aids, such as tables, calculating machines and tidal predictors, and particular 
management methods to produce chains of documents linked to other documents. TI‘s 
work to predict tides and storm surges provides a case study of the use of particular 
practices of calculation on a particular phenomenon to produce particular chains of 
documents. As such, this study adds to the small but growing literature on the practices 
involved in mathematical work, emphasising the physical materiality of such research, 
for example the use of technologies of calculation. In particular I analyse TI‘s work as 
that of constructing documents in linked chains, emphasising the importance of 
contingent choices during the construction process.  
Secondly, the thesis provides a case study of an institute and a research topic that today 
would be considered oceanographic, concentrating on the patronage structure of the 
two. Most work on the history of physical oceanography has emphasised the 
importance of naval patronage and rarely focused on direct industrial or civil state 
patronage. While TI was dependent for its income on sales of tidal predictions to the 
Navy, in the shape of Hydro, it was equally dependent on industrial patronage from the 
local shipping industry for further financial support and a building. The third element of 
TI‘s patronage structure was Liverpool University, providing connections to academia. 
Like a three-legged stool, TI relied on all three legs for patronage – if one leg had 
broken, the whole structure is likely to have fallen down. For example, while most of 
TI‘s funding was provided by the shipping industry in the early 1920‘s, Hydro then 
commissioned TI to do tidal predictions because of its connections with the university 
and because TI was neither a state organisation nor a private business. The three 
elements of TI‘s patronage structure were interconnected and interdependent. From the 
standpoint of most history of physical oceanography the patronage of storm surge 
science is equally unusual: first shipping industry, then local government and only after 
1953 civil state patronage, with some, but only some, naval involvement throughout. 
The thesis thus provides a case study of research into physical oceanography for which 
naval patronage was only one part of the story, arguing for increased attention to non-
naval patronage in the history of this field. 
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Throughout the thesis I emphasise the contested and contingent nature of patronage TI 
received from different actors. TI did not receive ‗naval‘ or ‗state‘ patronage; they 
received patronage from one particular part of one department of the Admiralty, the 
tidal branch of Hydro, and later one particular department of civil central government, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. In addition, the patronage they received was 
frequently contested. Securing patronage involved TI‘s researchers and supporters in 
complex negotiations and intense arguments about a wide range of issues, such as the 
accuracy of tidal predictions, the type of oceanographic science state actors should 
support and, of course, much institutional politics. Such politics was not only an issue 
within individual institutions and departments but also between local and central 
government, between Liverpool University and the local shipping industry, and between 
different groups of scientists. While TI‘s work on predicting tides and surges was aimed 
at increasing the predictability of nature, different actors disagreed not only on whether 
this aim was necessary but also on how to achieve it.  
The two themes of patronage, especially the gradual increase of state patronage, and 
TI‘s use of statistical practices of calculation to make surges calculable, tell a story of 
how a particular phenomena was ‗tamed‘ by scientists for their patrons using statistics.1 
It also provides yet another example of the gradual rise of technological and scientific 
governance of nature during the twentieth century, but focuses on the details of how 
this rise happened rather than on the governance that eventually came out of the work.2  
This is partly because the formulae that resulted from TI‘s work on constructing surges 
as potentially predictable were not put into use until after the flooding in 1953. Before 
then TI primarily used their forecasting formulae to promise increased predictability, or 
governance, of water; promises that only some actors were interested in. While the 
thesis discusses the contested increase in the number of actors interested in governing 
the sea, the primary focus of it is how storm surges were made calculable and 
predictable, or governable. This was done through the use of particular practices of 
calculation funded by particular actors for particular reasons. To study why and how 
surges were made calculable is a necessary foundation to understand the increase in 
                                               
1 Compare Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 22.  
2 W Harry G Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965); David 
Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For a recent 
example of historical work describing the rise of governance of nature, see Mark Whitehead, State, Science, 
and the Skies: Governmentalities of the British Atmosphere (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
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governance of the sea. Without understanding how TI tried to make surges predictable 
before 1953 we cannot understand how particular state actors attempted to govern it 
using TI‘s formulae for the warning system after 1953. However, for a full picture of 
this increase in governance this study should be complemented by wider studies of how 
different parts of society have attempted to govern the sea, e.g. by building coastal 
defences. 
This introduction will now situate the thesis within the contexts of the literature on the 
history of oceanography, meteorology and on practices of calculation. First, however, it 
will introduce storm surges in a little more detail. I then review the literature after which 
I provide an overview of the thesis.  
 
1.1 PRESENT-DAY CONTEXT: WHAT ARE ‗STORM SURGES‘ AND WHY DO 
THEY MATTER TODAY? 
What were the events that the workers at TI tried to forecast? Today they are called 
‗storm surges‘. In 1919 they were called meteorological effects, which is a more 
descriptive term. Scientists today define storm surges as relatively rapid changes in sea 
level due to wind and atmospheric pressure that affect the regular periodic tidal pattern.3 
This thesis focuses on storm surges as they affect England, i.e. extra-tropical storm 
surges.4  
According to recent descriptions by scientists, surges form when ―the atmosphere 
forces the water body, which responds by generating oscillations of the water level with 
various frequencies and amplitudes‖.5 Such an oscillation is then transported by the 
wind until it comes into contact with a coast either nearby (leading to a ‗local‘ surge) or 
far away (an ‗external‘ surge). A complex combination of causes decide the period and 
level of storm surges, such as the direction, speed and duration of the wind, the change 
                                               
3 Two introductory texts to tides, prediction and surges are John D. Boon, Secrets of the Tide : Tide and Tidal 
Current Analysis and Applications, Storm Surges and Sea Level Trends (Chichester: Horwood Publishing, 2004); 
Pugh, Changing Sea Levels. 
4 More extreme storm surges are formed in tropical waters. These can be extremely deadly and/or 
destructive, for example during the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone, the 1970 Bhola cyclone or the 2005 
hurricane Katrina. 
5 Gabriele Gönnert et al., Global Storm Surges, ed. German Coastal Engineering Research Council, Archive 
for Research and Technology on the North Sea and Baltic Coast (Holstein: Westholsteinische 
Verlagsanstatl Boyens & Co., 2001), 7. 
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in atmospheric pressure, the layout of the coastline and seabed, the track and intensity 
of the storm, and the rotation of the earth.6 The southern North Sea, including 
England‘s East Coast, is sensitive to storm surges due to its semi-enclosed funnel shape 
which intensifies the height of the surge. Like the ordinary tide, surges travel 
southwards along England‘s east coast. As they also both travel at about the same 
speed, due to both being similar kinds of travelling waves, a surge that coincides with 
high tide will affect most of this coast, as it did in 1953. Storm surge flooding has been 
recorded throughout European history, often with severe consequences in terms of loss 
of land or lives.7  
One reason to study the history of storm surge science is the context of climate change. 
According to the most recent research storm surges themselves are not predicted to 
become statistically significantly more frequent or severe due to climate change, but the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change expects sea level to rise.8 This increase in 
sea level means that the impacts of storm surge events are likely to become more 
pronounced, leading to increased risk of flooding and erosion. Any climate related sea 
level changes will come on top of the gradual geological changes that have affected 
Britain since the last glaciation, with some areas, notably London and the South, 
sinking, while others rise. Such sea level changes, and the North Sea‘s susceptibility to 
meteorological effects, mean the British have a long history of dealing with coastal 
flooding and erosion. Their responses to surges have varied across time and 
circumstances. For example, the number of storm surges in the Thames Estuary 
increased in the Middle Ages, causing loss of land. Considerable resources were initially 
spent to combat this, but as labour costs increased after the Black Death some retreat 
from the threatened land took place instead.9 While today there is much policy interest 
                                               
6 The rotation of the earth matters as the highest storm surges do not necessarily result from winds 
perpendicular to the coast, as the coriolis effect leads to what is known as Ekman transport  when wind-
drifted water is deflected up to 45° away from the wind direction (to the right in the Northern 
hemisphere). Ibid., 2-4; Keith Smith and Roy Ward, Floods: Physical Processes and Human Impacts (Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 151; Pugh, Changing Sea Levels, 139-141. 
7 Smith and Ward, Floods: Physical Processes and Human Impacts. 
8 IPCC, ―Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers‖, 2007 p. 8, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf accessed 30th November 2009. 
Jason Lowe et al., UK Climate Projections Science Report: Marine and Coastal Projections (Exeter: Met Office 
Hadley Centre, 2009). 
9 James A Galloway and Jonathan S Potts, "Marine Flooding in the Thames Estuary and Tidal River 
C.1250-1450: Impact and Response," Area 39, no. 3 (2007). 
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in coastal flooding,10 and much scientific work on sea level change and storm surges,11 
there is as yet little historical work on how the British have previously dealt with coastal 
flooding, or with other types of extreme weather.12 This thesis looks closely at how a 
particular understanding of meteorological effects, as storm surges that could be 
forecast using statistics, developed, which was one key way in which British society dealt 
with storm surges in the period 1919-1959. It thus aims to contribute towards providing 
a historical analysis of adaptation to extreme weather and climate change, particularly 
the use of science in twentieth century adaptations.  
I will now discuss literature relevant to the thesis, covering in turn literatures related to 
patronage of oceanography, forecasting of extreme meteorological events, differences in 
the type of mathematics used by different oceanographers and, finally, practices of 
mathematics, including a discussion of accuracy. 
 
1.2.1 PATRONAGE OF OCEANOGRAPHIC SCIENCE 
How and why TI attempted to make surges predictable was closely linked to who their 
patrons were. Patronage is a major topic of interest in history of science as a lens 
through which to analyse a range of issues. Ronald Doel discusses a range of questions 
that studies of patronage can be concerned with: What was the consequence of 
patronage for research? What was its influence on institutions? What research did it 
NOT allow? How did it link to politics? How did it influence the community and 
culture?13 In short, patronage is not just about money, but also about values, research 
and identity. As Mario Biagioli puts it, analysing patronage "is the key to understanding 
processes of identity and status formation that are the keys to understanding both the 
scientists' cognitive attitudes and career strategies‖.14 The funding of science is involved 
                                               
10 For example the Pitt Review after the summer 2007 floods and DEFRA‘s recent publication of both 
―Adapting to Coastal Change: Developing a Policy Framework‖ and the ―UK Marine Science Strategy‖ 
11 Specific programmes of work include Coastal Flooding by Extreme Events (CoFEE), Oceans 2025 
(especially the Sea Level and Vertical Land Movement work package 1.9) as well as continuing work on 
the storm tide warning system. 
12 See also Roderick J. McIntosh, Joseph A. Tainter, and Susan Keech McIntosh, "Climate, History and 
Human Action," in The Way the Wind Blows : Climate, History and Human Action, ed. Roderick J. McIntosh, 
Joseph A. Tainter, and Susan Keech McIntosh (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
13 Ronald E. Doel, "Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military's Influence on the 
Environmental Sciences in the USA after 1945," Social Studies of Science 33, no. 5 (2003). 
14 Emphasis in original. Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism 
(London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 14. 
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in the careers, identities and work of scientists, and this was certainly the case with 
storm surge science at TI. 
This section introduces literature on the history of oceanography, and to a lesser extent 
allied sciences, concentrating on patronage issues in the period from the First World 
War to the late 1950s. It argues that US historians of physical oceanography have 
concentrated heavily on military patronage, de-emphasising industrial patronage which 
was very important at TI. It also argues that what little work has been done in regards to 
twentieth century history of UK oceanography has focused more on its deficiencies 
than its actual work. By oceanography I mean research concerned with the sea. 
 
1.2.2 MILITARY PATRONAGE OF US EARTH SCIENCE 
Analysts of the patronage pattern of earth sciences in the US have argued that military 
patronage has been very important for physical earth sciences, such as physical 
oceanography and meteorology, especially in the post-war period.15 Chandra Mukerji 
has identified oceanography as an extreme case within the sciences with an unusually 
high dependency on government funding. She argues that in the post war period 
oceanographers were given funding so that they would be a reserve labour force to 
support policy or in case of need, e.g. during war.16 Naval patronage of physical 
oceanography has often been linked to the two world wars and the Cold War, though 
different authors identify different trigger points. For example, Gary Weir has studied 
the relations between the US Navy and oceanographers from the First World War to 
the Second World War and beyond. He argues that in the US the First World War led 
to military interest in physical oceanography, especially for detection of submarines. 
After the First World War lack of funding for both the Navy and academic 
oceanography led to a partnership between the Navy, especially the US Hydrographic 
Office, and academic oceanographers, with the Navy offering practical support such as 
                                               
15 Doel, "Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences."; Kristine C. Harper, Weather by the Numbers : The 
Genesis of Modern Meteorology (London: The MIT Press, 2008). 
16 Chandra Mukerji, A Fragile Power: Scientists and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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space on ships and also some monetary support. He argues that this relationship 
continued and grew in strength during the Second World War and beyond.17  
Others have argued that the Second World War was an important trigger in the rise of 
naval patronage of science. Ronald Rainger, for example, has argued that the patronage 
pattern of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography shifted from a mixed pattern of 
patronage and oceanographic research in the interwar period, towards a strong focus on 
military patronage and physical oceanography after the Second World War.18 Jacob 
Darwin Hamblin in turn identifies a different trigger point. In his view naval patronage 
of oceanographic research had only a limited start during the war when an ―awakening‖ 
of the mutual benefits of co-operation between Navy and oceanographers took place.19 
Instead he argues that the Navy was not thoroughly supportive until the first half of the 
1950s, when they on the suggestion of scientists through the Hartwell report began to 
develop atomic submarine warfare and defence. This was done to ensure the Navy‘s 
role within the larger US military and administration, which he argues was pro-air force 
at this time. This, according to Hamblin, led to a much higher level of naval patronage 
of oceanography during the 1950s.20 Despite the identification of different trigger 
points, these US historians of oceanography agree that naval patronage was very 
important for oceanography, especially physical, in the period covered by this thesis.  
 
1.2.3 BRITISH OCEANOGRAPHY AND STATE PATRONAGE OF SCIENCE 
Little historical work has been done on UK twentieth century oceanography and what 
has been done has emphasised its supposed deficiencies and communication problems 
with the Navy. I will question both these assumptions in this thesis. For example, 
Hamblin mentions Edward Crisp Bullard as a British case study of somebody doing 
                                               
17 Gary E. Weir, An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment (College 
Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2001). 
18 Ronald Rainger, "Constructing a Landscape for Postwar Science: Roger Revelle, the Scripps Institution 
and the University of California, San Diego," Minerva 39, no. 3 (2001); Ronald Rainger, "Adaptation and 
the Importance of Local Culture: Creating a Research School at the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography," Journal of the History of Biology 36, no. 3 (2003). See also  Naomi Oreskes and Ronald 
Rainger, "Science and Security before the Atomic Bomb: The Loyalty Case of Harald U. Sverdrup," 
Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 31, no. 3 
(2000). 
19 Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War : Disciples of Marine Science (London: University of 
Washington Press, 2005), 9-10.  
20 Ibid., ch 2.  
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oceanography in interwar Britain, but takes Bullard‘s words at face value when the latter 
claimed that British oceanographers were worse off than the Scandinavians in terms of 
support for their deep-sea work, with Hamblin seemingly arguing that not much ‗good‘ 
oceanography was done in the interwar period in Britain due to lack of state support.21 
TI provides a case study of an oceanographic institution in Britain that found enough 
patronage to establish itself in this period. In addition the so-called Discovery 
Committee was doing considerable amounts of oceanographic research in the Southern 
Oceans in the interwar period. Its work, which was run by the Colonial Office, focused 
on research related to the economic resources of the Antarctic, especially whales.22 
Bullard‘s comment was made in the context of discussions regarding what geophysical – 
not oceanographic – research should be emphasised in a Royal Society report on the 
‗needs‘ of geophysics after the Second World War.23 Bullard‘s claim may thus be better 
seen as that of a public scientist arguing for further financial support from the state for 
his geophysical science.24  
Margaret Deacon‘s work on twentieth century oceanography provides another example 
of how historians have argued that oceanography was weak in the UK in the interwar 
period and also that communications problems between the Navy and civilian scientists 
limited the work.25 Recently she stated that ―the nation that sent out the Challenger 
Expedition seemed largely to have lost interest in oceanic research, especially physical 
                                               
21 Ibid., 8-11. Bullard makes the relevant statement in Bullard to Darwin, 1st Mar 1946, BLRD F.85, 
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge 
22 Margaret Deacon, "Marine Science in the UK before World War II," in Of Seas and Ships and Scientists: 
The Remarkable Story of the UK's National Institute of Oceanography 1949-1973, ed. Anthony Laughton, et al. 
(Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 2010). This contradicts Clarke‘s statement that the Colonial Office 
had not provided significant funds to fisheries research before the 1940s, see Sabine Clarke, "A 
Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940 - 1960," Twentieth Century 
British History 18, no. 4 (2007): 474. 
23 ―List of projects‖ and various draft minutes and reports re Post-War needs in Geophysics Committee 
from 1944, BLRD F.86, and Bullard to Darwin, 1st Mar 1946, BLRD F.85, Churchill Archives Centre, 
Churchill College, Cambridge 
24 CMB 101, AE/1/2/3 & AE/1/9/4, Royal Society, shows Bullard‘s involvement in various Royal 
Society Committees on Geodesy and Geophysics. For more on public scientists see Edgerton, Warfare 
State; Andrew Hull, "Passwords to Power - a Public Rationale for Expert Influence on Central 
Government Policy-Making: British Scientists and Economists, c. 1900 - c. 1925" (PhD, University of 
Glasgow, 1994); Andrew Hull, "War of Words: The Public Science of the British Scientific Community 
and the Origins of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1914-1916," The British Journal for 
the History of Science 32, no. 4 (1999). 
25 However, Deacon‘s main work on the history of oceanography has concentrated on developments 
before the twentieth century, see Margaret Deacon, Scientists and the Sea 1650-1900: A Study of Marine 
Science (London: Academic Press, 1971). 
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oceanography, in the first part of the twentieth century‖,26 blaming this on lack of 
money. Despite stating this lack of interest in and support for oceanographic science, 
she then goes on to list work in biological oceanography and naval science, providing 
examples of work actually done. She briefly mentions TI as a ―notable exception‖ to 
what she says is the otherwise poor record of UK oceanography in the first half of the 
twentieth century.27 Earlier work of hers provides further examples of oceanographic 
work done in co-operation between the Navy and oceanography in the UK. She 
describes how Hydro survey ships were used by oceanographers for field work before 
the First World War, and how during the war this co-operation increased. At the end of 
the war plans were made to permanently incorporate oceanographic work into the 
Admiralty. This was said to be ―in the national interest‖ due to the increasing 
importance of submarines. While these plans came to little, Deacon discusses how other 
oceanographic research, e.g. on tidal streams, was carried out by the Navy in the early 
1920s.28 Willem Hackmann‘s book on the history of sonar provides further examples of 
such naval oceanographic work.29 Despite detailing quite substantial amounts of 
oceanographic work being done, both Hackmann and Deacon argue that such work 
was limited, in part by problems of communication with traditional Navy personnel 
struggling to accept civilian advice.30  
David Edgerton has argued against such views in his analysis of the relations between 
military, state and science in twentieth century Britain. He focuses on military-related 
state-supported research in Britain from 1920 to 1970, arguing that the British state 
spent large sums of money on military-related research and development in this period. 
He has adopted the concept ‗warfare state‘ to summarise his views. For the interwar 
period he argues that Britain‘s military remained well funded, and that, for example, the 
Navy was at least as strong, if not stronger, than other countries‘ navies, including in the 
area of R&D.31 While much literature on military patronage of science focuses on the 
Cold War period, Edgerton argues that there were close links between the military, 
state, industry and science in Britain well before the Second World War, and that much 
                                               
26 Italics as in original. Deacon, "Of Seas and Ships and Scientists," 19. 
27 Ibid., 22. 
28 Margaret B. Deacon, "G. Herbert Fowler (1861-1940): The Forgotten Oceanographer," Notes and 
Records of the Royal Society of London (1938-1996) 38, no. 2 (1984): 273. 
29 Willem Hackmann, Seek & Strike : Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914-54 (1984), 11-
43. 
30 Ibid; Deacon, "G. Herbert Fowler." 
31 Edgerton, Warfare State, 21-33. 
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new technology and innovations came from state/military/industrial research 
establishments in the interwar period.32  
What I take from Edgerton is an emphasis on tracing the actual extent of military and 
other state patronage of British science, such as TI‘s, in this period. As historians we 
should go beyond scientists‘ statements that the military and state did not provide 
sufficient support and that British science thus suffered. Like Weir has argued for the 
US, and Deacon and Hackmann show for Britain, there were at least some connections 
between the academic and naval oceanographic communities from the time of the First 
World War. However, unlike Edgerton, my focus is not on the state‘s relationship to 
military and science, but on a particular and rather peculiar institute which had links not 
only to specific departments of the military and civil state, including local government 
but also to industrial and academic actors. Edgerton argues that oceanography was a 
state science, but the work TI did was more than this.33   
 
1.2.4 NON-NAVAL PATRONAGE 
The concentration on naval patronage in much of the history of oceanography is useful 
and will be followed up in this thesis; however TI‘s patronage was often not military but 
instead industrial. Close links between industry and science have been described in 
many other branches of science and this source of patronage for oceanography should 
no less be ignored than military patronage.34 While there are some exceptions to the 
heavy emphasis on naval patronage, particularly of biological oceanography, historians 
of physical oceanography have until recently rarely concentrated on inter-linkages with 
industry in the discipline, and instead concentrated on state patronage.35  
                                               
32 Ibid., 122. 
33 Ibid., 112. 
34 See for example Jeff Hughes, "Plasticine and Valves: Industry, Instrumentation and the Emergence of 
Nuclear Physics," in The Invisible Industrialist, ed. Gaudillere and Lowy (1998); Robert Fox and Anna 
Guagnini, "Introduction," in Education, Technology and Industrial Performance in Europe, 1850-1939, ed. Robert 
Fox and Anna Guagnini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7-8; Karl Grandin, Nina 
Wormbs, and Sven Widmalm, eds., The Science-Industry Nexus : History, Policy, Implications, Nobel 
Symposium 123rd (2002) (Stockholm: Science History Publications/USA 2004); Jean-Paul Gaudillière, 
"The Invisible Industrialist : The Technological Dynamics of 20th-Century Biological Research," in The 
Science-Industry Nexus : History, Policy, Implications; Nobel Symposium 123rd (2002), ed. Karl Grandin, Nina 
Wormbs, and Sven Widmalm (Stockholm: Science History Publications/USA, 2004). 
35 For examples focused on biological oceanography, see Helen Rozwadowski, The Sea Knows No 
Boundaries : A Century of Marine Science under ICES (London: International Council for the Exploration of 
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However, lately more attention has been paid to industrial and other non-naval 
patronage of physical oceanography in various guises. For example, David Van Keuren 
has discussed the use of deep sea drilling technology developed by the oil industry in 
oceanographic and geological research.36 Ronald Doel et al also discuss industrial 
patronage when writing about work creating the Heezen-Tharp physiographic map of 
the ocean floor in the 1950s. One of the researchers involved in this map 
simultaneously did contract work for Bell Labs, which provided him with extra data and 
funding for the mapping work, while he helped them find a low-maintenance route for 
their new trans-Atlantic phone cable. Doel et al emphasise that the links to the industrial 
Bell Labs, as well as to the military, were very important for this key oceanographic 
research project. This shows that industrial patronage could be important even in 
American physical oceanography in the 1950s, often identified as a point when military 
patronage dominated oceanography.37 Eric Mills has recently argued that concerns 
regarding fisheries, agriculture and other industrial issues with links to weather and the 
sea had a key role in stimulating research in marine sciences generally in Scandinavia in 
the late nineteenth century. He has also downplayed the role of the Second World War 
as a trigger in the development of modern-day oceanography.38 Hamblin has recently 
written in more depth on the links between oceanographers, radioactive waste and 
atomic energy establishments of the US, Britain and France in the late 1950s. He turns 
the traditional patronage question of the influence of patronage on scientists‘ work on 
its head, arguing that the scientists‘ patronage strategies influenced the patrons‘ policies 
and status.39 In addition, while his book Oceanographers and the Cold War concentrates on 
military patronage of oceanography in the 1950s he also mentions many other sources 
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38  Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet, ch 3 & 9, esp p. 260. 
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United States, Britain, and France," Osiris 21, no. 1 (2006). 
 30 
 
of patronage, arguing that scientists played a strong role in defining their own part in 
the Cold War.40 
Despite these recent examples of attention to non-military patronage, many historians 
of physical oceanography seem to almost assume a dominance of military patronage in 
the discipline. Doel et al are quick to point out that Bell Labs were also secretly laying 
cables for military use, arguing there were close links to military needs even in the 
industrial patronage. However, the examples above demonstrate that the patronage 
patterns of oceanographic science have often been complicated, involving a range of 
patrons and interests with influences going in both directions between scientists and 
patrons.41 Atsushi Akera has argued historians should attend to what he calls 
fundamental pluralism in terms of institutions, interests, opportunities and priorities, in 
his case research into computers during the Cold War.42 While attention to military 
patronage is important because of its special political implications, the historians‘ 
attention to it should not necessarily be all-consuming, as all patronage has political 
implications which should be attended to. 
From the above it is clear that military patronage has been crucial for the work of 
American oceanographers both before and, especially, after the Second World War. 
However, there is not enough secondary literature to establish whether this pattern 
applies to the UK too. In addition, the emphasis by historians on naval patronage may 
neither take full account of other sources of patronage nor of the scientists‘ work in 
forming their own roles and relationships with patrons. This thesis will look closely at 
the connections between the Admiralty and TI‘s work but it must also take account of 
TI‘s other sources of patronage. By doing so this thesis provides an example of a 
different kind of patronage structure compared to that outlined by most historians of 
oceanography, in which industrial, local government and civil state patronage was also 
important. In addition it traces the connections between different parts of the state and 
TI, analysing how discussions and disputes between different state actors related to TI‘s 
patronage and its research. By attending both to such disputes and to the institution 
                                               
40 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War, conclusion. 
41 See also Angela NH Creager, "The Industrialization of Radioisotopes by the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission," in The Science-Industry Nexus : History, Policy, Implications; Nobel Symposium 123rd (2002), ed. 
Karl Grandin, Nina Wormbs, and Sven Widmalm (Stockholm: Science History Publications/USA, 2004). 
42 Atsushi Akera, Calculating a Natural World : Scientists, Engineers and Computers During the Rise of U.S. Cold 
War Research (London: The MIT Press, 2007).  
 31 
 
building strategies used by TI‘s researchers I attempt to show the contestation and 
contingency involved in TI‘s patronage. 
 
1.3 PRACTICES, ESPECIALLY OF FORECASTING 
During the twentieth century forecasting of extreme events, for example of storm 
surges, by experts has increased. Recently Gary Alan Fine wrote, in relation to weather 
forecasting, that ―[s]ociety depends on prognostication, allowing social systems to 
prepare for whatever shocks may transpire‖.43 The rise in forecasting of extreme events 
underlying this quote is a topic which has primarily been analysed within the history of 
meteorology but rarely with attention to the researchers‘ practices in developing 
forecasting methods. Before discussing that literature I will here define my usage of the 
term ‗practice‘.  
As Joseph Rouse makes clear ‗practice‘ is a term with many meanings and many varied 
theoretical attachments in social science and history.44 To me paying attention to 
practices is to pay attention to bodily skills and discipline. In addition, and following 
Rouse, I see language as part and parcel of the practices, skills and disciplines I am 
interested in. In particular, I am interested in how TI developed forecasting formulae in 
a practical manner – for example, how they used pen, paper, tidal gauge records and 
calculating machines to construct such formulae. Attention to such practices of 
calculation provides a deeper understanding of how TI‘s workers made surges 
predictable than is possible to achieve by attending only to published accounts of their 
work. Overall, my attention to practice places me within the wider project in history of 
science that attempts to show scientific and mathematical work as embodied work, that 
makes ‗things‘ in particular ways with particular effects, and that does not effortlessly 
travel.  
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Several historians of meteorology have studied historical attempts at making storms, or 
extreme flows of air, into more predictable or governable events.45 A key study is 
Robert Friedman‘s Appropriating the Weather on Vilhelm Bjerknes. By appropriating the 
weather, Friedman means that Bjerknes redefined, reclassified and restructured weather 
to make it more predictable by redefining it as a hydrodynamical problem, reclassifying 
the atmosphere into new three-dimensional concepts and restructuring weather 
forecasting to make it useful to flight, farming and fishing, and also to achieve 
professional support and recognition.46  
Overall such work on the construction of methods to predict extreme events is more 
limited in the history of oceanography. However, recently Eric Mills has recast 
Friedman‘s story about Bjerknes in oceanographic terms, describing how Bjerknes 
developed his hydrodynamical theorems. These were applicable to ‗baroclinic‘ 
conditions when lines of equal pressure and equal density are inclined due to properties 
of the oceans, like temperature, creating the possibility of currents. He then discusses 
how these theorems were taken up and further developed by oceanographers such as 
Bjørn Helland-Hansen and Johan Sandström, making Bjerknes‘s theorems into 
simplified equations that could be more easily calculated. In particular, he claims that 
once Helland-Hansen had reformulated the theory ―it was a routine matter to calculate 
the difference of current speed between surface and the depths across the plane joining 
the two stations‖.47 However, neither Mills nor Friedman go into detail of the practices 
of calculations used by Bjerknes, Helland-Hansen or Sandström. What were the 
routines used in these calculations and how were they made into routines by the 
researchers? What did Bjerknes and the others do in terms of practices to make the 
weather or ocean currents calculable and predictable? 
This question is not answered by history of meteorology, which has instead either 
focused on the use of forecasting techniques or the development of numerical weather 
prediction using digital computers. Anthropologists and historians of twentieth century 
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meteorology have often concentrated on day-to-day forecasting of extreme weather 
events. For example, Fine has studied how weather forecasting is done through 
everyday practice in a particular institutional settings, the importance of workplace 
culture in this and how changes in forecasting technology led to changes in forecasting 
practice.48 While his emphasis on practice is useful, he concentrates on the practices 
involved in everyday prediction, downplaying other aspects of importance for a full 
understanding of the prediction process, such as the reception of forecasts or the 
construction of forecasting formulae.49 Other historians of twentieth century 
meteorology have focused on the role of digital computers.50 Kristine Harper is a recent 
example of this, combining discussions of the development of numerical weather 
forecasting and digital computers with debates about the role of military and other 
patronage. Her work indicates the importance of patronage and institutional politics in 
earth sciences.51 Paul Edwards similarly combines an account of the history of 
computing and meteorology. He interestingly pays some attention to practices of 
calculation including those used before digital computers were introduced.52  
While researchers like Friedman and Mills concentrate on the work done on the science 
of forecasting, both they and for example Harper pay less attention to unpublished 
accounts of how the technical content was constructed than this study does. This thesis 
adds to the literature of history of meteorology and oceanography by studying another 
set of practices of calculation in depth – statistical ones as opposed to digital computing 
– in an under-studied time period. From the history of meteorology I take the attention 
to the history of forecasting, transferring this interest into the history of oceanography 
where forecasting has been emphasised much less. 
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1.4 DIFFERENT MATHEMATICAL APPROACHES TO OCEANOGRAPHY AND 
STORM SURGES 
The work TI did to develop surge forecasting formulae primarily used statistics. 
However, this statistical work linked to Proudman‘s and Doodson‘s wider tidal and 
oceanographic research as well as debates regarding the definition and 
institutionalisation of oceanography. This section sets out a number of different 
mathematical approaches to physical oceanography, contrasting the Laplacian tradition 
to dynamical oceanography, and also discussing work on the history of storm surge 
science in the Netherlands. Here and later in the thesis I will argue that the formation of 
contemporary oceanography as a discipline needs to be seen as contested definitional 
work in which debates between proponents of different approaches played a key role. 
Before returning to review the literature I will briefly describe TI‘s links to the Laplacian 
tradition. Doodson‘s wider work on the predictions of tides, within which the work on 
surges was set, came from the tradition of harmonic analysis of tides. Proudman also 
worked in this tradition of ―classical hydrodynamics and analytical mathematics‖.53 
Much of his work consisted of extension and application of Laplace‘s tidal equations to 
theoretical (as opposed to actual) bodies of water.54 Both Proudman and Doodson thus 
belonged to the Laplacian tradition of work on the hydrodynamic theory of long waves. 
This tradition was strong in Britain (and at Cambridge especially), including researchers 
such as George Biddell Airy (1801-1892), William Thomson/Lord Kelvin (1824-1907), 
Horace Lamb (1849-1934) and George Howard Darwin (1845-1912).55 As Eric Mills 
has put it recently, those who worked in this tradition were ―resolutely theoretical‖, did 
not work with actual geophysical fluids (they did not for example take account of 
temperature differences) and do not seem ―to have had the slightest interest in applying 
a significant body of theoretical fluid mechanics to the dynamics of the ocean‖.56 
However, tidal work was a key application of the work in this tradition, as described 
from different historical angles by Paul Hughes, Michael Reidy and David Edgard 
Cartwright. They do not consider storm surges in any great detail. Cartwright 
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concentrate on the technical development of tidal science and predictions.57 Hughes 
does the same, but also discusses some of the technologies of calculation used by 
researchers.58 Reidy concentrates on developments in tidal science in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, usefully emphasising links with industrial and military concerns.59 
An alternative approach to studies of the physical properties of oceans was being 
developed in Scandinavia around the turn of the century. The development of this 
‗dynamical oceanography‘ has been analysed by Mills. He argues that much of physical 
oceanography went down the route of a particular kind of dynamical mathematical 
analysis, following the development of Bjerknes‘s methods as discussed above. He 
argues that this dynamical analysis came to dominate oceanography. As an example of 
the difference between the two approaches he mentions that while Lord Kelvin had 
analysed barotropic flow, Bjerknes dealt with baroclinic flow, during which variation in 
ocean properties, such as temperature, creates conditions for currents that were not 
analysed in the Laplacian tradition.60  
While Mills is at pains to emphasise contingencies in how the dynamical method was 
adopted and adapted in different circumstances, he none the less portrays Bjerknes‘s 
hydrodynamics as the key part of the route that led to modern day oceanography, as 
dominated by what he calls its foundation text, The Oceans. This book, published in 
1941, was written by Harald Sverdrup (geophysicist and physical oceanographer), 
Martin Johnson (zoologist) and Richard Fleming (chemist). Mills argues that post war 
oceanography was shaped not so much by the war as by Sverdrup‘s vision of an 
integrated oceanography, incorporating physical, geological, biological and chemical 
sciences, and with dynamical oceanography as a crucial organising framework, as 
expressed in The Oceans.61 Mills‘s emphasis on dynamic oceanography as the key part of 
the eventually successful approach to oceanography is particularly clear in how Mills 
portrays George McEwen‘s alternative approach, describing it as mathematical physics. 
He writes that ―McEwen‘s method used a mathematics that was patently too complex 
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and inappropriate to the quality of his data‖.62 He argues that when McEwen entered 
oceanography, in the US in 1912, the future of the field was not determined and thus 
McEwen could not have foreseen that his methods would not become mainstream 
oceanography, but his emphasis is on explaining McEwen‘s failures. Mills discusses 
developments in Scandinavia, Canada, France, Germany and the US, but only mentions 
Britain in passing. According to him this is because little work was done in Britain using 
dynamic oceanography in the period he focuses on, before the Second World War.63  
The emphasis on Laplacian tidal equations in TI‘s theoretical work means that this 
thesis complements Mills‘s study, as his work concentrates on one particular strand of 
physical oceanography which TI‘s work did not fall into. While Proudman interacted 
closely with dynamical oceanography, for example writing a textbook on it towards the 
end of his career, his own research was focused on Laplacian tidal equations. He also 
defended this approach from accusations by Bjerknes and others that its neglect of 
baroclinic conditions, leading to vertical acceleration such as temperature-induced 
currents, could cause serious error, by arguing that the conditions under which this 
became a problem did not occur in actual tides in the oceans.64 While thorough analysis 
of this dispute is outside the scope of this thesis,65 it shows that Proudman‘s primary 
loyalty was towards theoretical work on tides in the Laplacian tradition. Proudman‘s 
Dynamical Oceanography references some of TI‘s work on storm surges and discusses 
some of the causes involved in surge generation (e.g. the effects of atmospheric 
pressure on the sea and the travel of such effects), but it does not name the 
phenomenon and does not discuss it in a focused section, demonstrating the distance 
between TI‘s work on forecasting storm surges and dynamical oceanography.66 While 
TI‘s researchers were aware of and interacted with dynamical oceanography, their own 
work was different from this approach.  
Some work on the history of storm surge science has been done in the Netherlands, but 
this has focused on tidal modelling research done for hydraulic coastal engineering 
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projects. Cornelis Disco and Jan van den Ende covers the period before 1953 in most 
depth, while Wiebe Bijker provides more cover for the period after 1953.67 They all 
identify 1953 as a key event, giving storm surge science impetus and funding. As I will 
do, they all also emphasise the interconnections between politics at many different 
scales and the techno-scientific work, as Bijker has expressed in the title of one of his 
articles: ―Dikes and dams, thick with politics‖.68 Disco and van den Ende have made the 
more specific claim that mathematical models of tides and storm surges were used as 
socio-political management tools by engineers to provide compelling, trusthworthy 
evidence in support of various engineering schemes for dams. They also discuss a range 
of different types of models, including electric and scale models, and differentiate 
between different types of mathematical models, using different equations, often based 
in hydrodynamic theory but also employing ideas from the harmonic methods of 
predicting tides.69  
Unlike TI‘s work with statistical forecasting formulae, the aim in the Dutch work 
analysed by historians was to predict the response of the sea water to new dams, dikes 
and other flood defences. The work described by these authors was linked to the 
planning of engineering projects instead of real time warning systems, but it used some 
of the same practices of calculation: human computers, slide rulers and desk calculators, 
careful checking of results, and lots of time and paper.70 While Disco and van den 
Ende‘s emphasis on this is useful, I will discuss TI‘s use of such practices in more 
depth. The practices were used for different purposes: TI used these practices for 
statistical calculations to forecast surges, whereas the work described by Disco, van den 
Ende and to some extent Bijker involved different kinds of mathematics based in fluid 
dynamics.  
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Within oceanography generally and tidal and storm surge science in particular there 
were thus a number of different mathematical approaches available. This thesis 
discusses how TI went down one particular route. While concentrating on TI‘s 
approach, it also pays some attention to different approaches to oceanography, 
especially regarding the institutional landscape of UK oceanography after the Second 
World War when debates about different types of oceanography impacted on TI. This 
problematises Mills‘s argument regarding the origin of contemporary oceanography, at 
least in Britain. In the case of Britain I believe this argument needs to be further 
contextualised in contested debates about the nature of oceanographic science at 
different times.  
 
1.5.1 PRACTICES OF MATHEMATICS 
While the perspective of history of oceanography is highly relevant to understand TI‘s 
work on predicting tides and surges, both Doodson and Proudman were trained as 
mathematicians and the work they did was mathematical, often statistical in relation to 
storm surges, and involved a large numbers of calculations. The overview of the existing 
literature above has identified a fascination with naval patronage within the history of 
oceanography, and a fascination with forecasting within the history of meteorology. 
While recent work by Mills has looked at the use of a particular type of mathematics 
within oceanography and Reidy pays some attention to practices of calculation 
regarding early nineteenth century tidal predictions, the literature review has also found 
a lack of attention to the construction of formulae used in forecasting and to the 
practices of theoretical work in both meteorology and oceanography. This lack, and 
Doodson‘s and Proudman‘s disciplinary affiliation to mathematics, brings us to this 
section on the history of mathematics and practices of calculation. How exactly did TI 
make surges calculable and predictable? The short answer is that they used multiple 
regression statistics to construct correlations that were then used to construct a 
forecasting formulae, but how did they do this practically? What was involved in this 
work? 
This section will first look at how historians have argued that mathematics can be 
studied through practices, but have rarely done so, before turning to examples of those 
who have in fact done this. In this area I concentrate on the work of Andrew Warwick, 
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Bruno Latour, Michael Lynch and Herbert Kalthoff, developing concepts and critiques 
I will then use to analyse TI‘s attempts to make surges predictable in the rest of the 
thesis. 
  
1.5.2 MATHEMATICS AS AMENABLE TO SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL 
STUDY 
Various historians of science have argued that mathematics is as amenable to 
sociological analysis as other scientific work. They have also argued that the 
universalisation of mathematics takes just as much work as the universalisation of 
experimental findings, and relies just as much on tacit knowledge and on networks of 
correspondence and data as experimental science.71 For example, Warwick has argued 
that there are a number of similarities between the theoretical and laboratory sciences, 
such as that the travel of both theoretical and experimental knowledge is difficult and 
dependent on tacit skills.72 David Bloor has described mathematics as a ―body of skills, 
beliefs and thought processes into which individuals must be initiated‖. 73 
Despite this, historians of science have paid considerably less attention to the practices 
involved in mathematical work than they have to the practices involved in laboratory 
science. Historical work on statistics could be an obvious comparison for TI‘s use of 
statistics in forecasting storm surges. However, work on the history of statistics has 
concentrated on the development of statistics to around the First World War and its use 
in social science for the purposes of the state. When there has been attention to the use 
of twentieth century statistics in natural sciences, this has concentrated on biology 
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(especially inferential statistics) and physics (e.g. probability and quantum physics), and 
does not appear to have concentrated on practices. I will refer to some of this work 
when discussing aspects of TI‘s work, but the history of statistics has not emphasised 
twentieth century applications and practices of calculation in sciences like oceanography 
or geophysics so comparison case studies are limited. What this literature has done is to 
make very clear that statistics is amenable to sociological and historical studies, showing 
many links between the particular social and scientific concerns of the practitioners of 
the work.74  
More generally, work on the practices used in mathematical work in specific physical 
sciences in the twentieth century is somewhat limited. While there has been some work 
done on the history of computing before digital computers, work analysing practices of 
calculation in relation to specific applications in more depth is still limited. However, 
the literature on computing often usefully describes machines and methods of work.75 
Some attention has been paid to the role of practices of teaching mathematics and 
theoretical physics and to the influence of this on research.76 When attention has 
focused on professional mathematical research, this has often concentrated on the 
process of constructing proofs in ‗pure‘ mathematics.77 However, I am interested not in 
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the practices of ‗pure‘ mathematics but in the practices involved in using statistics while 
trying to make a particular phenomenon predictable. Eric Livingston points out that the 
mathematical practice of theoretical physicists, which is closer to what I am interested 
in, is not necessarily the same as that of professional mathematicians, even if they are 
working on proofs of the ‗same‘ phenomena – his example is the divergence theorem – 
but that both can be studied through attention to practice.78 That is also the key 
message I take from this body of literature: mathematical work, even pure mathematics, 
can be studied as a historically contingent material practice. 
 
1.5.3 WORK ON PRACTICES OF MATHEMATICS 
I now turn to literature that has discussed the use of mathematical practices in scientific 
work, such as the use of statistics and computational techniques in particular disciplines, 
in more detail. One example is Edwards‘s recent book on computing and meteorology. 
He describes the use of statistics in climatology before digital computers and discusses 
practices of calculation, such as the use of analogue computing, other computing aids 
and punch cards, in meteorology in the first half of the twentieth century.79 He pays 
particular attention to the limits introduced by computational practices, introducing two 
concepts to analyse this: data and computational friction. He defines data friction as 
―the costs in time, energy, and attention required simply to collect, check, store, move, 
receive, and access data,‖ whereas computational friction is the ―expenditures of energy 
and limited resources in the processing of numbers [or, differently expressed,] the 
struggle involved in transforming data into information and knowledge‖.80  Edwards‘s 
attention to the impact and use of computing technology in a specific scientific 
discipline, meteorology, is interesting and useful. However, he relies on secondary 
sources which limit his attention to practices of calculation as they are written up. In 
addition, his focus is on the limits set by computing, not on the particular practices 
actually used in specific case studies. Another example is Mary Croarken‘s work on LJ 
Comrie at the Nautical Almanac Office, describing how he introduced computing there, 
but Croarken‘s work concentrates on computing per se instead of its use in other 
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aspects of science.81 Jon Agar‘s work on the links between computing and government 
ties together practices of calculation with an emphasis on the rise of the state and 
statistics, but in this work he pays less attention to scientific/mathematical research.82 
 
1.5.4 WARWICK: THE MATERIAL CULTURE OF MATHEMATICS 
An important exception to the lack of attention to the practices of mathematics is 
Warwick‘s work. He has argued for the study of theoretical works as skilled and 
practice-laden work, into which practitioners are encultured and trained so that many 
techniques and much ―theoretical technology‖ becomes tacit and taken for granted: 
―the products of theoretical work can be viewed as the cultural artifacts of the 
theoretical practices learned and articulated by theoreticians‖.83 His primary case study 
of how these theoretical practices were learnt and used is the development of 
mathematical physics at Cambridge University, which he approaches from the view of 
how students were trained, examined and worked between the eighteenth century and 
the early twentieth century. He emphasises the development of a particular material 
culture of mathematics at Cambridge, for which written exams, coaching as well as 
indvidual practice, and pen and paper were important. Through their training in these 
material practices mathematical physicists from Cambridge developed particular skills 
and sensibilities. Warwick also emphasises how mathematical physics travelled, 
discussing how the Cambridge teaching methods as well as theories travelled (or not as 
the case may be), how theories from elsewhere, such as Albert Einstein‘s work on 
relativity, were received at Cambridge and how the skills and theories taught there 
interacted with  such ‗received‘ theories in research work.84 To him, the cultural history 
of mathematical physics is a necessary explanation for how the ―technical history‖ of 
this discipline was made possible.85  
Warwick has also linked the history of technologies of calculation to physics, arguing 
that precision measurements and precision calculations were closely linked. Both 
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increased in Britain at the same time from the mid to late nineteenth century, and both 
were dependent on sets of new practices and technologies as well as on a specific 
industrial and governmental setting. New technologies of calculation, such as 
mathematical tables, calculating machines and new management practices regarding 
human computers, enabled the application of the new nineteenth century mathematical 
physics and analysis not only to the needs of bureaucracy, business and military but also 
to science and the creation of empirical laws – for example the kind of forecasting 
formulae TI constructed. Practices and technologies of calculation connected the style 
of mathematics taught for the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos, using pure algebraic 
analysis, to the needs of physics. He argues that new technologies of calculation led to 
new practices, which together enabled workers to calculate more and for longer with 
fewer mistakes (i.e. with higher accuracy and precision).86  
I take my attention to the material culture of mathematics and technologies of 
calculation from Warwick, but look at mathematical practice in a very different setting 
from Cambridge: that of provincial Merseyside. While Proudman and Doodson had 
links to the world of Cambridge mathematics, for example through training, they 
operated in a different world in which industrial and naval patronage was crucial. I will 
be combining attention to their practices of calculation with their attempts to enlist 
patrons. I also concentrate on the construction of statistical formulae in relation to a 
specific physical phenomenon of direct interest to TI‘s patrons, not the development of 
theoretical mathematical physics – I concentrate on TI‘s work on statistical forecasting 
formulae and harmonic tidal predictions, not their work on the hydrodynamic theory of 
surges or tides. In particular, I analyse the use of the theoretical technology of statistics 
as well as technologies of calculation in TI‘s work on this. 
 
1.5.5 LATOUR: CHAINS OF DOCUMENTS THAT CONNECT 
The practices of calculation TI used to construct forecasting formulae for surges 
produced reams of documents connected in chains; pieces of paper with numbers, 
graphs and calculations on them which linked to other such documents. To analyse how 
TI used new practices of calculations to produce and connect such documents I use 
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Bruno Latour‘s work on chains of inscriptions as a framework. This is partly as he has 
emphasised such documents, which he calls inscriptions or forms, and partly as he is 
one of the researchers who have encouraged studies of mathematical work from the 
same standpoint as other scientific work, emphasising that it is not abstract or 
transcendental but accessible to analysis through the study of documents and 
practices.87 I will focus on one particular aspect of Latour‘s work, extending his idea of 
chains of inscriptions to pay more attention to contingencies and less attention to the 
power-seeking behaviour of scientists. 
According to Latour one important aspect of scientific work is to create and combine 
inscriptions to find patterns. These inscriptions are transformed from one 
element/form to another in a never-ending chain of transformations producing ―chains 
of elements‖, with each element being a ‗re-presentation‘ of another. Each 
transformation leads both to amplifications and reductions, for example in terms of 
materiality or compatibility.88 In TI‘s case they received inscriptions from tidal gauges 
which they, through a number of transformations, turned into other inscriptions or 
documents ‗re-presenting‘ the surge as numbers extracted out of the tidal gauge record. 
Such documents, or n-th order forms, could be more easily stored (due to being 
compact) and also compared with other such surges.  
Latour argues that the creation of n-th order forms gives rise to unexpected 
‗supplements‘ for the scientists, i.e. results that increases their ability to intervene or 
convince.89 Such forms/inscriptions mobilise and stabilise the world, making aspects of 
it moveable and intelligible to the scientist, and by being such ‗immutable and 
combinable mobiles‘ they allow scientists to ―speak more authoritatively and with more 
assurance‖ about the world.90 For Latour scientists become master of the phenomena 
they are studying through work creating chains of documents, by studying such 
documents and finding patterns in the traces on them.91 Such mastery is particularly 
pronounced in ‗centres of calculation‘, such as TI, that bring together inscriptions and 
do additional work with them, creating further inscriptions, especially using calculations 
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and mathematical formalism.92 TI used statistical calculations on their inscriptions of 
surges to produce further documents, attempting to create forecasting formulae for 
surges to make this phenomenon predictable. Latour sees mathematical formalisms or 
theories as just another step in the creation of more and more mobile yet immutable 
inscriptions, arguing that they allow scientists to ―assemble many allies in one place‖.93 
For example, using Einstein‘s relativity theory scientists could do more than without it: 
―more frames of reference with less privilege can be accessed, reduced, accumulated 
and combined, observers can be delegated to a few more places in the infinitely large 
(the cosmos) and the infinitely small (electrons), and the readings they send will be 
understandable.‖94 
Latour is emphatic that the increase in power scientists gets from equations come from 
them increasing connections, not from some miracle of immaterial thinking. For 
example, he argues that the Lorentz transformation, as used by Einstein, increased 
connections by ―defin[ing] the paperwork necessary to move documents from one 
frame to the other and still maintain superimposition of traces at the end.‖95 He 
emphasises the paperwork involved in constructing Einstein‘s formulae: ―the word 
relativity refers to this lowly work of building and relating frames to another in such a 
way that some kind of stable form can be maintained‖ through various 
transformations.96 Latour‘s emphasis on such logistical work in the construction of 
formulae, such as Reynolds‘s formula,97 Mendeleev‘s table,98 Galileo‘s law of falling 
bodies99 or a diagram produced after fieldwork in Brazil,100 is productive for me. 
Together with the analytical tools I take from Warwick and others it provides an 
approach to analyse TI‘s mathematical work on surge forecasting as practice. However, 
Latour‘s main focus when it comes to theory, or formalism as he often calls it, is on the 
links between language and nature, with him concentrating on denying the ―canonical 
view‖ that the two are separate and need mysterious bridges to connect up. Despite his 
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emphasis on paperwork, he is usually less concerned with how chains of inscriptions or 
formulae are constructed in practice by scientists, instead focusing on debating various 
philosophical and sociological issues.101  
My focus is instead on how TI constructed their particular chains of documents and 
forecasting formulae. Why does a scientist create one document and not another? Why 
use one formula or mathematical technique over another? Latour does not much 
discuss the choices or work involved in creating these particular relationships. For 
example, his narrative of pedological research in Brazil analyses the scientists‘ 
―unbroken series of well-nested elements‖, e.g. of earth, pedocomparator and diagrams, 
but spends less time analysing how the scientists had chosen to construct each element 
or the particular links between them.102 How did these elements come to take the form 
of a wellnested unbroken series? While I agree that scientists construct chains of 
documents, I will add to this picture by further emphasising the work, choices and 
contingencies involved in constructing such chains of documents. 
My emphasis on the choices made when constructing chains of documents is closely 
linked to how I de-emphasise the power-seeking behaviour of TI‘s scientists. As is clear 
from the description of his view of the construction by scientists of chains of 
documents above, Latour explicitly argues that such work gives power to scientists. His 
concentration on the power of scientists has been criticised as assuming that scientists 
seek power and control, and gain this through their work, while in fact there are often 
strict limitations to the extent of their power.103 In particular Latour claims that 
mathematicians are in a strategic position to increase their powers as he sees 
mathematics and formulae as concentrating connections. To him, an increase of 
formalism will lead to an increase in connections in the network the 
formalism/equation is at the heart of, and thus to an increased ability for scientists to 
intervene, i.e. more equations equals more power. As he puts it in reference to theories: 
―Inscriptions allow conscription!‖104 
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While TI‘s researchers of course sought a certain amount of dominance in order to 
ensure their institute‘s continued survival and patronage, I will downplay the extent to 
which TI‘s researchers sought power as such. The choices they made when constructing 
chains of documents or choosing formulae cannot necessarily be explained by reference 
to them seeking power or domination – it was as much about immediate reactions as 
about long-term planning. Latour instead writes: ―All innovations in picture making, 
equations, communications, archives, documentation, instrumentation, argumentation, 
will be selected for or against depending on how they simultaneously affect either 
inscription or mobilization‖.105 I cannot see how a scientist can necessarily know in 
advance how a new ‗innovation‘ will affect inscription (i.e. the process of creating chains 
of documents) or mobilisation (i.e. the process of enlisting allies), and thus how they 
can select for or against it on this ground – it has to be tried out first. If scientists 
cannot know in advance if their experimental work will produce one of Latour‘s 
‗supplements,‘ they cannot select the ‗innovation‘ that will produce one, as they do not 
necessarily know which one will. Instead the shape of the chain of documents and the 
choices made in its construction must depend on other factors.  
Latour‘s work on chains of inscription provides a framework for my attention to 
documents and formulae. I will add to this framework by attending to the 
contingencies, choices and work involved in TI‘s construction of chains of documents. 
This is inspired not only by Warwick‘s work on the practices of mathematics but also by 
work done by Kalthoff and Lynch on practices of calculation. 
1.5.6 PRACTICES OF CALCULATION CONSTITUTING CALCULABLE ENTITIES 
How are events, such as storm surges, made into entities onto which mathematical 
practices, such as statistics, can be used to, say, predict future surges? This has been 
discussed from different angles but with similar results by Michael Lynch and Herbert 
Kalthoff, both arguing that things are constituted as calculable entities through practices 
of calculation, or mathematisation in Lynch‘s terminology. 
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 Lynch argues that different renderings of a phenomenon – in his case visual 
representations of biological specimens – select and, crucially, add visual features,106 and 
that such representations ―are essential to how scientific objects and orderly 
relationships are revealed and made analyzable‖.107 In particular, practices of selection 
and visualisation, such as ―clearly marking the outlines to distinguish one case from 
another‖,108 produce coded and aggregated objects onto which ―[a]rithmetic and graphic 
representational operations can then be performed on the basis of the enhanced 
identities and differences‖.109 Lynch‘s basic argument is that scientists constitute and 
frame phenomena through visual and mathematical practices that make them calculable. 
I agree with this and will give a detailed example of such a process operating in TI‘s 
mathematical work in chapter five. Lynch however argues that such practices operate 
―in the direction of generic pedagogy and abstract theorizing‖, i.e. he argues that 
scientists are able to in advance select how to constitute objects with a goal of specific 
desired results in mind. The same criticism as against Latour‘s selection of innovations 
to produce supplements applies: how can the scientist know in advance what practice 
will lead to a specific result in terms of pedagogy or theorising?110 I will instead argue 
that while TI‘s practices of calculations made surges into calculable objects, they did so 
in particular contingent ways that in unpredictable ways limited future calculations.  
Kalthoff has paid more attention to how practices of calculation produce chains of 
documents that bind as well as connect. Whereas he comes from the field of social 
studies of finance and concentrates on how banks make risk calculable, he specifically 
discusses how this was done through practices of calculation, using particular computer 
programmes containing particular formulae producing particular written documents 
from particular data put together in particular ways.111  He argues that such practices, 
and in particular the formulae used, bring into being entities that are structured in 
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specific ways, for example by the rules of mathematics.112 Following Heidegger, 
Kalthoff argues that calculation technology is part of a modern system of ordering of 
resources: ―modern technology transforms the objects it [calculation] reveals into 
uniform, materialized things that can be measured and compared through computing, 
balancing and calculating‖.113 However, the use of such technologies of calculation 
―means being set in a ‗chain‘ … of calculation: one level of calculation sets or place 
another level of calculation … one interpretation sets another interpretation‖.114 He 
argues that in modern society these set chains limit our understanding of phenomena, 
making technological understanding seem the only legitimate form.  
Kalthoff‘s and Lynch‘s approaches provide a way of analysing how TI made surges into 
calculable scientific objects.115 I will describe in detail how TI‘s practices of calculation 
constituted theoretical entities they called surges. These entities were linked to changes 
in sea level through chains of documents, in Latourian fashion. Surges were made 
calculable entities, and indeed constructed, through practices of calculation. Kalthoff 
differentiates between calculating something and calculating with that something and 
Lynch makes a similar differentiation between constructing a picture with selected 
attributes and mathematically analysing those ‗residues‘: ―Constructing a ‗good‘ picture 
of a laboratory specimen‘s residues is [a] prerequisite for mathematically analyzing those 
residues‖.116 I will explore this differentiation further in chapter five by discussing how 
the process of making surges into calculable entities was not sufficient to also make 
them predictable. In addition I explore the contingent process of establishing particular 
practices of calculation, which in turn contingently produce and structure the entities 
the practices constitute. Studying how chains of documents come into being provides a 
way to understand the historical contingencies involved in scientists‘ use of such chains. 
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1.5.7 ACCURACY, TRUST AND PRACTICES OF CALCULATION 
A key theme in this thesis is that TI attempted to increase the ‗accuracy‘ of their 
calculations or predictions of tides and storm surges. By ‗accuracy‘ they meant the 
closeness between observed and predicted sea level. How this closeness was judged will 
be further discussed in various places of the thesis. Much work has been done on 
accuracy in history of science, though it has concentrated on precision measurements.117 
I discussed one exception to this emphasis on precision measurements above in the 
context of Warwick‘s work on the links between technologies of calculation and 
accuracy. His work in this area shows that arguments about accuracy developed in the 
wider literature on precision measurements can also be adapted for other areas of 
science, such as computational and theoretical work.  
The wider work on precision measurements has shown that demands for increased 
accuracy of scientific measurements or calculations often have been linked to the needs 
of state or industry.118 For example, early nineteenth century German states wanted 
more precisely defined standards of weight and measure, which led to physicists 
working on precision measurements.119 Industry, both precision instrument engineering 
and the telegraph industry, was heavily involved in debates on precision measurements 
of resistance standards.120 I will argue that this was also the case at TI, discussing a 
number of cases where TI‘s work on improving the accuracy of tidal and surge 
predictions was linked to industrial, military or state demands. Graeme Gooday argues 
that trust was another important issue in relation to late nineteenth century electrical 
measurements. Trust in these measurements was a complex web of trust in people and 
their morality, materials, reading practices, machines, mathematical theories and the 
level of care taken.121 Rhetoric about precision measurements could also be important in 
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institution building. As Gooday has argued, physicists from the 1860s to 1880s appealed 
for resources for teaching laboratories by rhetorically using recent dramatic 
developments in research on precision measurements to justify the funding. Such 
appeals were made within a setting where there was both supply of laboratory training, 
through the expansion of physics in terms of personnel and resources, and demand for 
such training due to debates on scientific education and the expansion of the telegraph 
industry.122 I discuss how TI used similar arguments about accuracy to argue for funding 
in the 1920s, linking accuracy to trustworthiness as well as to funding, but in the context 
of precision calculations instead of precision measurements.  
 
1.5.8 PRACTICES OF CALCULATION AND STORM SURGES 
In order to analyse how TI attempted to make storm surges more predictable I use a 
range of analytical tools and approaches. From Warwick I take my attention to the 
material culture and practices of mathematics – how the seemingly universal language 
and results of mathematics were constructed in a particular place and in particular ways, 
using particular technologies. From Latour I take my attention to networks of 
inscriptions, centres of calculation and enrolment of patrons – chains that connect. 
From Lynch and especially Kalthoff I take the idea that particular entities are made 
calculable through practices in a particular way on particular documents – chains that 
bind. From the literature on precision measurement I take my attention to the rhetoric 
and practices involved in scientific work on accuracy and how this linked both to 
demands from state and industry and to arguments for patronage by scientists – TI‘s 
work was linked to its patronage. 
This thesis thus provides a case study of how a group of mathematicians attempted to 
make a particular phenomenon, storm surges, (more) predictable through the use of 
particular practices of calculations, creating documents and formulae. Such work on the 
accuracy of tidal predictions was linked to demands from industry and state actors. TI‘s 
work on the predictions of tides and surges was intensely dependent upon specialised 
practices of calculation, equipment (e.g. tide predictors) and networks of 
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correspondence, including the provision of data from many sources. These practices, 
technologies and data were used to construct documents and formulae in specific ways, 
using statistical practices of calculation to constitute storm surges as predictable events. 
Only by concentrating on the details of TI‘s mathematical practice is it possible to 
understand what TI did to make surges predictable.  
 
1.7 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter two describes how TI, the institute where the storm surge work discussed in 
the rest of the thesis was done, was established. This is set into the context of the First 
World War and debates regarding the effect of this war on science and the involvement 
of the state in scientific research. I also discuss aspects of tidal research before TI‘s 
establishment, focusing on changes in the level of accuracy in predictions deemed 
necessary by different actors. TI originated during the First World War as part of a 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) proposal to set up a 
Geodetic Institute to conduct academic research and give advice to the government. 
However, only the tidal part of it was developed while the rest of the institute was 
dropped, when Joseph Proudman via existing university-based networks managed to 
convince two Liverpool shipping brothers, Charles and Alfred Booth, to provide 
funding for five years.  
The ability of Proudman to convince businessmen of the need for TI was grounded in 
the increased size of ships and in the recent war during which the Navy had needed 
tidal predictions for mining operations and to ship troops to the continent. Together 
these two factors, war and larger ships, had changed the level of accuracy state and 
industrial actors wanted in tidal predictions, but this was not reflected in the initial 
BAAS proposal for which Proudman emphasised research on tidal theory. During the 
process of establishing TI, its research programme, as put forward by Proudman and 
Doodson, changed towards emphasising predictions over tidal theory. This change 
depended on audience, the work already done and on information received, crucially 
from the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty (Hydro). I argue that shipping 
men provided funding as they wanted more ‗accurate‘ tidal predictions that were closer 
to observations, and that because of this patronage increasing such accuracy became 
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one of key aims of the Institute. Within this research programme meteorological effects 
was one aspect that was said to need work. 
The third chapter then looks at how TI tried to implement this research programme 
during its first five years. The focus of the chapter is TI‘s work to improve the accuracy 
of tidal predictions in comparison with observations, and to predict meteorological 
effects. In both cases I argue that they introduced new practices of calculation, such as 
management routines and ideas from statistics. The chapter therefore also discusses TI‘s 
calculating machines and the human computers who used these, as well as the person 
who introduced them to TI, Arthur Doodson, and his work experiences during the First 
World War. These experiences shaped his practices of calculation.  
The chapter argues that TI‘s research workers linked accuracy and trustworthy 
predictions to practices of calculation. It provides a case study of the links outlined by 
Warwick between demands from different actors, developments of technologies of 
calculation and mathematical work, both theoretical and computational, aimed at 
improving the accuracy of the numbers generated by a specific theory.123 Doodson used 
new technologies and practices of calculation to redevelop the harmonic theory of tidal 
prediction as well as analysing tidal data to find further constituents by analysing 
residuals. He argued that because of these new practices of calculation he was able to 
include more of the constituents of tides in predictions, and that therefore these 
predictions would be of higher accuracy, i.e. closer to observations of tides. His 
arguments were however not only linked to developments in demands for accuracy and 
practices of calculation, but also closely linked to TI‘s institution building activities. I 
argue that the way Doodson and Proudman talked about improving accuracy was 
steeped in the need to justify both their funding and the work they did – talk about the 
need for accurate tidal predictions was a key part of their institution building strategy. 
As part of their work on the accuracy of tidal predictions, TI‘s researchers defined 
surges as residuals, a definition which I argue was also linked to Doodson‘s earlier work. 
Chapter four analyses how TI used the results of the work discussed in chapter three 
both to do predictions and to argue for patronage in the period up to 1929. The chapter 
also discusses how the Navy increased its patronage of TI, first by proxy via 
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Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) grants between 1921 and 
1923. In 1923 the funding from the Booth brothers and from DSIR ended, at which 
point TI used the results of their earlier work to argue for further patronage from the 
shipping industry and the Navy. TI‘s work on tidal predictions had been influenced by 
Hydro but not directly paid for by them until 1923 when an agreement was signed after 
which TI provided Hydro with an increasing amount of tidal predictions and analysis. 
This provided a measure of long-term funding and security for TI. The chapter looks at 
how this agreement followed not only TI‘s research on tidal predictions but also 
network building with Hydro and internal concerns within Hydro regarding the quality 
of predictions from their other supplier.  
With the agreement in 1923 the naval ‗leg‘ in TI‘s triangular patronage structure had 
appeared on a permanent basis. The other two legs, the university and the shipping 
industry, repeatedly renegotiated their relationship during the first decade of TI‘s 
existence, but at the end of it they had agreed a patronage and governance structure that 
would remain in place until the end of the period covered by the thesis. Under this 
structure the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB) paid a key role as patron of 
TI, housing it and providing funds, while the University had an important but smaller 
role, providing little monetary assistance but access to academic networks. One 
important industrial patron in this period was the Liverpool Steamship Owners 
Association (LSOA). They also became involved in 1923, following an appeal to them 
via personal contacts. A key part of this appeal from TI was a promise to provide 
forecasts of meteorological effects for Liverpool port. The main argument of this 
chapter is that TI‘s researchers were able to use their earlier work on predictions and 
storm surges to gain patronage and generate income by producing tidal predictions and 
forecasts of meteorological effects. They also built networks with their patrons, which 
by the mid 1920s were sufficiently strong that even when the meteorological forecasts 
were twice deemed unsuccessful this had no major effect on TI‘s patronage. 
While the first three empirical chapters covered TI and its work fairly widely, chapter 
five focuses on storm surge work. It concentrates on one flooding event in 1928, when 
fourteen people died in central London. The chapter analyses what TI and others did in 
response to this chance event, especially concentrating on TI‘s practices in their 
construction of surges. The chapter also looks at how the 1928 event led to changes in 
the patronage of TI‘s storm surge science, with a move towards local government, away 
 55 
 
from shipping industry patronage. The change of patronage was linked to a change of 
focus towards the forecasting of floods. TI however retained the idea of forecasts as 
corrections to tidal predictions and an emphasis on both increases and decreases in the 
water level, demonstrating the links between their work and the needs of their earlier 
industrial patrons.  
The chapter analyses how TI‘s definition and construction of surges came to dominate 
the scientific report into the event. TI used their work on surges, first to get another 
contract to do further research into them, and then to fulfil their promise to their new 
clients, in part by convincing others to use their definition of surges. This convincing 
was done partly through rhetorical displays of expertise and partly by using established 
and new practices to make a number of surges into calculable objects for themselves 
and the Met Office. A key section of the chapter analyses how TI did this and how they 
constructed (as opposed to defined) surges as residuals. It looks in detail at the practices 
of calculation involved: how tidal gauge records and tidal predictions were made into 
numbers on documents which were in turn transformed into more numbers on other 
documents and eventually into graphs of ‗surges‘ as residuals. This provides a detailed 
example of how TI‘s practices of calculation operated and how they constituted surges 
as calculable in a particular way, in a similar way to how Kalthoff‘s bank constituted risk 
or Lynch‘s scientists made specimens calculable.124 However, I argue that in order to 
make storm surges predictable it was not enough to make them calculable, as 
exemplified by how despite work by both TI and the Met Office the events were still 
deemed unpredictable. 
Chapter six analyses a number of events involving TI‘s storm surge work, especially 
concentrating on discussions regarding patronage from state actors for this work. The 
contested nature of patronage for research into storm surges was further emphasised in 
the decade after the 1928 event, through a dispute between London County Council 
(LCC), the Ministry of Health and the Treasury regarding who should fund proposed 
further research by TI into storm surges. In the end LCC gave in, nearly a decade after 
the event in 1937, and funded the work together with some other local authorities. With 
this the civil state had rejected becoming patron of storm surge science, but almost 
immediately after this, during the early part of the Second World War, the Navy became 
                                               
124 Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation."; Lynch, "The Externalized Retina." 
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interested in TI‘s work. In response to a request from Hydro in 1940 TI, who had 
already begun the research using one particular method, changed tack and produced a 
forecasting formula for the German coast using a different method involving statistics. I 
argue that the Navy‘s demands, together with problems with an earlier method TI had 
experimented with, impacted on the specific practices TI used and the type of formulae 
they constructed. After the war one of TI‘s research workers constructed a forecasting 
formula for Southend outside London, using similar methods to those used on the 
German coast during the war, i.e. statistical, and wrote up the work. To do this TI‘s 
researchers had to make choices regarding how to organise the data – for example 
which typology, theory and formulae to use. Such choices were contingent on many 
things such as the amount of work involved in calculations, the researcher‘s training and 
Hydro‘s request, and impacted on the results TI‘s work produced. I here develop my 
argument that chains of documents did not only connect but also bind.   
 In a curious incident, the report from the LCC work was not printed in the UK, but 
instead appropriated by the US Navy who had a very limited edition printed in the US, 
indicating further naval patronage of TI‘s storm surge work. More generally however, 
TI did not see the dramatic increase in naval patronage following the war that other 
historians of oceanography have reported. While the Navy and other state actors 
increased their patronage of oceanography in the UK too, this increase went to the new 
National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), an organisation led by George Deacon 
(1906-1984) who had worked on wave and swell forecasting for the Navy during the 
war. While Proudman and Doodson had been closely involved in its establishment, I 
argue that NIO represented a different kind of oceanography to that done at TI, which 
fits better into Mills‘s analysis of the development of dynamical physical oceanography. 
Following the contested establishment of NIO TI‘s patronage structure was re-
affirmed, with an increased emphasis on research agreed with MDHB and the 
University. This meant that during the 1950s TI continued more or less as before in 
terms of overall patronage and governance structure. One exception to the general 
continuation of the existing patronage structures was for storm surge work, which saw a 
dramatic increase in state patronage following the major storm surge in 1953. 
Chapter seven, the final empirical chapter, discusses this chance event, the 1953 East 
Coast flood, and the impact it had on storm surge science. The event led to a shift 
towards demand for, and patronage from, state actors for surge science, with generous 
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central government funding given to TI‘s work on forecasting surges. The chapter first 
discusses how and why state actors became patrons, emphasising the contested nature 
of this process. In comparison to most secondary literature on the event I argue that 
there was substantial political pressure on the government from the opposition to 
provide funding and that this, together with the existence of research-supportive 
officers within the land drainage division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, is 
why (parts of) central government became a patron of storm surge science. This 
patronage was in fact seen as a potential long-term saving by Cabinet ministers. 
The new patronage changed the framework within which TI did their work, leading to a 
coming together – or even collision – of different practices, which in turn led to 
questioning of TI‘s practices both by others and themselves. As part of their work, they 
had made particular choices in terms of practices of calculation, in particular how they 
calculated winds. These choices were criticised during a debate in the mid 1950s but 
when TI responded by suggesting they change from statistical practices towards more 
theoretical work they were asked to continue with statistics. After another couple of 
years‘ work TI declared the statistical formulae as good as they could get. Using 
statistics, storm surges were now as predictable as TI thought they would get and TI 
wanted to develop other practices. Through material produced as part of the 
questioning of TI‘s wind calculations I take a last look at TI‘s practices. This pulls 
together various strands of my discussion about TI‘s practices of calculation, again 
emphasising how they through work and choices made chains of documents that were 
shaped in particular ways, and both connected and bound them. When they suggested a 
change away from statistical practices TI was suggesting that new chains of documents 
needed to be constructed to gain further decreases in the difference between predicted 
and observed residuals. They wanted to part-break their earlier chains, changing away 
from statistics but retaining the image of surges as residuals, but this did not happen in 
the 1950s. 
As TI no longer wanted to construct surge forecasting formulae using the statistical 
practices of calculation they had honed since 1919, the end of the 1950s marks the end 
of the thesis. An additional push towards new practices of calculation was Doodson‘s 
retirement, aged 70. That, and the take-over of TI by the University in 1960, ending the 




CHAPTER 2 (1919-20), THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TI: SHIP 
SIZES, WAR AND TIDES  
This chapter outlines the establishment of the Tidal Institute (TI), in particular who 
became a patron of the Institute and why. It sets this in the context both of previous 
work on tides, especially regarding the accuracy of predictions, and debates regarding 
the involvement of state actors in science at the end of the First World War.  While the 
chapter concentrates on the establishment of TI, it also gives an understanding of the 
reasons for TI‘s initial work on storm surges. Today concerns with storm surges are set 
within the context of coastal flooding and climate change, but the initial work on 
meteorological effects on tides at TI was set within wider arguments for increasing the 
‗accuracy‘ of tidal predictions. The chapter also introduces actors that will recur 
throughout the thesis. How, and to what extent, did these different actors – Liverpool 
University, BAAS, Hydro and the shipping industry – become involved with TI? 
In particular, what was the role of state actors in TI‘s establishment? There is debate in 
the literature regarding the links between the state, military and science at the time of 
the First World War. Some writers have argued that the state and military were slow to 
take up and support science, while others argue that it in fact got strongly involved at 
this time. For example, Andrew Hull argues a number of new scientific bodies were 
established with the involvement of the state and the military at the same time that TI 
was set up. In the UK the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) was 
key in this. As well as itself being one of the scientific bodies that were established 
during the war, it set up seven new research stations, such as the Radio Research Board, 
in the period 1917-1920. DSIR also took over the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) 
from the Royal Society and the Geological Survey from the Board of Education, and 
created Co-operative Trade Research Associations.1 Hull sees the creation of these new 
organisations, and the establishment of various military-scientific bodies, such as the 
Board of Invention and Research at the Admiralty, the Munitions Invention 
Department for the Army and the Air Inventions Committee, as evidence for ―a 
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dramatic wartime conversion of the British government to belief in the worth of 
scientific research in war and peace, and a major financial commitment‖.2  Hull is 
arguing against authors such as Guy Hartcup who has claimed that stories of scientific 
and technological success during the First World War were mainly ―relatively simple 
pieces of engineering‖. Hartcup further argued that chemical gas warfare and tanks 
failed to take off because of a ―failure on the part of the ‗user’ to appreciate the 
capabilities and limitations of these new weapons‖, not because of ―technological 
failings‖3. According to Hartcup, the military authorities had been complacent regarding 
R&D pre-war and during the war they were slow to realise the possible contributions of 
science.4  
One reason behind TI was that the First World War had increased the interest in tidal 
matters, as its Secretary, Arthur Doodson (1890-1968), later noted.5 In the introduction 
I discussed how historians of oceanography have found that the First World War led to 
an increased military interest in physical oceanography and hydrography.6 For example, 
the UK Hydrographic Department (Hydro) organised an international conference in 
1919 that led to the creation of the International Hydrographic Bureau in 1921. The 
Bureau was aimed at increasing exchange and standardisation of hydrographic 
information, including tidal data.7 This increase of naval interest in oceanography may 
have provided a supportive environment for something like TI, but does not in itself 
explain its establishment. This chapter will analyse the establishment of TI as a specific 
case study of the debates regarding the role of state patronage of science at the end of 
the First World War. I argue that the question may need to be reformulated. Instead of 
asking if the war led to increased state and military funding of science generally, it may 
                                               
2 Hull, "Passwords to Power", 79. Varcoe provides further support for the idea of a sudden increase in 
activity creating scientific organisations following the First World War. Varcoe, Organizing for Science in 
Britain, 44-46. 
3 Emphasis in original. Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914-18 (London: 
Brassey's, 1988), 193. Other authors who have argued similarly include Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of 
Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); 
Hackmann, Seek & Strike : Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914-54; Roy M. MacLeod 
and E. Kay Andrews, "The Committee of Civil Research: Scientific Advice for Economic Development 
1925–30," Minerva 7, no. 4 (1969). 
4 Hartcup, The War of Invention, 6, 161.  
5 Arthur Doodson, Personal Information File, Royal Society. Doodson will be further introduced in the 
next chapter. 
6 Weir, Ocean in Common; Deacon, "G. Herbert Fowler," 284. 
7 Weir, Ocean in Common; Archibald Day, The Admiralty Hydrographic Service, 1795-1919 (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), 311-312. 
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be more useful to ask whether the war influenced what kinds of scientific work were 
done by different actors.  
On a related note, I also discuss what kind of arguments garnered TI patronage. TI‘s 
founders were able to argue there was a need to increase the accuracy of tidal 
predictions following the war and the recent increase in the size of ships. It was by 
appealing to the needs of state and industry for better tidal predictions that TI received 
patronage, but who exactly was prepared to pay for their work? While state actors 
already had a long history of heavy involvement in tidal science they were not directly 
involved in TI‘s initial establishment and did not provide funding, but did influence TI‘s 
research programme. Instead financial patronage from industry, often not emphasised 
by historians of physical oceanography, was important for TI.  
 
2.1.1 TIDAL WORK BEFORE TI 
The Hydrographic Department had a deep interest in tidal science at the time of TI‘s 
establishment, as they had had at least since the early nineteenth century when Michael 
Reidy describes them as ―the research and development wing of the British Admiralty‖. 
Reidy emphasises the close links between tidal research, the demands of merchant 
shipping and the military demands of the Admiralty in the early nineteenth century, 
arguing that tidal research enabled the British commercial and military empire to control 
the seas.8 From 1833 onwards the Admiralty organised the collection of tidal gauge data 
and published tide tables, but the calculation of the tide tables were done by outside 
contractors.9 The Admiralty continued to publish tide tables and be involved with tidal 
science throughout the rest of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.10  
Those who calculated the tide tables Hydro and others published used different 
methods. One method, the synthetic one, had been developed with support from 
BAAS in the 1820s and 30s.11  William Thomson (Lord Kelvin, 1824-1907) and the 
American William Ferrel (1817-1891) then independently developed the harmonic 
                                               
8 Reidy, Tides of History, 140. See also Hughes, "A Study in the Development of Primitive and Modern 
Tide Tables". 
9 Reidy, Tides of History, 116; Day, The Admiralty Hydrographic Service, 1795-1919 47. 
10 Day, The Admiralty Hydrographic Service, 1795-1919  
11 Reidy, Tides of History; Hughes, "A Study in the Development of Primitive and Modern Tide Tables". 
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method of tidal analysis and prediction in the 1860s. Thomson‘s work was done as part 
of a BAAS committee and expenses were paid by BAAS. The harmonic method was 
further developed by George Howard Darwin (1845-1912) in the 1880s, again with 
support from BAAS.12 The BAAS thus had a tradition of supporting research into tidal 
predictions. 
Darwin‘s version of the harmonic method of tidal analysis and prediction was critically 
revised by TI‘s researchers and it will therefore be described in a little more detail. In a 
book which was based on his Lowell Lectures in Boston in 1897,13 he explained the idea 
behind the harmonic method of tidal predictions: ―The analysis of tidal observations 
consists in the dissection of the aggregate tide-wave into its constituent partial waves, 
and prediction involves the recomposition or synthesis of those waves‖.14 This synthesis 
could either be done by hand or by using a mechanical computer called a tidal predictor.  
By analysing the tide-creating forces, or potential, of the moon and the sun, Darwin 
produced lists of astronomical constituents for a BAAS report in 1883. Such 
astronomical constituents represent the influence of different aspects of lunar and solar 
motion on the tides. Each constituent has an angular speed (related to its period and 
frequency) and an amplitude. Darwin also listed a number of other tidal constituents, 
related to non-astronomical influences on the tides, such as the effects on the tidal wave 
of shallow water. The depth of the water impacts the height of tides in many places 
including on the German coast and in estuaries such as the Thames or Mersey.  
Howevever, while he detailed these he also stated that he did not consider it necessary 
to analyse for other than the astronomical constituents and a few non-astronomical 
constituents of the particular type called compound tides to account for the periodic 
tides. His summary schedule of constituents included six compound tides out of 36 
possible.15 
                                               
12 Hughes, "A Study in the Development of Primitive and Modern Tide Tables"; Cartwright, Tides. 
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14 George Howard Darwin, The Tides and Kindred Phenomena in the Solar System: The Substance of Lectures 
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15 George Howard Darwin, "Report of a Committee for the Harmonic Analysis of Tidal Observations," 
in Report of the Fifty-Third Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Southport - 1833, 
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Darwin discussed the ‗correctness‘ of such harmonic tidal predictions, admitting that 
the weather often caused problems:  
The utmost that can be expected of a tide-table is that it shall be correct in calm 
weather and with a steady barometer. But such conditions are practically non-
existent, and in the North Atlantic the great variability in the meteorological 
elements renders tidal prediction somewhat uncertain.16  
Though he said the effect of barometric pressure was well known, with an inch change 
in mercury being equal to a change of sea level of just more than a foot, and winds 
known to be a major cause of errors to tidal predictions, Darwin did not think 
meteorological effects could be predicted. He did not believe forecasting formulae for 
meteorological effects could be developed.17  
Despite these problems Darwin believed harmonic theory produced successful, ‗good 
enough‘, predictions and that this was evidence it was a true theory for the tides: 
―Prediction must inevitably fail, unless we have lighted on the true causes of the 
phenomena; success is therefore a guarantee of the truth of the theory‖.18 He claimed 
that the set of constituents his schedule for harmonic analysis produced ―contain a 
complete record of the behaviour of the sea at the place in question‖.19 To Darwin, wind 
and barometric pressure was a source of error to otherwise trustworthy predictions. He 
drew a sharp line between these meteorological effects and ordinary ‗true‘ periodic tides, 
which he thought his theory and methods adequately captured and could predict 
accurately.  
Methods of predicting tides were further developed by staff at Hydro before and during 
the First World War. In 1912 a full-time tidal officer, Commander Harold Dreyer 
Warburg (1878-1947), was appointed by Hydro. Warburg had entered the Navy in 1894, 
concentrating on surveying from ships from 1899 until his eyesight stopped him doing 
this work in 1910, when he began office-based work, soon concentrating on tides.20 
Following his work on prediction methods, computation of some non-harmonic tide 
                                               
16 Darwin, The Tides and Kindred Phenomena in the Solar System, 219.  
17 Ibid., 220.  
18 Ibid., 225-226.  
19 My emphasis. Ibid., 199.  
20 J. F. Parry, "Meeting for the Discussion of Geophysical Subjects, Wednesday, 1918 June 12," The 
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tables was taken in-house, with an additional computer hired, though Hydro continued 
to have harmonic predictions for waters further afield, especially diurnal (once-daily) 
tides, done by outside contractors.21 In 1917 Warburg was appointed Superintendent of 
Tidal Work.22  
Hydro outsourced harmonic predictions as these were done using special tidal predictor 
machines and the department did not have one. Together with others William Thomson 
had developed these predictor machines, see figure 2.1 for an example. They are a form 
of mechanical analogue computers, or a type of automatic integrating machine.23 The 
machines added together the previously found harmonic constituents for a particular 
port to produce a prediction.24 Thomson had a bitter dispute with one of his 
collaborators, Mr E Roberts, regarding who should be considered the inventor of tidal 
predictors.25 In the end Mr Roberts built his own tidal predictor machine, and 
established a business in Broadstairs producing tidal predictions. This business was later 
taken over by his son and continued to provide the Admiralty with predictions. At the 
end of the First World War the two outside contractors Hydro used was this company, 
Messrs. Roberts & Son, and the NPL which had another machine.26 
                                               
21 Day, The Admiralty Hydrographic Service, 1795-1919 257. 
22 Ibid., 325-326. 
23 James S. Small, The Analogue Alternative: The Electronic Analogue Computer in Britain and the USA, 1930-1975 
(2001); Michael R. Williams, A History of Computing Technology (London: Prentice-Hall, 1985); Crosbie 
Smith and M. Norton Wise, Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of Lord Kelvin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 370-371; Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Tide-Predicting Machines," Nature 118, no. 
27 November (1926). 
24 For more on the operation and invention of tidal predictor machines, see Hughes, "A Study in the 
Development of Primitive and Modern Tide Tables"; Cartwright, Tides. 
25 Described in detail in Hughes, "A Study in the Development of Primitive and Modern Tide Tables", ch 
9. 




Figure 2.1: A Kelvin tidal predictor, used by TI from 192427  
 
The following, written by Warburg in 1921, describes in a somewhat idealised manner 
how Messrs. Roberts & Son went about producing predictions: 
A staff of two is permanently employed: (a) a man of great age (Mr. Roberts 
says 80) who is the computer, that is to say he carries out all the hack work of 
computing harmonic constants, and (b) a girl who reads times and heights from 
the machine curves. Mr. Roberts states that he always works the machine 
himself, checks both computations and curve readings personally, and 
personally calculates the harmonic constants from the computer‘s results. ....  
The staff employed are certainly highly expert and efficient and the general 
methods leave but a few loopholes for errors. Each machine curve is checked 
by means of 5 computed heights (the National Physical Laboratory checked 
each by 2 only); the times and heights are written on the curves themselves and 
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printed proofs checked from the curves, and in fact it is difficult to see how 
methods could be improved, but the work proceeds with such rapidity that 
errors undoubtedly do occur. 
Mr. Roberts has reduced actual work to the lowest possible limit; for instance in 
the computation of constants much division is required – he has his own M.S. 
Tables for dividing any numbers with any other; these are complete tables, i.e. 
they give the required result without interpolation of any sort; it is only by 
shortening work in this way he can get on with so small a staff. 
He employs no calculating machines, stating that an expert computer with the 
necessary tables is both quicker and more accurate than any machine.28  
In this description Warburg emphasised the practices of calculation used at Messrs. 
Roberts, such as how they checked and simplified the work to increase accuracy and 
efficiency. While Warburg was positive regarding these practices, he also claimed that 
the speed with which the work was done led to errors. This high speed was necessary 
for the company to make a profit. 
Hydro‘s interest in tides and tidal research further increased during the First World War, 
as the war stopped the earlier exchange of tidal predictions between different countries, 
including between Germany and England. To substitute for these Warburg had first 
tried what he called the ―scientific‖ harmonic method, but had found it 
―unsatisfactory‖, giving large differences between predicted and observed tides for the 
North Sea ports that were crucial for the war. Instead he had invented a ―rough 
unscientific method‖ to predict these tides which he claimed ―gave good results‖.29 
War-induced needs had led Warburg to identify problems with the harmonic method, 
arguing that it was not producing ‗good enough‘ predictions, in opposition to what 
Darwin had claimed at the end of the nineteenth century. He argued further work in 
this area was necessary, implicitly arguing for further funding. 
Since the first half of the nineteenth century there had been close links between military, 
industry and science regarding tidal work. In the early twentieth century such links 
                                               
28 ―Methods, staff, etc.‖, part of Minute from Warburg to Hydrographer, 28 Sep 1921, in HYD 
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29 Parry, "Discussion of Geophysical Subjects," 286. 
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existed between Hydro, NPL (run by the Royal Society for much of this period), 
Messrs. Roberts & Son and also the users of predictions, both naval and merchant 
shipping. The state, in the form of Hydro, was heavily involved in the calculation of 
tidal predictions and had been so since the nineteenth century, both doing ‗routine‘ 
work and research, but so were industry and scientists. In addition, regarding tidal 
predictions Hydro had its own R&D programme in the form of Warburg‘s work, which 
forms a case study against to those who argue the military did not take scientific 
research seriously before and during the First World War. 
 
2.1.2 HOW TO JUDGE THE ACCURACY OF A TIDAL PREDICTION? 
The (insufficient) accuracy of tidal predictions was identified as an important issue at 
the end of the First World War by Hydro. In February 1919 Warburg gave a detailed 
technical presentation of his new methods for predicting tides to the Royal 
Geographical Society. In this he emphasised that while the number of tidal predictions 
published by the Admiralty had increased radically between 1833 and 1912 ―there had 
been no corresponding increase in accuracy‖ though ―the increase in size, speed and 
draft of vessels‖ had made a higher accuracy desirable well before the war, which he 
claimed was why he had begun work on it.30 During the discussion of Warburg‘s paper, 
Hydrographer Parry emphasised the importance of accurate tidal predictions to seamen. 
He stated that during the recent war the laying of mines, the avoiding of torpedoes and 
the rapid movement of ships had relied on tidal predictions: ―if a vessel is being chased, 
it may be a question of life or death to her to be able to decide whether she may cross 
over a shoal or not [i.e. decide what the depth of the water is, influenced by the tide], 
and the disadvantage of not being able to cross and having to go round the shoal is 
obvious to us all‖.31  
Earlier Darwin had judged harmonic tidal predictions to be accurate, but now Hydro 
said they were not sufficiently accurate. In one sense judging the accuracy of tidal 
predictions was a ‗simple‘ comparison between the predicted and observed tide in a 
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particular location at a particular time. However, this comparison was of course far 
from simple. While tides are continuous, tidal predictions of times and height were 
usually given only for high and possibly low water.32 These times and heights were thus 
the numbers whose ‗accuracy‘ was at stake when talking about the accuracy of tidal 
predictions,33 but Warburg pointed out that for seamen it was more important that the 
time of high water was accurate than the height.34 In his paper Warburg spent 
considerable time defining what he meant by accuracy as ―[t]he proper judging of the 
accuracy of tidal predictions is not a simple matter‖.35 In the end he developed point-
scoring system for predictions, so that those closest to measured records got the highest 
scores, and produced percentage measures of the degree of accuracy of tidal 
predictions. He claimed this showed that his new equation method of predicting tides 
produced more accurate predictions than the method usually used by the Hydrographic 
Department.36  
To increase accuracy was to reduce the difference between observed and predicted 
times and heights of high and low waters. However, judging what this difference was 
involved complex comparisons and judgements of tidal gauge records and predictions. 
Firstly, the accuracy of tidal gauge records compared to actual sea levels was by no 
means assured, as there could be measurement errors, for example if the gauge‘s clock 
was wrong, or issues with where and how the gauge had been placed – one part of a 
port might have a different tidal pattern to another – or there might be problems with 
deciding the datum.37 Even if the tidal gauge record was deemed to represent sea levels 
at a chosen place closely enough, these records included meteorological effects, which 
tidal predictions made no pretence of including, so to judge the accuracy of the 
predictions in comparisons with the records it was necessary to take meteorological 
                                               
32 See e.g. Harbour Regulations and Tide Tables from Januarly to December, 1911, for the Port of Lagos, Southern 
Nigeria,  (Lagos: Government Printer, 1910). 
33 Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Report on Harmonic Prediction of Tides," in Report of the Eighty-Eighth 
Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Cardiff - 1920, August 24-28 (London: John 
Murray, Albemarle Street, 1920), 321-322.  
34 Warburg, "The Admiralty Tide Tables and North Sea Tidal Predictions," 310. 
35 Ibid.: 311. 
36 Warburg 1919. Warburg seems to use the term ‗degree of accuracy‘ as a quantitative term for the 
accuracy of a large number of predictions whereas he uses the term ‗accuracy‘ in general discussion and 
when talking about one specific prediction, compare Gooday, The Morals of Measurement, 57. 
37 For an example of such problems, see Shankland to Doodson, 22nd May 1928, Box 16, BA 
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effects out of the records.38 However, the difficulties in calculating what the 
meteorological effect were made it difficult to take them out of the records. Warburg 
had identified this as a key problem, but had not had time to work on it, so had instead 
chosen to assess the accuracy of the predictions during the summer, when 
meteorological effects should be smaller.39 
Secondly, the accuracy of predictions by themselves was another issue, both analysing 
for constants and calculating predictions using such constants. Predictions were 
connected to observations through the process of analysing tidal gauge records for the 
constituents that were used in the predictions – if the observations were poor the results 
of the analysis would also be poor. In addition, choices during the process of analysis, 
such as how many or which constituents to analyse for, could impact on the 
predictions. Another issue was that only a limited number of the potentially very large 
number of harmonic constituents found could be included in machine calculations, as 
tidal predictors were physically limited in terms of the number of constituents they 
could be set to include. Even if the fullest practicable harmonic development of tides 
was used, there were non-harmonic aspects of the tides that a standard harmonic 
prediction did not necessarily include, such as further shallow water effects. 40 The 
analysis and predictions also relied on complicated calculations that needed not only to 
follow the latest theory of how to calculate tidal predictions but also to follow 
mathematical rules without mistakes.41 The use of tidal predictor machines introduced 
potential calculation errors which needed to be accounted for when gauging the 
accuracy of predictions.42 Warburg pointed out that harmonic predictions produced by 
different people using the same constants differed substantially, linking this to such 
machine errors.43 
                                               
38 Emphasis added. Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: First Annual Report, 1920 (Liverpool: 
University of Liverpool, 1920), 7-8. 
39 Warburg, "The Admiralty Tide Tables and North Sea Tidal Predictions." 
40 Emphasis added. Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: First Annual Report, 1920, 7-8. 
41 This immediately raises issues of rule-following, which is philosophically problematic – how to know 
that the rules have been applied correctly is not necessarily obvious, even if we can decide what the rules 
are. See Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory," 313-316; Harry M. Collins, Changing Order : Replication and 
Induction in Scientific Practice, 2nd ed. (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
42 See folder ―Machine tests‖, Box 126, BA and Arthur Thomas Doodson, "To Assist Works on the 
Tides," in Report of the Eighty-Ninth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Edinburgh - 
1921 September 7-14 (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1922), 243.  
43 Warburg, "The Admiralty Tide Tables and North Sea Tidal Predictions," 310. 
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As Graeme Gooday has emphasised, judgements of measurement accuracy depended 
on many different issues and varied over time and situation.44 The same held for 
judgements of the accuracy of tidal predictions. While Darwin considered that his 
harmonic method produced accurate predictions at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Hydro did not think so at the end of the First World War. In addition there were 
multiple judgements and issues, such as regarding the accuracy of observations 
including meteorological effects, involved in this matter. The accuracy of 
measurements, calculations and predictions were all connected together and what the 
necessary accuracy was or what accuracy meant was often left vague. This meant that 
talk of and work on the accuracy of predictions could easily be used for rhetorical 
purposes, such as when Warburg argued for further work in this area during his 
presentations.  
 
2.1.3 PROUDMAN’S CAREER BEFORE TI 
Warburg was not the only new tidal researcher in the 1910s. Another was Joseph 
Proudman (1888-1975), who later became TI‘s Director. His father was a farm bailiff 
and tenant farmer in Bold, between Widnes and St Helens (in Merseyside), and he 
himself was a pupil teacher between 1902 and 1907 in nearby schools. As he was not 
from a privileged background he needed to earn a living through his scientific work. In 
1907 he became a scholarship student of Mathematics at the University of Liverpool 
where he gained the B.Sc. in 1909 and B.Sc. Honours in 1910. Again as a scholarship 
student he then went to Trinity College, Cambridge, to study pure and applied 
mathematics. After passing the Mathematical Tripos in 1912, with distinction and first 
class grades in the final exam, he spent a third year at Cambridge doing research. This is 
when he became interested in tides.45 Proudman later described how he went to 
Cambridge with a view to do research on electricity and chose courses accordingly. 
However, after he had sat his exams he claims he could not, despite talking to a number 
of mathematicians in Cambridge, including Joseph Larmor, find anyone who could give 
him the ―definite problem‖ he felt he needed. His Director of Studies eventually 
                                               
44 Gooday, The Morals of Measurement, 268. 
45 This was a couple of years after the nineteenth-century Wrangler system had been abandoned in 1909. 
Warwick, Masters of Theory, 284-285. 
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recommended that Proudman write to Horace Lamb (1849-1934), Professor of 
Mathematics at Victoria University of Manchester, who ―[b]y return of post‖ sent him a 
problem in the theory of tides Proudman deemed suitable.46 As part of his work on 
hydrodynamics Lamb had worked on the mathematical theory of tides and other types 
of oceanic waves such as tsunamis.47 After this Proudman‘s research career centred on 
the dynamical theory of tides.  
After his student years in Cambridge, in 1913, Proudman took up a post as lecturer in 
mathematics at Liverpool University. He continued to teach at Liverpool when in 1915 
he became a Fellow of Trinity College, spending summers in Cambridge. During most 
of the First World War Proudman remained at Liverpool due to ―being placed in a low 
medical category‖ but, on top of the tidal work, he also worked on ballistics at the 
Research Department of Woolwich Arsenal for the last half of 1918.48 His health 
problems may have been due to recurrent psychological issues rather than physical 
problems, as two later episodes of what was called exhaustion, nervousness and 
insomnia have been recorded.49 At Woolwich he produced a paper on ―the gyroscopic 
dirft [sic] of a shell‖. He had also worked with Thomas Bertrand Abell (Professor of 
Naval Architecture), who in turn worked with the Admiralty.50 Proudman thus had 
some personal networks with the military world. 
Much of TI‘s mathematical research was based in a tradition of mathematical physics 
rooted at Cambridge,51 in particular the development there of Laplace‘s work on the 
hydrodynamic theory of long waves. TI‘s statistical work on forecasting storm surges 
was complemented by work in this tradition, for example developing solutions to 
related dynamical problems for simplified basins.52 Proudman was TI‘s main 
practitioner of this hydrodynamical work and their link to the Laplacian tradition. How 
did he acquire the skills to operate in this tradition? He claims to have ―felt no need‖ 
                                               
46 Joseph Proudman Biographical lecture D 212/2, LUA 
47 A. E. H. Love and R. T. Glazebrook, "Sir Horace Lamb. 1849-1934," Obituary Notices of Fellows of the 
Royal Society 1, no. 4 (1935). 
48 Joseph Proudman, Personal Records of Fellows of the Royal Society, Royal Society Archive, 8.2 
49 In summer 1932 he was given leave for exhaustion and nervousness, see documents in D/BO 1/5/1, 
MMM – North Street. In 1951 Doodson mentioned to Hydrographer Day that Proudman ―is troubled 
with insomnia, is not allowed to see anyone and has just received a term‘s leave of absence.‖ Doodson to 
Day, 2nd Feb 1951, D/BO 1/4/17, MMM – North Street. 
50 University Council Report book, 1918, S2466, LUA 
51 Warwick, Masters of Theory. 
52 See e.g. Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Meteorological Perturbations of Sea-Level and Tides," Geophysical 
Journal International 1, no. s4 (1924). 
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for coaching, nor for tutorial classes, once at Cambridge, instead claiming lectures and 
working out of examples were ―completely satisfactory‖ for him and his teachers.53 This 
partly reflects the changes the Cambridge mathematics course was undergoing at the 
time of Proudman's attendance. Following the reforms to the Mathematical Tripos in 
1909 fewer used private coaches and the subjects students were choosing were 
changing, away from the earlier emphasis on the solution of physical problem.54 
However, it also indicates that he had already acquired some of the skills necessary to 
pass the Cambridge mathematics exams successfully before arriving at the university.  
In addition, Proudman seems to have been torn between the ‗old‘ and ‗new‘ Cambridge 
styles, claiming to have learnt most from RA Herman, whom he described as ―of the 
old Cambridge school‖ and whom Andrew Warwick calls a leading coach.55 However, 
he also claims that he was ―much attracted‖ to the kind of mathematics practiced by 
Littlewood and Hardy, whom he called ―pure mathematicians of a new type in 
England‖ whose work Warwick suggests attracted many students under the new 
examination system. 56 Yet, when Proudman failed to find an attractive problem in 
electricity, he turned back to physically related problems solving in the tradition of 
mathematical physics. 
While Warwick discusses how former wranglers turned public school teachers were 
important in preparing students for the Cambridge Tripos in the nineteenth century, 
Proudman did not go to public school.57 However, Warwick also mentions that 
Ebenezer Cunningham and Harry Bateman, both Cambridge-trained mathematicians, 
were holding junior lectureships in mathematics at Liverpool University at about the 
same time Proudman was a student there.58 Proudman describes his undergraduate 
teaching at Liverpool as including ―work[ing] out vast quantities of examples‖ set, 
                                               
53 Joseph Proudman Biographical lecture D 212/2, LUA 
54 Warwick, Masters of Theory, 280-285; Andrew Warwick, "Cambridge Mathematics and Cavendish 
Physics: Cunningham, Campbell and Einstein's Relativity 1905-1911 Part II: Comparing Traditions in 
Cambridge Physics," Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24, no. 1 (1993): 2-3. Proudman 
claimed many were still using coaches when he attended Cambridge. 
55 Warwick, Masters of Theory, 283. Joseph Proudman Biographical lecture D 212/2, LUA 
56 Ibid., 434. Joseph Proudman Biographical lecture D 212/2, LUA 
57 Ibid., ch 5. 
58 Warwick, "Cambridge Mathematics and Cavendish Physics: Cunningham, Campbell and Einstein's 
Relativity 1905-1911 Part I: The Uses of Theory," 639 & 644. 
 72 
 
corrected and criticised by his lecturers, all of which had been wranglers.59 This indicates 
that he was developing some of the specific problem solving and learning skills used by 
Cambridge mathematicians while he was at Liverpool University, taught by former 
wranglers, much like the public school students discussed by Warwick. Further 
investigations of how, and the extent to which, teaching methods first developed at 
Cambridge spread to mathematics departments at other universities in Britain when 
wranglers lectured there is something that could extend Warwick‘s thesis regarding how 
mathematical teaching methods have travelled.  
 
2.2.1 THE LIVERPOOL SETTING: THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND THE 
UNIVERSITY 
Both Liverpool University and the Liverpool shipping industry were involved in the 
establishment of TI. Their interests in TI and tidal work are introduced here, beginning 
with the shipping industry. When TI was established in 1919 the shipping man Alfred 
Booth gave £350 per year towards payment of the salary for the Secretary of TI while 
his brother Charles Booth, also a shipping man, gave £50 per year towards working 
expenses, both for five years.60 This was the core of the early TI‘s funding, but why did 
these shipping men provide funding for tidal science? No direct evidence of why the 
Booths decided to fund TI appears to exist, so this section attempts to find a more 
contextual answer.61 I argue that the Booths were part of a modernising faction of the 
Liverpool shipping community who owned and managed ever-larger ocean liners, had 
links with university science as well as the state and were keen on increasing the 
throughput of the port, spurred on by the First World War. 
The Booth brothers, Charles (1868-1938) and Alfred (1872-1948), had obvious and 
direct interests in the success of shipping, particularly in Liverpool, with Charles being 
chairman of the Booth Steamship Company and Alfred chairman of the Cunard 
Steamship Company, but also more generally. Alfred Booth had studied Mathematics at 
King‘s College, Cambridge, graduating in 1894. He did not come very high in the order 
                                               
59 Joseph Proudman Biographical lecture D 212/2, LUA. The Professor, FS Carey, had been third 
wrangler about 1880 and another lecturer, James Mercer, was senior wrangler in 1905, according to 
Proudman. 
60 Gift book 1 Oct 1903-Sep 1912, Feb 1919, S81, LUA 
61 See note 97, this chapter, for references regarding TI‘s establishment 
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of merit at shared 29th position in Part I, but his mathematical training gave him a 
chance of understanding what Proudman‘s work was about and the proposed research 
TI would do.62 He had been Chairman of the Board of Trade Committee on the 
Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries and member of Lord Balfour‘s Committee on 
Commercial and Industrial Policy in 1916, so was involved in national politics.63 Charles 
Booth was similarly involved in a range of organisations and companies. Crucially he 
was on the University Council for many years, forming a link between the shipping 
world and the university. He was also involved in port-related organisations, as 
Chairman of the Employers Association of the Port of Liverpool (1919-1938) and later 
a member of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (1924-1938).64  
Another of TI‘s industrial patrons was the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB), 
a large organisation heavily dominated by shipping interests that had run Liverpool port 
since 1858.65 From 1920 MDHB were represented on the governing committee of TI, 
and thus another of TI‘s patrons which became gradually more and more important 
during the first decade of its existence. MDHB had had a long-standing interest in tides 
and their prediction, as evidenced by the existence of committee papers on tidal 
matters, for example discussing several investigations into differences in tide tables 
produced by different organisations.66 MDHB was interested in tides as the height of 
the tides determined when ships of different sizes could access the port.67 As the size of 
ships increased with the introduction of ever-bigger ocean liners before the war this 
became more and more of an issue. Table 2.1 shows the increase in tonnage per vessel 
from 375 tonnes per vessel in 1880 to 996 tonnes in 1919, indicating that ships became 
larger. New docks, able to cope with ships with 34 foots draught, were said to be 
needed by companies running passenger and cargo ocean liners, as the current docks 
                                               
62 Cambridge University Reporter, 29th May 1894, p 846, and 12th Jun 1894, p 904. He does not appear to 
have sat the Part II exam, which only the more advanced students sat after another years work, see 
Warwick, Masters of Theory, 267-268.  
63 REGISS database, "Who's Who - 1897-1998." 
64 Ibid. 
65 The Board had 28 members, 24 of whom were elected by users of the Docks (so primarily shipping 
men) and 4 were nominated by the Mersey Conservancy Commissioners. Stuart Mountfield, Western 
Gateway : A History of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1965). 
66 MDHB WUP T111 ―Liverpool Tide Tables,‖ Liverpool Maritime Museum Archive 
67 James N. Shoolbred, "The Tidal Regime of the River Mersey, as Affected by the Recent Dredgings at 
the Bar in Liverpool Bay," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical 
and Physical Character 78, no. 523 (1906). 
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could not deal with ships with such draughts.68 In response to such demands for larger 
and deeper docks with wider entrances and other facilities, the Docks Board organised 
new dock facilities and ‗improvements‘ to the Mersey, including ‗training banks‘ to 
control the channels of the river and dredging in the Edwardian period.69 Another 
concern was that such work could lead to changes in the tides.70  
A key factor behind industrial demands for increasing accuracy of tidal predictions was 
thus the increasing size of ships with the introduction of ocean liners. Another was the 
First World War, as it led to a large increase in ships using Liverpool docks which 
created congestion, labour shortages and raised costs. In 1915 the Liverpool Committee 
for the Co-ordination of the Naval, Civil & Military Requirements of the Port was 
established by central government in 1915, to reduce the congestion of the port as this 
was said to be important for the war effort. It had representation from a range of 
interests, including not only the ship-owners of MDHB but also the Navy, labour, 
railways and others, and was chaired by Alfred Booth.71 Initially the MDHB criticised 
this new committee,72 but according to Francis Hyde, an economic historian of the port, 
―measures were taken as a result of the war to improve efficiency [i.e. increase the port‘s 
throughput]‖, so the MDHB‘s initial resistance was overcome.73 At the time of TI‘s 
establishment the Liverpool shipping industry was divided into factions. MDHB has 
been characterised by Adrian Jarvis as having a ―cosy environment, high average age 
and a low turnover of members‖ at this time, which he claims led to poor policy making 
and poor performance monitoring, including some spectacular overspends on poorly 
managed projects.74  
 
 
                                               
68 Mountfield, Western Gateway, 140. 
69 Ibid., 105-109,115-125. 
70 Shoolbred, "The Tidal Regime of the River Mersey, as Affected by the Recent Dredgings at the Bar in 
Liverpool Bay." 
71 Tidal predictions does not seem to have been considered by the committee.  D42/C1/1/18, Liverpool 
Committee for the Co-ordination of the Naval, Military and Civil Requirements of the Port, LUA. 
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72 Ibid. 
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1880 20,070 7,524,533 375 
1881 20,249 7,893,948 390 
1882 20,966 8,104,136 387 
1883 21,315 8,527,531 400 
1884 23,940 8,800,362 368 
1885 21,529 8,571,454 398 
1886 20,598 8,370,723 406 
1887 21,884 8,797,783 402 
1888 22,241 9,017,935 405 
1889 22,662 9,291,964 410 
1890 23,633 9,654,006 408 
1891 22,775 9,772,506 429 
1892 22,304 9,968,697 447 
1893 21,206 9,468,539 447 
1894 21,170 9,960,902 471 
1895 23,943 10,777,146 450 
1896 23,695 11,046,459 466 
1897 23,640 11,473,421 485 
1898 24,664 11,815,376 479 
1899 25,522 12,534,116 491 
1900 24,870 12,380,917 498 
1901 24,334 12,648,539 520 
1902 24,214 13,308,305 550 
1903 24,827 14,537,751 586 
1904 25,400 15,626,241 615 
1905 26,065 15,996,387 614 
1906 25,773 16,147,856 627 
1907 25,635 17,064,211 666 
1908 25,739 17,111,814 665 
1909 24,799 16,747,479 675 
1910 24,961 16,654,071 667 
1911 25,377 17,600,888 694 
1912 23,483 17,327,415 738 
1913 24,982 18,433,269 738 
1914 24,756 19,086,672 771 
1915 22,562 18,980,913 841 
1916 18,742 15,679,943 837 
1917 16,747 14,018,652 837 
1918 11,855 11,687,204 986 
1919 12,372 12,324,010 996 
1920 17,115 16,521,373 965 
Table 2.1: The total number of vessels and the total tonnage for which MDHB were paid rates, the ratio of 
which shows the increase in tonnage by vessel between 1880 and 192075 
 
                                               
75 Mountfield, Western Gateway, Appendix IV. 
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There was conflict between the traditionalist MDHB and the modernising war 
committee, led by Alfred Booth, during the First World War. The modernisers appear 
to have won out, leading to the ‗efficiency drive‘ identified by Hyde, which was 
continued after the war. It led not only to further attempts to cater for larger ships, e.g. 
through building works to widen the entrance to the Alfred Docks, but also to changes 
in the management of MDHB, such as its financial routines.76 This efficiency drive 
coupled with the longer term trend of increasingly larger ships and a tradition of 
donations to the university seems the most likely reason why the Booths funded TI. 
Within such an efficiency drive funding research on improving tidal predictions would 
have made sense as it was supposed to help reduce accidents, such as ships grounding 
due to lower than expected tides, and also increase throughput, as water depths would 
be known – supposedly – with more certainty, so shipping could be allowed to enter 
and leave for longer. As we will see below and in the next two chapters, in funding 
applications TI repeatedly argued that ‗inaccurate‘ tidal predictions caused dangers, 
delays and expense for shipping, which their work could fix.77  
 
2.2.2 LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY 
The University formally established the new TI, and is thus an important patron for the 
Institute, but provided very little funding. TI was not unusual in being hosted by the 
University but funded by local shipping industry, as the University‘s own history of 
patronage shows. Throughout the University‘s history it had relied heavily on local 
industry, especially shipping, for funding; a common pattern for English provincial 
universities at this time. When Liverpool University College was set up in 1881 much of 
the funding came from local subscribers, including £6230 by ship owners towards a 
chair of Mathematics.78 As funding from other sources increased, the proportion from 
industry decreased, but the shipping industry and traders continued to contribute 
significant sums, for example to establish the School of Tropical Medicine in 1899 
(supported by amongst others the Booth Line, which traded with Brazil), and a chair in 
                                               
76 Ibid., 136-146. 
77 LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, (illegible date) April 1923, Vol 29, D/SS/2/4, MMM 
78 Thomas Kelly, For Advancement of Learning : The University of Liverpool, 1881-1981 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1981), 48-49. In 1884 the college joined Victoria University and then in 1903 Liverpool 
became an independent University. 
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Naval Architecture in 1909.79 Much research work was done for the shipping industry, 
e.g. on using cement in waterwork construction, cold storage machinery and marine 
propulsion using internal combustion engines.80  
Donations from the shipping industry to the university continued during and after the 
First World War. For example, in 1920 ship-owners and industrialists endowed four 
chairs in engineering.81 Though not directly from the shipping industry, one of the war-
time donations is of particular interest due to its links to TI‘s work. In 1919 a 
Department of Oceanography was created, endowed by Natural History Professor 
Herdman and his wife. Biological oceanography had existed at the University since the 
1880s with a marine biology station established in 1887 and moved to Port Erin, Isle of 
Man, in 1892, when a Fisheries Laboratory also became part of the Natural History 
department.82 Herdman had successfully argued that this research was important for the 
fishing industry and got monetary support from local industry as well as government for 
this ―applied biology‖.83 The Department of Oceanography initially concentrated on 
biological oceanography, so was not in direct competition with TI‘s mathematically-
based physical oceanography. Its establishment was mainly Herdman‘s way of leaving a 
legacy but also seems to be part of the general increase in interest in oceanography 
following the war, which TI was similarly part of. If there was any competition between 
the Herdmans‘s Department of Oceanography and Proudman‘s TI this has not left any 
traces in the sources.  
Given this context of constant and repeated donations by shipping men to the 
university, it is not surprising that industrial patronage was important to TI, despite the 
lack of comparators within history of oceanography. However, we now turn to how it 
came to be that TI was founded through a benefaction from shipping men such as the 
Booth brothers, because this was not the initial plan. 
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82 Ibid., 72-73. 
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2.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TI: THE BAAS CONNECTION  
During the First World War a large BAAS committee of senior scientists under section 
A (Mathematics and Physics) set up a survey of the state of geodetic research, in part 
they said to keep alive scientific interest in geophysics following George Howard 
Darwin‘s death.84 The committee argued that a Geodetic Institute, covering geodesy, 
seismology, terrestrial magnetism and tides, was necessary and would give much useful 
help to the state. They also argued that there existed no specialised research institution 
for work on these topics and, critically, no British institution that could provide 
scientific advice to government on these topics.85 The arguments for the proposed 
Geodetic Institute are likely to have been part of the wider agenda to increase the links 
between science, military and government, which has been identified at BAAS and 
elsewhere in relation to the establishment of DSIR,86 and  the emphasis within BAAS to 
use science for ―national efficiency‖.87 These BAAS scientists were arguing for increased 
funding for theoretical geodetic research by framing their proposed institute as assisting 
the state. 
These arguments can be exemplified by the tidal survey. As part of the wider BAAS 
survey Horace Lamb prepared a report on the current state of research on tides. Lamb 
asked Proudman, his protégé, to help with the report.88  However, their report to the 
BAAS concentrated on academic aspects of tidal science. It claimed that though existing 
tide-tables were ‗sufficiently accurate‘ for practical needs, ‗improved‘ predictions of 
                                               
84 The non-tidal members of the committee were astronomer Frank Watson Dyson, who chaired it, 
physicist Charles Chree (who reported on magnetic observations), Charles F Close (Director General of 
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The British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1831-1981, ed. Roy M. MacLeod and Peter Collins 
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periodic tides were needed to further theoretical research on the dynamic theory of 
tides. One issue was uncertainties in the harmonic constants for long-period periodic 
tides which were due to ―meteorological disturbances‖.89 In other words, storm surges 
needed to be analysed so they could be separated from periodic tides, which in turn 
would lead to improvements of the general (Laplacian) theory of tides. The report did 
not mention such improvements as being linked to improvements in predictions as 
published by the Admiralty. Overall this report emphasised the theoretical aspects of 
tidal science over the need to improve predictions for practical reasons, arguing that 
funding for theoretical but not practical research was necessary. There was a disconnect 
between the message of the main geodetic committee, claiming the proposed institute 
would assist the state, and the message of Lamb and Proudman, not discussing state 
needs but instead focusing on theoretical research.  
The Hydrographer argued there was a similar disconnect between academic tidal 
research and the work of ‗practical men‘. As part of their campaign for increased state 
support of geodetic research the BAAS committee organised meetings at the Royal 
Astronomical Society to bring together workers in the field of geophysical sciences.90 In 
1918 one of these geophysical discussions covered tides and was attended both by 
Proudman and key Hydro staff, including the Hydrographer Parry who chaired. At this 
meeting Warburg, Lamb and Proudman all presented work. The Hydrographer claimed 
to have only accepted to chair the discussion to emphasise the need for co-operation 
between ―practical‖ men, like himself and Warburg, and ―scientific‖ men, like Lamb 
and Proudman. He thought such co-ordination was lacking and pointed out that 
―knowledge of the tides was vital to the seaman, especially in war‖.91 Yet despite this call 
for increased tidal research, quoting the war as one reason it was needed, Hydro did not 
offer monetary assistance either to the proposed Geodetic Institute or to the Tidal 
Institute. 
In the end the proposed Geodetic Institute petered out, as other actors including the 
Royal Society were working towards setting up a similar institute at Cambridge 
                                               
89 Horace Lamb and Joseph Proudman, "Preliminary Report on Tides and Tidal Currents," in Report of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1918 (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, London, 
1919), 15. 
90 Dyson, "Discussion of Geophysical Subjects." 
91 Parry, "Discussion of Geophysical Subjects."  
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University funded not by the state but by private benefaction.92 BAAS decided to let 
others organise – and fund – geodetic research, though they continued to argue in 
favour of it.93 In relation to DSIR Hull has argued that the BAAS was more radical than 
the Royal Society in its demands for increased state funding of science at this time. The 
Geodetic Institute may be a further example of such institutional politics, and as with 
DSIR, the Royal Society and in this case also Cambridge University ‗won out‘, with the 
result of fewer demands for state funding of science.94  
This section has discussed some of the academic reasons for establishing TI, primarily 
to further research on tidal theory, and also that TI‘s establishment was part of a wider 
context of contested arguments for increasing scientific involvement with the state. 
However, while these arguments for theoretical research from BAAS had not been 
enough to get funding, the proposed tidal branch of the Geodetic Institute turned into 
TI. 
 
2.4.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TI  
How was TI established? In early 1918 Proudman had hoped to become head of the 
tidal department of the proposed Geodetic Institute but then later in the year, as the full 
Institute became less likely, he started formulating plans for setting up a separate tidal 
institute at Liverpool, to be funded by shipping men. By November he had formulated 
a memorandum to be put to these shipping men via the professor of mathematics, FS 
Carey.95 While this memo appears to have been lost, at this stage Proudman clearly 
reformulated his proposal in a way he thought would appeal to industry, which worked. 
In early 1919 he had a meeting with Charles Booth, member of the Council of the 
University, who apparently called the proposed Tidal Institute a ―capital idea‖ and said 
he would put the idea to his brother.96 A few days later in early February Charles told 
Proudman that he and his brother Alfred Booth would provide funds of £400 per year 
                                               
92 Organising Committee of Section A, "Reports on Physical Sciences for Which World-Wide 
Observations Are Important," 27-31. 
93 EH Griffiths and EO Henrici, "The Urgent Need for the Creation within the Empire of a Central 
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94 Ibid.  
95 Doodson to Margaret, 19th Feb 1918, 17th Jun 1918 and 19th Nov 1918, Doodson Papers 
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to support TI for five years.97 The University then became involved, accepting the 
Booths‘ offer and establishing TI ―as proposed in the letters‖ from the Booth 
brothers.98 With this TI was established. 
Proudman became Director, a role for which he was not paid but instead remaining 
employed by the University, and Arthur Doodson Secretary of the new Institute, which 
was housed by the University, providing it with a room in the Holt Physics Laboratory.  
As rooms were scarce at the University this shows it wanted to encourage the 
Institute,99 but while they were clearly happy to be involved in TI they did not fund it, 
providing only a minimal grant (initially £10 per year).100 When TI was established its 
governing committee had only six members and was dominated by the University and 
the Booths,101 but by 1920 it had grown to 15 members. While there was a strong 
contingent of shipping men, consisting of the Booths and representatives of MDHB, 
scientific representatives had numerical dominance of the governing committee at this 
point.102 
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Another of TI‘s early sources of funding was BAAS. In the wake of the proposed 
Geodetic Institute Section A (Mathematics and Physics) of the BAAS set up a tidal 
committee chaired by Doodson.103 In the autumn of 1919, TI‘s first year, this 
committee was given the largest grant within section A of £150, which went to TI to 
pay for staff to do computational work. After this the BAAS funding of the committee 
quickly declined, e.g. to only £35 in 1920, and completely stopped in 1922.104 The role 
of BAAS and this funding will be returned to in the next two chapters.  
 
2.4.2 PROUDMAN’S MOTIVATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING TI AND HIS CAREER 
AFTER TI  
Proudman was a finder of opportunities and funding for himself and his chosen field, 
for example when he contacted Lamb asking for a research problem or when he was 
able to convince the Booths to fund TI. He however had to put much effort into trying 
to find a niche and support, balancing his life, for example teaching at Liverpool and 
researching at Trinity College, and applying for funding, for example from the Booths. 
As we will see in the remainder of this chapter and the following two Proudman looked 
for funding for TI wherever he could think of, gradually adjusting how he portrayed 
TI‘s research programme to fit the audience. He invented his institution building 
strategies as he went along.  
As the memo to the Booths have not been preserved it is unclear exactly how 
Proudman framed the Institute to them, but it seems likely it was as a combination of 
theoretical work, as in the BAAS reports, and as work aimed at improving tidal 
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predictions, which the Institute‘s research programme later emphasised. For a few years 
starting in 1915 Proudman collaborated with Geoffrey Ingram Taylor (1886–1975), a 
Cambridge mathematician and physicist, on the theory of the disturbances to a rotating 
fluid caused by moving solid.105 Proudman wrote to Taylor that TI was set up in order 
to take the suggested work from the BAAS report forward by ―one man spending the 
whole of his time on material relating to actual tides‖.106 As Proudman later described 
the rationale for TI, the BAAS study and his own experience from six years of 
theoretical research on tides led him to believe ―there was an opportunity for an 
institute‖ in Britain researching tides.107 While an important part of spotting this 
opportunity was finding gaps in academic work that could be filled by the Institute (as 
done in the BAAS report), another part of it was Proudman‘s realisation that such an 
Institute was potentially fundable by the shipping industry, if related to actual tides.108 
While he was still emphasising the more theoretical work suggested by the BAAS report 
at this point, this was now to be done on actual, as opposed theoretical, tides, though he 
still did not discuss tidal predictions. However, his discussions with the Booths also 
began a process of making him aware of the industrial need for tidal prediction in a way 
he claimed not to have been before establishing TI.109 
In addition, for Proudman, establishing TI not only furthered his academic research on 
tides but also his own career. Following the establishment of TI, he was upgraded 
(without competition from other candidates) from Lecturer to Chair of Applied 
Mathematics at Liverpool from October 1919.110 That establishing TI was important to 
his career can also be seen from his Royal Society Certificate of Election from 1925. 
Almost half of the ―Qualifications‖ section on this was spent on TI and its work, with 
the rest concentrating on his own work on the dynamical equations of the tides for 
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which he had won the Adams Prize in 1923.111 In 1933, when the previous professor, 
James Johnstone, retired, Proudman took over the Department of Oceanography, 
refocusing it on physical oceanography.112 
 
2.5 THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TI 
For Proudman establishing TI was an important part both of supporting his chosen 
topic of research and of establishing his own career. For Liverpool University, TI was 
another research institute funded by local shipping men, while for those funders TI was 
part of a wider modernising agenda aimed at increasing the throughput of Liverpool 
port and make the passage of the increasingly large ships they owned and managed safer 
and faster. While all the actions and motivations by those involved should be seen with 
the First World War and an increased role by the state in supporting science in the 
background, TI was established without state support or involvement. While it was part 
of the creation of new scientific organisations described by Hull it was not directly 
linked to state actors at this early stage through funding, especially not after the collapse 
of the plans for the Geodetic Institute.113 However, while the state initially provided no 
funding, a particular part of it, the Hydrographic Department of the Admiralty, quickly 
became involved in defining TI‘s research programme. 
As part of developing TI‘s research programme the scientists there started 
corresponding with Hydro in late summer 1919, exchanging information and asking for 
advice. The first preserved letters are from August 1919, more than half a year after TI 
was established, and fairly formal and impersonal. While this is indicative of the initially 
distant relationship between the two organisations, the letters also show how Hydro 
became increasingly involved with TI‘s work. In their correspondence Hydro told TI 
what they thought were the main problems with current tidal predictions, for example 
that they were particularly poor for shallow water ports. This was an issue identified 
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from Warburg‘s work on prediction accuracy during the war.114 In these letters Hydro 
tried to influence TI‘s work, suggesting it should work on the issues with predictions 
identified by Warburg. TI took them up on their suggestions, but not literally. For 
example, Warburg explained to the Hydrographer in 1920 that he had told Proudman 
that he disagreed with TI‘s choice of port for in-depth analysis, as he thought Newlyn 
tides had too little shallow water effects to provide a good basis for new ways of 
calculating the tides, but TI continued working on Newlyn tides.115 Without paying for 
the work, Hydro tried to influence TI‘s tidal research to fit its own agenda and to some 
extent achieved this aim.  
About the time of TI‘s establishment there were discussions within the Hydrographic 
Office regarding the quality of the tidal predictions they purchased. When the India 
Office moved its tidal predictor machine from NPL in Teddington to India in 1920, 
Messrs. Roberts & Son became the only external provider of predictions to the 
Hydrographic Office.116 Several staff at the Hydrographic Office discussed whether they 
should purchase their own machine and take at least some of the calculations in-house. 
Doing this would prevent Messrs. Roberts & Son from becoming a monopoly and also 
reduce the government‘s dependence on private business which could potentially 
increase the charges or reduce their services without warning.117 Both Hydrographer 
Learmonth and the Director of Scientific Research, FE Smith, initially argued that 
Hydro should purchase a tidal predictor. However, Warburg then paid a visit to Messrs. 
Roberts & Son. His report, a part of which was quoted above in section 2.1.1, reduced 
Hydro‘s concerns about the quality of predictions and the possibility of a sudden 
cessation of provision sufficiently to put the matter on hold for a few years. In addition, 
finance was an issue for Hydro which influenced the decision to stick with Messrs. 
Roberts & Son.118 This discussion further supports my earlier contention that Hydro‘s 
staff were concerned about the quality of tidal predictions at this time. However, despite 
their frustration with the state of tidal research they were not involved in TI‘s 
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establishment and did not provide any direct funding to the young TI – it was not even 
mentioned in the debates regarding the supply of predictions.  
While my findings regarding Hydro‘s lack of involvement in TI‘s establishment may 
seem to support those who have argued that the Navy was slow on the uptake of 
academic science, this is not how I interpret the situation. Instead, as at the Royal 
Astronomical Society geophysical meeting on tides in 1918, they wanted to encourage 
‗scientists‘ to work with ‗practical‘ men, like themselves, to improve tidal predictions. 
The Navy was keen to communicate and co-operate, but does not at this stage appear 
to have even considered that financial support of TI from the Navy‘s limited resources 
would be a way to do so.119 At this time there was not an obvious way for state and 
science to co-operate; instead the form of such co-operation was up for discussion.  
If anyone was, it was Proudman who was slower on the uptake of the naval needs for 
tidal research. He later claimed that he had not realised how bad the predictions were 
seen to be by seamen until after he had established TI, implying he had not picked up 
on Hydro‘s complaints during the geophysical meetings.120 However, as we now turn to, 
it is clear that the complaints and suggestions of Hydro and other seamen like the 
Booth brothers changed TI‘s early research programme towards one which emphasised 
tidal predictions.   
 
2.6 TI‘S RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
TI‘s research programme, as presented to potential or actual patrons, changed as TI was 
established. It changed from the theoretically oriented research programme developed 
as part of the BAAS report which had failed to get funding, towards a research 
programme which received funding from shipping men and was also influenced by TI‘s 
discussions with Hydro.121 In TI‘s first annual report, written by Proudman and 
Doodson and presented both to TI‘s actual and potential funders, a key justification for 
TI‘s existence and funding was said to be to improve tidal predictions generally. It is 
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thus a first example of how the patronage TI received from shipping men, interested in 
tidal predictions, interacted with their stated research programme.122 
TI‘s First Annual Report constructed the research problem of the Institute by stating 
that existing tidal predictions faced several problems. Some of these problems had been 
pointed out to them by Hydro, while TI had identified others through their own work. 
Like Warburg had, they mentioned that for a port such as Liverpool the existing tidal 
predictions varied substantially between different suppliers of prediction. Second, when 
comparing predicted and observed tidal heights, using records from tidal gauges, there 
were also large differences TI‘s researchers called residuals. TI saw the reduction of 
these residuals as important to increase the ‗accuracy‘ of tidal predictions, and a crucial 
aspect of this was in turn to investigate meteorological effects, as can be seen from their 
frequent mention in this programmatic statement of TI‘s proposed research in its First 
Annual Report: 
In predicting tides we want firstly an accurate record of observations taken over 
a number of years; secondly, an accurate analysis of the record so as to discover 
the laws which the normal tide follows and to disentangle the irregular 
meteorological effects; thirdly, an accurate method of predicting the normal tide; and 
lastly, a method of predicting the irregular meteorological effects. At the present time 
these wants are far from being satisfied, but it has been the general opinion that 
only the last is serious. It may be remarked that the meteorological effects cannot 
well be investigated until we know accurately what the tides would be without 
them.123  
TI‘s research programme, as presented to its potential and actual patrons in its First 
Annual Report, thus emphasised accurate tidal predictions. In order to predict tides 
more accurately predicting meteorological effects was seen as a key task.  
TI‘s objectives were of course wider than that covered by the above quote: the 
Institute‘s aims were to do scientific research into tides, to train students in applied 
mathematics, be a ―bureau of organised information concerning the tides‖ and to do 
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commercial research.124 While their research programme itself was wider and included 
work not directly linked to predictions, it is clear that the way in which Proudman 
framed the needs for the work changed as his audience changed. With shipping men as 
key patrons and in collaboration with Hydro, he now emphasised the importance of 
improving tidal predictions for the use of shipping that he had denied were necessary 
when writing the report to BAAS with Lamb. Within this research programme the need 
to study storm surges was emphasised, which illustrates that initially the study of storm 
surges at TI was not linked to flooding but to a wider programme of increasing the 
accuracy of tidal predictions.  The next chapter will look at how TI tried to implement 
this research programme. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed how TI was established and has introduced some of TI's early 
patrons: Proudman, Liverpool University, BAAS, the Booth brothers and MDHB, and 
also discussed the role of Hydro. TI‘s initial patronage represented a combination of 
academic and industrial interests, with the Navy providing TI with the resource of 
research ideas. While TI‘s heavy reliance on industrial patronage was common at 
Liverpool University, as at other similar universities in England at the time, it makes TI 
a relatively unusual case in the history of physical oceanography which has focused on 
naval patronage. The First World War was an important background factor for an 
increase in interest in tides and oceanography generally, as it had cut off the supply of 
tidal predictions, led to congestion in ports such as Liverpool and seen the use of 
submarines. However, while the Navy was neither directly involved in the establishment 
of TI nor provided funding, fairly quickly it became involved in the definition of TI‘s 
research programme. 
In relation to the debates regarding the role of the First World War in increasing state 
involvement in scientific research, such an increase was not obviously evident in TI‘s 
establishment. The BAAS plans were not given state funding and in the end TI relied 
on industrial funding. In TI‘s case the question posed by historians needs to be framed 
differently. It was not so much whether the First World War led to increased state 
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support of science in general, but whether it led to increased interest in and support of 
particular types of research. That it certainly did: the TI that eventually resulted had a 
research programme that was focused on tidal predictions, instead of the more 
theoretical programme pictured as part of the proposed Geodetic Institute, and this was 
linked to Hydro‘s concerns and to TI‘s patronage from the Booths, which in turn was 
linked to the efficiency agenda prompted by the war. In addition, the border between a 
patron providing resources and a non-patron is not straightforward. While Hydro 
neither provided finance, like the Booths, nor space, like the university, it did provide 
assistance with research topics. As we will see in chapter four Hydro‘s patronage would 
grow from this beginning, as it explored various ways of co-operating with TI and 
influencing its work.  
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CHAPTER 3 (1920-23), TIDAL PREDICTIONS AND 
PRACTICES OF CALCULATION 
The previous chapter showed that the key argument TI used to get funding was that its 
work would increase the accuracy of tidal predictions. This increase in accuracy had to 
do both with increasing the accuracy of periodic tidal predictions and with providing 
‗corrections‘ to such predictions to account for irregular meteorological effects. This 
chapter argues that TI attempted to increase the accuracy of tidal predictions by 
introducing new practices of calculation, such as new types of mechanical calculators 
and statistics. According to TI‘s researchers their practices of calculation were new. 
Arthur Doodson, for example, claimed that he was introducing a new way of calcuating 
constituents which was faster and more accurate.1 As Andrew Warwick has suggested, 
such changes in the practices of calculations to increase accuracy need a historical and 
contextual explanation.2 A context for these changes was provided in the previous 
chapter: TI's work to introduce new ways of calculating tidal predictions was set in the 
context of the First World War and a shipping industry increasingly using larger ships. 
In addition, their new ways of doing such calculations were inspired not only by 
scientific work but also by ballistics calculations done by Doodson, TI‘s secretary, 
during the war.  
When offering him the job of secretary, Joseph Proudman linked Doodson‘s ―ability‖ 
or skills to the future patronage of TI: 
When the number of years [of funding from the Booths] is up (and possibly 
before) the work done will be reviewed and if it is considered to warrant it, an 
attempt will be made to fund a permanent institute on a larger basis, by 
appealing to the remaining ship owners of Liverpool. From what I know of the 
subject and your ability I am certain that if you come now the thing will be a 
success.3  
                                               
1 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 218. 
2 Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory," 317.  
3 Proudman to Doodson, quoted in Doodson to Galloway, 6th Feb 1919, Doodson papers 
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The future of the institute, especially its ability to get funding, thus depended on it 
showing it could improve the accuracy of tidal predictions used by TI‘s shipping 
industry patrons. This linked patronage to the practices of calculating tidal predictions.  
Warwick has argued that new technologies of calculation enabled the application of the 
new nineteenth century mathematical analysis both to the need of business and military, 
and to scientific work.4 His short piece on this concentrates on technologies of 
calculation such as table making and does not provide a detailed case study of how a 
particular ―problem of generating numbers from analytical expression‖ was affected by 
these developments.5 This chapter provides such a case study, showing how the 
industrial and military setting outlined in the previous chapter came together with the 
practices of calculation Doodson learnt during his early career, to change how the 
particular problem of generating tidal predictions from harmonic theory was done in 
order to make them more accurate. This was a key part of Proudman‘s and Doodson‘s 
institution building for TI. To justify their work and funding, TI‘s researchers had to 
convince others that the work they did needed doing, which they did by arguing that 
earlier methods were not ‗accurate enough‘. As Graeme Gooday has made clear the 
definition used by scientists and others of 'accurate enough' often changes over time: 
―What counted as accuracy was what constituted a sufficient degree of accuracy for a 
particular purpose to be undertaken within existing contextual constraints of money and 
time to the satisfactions of relevant audiences‖.6 This applied not only to precision 
measurement, but also to precision calculations. Such arguments were also not only 
about science but also about patronage from state, industrial and other actors. 
 
3.1 ARTHUR DOODSON AND THE PRACTICES HE BROUGHT TO TI 
I will begin this chapter by introducing TI‘s key workers, first Arthur Thomas Doodson 
(1890-1968) and then the computers. In 1913 Arthur Thomas Doodson was one of 
Proudman‘s first research students, which is how the two met. When TI was established 
in 1919 Proudman was Director whilst also holding down other posts, while Doodson 
became the senior full-time member of Institute staff as Secretary. I will here describe 
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Doodson‘s career before he started at TI in some depth, including the influence of debt, 
deafness and religion, using letters from him as a primary source.  While obviously one-
sided, these letters provide a contextual understanding of the skills he acquired during 
his early career which help in understanding TI‘s practices of calculation and how they 
went about trying to increase the accuracy of tidal predictions.7 His skills were in 
precision engineering and the use of mechanical calculators, as well as in doing statistics, 
applied mathematics and manual calculations.8 In terms of research, his key skills were 
those of organising mathematical problems in a way that was amenable to manual 
calculations and then organising and managing these calculations; skills he would later 
use at TI. 
Like Proudman, Doodson was not from a privileged background. Doodson‘s father was 
for a time a cotton mill manager, but had problems with employment; attendant 
financial difficulties meant Doodson could not attend full time secondary school. Again 
like Proudman, he was a pupil-teacher while also doing half-days and evening classes at 
various schools in Leigh and Rochdale outside Manchester.9 Initially Doodson wished 
to become a teacher and started studying sciences at Liverpool University in 1908 while 
also training as a teacher, but as he became seriously deaf while a student he could not 
pursue this career.  He gained a first class B.Sc. degree in 1911 in chemistry and 
                                               
7 Much of the biography I present here is based on letters Doodson wrote to his wife-to-be Margaret 
Galloway. In 1954 Doodson collected together some of these letters and put a selection into a folder 
which is now part of the Doodson papers at Liverpool World Museum. The selection is far from 
complete (often only part of letters have been preserved) and are self-selected. It is clear from some of 
the notes he has had added that the selection he made concentrated on his scientific work, but it also 
covers his early career in some details. There is little on his relationship to Margaret or e.g. religion, 
though the letters discuss some personal matters such as finance and his conscientious objections to the 
war. The same folder also contains a few letters to his university colleague Nightingale.  
Some caution in the interpretation of Doodson‘s letters to his girlfriend is necessary, as he will have 
wanted to present his work in a good light to her and in extension to her parents, to convince them he 
was progressing in his career sufficiently so that he would eventually have the income it was felt he 
needed in order to marry Margaret. However, while the introduction of new practices of calculation may 
not have been as smooth as Doodson told Margaret, he did progress in his career during this period and 
it seems likely that it was his skills in organising and managing calculation that enabled this, especially as 
biographies of him (e.g. his FRS one by Proudman) similarly emphasise his skills in this area. The letters 
to Margaret provide the best available evidence of how Doodson acquired these skills. They also offer 
some insight into these kinds of practices and how Doodson worked. 
8 While Doodson used his skills in light engineering and precision measurements at TI e.g. in redesigning 
tidal predictor machines, they are less relevant to the argument and will not be emphasised. For 
something about how he used these skills, see Doodson, "Tide-Predicting Machines."  
9 Doodson Personal Information File, section 6, RSA 
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mathematics and then studied for an honours degree in mathematics which he gained in 
1912 (also first class).10 
Finding employment proved difficult with his disability but he worked first as a meter-
tester at Ferranti in Hollinwood from late 1912. Doodson there set about learning 
electrical theory through self study, formal classes and by discussions with a superior. 
About a year into his post he claimed to have been able to fix a meter, using this 
knowledge of electrical theory, and also to have been able to successfully defend his way 
of fixing the meter to the Head Tester, who had not initially believed Doodson did it 
correctly.11 Self study and long hours were a key part in how Doodson acquired skills at 
this point.  
Money was very short for the Doodson family and he had run up debts while attending 
university so Doodson was continually looking around for better paid opportunities.12 
In the summer of 1914 the managers at Ferranti had been asked to recommend a 
person for a post at Manchester Corporation and Doodson was nominated.13 He started 
work there in August at the Testing and Standardizing Department as ―polyphase meter 
and instrument tester‖ and stayed there throughout the beginning of the war.14 
Doodson found the work at Manchester Corporation more interesting than at Ferranti‘s 
as it was less routine and involved ―plenty of experience on all kinds of instruments 
taking them to parts and calibrating them to 1/10th per cent accuracy‖. He was in charge 
of testing the candle power of lamps and how they distributed light, whilst also 
calculating the results of all the testing and doing other work such as experimenting on 
meter discs.15 
At the same time as this precision testing and standardisation work he was also working 
on precision calculations. In 1913 he registered as a part time research student at the 
Department of Mathematics of the University of Liverpool where Proudman supervised 
him. Here his skill in organising computations started to be developed whilst working 
on Riccati-Bessel functions and on tables of sines and cosines of radians, and he was 
                                               
10 Proudman, "Arthur Thomas Doodson, 1890-1968." 
11 Doodson to Galloway, 9th Dec 1912 and ―probably October 1913‖, Doodson papers 
12 Doodson to Galloway, 1st Apr,  1st, 11th, and 18th Mar 1914, 14th Jun 1914, Doodson papers 
13 Doodson to Galloway, 14th , 20th Jul 1914, Doodson papers 
14 Doodson to Galloway, 1st Aug & 14th Oct 1914, Doodson papers 
15 Doodson to Nightingale, 3rd Dec 1914, 4th Aug 1915 Doodson papers 
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awarded a M.Sc. degree in 1914.16 Doodson sent these tables to the BAAS committee 
on mathematical tables, at this time organised by John William Nicholson, which 
published them and offered him a place on the committee which he took up for two 
years in 1915 and 1916.17 His calculation work, often done while travelling or during 
lunch breaks, here gained him entry to national-level networks of professional 
mathematicians.18  
Following his Master‘s work Doodson continued his collaboration with Proudman, 
doing calculations  to produce tables and graphs related to what they called the 
Diffraction Problem; or more formally the diffraction or scattering ―of a plane 
electromagnetic wave by a perfectly conducting sphere‖. The work went on through 
1914 and into 1915, in preparation for publication by the Royal Society.19 In letters to 
Margaret, his wife-to-be,20  Doodson explained how he introduced new practices of 
calculations, not included by Proudman, to make the work more accurate by for 
example introducing checks on the arithmetical procedures.21 These practices of 
calculation was what made Doodson‘s work different from others‘ work. He wrote to 
Margaret that he was ―astonished to see the mass of interesting results‖ he had obtained 
as he had ―succeeded in making the component curves depend on other curves of small 
amplitude and which can thus be easily graphed on a large scale … I have resolved the 
curves into simpler components which show the structure‖.22 This is one example of 
                                               
16 Proudman, "Arthur Thomas Doodson, 1890-1968." 
17 Doodson to Galloway, 14th May 1914, Doodson papers. For more on the Mathematical Tables 
Committee, see Martin Campbell-Kelly and Mary Croarken, "Beautiful Numbers: The Rise and Decline 
of the British Association Mathematical Tables Committee, 1871-1965," IEEE Annals of History of 
Computing 22, no. 4 (2000); Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory." For more on mathematical tables, see 
Campbell-Kelly et al., The History of Mathematical Tables. 
18 Proudman, "Arthur Thomas Doodson, 1890-1968."  
19 Doodson to Galloway, 20th Jul, 1st Aug, 17th Dec 1914, 14th Mar 1915, Doodson papers, Joseph 
Proudman, Arthur Thomas Doodson, and G. Kennedy, "Numerical Results of the Theory of the 
Diffraction of a Plane Electromagnetic Wave by a Perfectly Conducting Sphere," Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical or Physical Character 217(1918). 
20 Margaret had been to school and university with him, studied science or mathematics, helped him with 
calculations, created paper versions of slide rules and was teaching science at a girl‘s boarding school.  
Doodson to Galloway, 2nd Mar 1916, Doodson papers 
21 Doodson to Galloway, 20th Jul, 1st Aug, 17th Dec 1914, 14th Mar 1915, Doodson papers 




Doodson practicing the skills involved in going from mathematical theory to 
calculation, in this case by working out a way to divide curves into constituents.23  
Through 1915 the war became an ever bigger concern for Doodson. He had been 
deeply religious, as was Margaret, since about 1914 and was an active member of a local 
church. This church was part of ―The Churches of God in the Fellowship of the Son of 
God‖, a splinter group from the Plymouth Brethren (which in turn is an Evangelical 
Christian group, often socially conservative and separate from other free churches).24  
Despite joining recently his religion had a great impact on his life and meant he was a 
conscientious objector to the war. Doodson wrote to his friend Ernest Nightingale in 
August 1915 that ―nothing will drive me into the army or even into association with it 
in any shape or form‖ and ―my views are very decided on the question‖.25 As a 
conscientious objector, but also referring to his deafness and scientific work, Doodson 
was brought in front of the local conscription tribunal in March 1916. After rough 
treatment he was eventually given ―absolute exemption‖ on conscientious grounds with 
the condition that he must do work of ‗national importance.‘26 
Doodson‘s search for more interesting work and a higher salary, to pay off his debt and 
to enable him to get married, continued.27 When Karl Pearson at University College 
London advertised a post involving statistical work Doodson applied and received an 
encouraging reply. While Pearson‘s laboratory did war-related government work 
Doodson assumed this was medical work, which he could not object to, but he did not 
think he would be accepted because of his conscientious objections.28 However, 
                                               
23 Much later Doodson published a version of this method of smoothing numerical tables, see Arthur 
Thomas Doodson, "A Method for the Smoothing of Numerical Tables," The Quarterly Journal of Mechanics 
and Applied Mathematics 3, no. 2 (1950). 
24 Proudman, "Arthur Thomas Doodson, 1890-1968." See also John Rylands University Library, 
"Frequently Asked Questions, for the Christian Brethren Collections,"  
http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/specialcollections/collections/brethren/faq/#d.en.111853.  
25 Doodson to Nightingale, 4th Aug 1915 Doodson papers 
26 Doodson to Galloway, 13th Apr; 4th Mar 1916, added notes dated 1954; 23rd Mar 1916, Doodson 
papers. In a 1954 note he explains that the tribunal refused to deal with him as a conscientious objector 
because of the subsidiary grounds and that he was treated roughly and called names. He writes that his 
case was mentioned twice in parliament. For example he was called ―a disgusting mass of shivering fat‖ 
by one member of the Shaw tribunal and this was referred to in Parliament as an example of poor 
treatment of conscientious objectors in the Tribunals, see Hansard, ―Army Estimates, 1916-1917‖, HC 
Deb 16 March 1916, vol 80, c2435, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1916/mar/16/army-estimates-1916-17#column_2435. 
Accessed 18th Jan 2010. 
27 Doodson to Galloway, 9th Dec 1915, Doodson papers 
28 Doodson to Galloway, 1st Jun 1916, Doodson papers 
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Doodson was offered the post, the tribunal agreed for him to go29 and he began work at 
the Draper‘s Biometric Laboratory in late September.30  
Initially he liked the work, and the ways in which he worked was praised as accurate by 
Pearson, as Doodson gave the results of a particular calculation to eight figure accuracy 
where others had given six figures using the interpolation method he had developed 
when working on the Diffraction Problem with Proudman.31 However, in December 
Pearson told him that the laboratory was likely to be wholly turned over to defensive 
war work, such as calculations for anti-aircraft or anti-submarine defence, and if he did 
not accept this work he would have to leave his post.32 The war-related work gave 
Doodson the feeling that his ―hands were not clean but bloodstained‖ and according to 
his letters to Margaret he seriously considered refusing.33 However, he would have had 
difficulties finding another post as a conscientious objector to do the sort of work he 
could and wanted to do – he seems to have become involved in the work at UCL 
quickly – and in the end decided to stay. While he in his letters claimed he was also 
doing the more Christian thing by honouring the promise he had had to give to Pearson 
before getting the post to do whatever work he was given, and claimed to take comfort 
in that the fellow Brethrens he consulted agreed with him that he must keep his 
promise, it seems likely that the prospect of unemployment was as great or a greater 
part of his decision.34 Perhaps being away from family and old friends in London 
loosened his resolve as a relatively new recruit to the church.35 
In 1917 Pearson‘s laboratory was turned over wholly to war work, doing calculations 
for the Anti-Aircraft Experimental Section (AAES) of the Munitions Inventions 
                                               
29 Pearson has been described as sympathetic to Quakers and their hardship, which may have had 
something to do with him taking the religious Doodson on. Theodore M. Porter, Karl Pearson: The Scientific 
Life in a Statistical Age (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 250.  
30 While Magnello emphasises the differences between the work done in Pearson‘s different laboratories, 
the Galton Eugenics Laboratory and the Draper‘s Biometric Laboratory, with the latter focusing on 
statistical rather than eugenic work, Doodson did not differentiate between the two in his letters. The 
differences may have been blurred by the increase in warwork. Magnello, "The Non-Correlation of 
Biometrics and Eugenics: Rival Forms of Laboratory Work in Karl Pearson's Career at University College 
London, Parts 1 and 2." 
31 Doodson to Galloway, summer and autumn 1916, especially 14th Nov 1916, Doodson papers 
32 See also Magnello, "Karl Pearson and the Establishment of Mathematical Statistics."; David Alan Grier, 
When Computers Were Human (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
33 Doodson to Galloway, 24th Jan 1917, Doodson papers 
34 Doodson to Galloway, December 1916 and January 1917, Doodson papers 
35 He did however remain a member of the church for life, even when Margaret died young, something 
which Proudman described as limiting his social life, Proudman, "Arthur Thomas Doodson, 1890-1968." 
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Department.36 The practices of calculations used gradually changed during this year. 
Many of these changes in practices were instigated by Doodson, sometimes in 
collaboration with colleagues, after disputes with Pearson. In February the staff was 
smoothing values in double entry tables produced as part of the ballistics work. 
Doodson had suggested using his method from the Diffraction Problem. This used the 
differences between values in the table to produce ‗families‘ of curves, one for the 
vertical and one for the horizontal aspect of the table, and then smoothed the table by 
comparing the values in it to these curves. His method minimised differences between 
the values to be smoothed and a function derived from those values. However, Pearson 
suggested a slightly different method applied to only one direction of the table. Pearson 
found his own version of the method not worth the trouble and suggested abandoning 
Doodson‘s method, leading to a disagreement.  
At this point Doodson described the war work in scathing terms:  
The work goes on in a silly fashion, curves are drawn with splines [aids for 
drawing curves consisting of a flexible strip of material that is fastened down] 
that have natural kinks in them and then read ‗accurately‘ with a lens! No 
wonder the final results need smoothing!37  
As part of his spat with Pearson, who was unusually badtempered at this time according 
to Doodson‘s colleagues,38 Doodson suggested to ―graph not the function, but the 
function minus its first approximation‖. He claimed this would increase the accuracy ―at 
least 10 times‖ based on his experience from the work on the Diffraction Problem.39 
Pearson did not agree with it, but A W Young, one of Doodson‘s colleagues, tried it 
and liked the method. Together the two developed this more numerical, less graphical 
method based on interpolation to calculate the tables for the war work, e.g. of 
coordinates, over the year. Only very gradually did Pearson come round to the method, 
                                               
36 For more on the work of this Section, see June Barrow-Green, "Planes and Pacifism: Activities and 
Attitudes of British Mathematicians During WW1," Gresham College with British Society for the History 
of Mathematics, http://www.gresham.ac.uk/event.asp?PageId=45&EventId=616 ; Michael Pattison, 
"Scientists, Inventors and the Military in Britain, 1915-19: The Munitions Inventions Department," Social 
Studies of Science 13, no. 4 (1983); Meg Weston Smith, "E. A. Milne and the Creation of Air Defence: Some 
Letters from an Unprincipled Brigand, 1916-1919," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 44, no. 2 
(1990). 
37 Doodson to Galloway, 14th Mar 1917, Doodson papers 
38 Pearson was known to be difficult to work with at the best of times, see Porter, Karl Pearson: The 
Scientific Life in a Statistical Age, ch 9. 
39 Doodson to Galloway, 14th Mar 1917, Doodson papers 
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with lots of arguments. However, towards the end of the year, especially after 
complaints in October 1917 regarding the accuracy of tables produced with the old 
method from the users of these at AAES, Doodson‘s method was used more and 
more.40  
Doodson was gradually and informally promoted. Pearson would sometimes let 
Doodson take charge of the work, as in November 1917 when all the staff were 
working under his direction on developing a numerical interpolation method, but 
sometimes Pearson would insist that his own methods be used.41 At this point Doodson 
claimed the changes he introduced made the work quicker and more ―correct‖, i.e. 
accurate, partly as his method was numerical instead of graphical:  
We are exceedingly busy at College, just finishing a gun off by a new 
interpolation method I developed. There will [be] no necessity for any drawing 
work at all, and the method is a very good one, giving results correct to 0.1 foot 
easily where drawing was sometimes out by 10 or even 20 feet.42  
While Pearson would sometimes still do the theory of a problem (i.e. turning it into 
solvable equations), he often left the planning out and organising of the work (i.e. 
dividing the solvable equations into smaller parts organised onto documents that could 
be used by the computers) to Doodson. This emphasises that Doodson's key skill was 
that of organising calculations, which included such things as being able to lay out the 
work clearly for the other computers and write neatly.43 Doodson claimed his method 
to do the ballistics work was ―much more accurate than the other, involves less work, is 
far more expeditious, [and] needs only a short table (I could get it on this sheet of 
paper) in place of a large volume of tables‖.44 It was these practices of calculation, 
speeding up the work – he claimed by five times45 – and making the calculations more 
―accurate‖ (e.g. closer to whatever was considered the ‗true‘ value, however defined),  
that enabled him to slowly rise in the ranks at UCL.  
                                               
40 Doodson to Galloway, spring to autumn 1917, Doodson papers 
41 Doodson to Galloway, 26th Nov 1917, Doodson papers 
42 Doodson to Galloway, 19th Nov 1917, Doodson papers 
43 Doodson to Galloway, 29th Nov 1917, Doodson papers 
44 Doodson to Galloway, 15th Oct 1917, Doodson papers 
45 Doodson to Galloway, 26th Nov 1917, Doodson papers 
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The development and usage of Doodson‘s methods and the practices attached to them 
continued in early 1918. In late January the Director of Ordnance at Woolwich paid a 
visit to UCL to find out about one of the methods Doodson had developed, the small 
arc method. The Director was ―greatly interested‖ and Doodson had the method 
written up for him. Doodson wrote to Margaret that ―[my] reputation is made as far as 
small arc methods is concerned‖. 46 However, Doodson was feeling less and less happy 
with Pearson, was concerned about his future prospects and still felt that the war work 
stained him: ―This kind of work can never receive the blessing of God; of that I am 
certain‖.47  
This state of affairs continued until late March, when Doodson was asked whether he 
would take over the managing of the AAES work as Pearson was stepping down. 
Initially he was minded to decline the post for conscientious reasons, as he would work 
directly for the Munitions Inventions Department, but in the end accepted the post.48 
The only indication why he decided to accept despite his conscientious objections is 
that he was ―[r]econciled in measure to it ... as its principal service was in connection 
with the protection of London against Zeppelins‖.49 There were also no better 
conditions elsewhere, even if he could have found another job. Again, the threat of 
unemployment, enjoyment of the work and perhaps distance from his fellow Brethren, 
combined with an awareness that this post would be a major step up in his career, 
appears to have overcome his conscientious objections against the work. 
As Director of the Computing Branch of AAES Doodson was now ―responsible for all 
computations and tables respecting anti-aircraft gunnery and a staff of about 15 
computators‖.50 The AAES work continued until the Armistice and beyond. Doodson 
continued to develop and distribute his methods, co-operating with Archibald Vivian 
Hill (the head of AAES), Ralph H Fowler and other mathematicians, many of whom 
were or became FRS and had close connections to Cambridge mathematics (often with 
Trinity College, Proudman‘s college). This gave Doodson connections to the 
                                               
46 Doodson to Galloway, 22nd Jan 1918, Doodson papers 
47 Doodson to Galloway, 4th Feb 1918, Doodson papers 
48 Doodson to Galloway, 22nd Mar, 5th Apr, 1918, Doodson papers 
49 Doodson‘s Personal Information File, section 8, RSA 




Cambridge-focused personal networks in mathematics that Proudman had entered 
through his studies.  
After the Armistice Doodson‘s team was eventually moved to Woolwich. Though the 
team was offered to continue working most left the military soon after the war. 
Proudman offered his former student Doodson the post as Secretary at TI in early 
1919, which Doodson quickly accepted. He started work at TI and married Margaret in 
April. He refused to be put forward for an honour, which many of his mathematician 
colleagues received, as it was for war work. He was however keen to make sure that he 
and his team were clearly referenced and quoted in publications such as the Textbook of 
Ballistics produced in 1919, to make sure they were given their due credit for the 
methods they had developed.51 This and his decision to accept the promotion to direct 
the Computing Branch of the AAES illustrates the tensions between Doodson‘s 
conscientious objections and his career building strategies. It is clear that Doodson had 
strong conscientious objections but he also saw that he and his colleagues needed 
recognition for their work to further their careers.  
Before starting at TI Doodson had no experience of tidal work,52 but during his early 
career he had acquired a range of skills including in precision measurement and 
precision calculation, and above all skills in organising complex calculations. These skills 
had enabled him to rise in the ranks during the war and later this chapter will look at 
how he used these on a particular computational and mathematical problem – that of 
tidal predictions – but first other workers at TI and some of their tools will be 
introduced. Both the workers and their tools were important for TI‘s attempts to 
increase the accuracy of tidal predictions through new practices of calculation. 
 
3.2 TI‘S COMPUTERS, CALCULATING MACHINES AND WORKING PRACTICES 
At TI Doodson was from very early on assisted by assistants called ‗computers‘. These 
computers were usually female and school leavers, though the first computer was Miss 
A L Cooper who unusually for TI‘s computers had a B.Sc. She had worked for 
                                               
51 Doodson to Galloway, summer 1918 to February 1919 and 1954 notes, Doodson papers 
52 David Edgar Cartwright, "The Historical Development of Tidal Science, and the Liverpool Tidal 
Institute" (paper presented at the conference Oceanography, the past: Third International Congress on 
the History of Oceanography, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, USA, 1980). 
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Doodson for a while in London during the war.53 In 1921 a second computer, Miss S K 
Lowry, was added. The staff then remained the same until Miss A Ainsworth was added 
in 1926 and Miss D Dood in 1927, which correlates with a rise in tidal predictions done 
by TI during this period which will be discussed in the next chapter. None of the three 
later computers had degrees.54 Later the number of computers gradually increased, 
reaching 13 women in 1959.55 
TI‘s computers left behind sheets after sheets of numbers, graphs and other calculations 
– a major part of the Bidston archive – but there were obvious and clear status and 
gender divisions at TI, separating out the researchers from the computers.56 Joyce 
Scoffield has described her duties as a junior ‗computer‘ in the early 1960s (i.e. just after 
the end of the period covered by the thesis) as ―to observe the weather, to operate the 
tidal prediction machines, to fire the one-o‘clock gun, to do ‗differencing‘ [mathematical 
smoothing work checking tidal predictions] and to make coffee for everyone and 
prepare lunch for the male staff‖.57 In other words, the computers then did a mix of 
scientific work, general administrative duties and housekeeping. Of note is Scoffield‘s 
comment that the ‗differencing‘ methods used to smooth tidal predictions were based 
on work Doodson had done during the war.58 She also described some of the processes 
and practices involved in doing predictions: setting up the tidal predictor, running it 
while taking down the results, checking these results using ‗differencing‘ (which 
involved calculations, checked by a more senior computer titled ‗smoother‘ who then 
graphed the figures), writing up and photographing of the predictions. All in all she 
estimates that predicting the tides for one port took four days for several people, in 
total 30 people hours.59 While there will have been changes to the routines over the 
years, especially in regards to the copying of the final results, her work will have been 
similar to that done by the female computers in the late 1920s as mechanical tidal 
predictors were still used in the 1960s.  
                                               
53 See e.g. Doodson to Galloway, 1st Jul 1918, Doodson papers 
54 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: First Annual Report, 1920; Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal 
Institute: Second Annual Report, 1921; Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Seventh Annual Report, 1926 
(Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1926); Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Eighth Annual Report, 
1927 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1927).  
55 LOTI, Annual Report 1959 (Liverpool: C. Tinling and Co. Ltd., 1959). 
56 Compare Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(London: University of Chicago Press, 1994 ), ch 8.  
57 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory.  
58 Ibid., 275. 
59 Ibid., 225-228.  
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The computers and Doodson used various calculating aids from the start and TI 
acquired its first tidal predictor in 1924, with another added in 1929. Apart from such 
specialised calculating aids TI used general purpose calculating machines. By 1935 TI 
had five: one second hand Tate Arithmometer (bought in 1919), a second hand 
Muldivo (bought in 1921), two new Comptometers (one bought in 1921 and another 
one in 1931) and a new electrical Monroe calculating machine (bought in 1925). In 1935 
Proudman argued that TI needed to buy a new calculating machine on efficiency 
grounds, claiming that the old second-hand ones were inefficient as they were liable to 
error and of ―primitive types‖, and that ―[a]n operator using one of them cannot do 
nearly so much work in a given time as he could if he were using a more efficient 
machine‖.60 In response to Proudman‘s request a ―very satisfactory‖ Mercedes Euklid 
No. 38 calculating machine was purchased.61 This emphasises both the importance 
given to calculating machines by TI and also how Proudman linked error-prone and 
slow machines to inefficiency, i.e. lower output of work. He argued that a more accurate 
(less error-prone) and fast machine equalled more efficient work, which in turn meant 
the worker could do more work, so fewer workers needed to be employed. This 
argument clearly worked on TI‘s governing committee, as they gave funding for the 
purchase of machines.  
There is some debate in the secondary literature regarding the extent scientists 
employed mechanical calculators in the early 1920s. According to Mary Croarken 
calculating machines, like the Brunsviga, were not commonly used by scientists until at 
least the middle of the 1920s, which would mean TI was an early adopter of such 
machines.62 On the other hand, according to Warwick scientists were using mechanical 
calculators widely by the turn of the century and Paul Hughes has identified the use of 
arithmometers by British tidal researchers in the nineteenth century.63 However, at the 
time of TI‘s establishment the tidal prediction company Messrs. Roberts & Son did not 
                                               
60 Proudman to Roberts, 3rd Oct 1935, D/BO 3/3/1, MMM – North Street. Note how Proudman 
genders the operator as male, despite most of TI‘s computers being female. 
61 Doodson to Secretary, 22nd Oct 1935, D/BO 3/3/1, MMM - North Street. TI continued to purchase 
different calculating machines throughout the period covered by this thesis, e.g. a comptometer in 1948 
(Doodson to Mountfield, 30th Jul 1948, D/BO 3/3/1, MMM - North Street). 
62 Croarken, Early Scientific Computing in Britain, ch 1&2. 
63 Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory."; Hughes, "A Study in the Development of Primitive and 
Modern Tide Tables", ch 10. 
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use them.64 Pearson has been identified as an early adopter of calculating machines, by 
both Warwick and Croarken, and his students clearly took after him regarding the use 
of such machines.65 Like another of Pearson‘s ‗disciples‘, LJ Comrie (1893-1950), who 
introduced mechanized computation at the Nautical Almanac Office, Doodson seems 
to have re-introduced mechanized calculators into English tidal science.66 Their 
adoption of such machines were also part of a wider increase in the mechanization of 
calculation and information processing at this time, which by Jon Agar has been linked 
to the sort of modernisation and efficiency ‗drive‘ Alfred Booth led during the First 
World War.67 Proudman‘s argument that a computer with a more ‗efficient‘ calculating 
machine could do more work is an example of this. The use of mechanical calculators 
was one of the ways in which Doodson organised TI‘s tidal computations in a way that 
increased their data processing capabilities.  
The photograph in Figure 3.1 illustrates TI‘s working practices. The photo is likely to 
have been staged to show the range of work TI did, probably for some promotional 
literature or an article about them, and portrays TI as an efficient and orderly scientific 
computation office. Doodson and Dennis are posing, performing tasks deemed typical 
or representative of TI‘s work. Doodson is using a calculating machine at his desk, 
surrounded by writing material, including a ruler to construct documents, and a waste 
paper basket under his desk. The booklet on his table looks like a copy of one of TI‘s 
Annual Reports. The computer is using another ruler, taking measurements from a 
record, perhaps a tidal gauge record, which is being held down by a heavy stick to 
manage the roll of paper. In the foreground another weight holds a large chart of what 
appears to be the Irish Sea.68 In the background another desk has books on it and more 
papers, which can be seen as symbolising TI‘s more analytical and theoretical work as 
opposed to the measurements and calculations being done by Doodson and the 
computer. A university gown is hanging in the background, signalling to the viewer that 
this setting is an academic as opposed to a commercial or military computing operation. 
  
                                               
64 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 340. ―Methods, staff, etc.‖, part of Minute from Warburg 
to Hydrographer, 28 Sep 1921, in HYD 587/1921, within H 4434.23, UKHO 
65 Croarken, Early Scientific Computing in Britain, ch 1&2; Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory." 
66 For more on Pearson and ‗disciples‘ see Porter, Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age. 
67 For example in A Booth‘s work for the war time committee. Agar, The Government Machine, 177.  
68 The larger scale original shows the outlines of the land around the Irish Sea rather clearer but it is 




Figure 3.1: Doodson and one of the computers, Mrs Dennis, in TI‟s room at the University campus in the 
Holt Physics Laboratory69  
 
Judging from this picture, the image TI wanted to portray of their work was that of 
organised calculations, with one task per table and with different people specialising on 
specific tasks. While the chart is displayed to the camera hanging artfully off the shelf, 
even Doodson‘s somewhat dishevelled collection of papers can be interpreted as that he 
is writing on a number of documents simultaneously, and thus operating in an efficient 
and productive manner (or the papers may just have been disorganised by the 
photographer to soften the image and lead the eye towards the supposed result of the 
                                               
69 Permission to reproduce in unpublished material kindly given by the copyright-holder National 
Oceanographic Centre, Liverpool. The computer and the location has been identified by staff at NOC 
Liverpool, but there is no further information as to its context. I thank J Eric Jones and the NOC 
Liverpool library staff for providing me with a copy of the picture and allowing me to use it. As Mrs 
Dennis started work at TI in 1929, the picture is likely to be from the late 1920s or the 1930s given the 
age of Doodson and Dennis. The empty bookshelves in the background suggests it may have been taken 
soon after most of TI and its possessions moved to Bidston Observatory in 1929, so perhaps the picture 
was taken to promote the merger of TI and the Observatory (which will be discussed in the next chapter). 
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posed work process: the chart). Everything is thus well organised, seemingly staged to 
portray order and productivity. TI is thus displayed as an efficient producer of scientific 
calculations, which would be a suitable image to put across to potential funders or 
purchasers of tidal predictions. 
Another issue that can be noted in the picture is the physicality of mathematical and 
computational work involving documents. If Dennis worked in the position in the 
picture regularly she probably developed backache, while Doodson‘s fingers or papers 
would get inkstains from the fountain pen lying on the table. In addition, of note is the 
physical materiality of documents: weights are needed to keep them in order and they 
need to be organised in particular ways to be productive, as in the case of Doodson‘s 
papers (whether they were organised as an example of mathematical practice or by the 
photographer to draw the eye) or the documents surrounding the books on the back 
table. While flat surfaces and documents are no doubt easier to work with than ‗raw 
nature‘, as Bruno Latour has argued, documents need material work too – the 
comfortable office Latour refers to would soon give Dennis a bad back and the roll of 
paper would escape her control without the weight on it.70  Adding this materiality to 
Latour‘s notion of chains of documents makes it stronger, by showing one aspect of 
how such chains are constructed.  
This photograph provides a picture of how TI worked and its setting, and literally 
makes some of their computational work and workers visible, albeit in a very posed 
manner. It well summarises this section by emphasising the importance to TI of human 
computers, mechanical calculating machines and documents. Such calculating machines 
were linked to efficiency by Proudman, and TI was part of a group of organisations, 
often with personal links to Pearson, who were keen to use calculating machines. While 
the picture shows little of the non-mathematical work at TI – such as how the 
computers made coffee or the work involved in archiving documents – it emphasises 
the physicality of mathematical work. In addition it tells us something about how TI 
wished to be portrayed: as an academic, efficient and productive computational 
organisation that achieved results. However,  it does not explain the details of how TI 
used practices of calculation to justify their work and funding by attempting to increase 
the accuracy of tidal predictions. This will be discussed next. 
                                               
70 Latour, Pandora's Hope, 38, 53.   
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3.3 ACCURATE TIDAL PREDICTIONS AND PRACTICES OF CALCULATION 
3.3.1 LACK OF ACCURACY AS AN ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY FUNDING 
One of TI‘s early sources of funding was BAAS, who provided £150 funding in 1919 
for computer assistance to a tidal committee chaired by Doodson.71 In order to justify 
the funding given to the committee and used by TI, Proudman and Doodson needed to 
convince their audience at BAAS that they were doing necessary research, which boiled 
down to justifying research on tidal predictions. This in turn meant convincing their 
audience that Darwin‘s methods of tidal analysis and predictions were no longer 
accurate enough. To justify their funding and their research they used a rhetoric linking 
trust and accuracy familiar to historians of precision measurements.72 TI‘s use of the 
term ‗accuracy‘  was very like that by physicists arguing for funding for teaching 
laboratories in the 1860s to 1880s, analysed by Gooday. Like these physicists TI used a 
rhetoric of accuracy to argue for funding and support, but unlike them TI emphasised 
accurate precision calculations, not measurements.73  
Many TI‘s researchers needed to justify believed that tidal predictions were seen to be 
‗good enough‘ by seamen. Judging from his earlier BAAS report with Horace Lamb, 
this had included Proudman, but while procuring TI‘s funding and developing its 
research programme Proudman had changed his views. He explicitly admitted this, 
claiming that after further work he had found existing predictions wanting.74 However, 
his earlier view that the predictions were good enough for seamen was still widespread. 
The responses to a paper by Harold Warburg from Hydro‘s tidal branch, whose work 
on tidal predictions was mentioned in the previous chapter, given to the Royal 
Geographic Society in 1919, exemplifies the surprise some expressed at the need to 
improve harmonic predictions. During the discussion of Warburg‘s paper, a Mr EC 
Barton expressed ―shock to learn that the harmonic methods have fallen into such 
disrepute‖. The chairman of the talk, the geologist Sir Aubrey Strahan, was surprised at 
the need for ―extreme accuracy‖ in tidal predictions, and questioned the value of 
                                               
71 Report of the Eighty-Eight Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Cardiff - 1920, August 
24-28, xx. 
72 See for example Gooday, "Precision Measurement and the Genesis of Physics Teaching Laboratories in 
Victorian Britain."; Gooday, The Morals of Measurement; Schaffer, "Accurate Measurement Is an English 
Science."; Hunt, "The Ohm Is Where the Art Is." 
73 Gooday, "Precision Measurement and the Genesis of Physics Teaching Laboratories in Victorian 
Britain.", also Gooday, The Morals of Measurement, 63, note 77.  
74 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 323.  
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working with errors in periodic tidal predictions when meteorological factors could not 
be predicted.75 Another example of the view that meteorological effects were a greater 
problem for the accuracy of tidal predictions than the harmonic methods used in their 
analysis and prediction comes from Nature in 1921. In an exchange of letters Proudman 
argued against the views of AC Tennant, a previous employee of MDHB. The latter had 
suggested that meteorological effects should be the priority of tidal research. Proudman 
instead claimed harmonic predictions were not as good as normally thought and needed 
work before meteorological effects could be dealt with.76  
In this exchange Proudman was not only arguing for tidal research generally and 
specifically at TI but also justifying TI‘s initial concentration on periodic tides rather 
than meteorological effects. However, Proudman only came to concentrate on analysis 
and prediction after TI was given funding from shipping men and advise from Hydro. 
In the exchange in Nature Proudman was thus justifying an initial research programme, 
influenced by TI‘s patronage to focus on periodic tides, and defending this from 
accusations from Tennant and others that research on this topic was not necessary. 
More generally, this was also part of Proudman and Doodson‘s institution building 
strategy.  To justify TI‘s existence, its research programme and funding Proudman and 
Doodson argued that the accuracy of tidal predictions produced through existing 
methods was now insufficient for the needs of the users of such tidal predictions. They 
did this through a number of routes, such as Proudman‘s article in Nature and the 
exchange there with Tennant, but I will here concentrate on how they attempted to 
change the definition of the necessary accuracy in predictions through reports to their 
patron BAAS.  
In reports officially from the Tidal Committee to BAAS Proudman and Doodson used 
a strong rhetoric linking trust to accuracy, arguing that current predictions were not 
trustworthy as they were inaccurate and that further work by scientists – i.e. themselves 
– was needed on predictions.77 For example, in his 1920 report Proudman tried to 
dislodge the belief in existing harmonic analyses as bringer of truth and a high level of 
                                               
75 Parry et al., "The Admiralty Tide Tables and North Sea Tidal Predictions: Discussion," 329.  
76 Joseph Proudman, "Ocean Tides," Nature 107(1921); "The Scientific Investigation of the Ocean : Need 
for a New 'Challenger' Expedition," Nature 106, no. 2653 (1920); A. C. Tennant, "Ocean Tides " Nature 
107(1921): 299-300; Joseph Proudman, "[Letters to Editor], Reply to Tennant," Nature 107(1921): 300. 
77 On trust in science see e.g. Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and 
Public Life (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995); Shapin, A Social History of Truth; Gooday, The 
Morals of Measurement. 
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accuracy by critically analysing Darwinian harmonic analysis. He questioned how close 
such harmonic analyses were to the observed astronomical tide: it ―yet remains to be 
found to what precise extent the purely astronomical tide at any station may be 
expressed as a series of a reasonable number of harmonic constituents‖.78 As another 
example, he compared ―ten different determinations of what ought to be the same 
constant‖, finding that ―the deviations from year to year [in the values found for the 
constant] are so great as to prohibit any reliance being placed on the results of the 
customary analysing processes applied to a single year's data‖.79 Again, he was talking 
about deviations, or lack of accuracy, stopping the results of established analysing 
procedures from being reliable, or trustworthy. 
At the same 1920 BAAS meeting at which Proudman criticised harmonic analysis, 
Doodson reported, equally critically, on the accuracy of existing harmonic prediction of 
tides. He first argued that current harmonic predictions of the periodic tides ought to be 
satisfactory, given existing theory and methods of calculations, despite meteorological 
effects causing difficulties in producing closeness between predicted and observed tidal 
levels.80 He then claimed that it was in fact well known that predictions of the periodic 
tide were not ‗accurate enough‘: ―there are periodic or systematic differences in height 
and time of high water which are sufficiently serious in many cases to cause distrust … 
the distrust has led in many cases to the complete abandonment of the method of 
harmonic prediction‖.81 Doodson explicitly linked inaccuracies, i.e. differences between 
observed and predicted tides, to distrust, and this in turn to the use of tidal predictions. 
As an example of the ―degree of inaccuracy [which was] considered by authorities to be 
unsatisfactory‖ Doodson mentioned that the average error at Quebec for the time of 
the high water was 16 minutes and for low water 28 minutes despite the analysis being 
based on what he said was good data.82 Doodson also listed other problems, for 
example that predictions by different organisations gave different results despite using 
the same harmonic constants: ―Where … we may have two different predictions, each 
supposed to be authoritative, which differ occasionally by nearly a foot and on average 
by five inches in height, then one‘s confidence in the accuracy of prediction is badly 
                                               
78 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 323.  
79 Ibid., 327-328. He here uses statistical error analysis, which Gooday argues was still relatively 
uncommon practice in Britain. Gooday, The Morals of Measurement, 75-76.  
80 Doodson, "Report on Harmonic Prediction of Tides," 321. 




shaken‖.83 Doodson did not give any examples of any practical problems caused by 
these issues, just that they were causing the abandonment of the harmonic method. 
Improving accuracy was presented both as necessary and as a self-evident goal of 
scientific work to ensure the survival of Darwin‘s harmonic method. 
By attempting to convince their listeners or readers that existing predictions should not 
be seen as good enough, Proudman and Doodson were justifying their research 
programme and funding. In addition, like so many other scientists‘ calls for work to 
increase accuracy, TI's calls for increasing the accuracy of tidal predictions should be 
seen in the industrial and military context set out in the previous chapter. Their 
arguments were also very similar to those of earlier physicists arguing for funding for 
laboratories, but instead arguing for funding for mathematical research.84 Another 
difference is that TI emphasised very recent, post-war, achievements by themselves and 
not the achievements of the wider scientific community over a few decades. They were 
thus using the stereotypically modern argument of insisting on what Steven Shapin has 
called ―the insufficiency of authoritative texts and upon the careful inspection of 
testimony‖.85 For example, Proudman gave a case where earlier workers had taken a 
calculation shortcut which Proudman wanted the reader to doubt the validity of, 
pointing out that William Thomson had stated that the equilibrium principle should be 
used to allow for ―the changing inclination of the moon's orbit to the earth's equator‖.86 
Proudman claimed that even when it was later found that ―the inclination of the moon's 
orbit … was not according to the equilibrium principle‖ it was still ―afterwards always 
treated as if it were so‖.87 Tidal researchers had trusted Thomson, the authority, and 
followed his advice instead of taking account of the evidence. Proudman was arguing 
this was not enough; an argument which justified TI‘s choices of research topic. 
When complaining about the use of the equilibrium principle Proudman was also 
arguing that the ways the calculations had been done previously did not take into 
account factors he deemed necessary and thus did not produce sufficiently accurate 
                                               
83 Ibid., 322. 
84 Gooday, "Precision Measurement and the Genesis of Physics Teaching Laboratories in Victorian 
Britain.", also Gooday, The Morals of Measurement, 63, note 77.  
85 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 201. This is ‗stereotypically modern‘ as arguments of this sort have 
been made throughout history by many new generations of workers as part of their attempts to portray 
themselves as ‗modern‘ and as improving on earlier generations. 
86 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 336. 
87 Ibid., 337. 
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results. The chapter now turns to how TI‘s researchers changed the practices of 
calculating tidal predictions and argued that their new methods produced more accurate 
results. 
 
3.3.2 NEW PRACTICES OF CALCULATION: RESIDUALS AND ABACS 
TI‘s first step in justifying their research and funding had been to encourage distrust in 
existing methods. The next step for them was to show they could do better, which they 
did by linking the introduction of new practices of calculation to increased accuracy. 
Doodson had not only questioned the status of Darwinian harmonic analysis as bringer 
of truth but also claimed that the methods involved were inefficient and cumbersome, 
producing uncertain and scanty results.88 Doodson‘s work was linked to his experience 
of running mathematical laboratories during the war as well as his development of 
methods of calculation. He now took these new practices of calculation and turned 
them on tides, and argued that the new practices led to an increase in accuracy.  
Overall Doodson‘s method was one of intensive analysis of tidal records, by which he 
meant subtracting partial tides as they were determined and examining the successive 
residues.89 As part of this work he also re-developed the tide-generating potential, i.e. 
reworked how the harmonic theory had been worked out mathematically by Darwin, 
using new tables for the motion of the moon calculated by E W Brown (1866-1938).90 
He linked work on the theory of harmonic prediction to introducing new practices of 
calculation, making this a case study of the use of such practices to improve the 
accuracy of the numbers generated by a specific theory, which was also adapted through 
this work.91  
I will concentrate on two key aspects of Doodson‘s method, which differentiated it 
from that developed by Darwin: Doodson‘s emphasis on residuals and his use of new 
methods of calculation. Doodson‘s method of analysing tides first removed major, 
known constituents and then analysed the residues, or the number left after the known 
                                               
88 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 234.  
89 Ibid., 217. 
90 Arthur Thomas Doodson, "The Harmonic Development of the Tide-Generating Potential," Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical and Physical Character 100, no. 704 
(1921): 305-329, quote from 305. 
91 Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory." 
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constituents had been subtracted, for further constituents. These further constituents 
were then taken out and the residual again analysed. He claimed certain errors were 
―proportional to the size of the constituent producing it‖. Concentrating on the smaller 
constituents found in the residuals after known major constituents had been removed 
could account for such errors, especially ones related to the presence of other 
constituents.92 This linked to what Doodson thought another important difference 
between his and Darwin‘s methods was. While Darwin may not have agreed with this 
portrayal of his method, Doodson and Proudman suggested that Darwin‘s methods did 
not account for the possibility of unknown or perturbing constituents. This was because 
of Darwin‘s identification of a suggested list of constituents to analyse for, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, and the lack, as Doodson portrayed it, of inbuilt checks for 
whether there were other constituents that might influence the ones found through the 
process.93 Doodson and Proudman claimed it was ―general practice‖ to minimise 
residuals through the least square method in relation to one only of the large 
constituents and then ignore the rest of the residuals.94 Proudman had identified this as 
a major source of error in analysis, leading to ―imperfectly isolated‖ constituents.95 In 
particular he considered this a problem with shallow water effects  with speeds similar 
to that of other constituents, as the effect might not be separated fully from the other 
constituents.96  
To deal with this problem Doodson adapted Darwin‘s method of analysis for use on 
residuals, claiming that working with residuals instead of observations gave ―greater 
freedom possible in the details of analysis‖.97 To analyse for a particular constituent 
Darwin had taken values at a given hour for each lunar day and then averaged these 
values from thirty consecutive days. He then used the 12 averages from one year to 
calculate constants A and B, which were used to estimate the height of the constituent.98 
This had worked in the case he analysed as the periods in the constituent was either a 
                                               
92 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 236. 
93 Ibid., 220, 233-226.  
94 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 330, 332. 
95 Ibid; Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 220. 
96 Proudman, "Report on Harmonic Analysis," 333. 
97 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 236. 
98 As Darwin explained the use of A and B: ―Supposing n to be the speed of any tide in degrees per mean 
solar hour, and t to be mean solar time elapsing since 0h of the first day; then the immediate result of the 
harmonic analysis is to obtain A and B, two heights (estimated in feet and tenths) such that the height of 
this tide at the time t is given by A cos nt + B sin nt.― Darwin, "Report of a Committee for the Harmonic 
Analysis of Tidal Observations," 78.  
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year or half a year.99 Doodson implied this did not necessarily work in all cases if the 
periods were different. He instead used sets of 10 days‘ data which were then further 
averaged to find the final value of A or B. However, instead of straightforward 
averaging using a pre-set interval of time, for example Darwin‘s 30, Doodson used 
asymptotic means to find the values of A and B. He constructed the asymptotic means 
graphically, by drawing curves of the sum of the values for A (or B) divided by the 
number of As (or Bs) and then drawing a smooth curve visually finding the tendency of 
the mean (the dotted curves in Figure 3.2). When working on the Diffraction Problem 
with Proudman and on ballistics calculations during the war Doodson emphasised 
methods that combined the use of numerical and graphical interpolation techniques, 
and used differences or residuals as an integral part of this work.100 While asymptotic 
means are somewhat different from his earlier smoothing and interpolations technique, 
the graphs constructed for that again emphasise the (decreasing) differences between 
means and a subsidiary function, in this case the trend of the asymptotic mean.  
 
                                               
99 The meaning of ‗day‘ and ‗hour‘ is complicated in tidal science. Ideally these should be in ‗special time‘, 
related to the time taken for the argument of the residuals to increase by 360 degrees if it was diurnal or 
720 degrees if it was semidiurnal, but in another difference between the two methods Darwin had used 
mean solar hours and corrected for this, while Doodson generalised Darwin‘s method by using special 
time. Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 233-238. 
100 He later summarised his methods of interpolation and smoothing as follows: ―A subsidiary function is 
built up of differences corresponding to those obtained from the table to be smoothed and is then 
compared with the tabulated function. The difference between the two is then smoothed graphically.‖ 
Doodson, "A Method for the Smoothing of Numerical Tables," 217. 
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Figure 3.2: An example of Doodson‟s graphs to calculate the asymptotic means of the values of A and B for 
the constituent M2, as presented in the BAAS report. M is the number of contributory values of A or B 
respectively.101  
 
In combination with his mathematical arguments, Doodson couched his work in a 
strongly rhetorical and moral, sometimes metaphysical, language justifying the funding 
TI had received. He linked his use of residuals and his practices of calculation to the 
trustworthiness of his methods. Twenty years earlier Darwin had claimed that the 
success of harmonic methods meant that the theory was true and that his method gave 
a full description of the behaviour of the seas.102 Doodson questioned this, claiming that 
earlier methods assumed their own truth by only analysing for expected constituents: 
―the resulting numbers are taken on trust‖.103 He claimed his own methods of 
calculation instead were designed to give indications of unknown constituents or 
disturbances, such as meteorological effects, as such unknown aspects would show up 
as residuals. This was not just about the calculations but also a moral and metaphysical 
claim. In terms of reality and truth, for Doodson it was all in the residuals: ―Our sole 
                                               
101 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 239. 
102 Darwin, The Tides and Kindred Phenomena in the Solar System, 225-226.  
103 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 220. 
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index of reality lay in the residues. If, after taking out all the ‗Darwinian constituents,‘ 
there were unmistakable signs of semi-diurnal constituents still remaining, then this 
would be regarded as sufficient proof of reality‖.104 Reality was in the calculations and 
the data, not in how Darwin had worked out his theory or in Lord Kelvin‘s predictor 
machines.105 To account for ‗reality‘ Doodson argued that new practices of calculation 
accounting for residuals were necessary.  
A more down to earth reason why Doodson saw his concentration on residuals as an 
important part of increasing the accuracy of tidal calculations was that he found new 
constituents this way. For example, Darwin had only analysed for six of the 29 
constituents Doodson deemed necessary to predict the shallow water effects on tides at 
Liverpool.106 Darwin had stated that he had only thought it was necessary to analyse for 
such effects for the main lunar and solar constituent, but Doodson ignored this 
statement and found many other constituents for shallow water effects using his 
analysis.107  
In addition the idea of residuals was also important for his work on meteorological 
effects, and I will discuss it in a little more detail. The term ‗residual‘ is still common in 
modern statistics where residuals can be calculated in a number of ways but indicate the 
distance between the observed data point and the equation line found by a particular 
statistical model.108 Residuals are an integral part of least-squares analysis, a very 
common statistical model, as when such a regression equation is fitted, this finds values 
that minimises the sum of squared residuals.109  
The concept of residual was still in development at the time of TI‘s establishment. Both 
Theodore Porter and Donald MacKenzie identify Francis Galton as the first who saw 
residuals as variation, arguing that earlier workers in the area had seen such residuals as 
measurement errors and not ‗real‘ variation. They argue Galton‘s emphasis on variation 
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107 Darwin, "Report of a Committee for the Harmonic Analysis of Tidal Observations," 74. 
108 Andy Field, Discovering Statistics Using SPSS, 3rd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2009), 215. 
109 Ronald R. Hocking, "Linear Regression," in Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences, ed. Samuel Kotz, et al. 




came from his interest in hereditary traits.110 He shared this interest with Doodson‘s 
former employer Karl Pearson, who also saw residuals as real variation.111 According to 
Desrosières, Pearson interpreted residuals in regression models as a combination of 
measurement errors, omitted variables or as variability of unknown origin. Desrosières 
argues that this analysis of residuals as made up of different parts was taken further by 
econometric modellers in the 1930s and 1940s. By these modellers the residual was 
further divided into errors in specification of the model (i.e. how the theory was 
translated into a statistical model including the choice of specific measurable variables 
to stand for the theoretical ones), irreducible variability and errors of measurement. 
Analysis of unexplained variability could be used to formulate further refinements of 
the econometric model.112 What these econometric modellers did is also what Doodson 
did in his tidal work – analysing unexplained variability through residuals to refine the 
harmonic model of tidal prediction.  
The second aspect of Doodson‘s work I will concentrate on was his methods of 
calculation. He argued that the new methods and practices of calculation he introduced 
were what had made his investigation possible, as he claimed they reduced errors and 
increased the speed of work:  
The investigations were made possible by the invention of a scheme for the 
numerical calculation and summation of the harmonic constituents; this scheme 
very greatly reduced the labour of calculation, and the results of summation of 
one set of constituents could be relied on to within about 0.01 foot.113 
His report detailed the scheme of calculation, or abacs, Doodson had created to help 
calculate and sum the harmonic constituents. This involved constructing special 
purpose scales graduated in degrees on one side and ―the appropriate cosine scale‖ on 
the other side, enabling the calculator to read off cosines and multiples of these without 
referring to trigonometric tables.114 He cut such scales into sections as long in degrees as 
                                               
110 Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900, 293-296; MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain, 56-72.   
111 In his case his view on residuals was also linked this to his views on causality. For example, in ―The 
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the speed of the constituent being calculated and put these together side by side, see 
Figure 3.3. This meant it was possible to find the sums by drawing horizontal straight 
lines between the sections. In his description of this and other methods and schemes 
for calculation, he frequently gave practical details. For example in this case he stated 
that ―[t]he best procedure is to use paper ruled in quarter-inch squares with the vertical 
lines half an inch apart, and with one half-inch to a degree‖.115  
 
 Figure 3.3: Example scale for reading off cosines and multiples of these. An example of the specific new 
technologies of calculation Doodson introduced to compute tidal constituents.116  
 
Doodson repeatedly emphasised what he called the trustworthiness of his methods, 
discussing his error-checking procedures for calculations of predictions in detail and 
also claiming that his new methods reduced errors inherent in Darwinian harmonic 
analysis.117 The same emphasis was found in his otherwise more formal and 
mathematical article in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, where he also redeveloped the 
tide potential. There too he discussed his practices of calculation, emphasising not just 
how his methods were fully numerical and harmonic throughout, but also for example 
how his new notational scheme made the work easier, how he introduced checks on the 
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calculations and how arguments could be grouped to save on writing and calculations.118 
He thus used new practices of calculation to work out the theory of harmonic analysis 
and predictions, as well as how predictions were to be calculated in practice. He also 
used these new practicess as rhetorical tools in his articles and presentations. 
Doodson‘s work on the practices and technologies of calculation involved in tidal 
predictions meant he could manage a larger number of calculations than had been 
possible for Thomson, Darwin and other earlier tidal analysts, for example by using his 
abac to calculate and sum harmonic constituents.119 This in turn made it possible for 
him to look for further constituents (e.g. 29 for Liverpool) and include more constants 
and to account for more variation (or residuals) in the data, both when he re-developed 
the tide potential and when he analysed residuals in tidal gauge data. This thus provides 
a case study of the processes Warwick has outlined, whereby demands for increased 
accuracy from scientists (expressed in Lamb and Proudman‘s earlier report to BAAS), 
industry and military combined with new practices of calculation.120 These practices and 
technologies were used to rework the earlier version of the harmonic theory, using 
mathematical analysis techniques taught by Cambridge wranglers to Doodson during his 
studies at Liverpool University combined with computational analysis of tidal data, 
using techniques developed in mathematical laboratories in London during the war. 
Doodson linked calculations with theory, amending both to produce predictions which 
were closer to observations by including more of the variation in the data and which he 
could thus class as more accurate.  
However, the processes of institution building was also very important in this. 
Doodson‘s work on improving the accuracy of tidal predictions was set within the 
context of justifying and applying for funding. How he and Proudman communicated 
their work was a political business full of rhetoric regarding trust and the morals of 
using particular practices of calculation, e.g. whether it was acceptable to rely on existing 
theory or if it was necessary to look at the data anew. This is similar to the debates 
regarding precision measurement and demands for funding of physics laboratory 
                                               
118 Doodson, "The Harmonic Development of the Tide-Generating Potential." 
119 Doodson, "To Assist Works on the Tides," 218. 
120 Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory." 
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discussed by Gooday,121 with the difference that this was in another field, precision 
calculations, showing a wider applicability of his ideas. In their reports to BAAS 
Proudman and Doodson were justifying their own work by claiming that existing 
methods did not produce satisfactory results, and attempted to show that they could do 
better and thus deserved funding, supporting this argument by explaining in detail how 
their new practices of calculation worked.  Doodson‘s rhetoric of accuracy and trust was 
in this way underwritten by new practices of calculation. Without such open display of 
these new practices, the claims for new, more accurate, calculations of periodic tides 
would have been much less plausible.  
In the next chapter I will return to how TI were able to use this work on tidal 
predictions and practices of calculation as part of their institution building. All this work 
was however related to periodic tides. We now turn to TI‘s work on irregular 
meteorological effects. 
 
3.4 METEOROLOGICAL EFFECTS: RESIDUALS AND STATISTICAL 
CORRELATIONS 
As we saw in the previous chapter‘s discussion of the first annual report, investigations 
into meteorological effects on the tides were portrayed as a crucial aspect of increasing 
the general accuracy of tidal predictions in TI‘s First Annual Report. That the prediction 
of meteorological effects needed further work was also the view of  many others, as 
discussed earlier. TI claimed that earlier work had defined the problem but only 
produced qualitative results, which were sometimes conflicting, whereas they aimed at 
producing quantitative results, reducing meteorological effects ―to law‖.122 This section 
describes TI‘s early attempts at providing a formula to numerically predict 
meteorological effects on a daily basis. Later chapters will discuss their work and 
practices in much more detail, but here I introduce two key aspects of their work which 
remained important at TI until at least the late 1950s: the definition of meteorological 
effects as residuals and the use of statistical methods in TI‘s attempts to forecast such 
                                               
121 Gooday, The Morals of Measurement; Gooday, "Precision Measurement and the Genesis of Physics 
Teaching Laboratories in Victorian Britain." 
122 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Third Annual Report, 1922 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 
1922), 6.  
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effects. Both of these were rooted in TI‘s earlier work on tidal predictions and further 
back to Doodson‘s training and early career – how TI constituted meteorological effects 
as objects for scientific study was historically contingent. 
Statistical methods were introduced as soon as TI began work on meteorological 
effects, in 1920 when Doodson supervised a M.Sc. student, Frederick Williams Reece, 
writing a thesis on meteorological effects. Like TI itself this thesis was justified in terms 
of improving inaccurate tidal predictions for the benefit of shipping, in this case by 
attempting to produce a quantitative formula to correct for meteorological effects.123 
Much of Reece‘s thesis surveyed the earlier literature, concluding that most researchers 
had first calculated mean sea-level and mean barometric pressure over some fairly long 
period such as a month before trying to find relations between these two, which he 
claimed masked the immediate effect of local pressure on a specific tide.124 The use of 
means was also one particular practice of calculation, which reduced the amount of data 
to be compared in a particular way. Reece‘s original research concentrated on 
correlating pressure and sea-level, as earlier scientists had done, but he used statistical 
methods instead of comparing means taken over long periods. Reece, on Doodson‘s 
suggestion, used correlation tables as in figure 3.4 to link each measurement of sea level 
to the corresponding barometric measurement, instead of comparing means. In other 
words, Reece and Doodson introduced statistical practices of calculation which had not 
previously been used on the problem of meteorological effects.  
 
                                               
123 Frederick William Reece, "Variations in Mean Sea-Level" (M.Sc., University of Liverpool, 1921), 1-3. 




Figure 3.4: Example correlation table produced by Reece for his Master thesis under Doodson‟s 
supervision, correlating barometric pressure and sea level in Liverpool in November and December 1917125 
 
Doodson‘s work on meteorological effects depended on the analysis of residuals he had 
developed for periodic predictions. Formally, he defined the meteorological effect as 
                                               
125 Ibid., 54. 
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the ‗residual‘ remaining after astronomic  and other periodic constituents, such as 
shallow water effects, had been taken out off tidal gauge records. However, when 
working with meteorological effects, this residual was defined as the difference between 
periodic tidal predictions, ideally TI‘s improved ones, and tidal gauge records. How TI 
constructed surges as residuals in practice will be discussed in chapter five. Here I want 
to concentrate on the concept itself and I have therefore created an explanatory graph 
of a particular storm surge using data fromTI‘s archive, see figure 3.5. Defined as a 
residual a storm surge was the difference between the observed and predicted tide. For 
example, at 2am on the 17th of December 1917 the predicted tide at Southend was 17.5 
feet but the observed tide was 19.5 feet. The meteorological effect, defined as the 
residual, was then 2 feet (19.5-17.5).  
By defining meteorological effects as the residual of observed minus predicted sea level 
TI assumed it was possible to analyse tides and meteorological effects separately. In 
addition they structured the sea – or rather tidal gauge records – as calculable in a 
specific way, assuming that changes in the sea level/tidal gauge inscriptions could be 
straightforwardly divided into periodic tides and meteorological effects by simple and 
direct subtraction. The definition thus emphasised a dividing line between tides and 
meteorological effects in order to constitute surges as calculable objects.126 However, 
their definition thus did not just emphasise a dividing line, but a particular dividing line 
of direct subtraction done ‗vertically‘ at specific times.127 
 
                                               
126 Compare Lynch‘s discussion of how dividing lines were emphasised in representations of biological 
specimens. Lynch, "The Externalized Retina." 
127 While not a historical example, the contemporary definition of storm surges as ‗skew surges‘ instead of 
as Doodson‘s ‗vertical‘ residuals of observation minus prediction highlights that his structuring of his 
research object was one particular way of making the sea/tidal gauge record calculable. Skew surges are 
defined as the difference between the predicted high water level and the maximum observed sea level, 
whatever the timing of the two – the difference can be taken at an angle instead of vertically. For 
example, looking at the second high water, the maximum observed and predicted sea levels do not 
coincide. The maximum surge would be at 14hrs and -1.3 feet, whereas the skew surge is the maximum 
observed sea level, 16.6 feet at 3pm, minus the predicted high water level, 17.4 feet at 2pm, so 16.6-17.4 
= -0.8. The skew surge is considerable smaller than the surge. See  K. J. Horsburgh and C. Wilson, "Tide-




Figure 3.5: A storm surge defined as the residual, or observation minus prediction (obs-pred)128 
 
Defining storm surges as residuals was part of Doodson‘s wider programme of making 
tidal predictions more accurate, i.e. closer to observed tides, by reducing the residuals in 
his harmonic model. The way he did this was by sub-dividing it into smaller harmonic 
constituents or other variables such as meteorological effects. While Doodson was well 
aware that meteorological effects were causally quite different from the other residuals 
he identified, such as shallow water effects or other new constituents, he discovered 
them in similar manner and called them all residuals. However, while Doodson linked 
meteorological effects to other residuals by using the same term, residual, they were 
predicted in different ways. His revised harmonic model for prediction of tides was not 
designed to include meteorological effects – to use statistical terms, the model had no 
variables for meteorological effects so could not be expected to explain the variation 
caused by them. Instead he needed to find another way of dealing with meteorological 
effects to increase the accuracy of tidal predictions. 
                                               
128 Data from folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA, as in figure 5.2. This is a purely illustrative 
graph. TI did not display surges in this format, partly because of the process they constructed them 
through (explained in chapter five) but also because displaying the surge on the same scale as the tidal 
level minimises the former. The graph does however explain the concept. 
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Example residual: tidal data from Southend, from 15 hrs on the  
16th Dec until 23 hrs on the 17th Dec 1917
 123 
 
In 1922 much of TI‘s time was spent on meteorological effects and Doodson combined 
statistical methods with the idea of residuals to produce a forecasting formula for 
meteorological effects in Liverpool.129 Doodson continued the work begun with Reece, 
developing a numerical formula to ‗correct‘ the tidal predictions.130 He did this by 
calculating the residuals for a number of events affecting Liverpool, and then 
correlating these with local atmospheric pressure and to pressure gradients in two 
directions over the Irish Sea, assuming this relationship could be represented as a linear 
function.131 He used correlation tables and what he called the method of least squares to 
construct what is now called a multiple regression formula. Through this he first found 
―partial‖ correlations between two of the variables (the sea level residual, local 
barometric pressure and the two pressure gradients) at a time, and then a ―compound 
correlation coefficient,‖ representing the correlation between sea level and all of the 
meteorological variables in his formula.132 For Liverpool the final correlation coefficient 
was 0.859, a quite high value. In other words, Doodson further used new statistical 
practices of calculation, such as correlation, he had already introduced to storm surge 
science with Reece, and combined these with his emphasis on residuals to create 
forecasting formulae. In an article on this work, Doodson did not blackbox the method 
of least squares/multiple regression, but instead described it and its rationale in detail, 
for example giving the formula defining standard deviation.133 This shows that these 
statistical practices were new not only in storm surge science but also more broadly – 
Doodson did not expect other researchers to know it.  
Doodson continued this work on forecasting formulae in 1923, alongside other 
statistically based investigations on meteorological effects, for example into ‗time-
relations‘ – essentially, does the correlation between the different pressure 
measurements and sea level improve if they are not all taken at the same time? In 
Liverpool this was the case, as the greatest correlation between local pressure and sea 
                                               
129 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Third Annual Report, 1922, 5.  
130 He used a method developed by a Mr Jolly at the Ordnance Survey, which were interested in 
establishing mean sea level as a datum for their maps. Jolly later claimed Doodson was developing an 
almost identical method at the same time he was working on his method and that only luck got his own 
into print earlier, thus sharing the credit with Doodson. It was this simultaneously discovered method 
that Doodson developed further. The Earl of Ronaldshay et al., "The Tides and the Work of the Tidal 
Institute, Liverpool: Discussion," The Geographical Journal 63, no. 2 (1924): 146.  
131 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Third Annual Report, 1922, 6-7. 
132 Doodson, "Meteorological Perturbations of Sea-Level and Tides," 134.  
133 Ibid.: 130-133.  
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level was found if the sea level was taken three hours earlier than the pressure, while 
different time-relations existed between pressure gradients in various different locations 
and sea level in Liverpool.134 These investigations were aimed at making the forecasting 
formula more ‗accurate‘, which was what TI‘s funders were interested in.135 I will return 
to TI‘s use of this formula both in funding applications and for predictions in the next 
chapter. 
Defining meteorological effects as residuals in the way Doodson did was new, and in 
different contexts others used other definitions. For example, in 1926 HA Marmer 
(Assistant Chief, Division of Tides and Currents, US Coast and Geodetic Survey) 
discussed the effect of winds on tides, but compared the observed tide during one 
particular storm with the curve of mean tide, not the predicted tide for those particular 
dates. Again in 1932 Marmer compared observed tidal curves over five days but did not 
explicitly compare these with predicted tides.136 In both cases Marmer was more 
interested in the qualitative shape of the tidal curve and how this was changed by the 
effect of the wind. He was not after quantitative predictions the way TI were. In some 
work done for a short-lived BAAS committee in 1896, WH Wheeler had similarly 
compared storm surge events to mean water levels.137  
Doodson‘s definition of storm surges as residuals was a contingent choice linked to his 
wider project of improving the accuracy of tides and also his research methods and 
practices of calculation, especially the idea of residuals, he used for this wider 
programme. However, while Doodson wanted to improve predictions of both periodic 
and meteorological residuals, different methods were used on different residuals: 
periodic residuals were included in Doodson‘s harmonic model for tidal predictions 
while the meteorological ones were analysed separately, using different models of 
predictions. The latter predictive models were based on statistical correlations, which 
was a new practice of calculation in storm surge science. This usage of statistics was 
                                               
134 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Third Annual Report, 1922, 7. Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal 
Institute: Fourth Annual Report, 1923 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1923), 3. See also Doodson, 
"Meteorological Perturbations of Sea-Level and Tides." 
135 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Fourth Annual Report, 1923, 3.  
136 H. A. Marmer, The Tide (London: D. Appleton and Company, 1926); H. A. Marmer, "Tides and Tidal 
Currents," in Bulletin of the National Research Council: Physics of the Earth - V, Oceanography (Washington D.C.: 
The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, 1932). 
137 W.H. Wheeler, "The Effect of Wind and Atmospheric Pressure on the Tides," in Report of the Sixty-
Sixth Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science Held at Liverpool in September 1896 (London: 
John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1896).  
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linked to Doodson and his training and work experience in London, as well as to his 
earlier use of residuals as a particular practice of calculation to analyse tides. Using these 
practices Doodson was starting to construct particular chains of documents to constitute 
surges as calculable in particular ways, and – at least in theory – eventually predictable.138  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed how TI‘s researchers defined storm surges as residuals. This 
was in the context of a wider project of analysing tides for ever smaller residuals, in an 
attempt to try to improve the accuracy of periodic tidal predictions by incorporating 
further constituents revealed by these residuals. To do this, and to justify the funding 
they had been given by different actors, TI‘s researchers introduced new practices of 
calculation that increased the amount of calculations that could be done accurately in 
any given time, in order to be able to do more analysis and incorporate more 
constituents. These new practices of calculation, e.g. the use of calculator machines and 
new schemes of calculation, were introduced by Doodson, who had learnt them during 
academic, industrial and military work. His work to improve the accuracy of tidal 
predictions was linked not only to scientific research into the theory of tides, such as 
Proudman was doing, but also to demands for increased accuracy in tidal predictions 
from industry and the military, linked to an increase in the size of ships and to the First 
World War, e.g. Hydro‘s difficulties in predicting tides on the German coast.  
Schemes to increase ‗accuracy‘ have been studied repeatedly by historians of science, 
though they have predominantly concentrated on precision measurements.139 This and 
the preceding chapter has instead provided a case study of efforts to increase the 
accuracy of precision calculations, linking changing practices of calculation to demands 
for increased accuracy from different actors. This case study has developed Warwick‘s 
work on the importance of the use of practices of calculation in work aimed at 
increasing the accuracy of numbers generated from theories, as well as the links 
                                               
138 As will be discussed further in chapter five, my emphasis on the historical contingency of how 
scientific objects are constituted separates my work from Kalthoff and Lynch‘s. Lynch, "The Externalized 
Retina."; Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation." 
139 E.g. Gooday, The Morals of Measurement; Wise, "Introduction."; Hunt, "The Ohm Is Where the Art Is." 
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between this and demands not only from science but also from industry and military.140 
The case study has also added the importance of institution building. Justifying funding 
was a crucial aspect of Proudman and Doodson‘s use of terms such as accuracy and 
trust, as well as their use and written displays of practices of calculation. In addition, 
there were some tensions between justifying their funding from academic actors, such 
as BAAS, and industrial actors, such as the Booths. What the latter wanted was not 
necessarily what the first expected, and vice versa. These tensions manifested 
themselves in the struggle Proudman and Doodson undertook to convince their BAAS 
audience that their work was necessary. The next chapter looks further at the 
development of TI‘s patronage structure.  
                                               
140 Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory." 
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CHAPTER 4 (1923-28), THE USE OF NEW PRACTICES OF 
CALCULATION FOR PREDICTION AND PATRONAGE 
The previous chapter discussed TI‘s work to try to increase the predictability of tides 
and meteorological effects. In this short chapter we turn to how TI used the products 
of their labour, both to gain further patronage and to do predictions. Through this, the 
chapter discusses how TI‘s triangular patronage structure developed, and thus how the 
Institute was linked to military, industrial and academic actors. These relationships were 
repeatedly renegotiated during TI‘s first decade and were also linked to the work TI was 
doing. This work was focused on providing an increasing number of predictions of 
periodic tides as well as of meteorological effects. In this period increasing the 
predictability of storm surges was about providing corrections to tidal predictions 
provided to TI‘s shipping industry patrons. 
From 1923 onwards the Hydrographic Department (Hydro) became increasingly 
involved with TI by buying its tidal predictions. These purchases were TI‘s main 
connection to central government and the military and provided a source of steady 
income for the Institute. The role of tidal predictions in TI‘s work and budget until the 
1950s will be discussed in this chapter, discussing the contributions of different types of 
clients, for example almanac publishers and Hydro. 
 
4.1.1 A TURNING POINT FOR TI: 1923 AND SHIPPING PATRONAGE 
In 1923, as the Booths‘ funding was coming to an end, Joseph Proudman and Captain 
FW Mace, MDHB's Marine Surveyor and a member of TI‘s governing committee, 
prepared a funding bid based on TI‘s early work. This was presented to LSOA in April 
by Charles Booth and Charles Livingston, both of whom were members of both LSOA 
and TI's governing committee. LSOA had been formed in 1858 to lobby MDHB but 
quickly became active nationally too, for example providing evidence to Parliamentary 
Committees. Its membership consisted of leading liner companies and has been 
described as ―a ‗Who's Who‘ of the great names of both the Liverpool and national 
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shipping scene‖.1 It had a clear free trade and free sea stance, arguing for equal access 
for all ships to all ports and against taxation and state interventions in shipping.2 It thus 
represented the commercial interests of the shipping industry, especially large 
companies and deep sea liner companies; in other words shipping companies more 
likely to use large, deep ships, sensitive to the height of water. 
TI‘s ―appeal for subscription‖ to LSOA is also another example of how TI received 
funding by constructing the need and possibility of improving the accuracy of tidal 
predictions. The appeal was closely targeted, arguing that knowledge of tides was 
needed first and foremost for shipping, especially for large vessels such that members of 
LSOA were likely to own and manage. It claimed that ―navigation in shallow water … is 
vitally dependent on accurate predictions on the depth of water‖, and that inaccurate 
predictions caused dangers, delays and expense for shipping. Present predictions were 
said to be ―susceptible to much improvement‖ and the appeal claimed that ―[i]n spite of 
the great increase in the size of ships little advancement in the accuracy of tidal 
prediction has been made for forty years‖. To improve this situation a permanent 
research institute was said to be necessary. Giving examples of TI‘s early work, such as 
how their work had led to the ―discovery‖ of a particular shallow water effect that could 
affect Liverpool‘s tides by nine inches, TI were said to have made a very good start at 
being such an Institute, but it now needed support to put this work into practice.  While 
the appeal also mentioned that tidal knowledge was needed to solve ―problems of dock, 
harbour, river and coastal engineering‖ and was of ―great scientific importance‖, linked 
with seismology, geodesy and astronomy, the emphasis was very much on improving 
the accuracy of tidal predictions for shipping purposes.3  
In this appeal TI‘s supporters were arguing that with a grant from the shipping industry 
the Institute could put their earlier researches, described in the previous chapter, into 
practice. This, it was argued, would result in less danger for the ships LSOA‘s members 
owned and managed and thus less costs for their companies. The appeal continued and 
                                               
1 Maritime Archives and Library, Information Sheet 51, Liverpool Steamship Owners Association, 
http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/maritime/archive/pdf/Business-
Liverpool%20Steamship%20Owners%20Association,%20Source%20Guide%20no51.pdf, accessed 31st 
Oct 2009. 
2 Leslie Hughes Powell, A Hundred Years On : History of the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, 1858-
1958 (Liverpool: Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association, 1958). 
3 ―Tidal Institute,‖ Appeal attached to LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, (illegible date) April 
1923, Vol 29, D/SS/2/4, MMM 
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widened the institution building strategy Proudman had begun to use perhaps with the 
Booths and definitely in TI‘s first annual report, further emphasising those aspects of 
TI‘s research programme of appeal to shipping men. The strategy worked and from 
1923 until at least 1930 LSOA ―unanimously‖ gave grants to TI. In 1923 the grant was 
£1200 after which it gradually decreased, for example in May 1928 LSOA gave them 
£250, as TI‘s other income increased.4 In their appeal, TI‘s researchers said laid out 
their planned programme of work, to be done if they received a grant. This was 
generally aimed at improving tidal predictions. In particular, TI promised to provide 
forecasts of meteorological effects in Liverpool within a year, using the forecasting 
formula they had developed.5  
 
4.1.2 MDHB AND THE GOVERNANCE OF TI 
During the first decade of TI‘s existence its governance structure was in constant flux, 
and 1923 was one of the many turning points. Though there had been a strong 
contingent of shipping men, consisting of the Booths and representatives of MDHB, 
on it, academic representatives initially had numerical dominance of TI‘s governing 
committee.6 This changed in 1923, when MDHB and the University formed a Joint 
Committee to govern TI and Liverpool Observatory. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century MDHB had been charged by Parliament to maintain 
an Observatory. The Liverpool Observatory had been started in 1845 and was 
responsible for astronomical, seismographic and meteorological measurements in 
Liverpool as well as chronometer testing. It had moved to Bidston Hill, across the 
Mersey on the Wirral peninsula, in 1864. In December 1922 the University, which 
already had strong links to the Observatory,7 approached MDHB to discuss ―the 
possibility of closer co-operation between the Board and the University in the 
administration and activities of [the Observatory and TI], on the grounds both of 
                                               
4 No conditions appear to have been attached to the grants. How the grants decreased can be seen in the 
table in the Appendix. LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, 17th July 1923, Vol 29; and LSOA 
General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, 21st May 1928, Vol 36, D/SS/2/4, MMM . Also TI‘s ledger, S2147, 
LUA 
5 ―Tidal Institute,‖ Appeal attached to LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, p. 3, (illegible date) 
April 1923, Vol 29, D/SS/2/4, MMM  
6 See chapter 2, note 101 and 102  
7 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 152. 
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usefulness and economy‖.8  The University saw a dramatic increase in students 
following the war which led to pressure for rooms, teaching staff and funding,9 and it 
wanted to save money.  In return MDHB suggested that they and the University should 
set up a Joint Committee, governing both TI and the Observatory, and also offered the 
University use of the Observatory building free of rent, stating that the Board would 
continue to maintain the building ―in good and sufficient repair‖.10  
The University agreed, and entered into an agreement with MDHB. Under this 
agreement the two organisations kept their finances and staff separate, but were 
governed by a Joint Committee with the same members.11 After the implementation of 
the Joint Committee of MDHB and the University in 1923 TI‘s earlier committee was 
slimmed down to ten members, five appointed by the University and five appointed by 
MDHB. As the University representatives included Charles Booth, whose affiliation was 
both that of Booth Steamship Co. and Vice-President of the University Council, the 
numerical advantage was now with shipping men. A new Admiralty representative, tidal 
super-intendent Harold Warburg, was also part of the University contingent, further 
shrinking the number of academics.12  
With this agreement and with LSOA‘s funding, the importance of the shipping industry 
as a patron of TI, both financially and in its governance, was emphasised. As the appeal 
to LSOA made clear this industrial patronage was linked to TI‘s early work on 
predicting storm surges and periodic tides. TI received patronage from LSOA and 
MDHB because these organisations had been convinced (by TI‘s rhetoric as well as 
other factors) of the need for improved predictions, which TI were able to successfully 
argue they could provide on the basis of their earlier work. This thus linked their 
patronage to their introduction of new practices of calculation.  
                                               
8 MDHB Finance Committee Minutes, 5th Dec 1922, MDHB MP/10/42, MMM 
9 Kelly, For Advancement of Learning : The University of Liverpool, 1881-1981, 188, 245. 
10 MDHB Finance Committee Minutes, 5th Dec 1922, MDHB MP/10/42, MMM 
11 Agreement text, attached to letter from Proudman to Warburg, 15th Jun 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO 
12 The University representatives were Charles Booth, Proudman, Professors Johnstone and Wilberforce, 
and Warburg. The Board representatives were Plummer from the Observatory, F W Mace (MDHB‘s 
marine surveyor), Charles Livingston and two new shipping men: H Concanon and H F Fernie. In 1927 
Concanon was replaced by L A P Warner (General Manager and Secretary of the Board) and in 1928 
Plummer died and was replaced by A B Cauty (of the White Star Line and a member of the Board). 
Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Fifth Annual Report, 1924 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 
1924); Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Eighth Annual Report, 1927; Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal 
Institute: Ninth Annual Report, 1928 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1928). 
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There were continued links between TI‘s research programme and its patronage. In line 
with the needs of TI‘s major patrons, the researchers at TI continued to do much work 
on improving tidal analysis and predictions. This work was formally presented to their 
patrons each year in TI‘s Annual Reports. For example, TI‘s Annual Report in 1927 
discussed some work Arthur Doodson had done to include further constituents into his 
method of analysis of records. It also stated that ―much has again been done on the 
analysis of observations and on allied questions of research, while theoretical dynamical 
investigations have been continued‖.13 This quote emphasises how they combined work 
on analysis and predictions, and theoretical work. Both types of work, on predictions14 
and on tides in theoretical seas15 resulted in articles in academic journals. Such 
publications ensured that TI‘s work, whether on predictions or Laplacian theory of 
tides, could be portrayed as scientific and academic. TI tried to balance the work and 
image of a scientific institute with producing an increasing number of predictions and 
working on the accuracy of these.  
Another way TI used its work on tidal predictions was to actually produce forecasts and 
sell them. At this time tidal predictions were published not only by HM Nautical 
Almanac Office but also by commercial publishers, often small specialised ones like 
Glasgow-based Brown, Son & Ferguson which had begun publishing their Brown‘s 
Nautical Almanac in 1876.16 Nautical almanacs contained tables (e.g., of tidal predictions 
and astronomical information) and other information used by sailors to navigate. The 
information was either compiled from a range of sources (including Hydro) or written 
and computed by staff employed directly by the publishers. In the early 1920s Holden‘s 
Almanack, a nautical almanac from Liverpool, commissioned TI to produce tidal 
predictions for Liverpool. TI also saw their production of these predictions in 1923 as a 
                                               
13 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Eighth Annual Report, 1927, 3. 
14 For example, Joseph Proudman and Arthur Thomas Doodson, "The Principal Constituent of the Tides 
of the North Sea," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A 224(1924); Arthur Thomas 
Doodson, "Perturbations of Harmonic Tidal Constants," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A 
106, no. 739 (1924); Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Application of Numerical Methods of Integration to 
Tidal Dynamics," Geophysical Journal International 1, no. s10 (1928); Arthur Thomas Doodson, "The 
Analysis of Tidal Observations," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A 227(1928). 
15 Such as Joseph Proudman and Arthur Thomas Doodson, "On the Tides in an Ocean Bounded by Two 
Meridians on a Non-Rotating Earth," Geophysical Journal International 1(1927). 
16 Brown, Son and Ferguson Ltd, "Our history", http://www.skipper.co.uk/history.htm, last accessed 05/03/2011. 
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research project in itself.17 Such developments and use of TI‘s earlier research on 
predictions led to further changes in 1923. 
 
4.2.1 STATE AND NAVAL PATRONAGE 
In 1923 the importance of tidal predictions for TI‘s research programme and patronage 
was enhanced further by Hydro becoming increasingly involved in TI‘s finances and 
governance, through an agreement to purchase predictions. This section will set that 
agreement within a context of gradually increasing co-operation between TI and Hydro, 
in part by proxy through other state actors. 
 
4.2.2 TI’S DSIR-GRANTS 
Starting in 1921 TI received grants from DSIR for three years. This section will discuss 
TI‘s application for these grants, emphasising the role of the Navy in this, which 
provides a window into Hydro‘s views of TI at this point, and the gradual growth in 
closeness between the two organisations. TI‘s application to DSIR in early summer 
1920 used the by now familiar arguments that TI would fulfil scientific research needs 
in geodesy as well as assist the shipping industry by reducing dangers and costs to it, by 
decreasing the difference between tidal predictions and observations. Initial discussions 
within DSIR were supportive of the application, though it was adjusted downwards by 
TI to £600, as this was the amount they expected to raise from other sources.18 DSIR‘s 
standard practice was to give a ‗pound for pound‘ grant equal to money raised from 
industry or other sources.19 When deciding on TI‘s application, DSIR consulted other 
departments, including the Admiralty. With Admiralty support for TI‘s application, 
DSIR prepared a request to the Treasury for pound for pound grant of £600.20 The 
Treasury grudgingly agreed to this.21 TI continued to receive DSIR grants until 1923/24. 
                                               
17 Doodson to Warburg, 7th Jun 1923, H 4038/23, UKHO 
18 DSIR 36/13/4 ―University of Liverpool, Tidal Institute, Grant-in-Aid 1920-21‖, NA 
19 Varcoe, Organizing for Science in Britain; Rose and Rose, Science and Society. 
20 DSIR 36/13/4 ―University of Liverpool, Tidal Institute, Grant-in-Aid 1920-21‖, NA 
21 The Treasury, who had only been given information on the objectives of the institute, thought it had 
―some 'pure research' value for mathematicians‖, that the ―Admiralty value it (as a charge on other 
people's vote)‖ and that it might be of interest to the Ministry of Transport, who according to a 
newspaper article might be interested in tidal power using a barrage over the Severn estuary. The Treasury 
 133 
 
This withdrawal of state funding, with DSIR claiming it should be replaced by shipping 
industry funding, had been intended from the start, with DSIR arguing that their grant 
was aimed to help TI do work which would ―secure to the Institute a full measure of 
support from the shipping firms and other bodies interested‖.22 As discussed above, TI 
did find shipping support and thus became ‗self-supporting‘, making it an unusual case 
among DSIR supported institutions.23 
The most interesting aspect of DSIR‘s grant is the role of the Navy, as while the grant 
ostensibly was funding from the civil state, it was only with support from the Admiralty 
that DSIR gave TI a grant, so in as sense this was naval patronage by proxy. The view 
put forward by the Admiralty when consulted by DSIR stemmed from the 
Hydrographic Department, especially from Warburg. Those within the Admiralty who 
had been contacted by DSIR in turn consulted the Hydrographer, who then consulted 
Warburg.  
Warburg‘s response to DSIR‘s consultation, which in the end supported TI‘s 
application, curiously also provides an example of the distance between Hydro and TI 
at this point. He began by claiming that since Hydro‘s Tidal Branch had been set up in 
1912 there had been a dramatic increase in tidal work, and argued the best way to meet 
this demand would be to set up a tidal prediction section within Hydro, doing both 
―scientific and practical‖ work, but this would require investment and a trebling of the 
staff numbers. He then went on to list a number of institutions and individuals who did 
tidal work, not just Hydro and TI but also Manchester University, the National Physical 
Laboratory, the Ordnance Survey, Messrs. Roberts and Son, and private individuals. 
Warburg saw no ―general reason‖ why TI should be picked out for preferential 
treatment from these institutions and in fact favoured money to be spent on co-
ordination of departmental work on tides, perhaps through a ―properly equipped Tidal 
Branch‖ or development of the work at NPL rather than to ―subsidise non-official 
                                                                                                                                     
had not been given information as to why the Admiralty and DSIR felt the research was of value or 
information on the promised benefits to naval and merchant shipping. The Treasury‘s reaction to TI‘s 
application, doubting the value of its research, shows the importance to TI of framing its research as 
essential to shipping if it was to be appreciated. T 161/74 ―Tidal Institute, Liverpool. Grant-in-aid‖, NA 
22 Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research for the Year 1923-
24, Cmd. 2223 (London: HMSO, 1924), 34; Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research for the Year 1920-21, Cmd. 1491 (London: HMSO, 1921), quote p68.  
23 Others have claimed few DSIR supported institutions became self-supporting, see Varcoe, Organizing 
for Science in Britain; Rose and Rose, Science and Society, 40-44. For more on DSIR, see Hull, "War of 
Words."; Clarke, "Pure Science with a Practical Aim."  
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investigations‖.24 There are two issues at stake here. Firstly, Hydro did not at this point 
see TI as an institution that generally deserved special treatment or had any particular 
relationship to Hydro or the state. Secondly, Warburg was also arguing for an increase 
in funding for his own branch of the Hydrographic Department. 
Having said all that, Warburg then turned around and argued that the application from 
TI was a special case that should be given a grant, though with the condition that their 
research programme should reflect Hydro‘s priorities. The key behind this switch was 
that TI were already doing work suggested by Hydro, e.g. on tidal predictions for the 
BAAS reports and on assessing the accuracy of machine predictions as discussed in the 
previous two chapters. He emphasised that DSIR‘s grant should be conditional upon TI 
doing work ―of practical value as agreed to by the Hydrographer‖.25 While the 
Admiralty was very supportive of TI in its official letter to DSIR, saying the work was 
of ―considerable importance‖ to them, they endorsed Warburg‘s recommendations for 
placing conditions on the research, asking TI to focus on specific areas such as ―the 
investigation and elimination of errors in harmonic tidal predictions and predicting 
machines‖.26 In return for state patronage from another department‘s budget Hydro 
wanted influence over TI‘s research programme. 
Warburg‘s report reflected a gradual increase of Hydro interest and involvement in TI‘s 
work. While TI did not get money direct from Hydro and was not in 1920 seen as an 
institution that generally deserved state support, Warburg thought that their work should 
be supported as long as it was ‗practical‘ and under the influence of themselves, so 
supported TI‘s application for a state grant for this work. However, while Hydro 
advised on TI‘s research programme following the DSIR grants, they were only 
marginally more involved in this than before the grant.27 A greater increase in this – and 
also the abandonment of Warburg‘s dreams of a much enlarged tidal branch – came in 
1923. 
 
                                               
24 Minute by Warburg, 26th Aug 1920, HD 1472/20, UKHO 
25 Minute by Warburg, 26th Aug 1920, HD 1472/20, UKHO 
26 Admiralty to Secretary, 8th Oct 1920, DSIR 36/13/4 ―University of Liverpool, Tidal Institute, Grant-in-
Aid 1920-21‖, NA 
27 Documents in HD 1472/20, UKHO 
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4.2.3 INCREASED HYDRO PATRONAGE: THE COMMISSIONING OF TIDAL 
PREDICTIONS 
As was discussed in chapter two, Hydro was concerned with the quality of the 
predictions they bought from Messrs. Roberts & Son.28 By 1923 the contacts between 
TI‘s researchers and Hydro had strengthened to the extent that Warburg claimed that 
Proudman regularly wrote informally of developments to him.29 TI had not been 
mentioned as a potential alternative source of predictions during the debate regarding 
Messrs. Roberts & Son in 1920, but by 1923 this had changed. In 1923 some of the 
Roberts predictions contained large errors for the last four months of 1924 for four 
ports, including London and Liverpool. Embarrassingly the predictions for London had 
been sent to the US and were in print there before the errors were identified, resulting 
in profuse apologies from Hydro to their US counterpart.30 At the same time TI had 
compared their new predictions for Liverpool (done on commission for Holden‘s 
Almanack and as part of their own research) with Messrs. Roberts & Son‘s. Having 
identified the existence of an error they had immediately sent a letter to Hydro, 
enclosing tables of TI‘s and Roberts‘ Liverpool predictions for January and November 
so Hydro could compare them. TI also provided Hydro with examples of how they had 
made ―exhaustive and satisfactory tests ... of the accuracy of our work‖.31 TI both 
showed their own reliability and Messrs. Roberts & Son‘s unreliability in this letter, 
using a display of their practices of calculation to underwrite this message. 
Following this incident, Warburg produced a report listing mistakes made by Messrs. 
Roberts & Son in recent years, discussing how their work contained clerical errors, only 
some of which could be detected through checks at Hydro. Warburg was not arguing 
that Messrs. Roberts & Son‘s method of predicting tides was poor, but that the firm 
made too many mistakes in their calculations and that they did not check their work 
sufficiently – their practices of calculation were deemed too unreliable rather than 
faulty. Warburg argued that these issues with their work meant that the question of 
                                               
28 Documents in file HYD 587/1921, within file H4434/23, UKHO 
29 Report to Hydrographer, 26th Jun 1923, H 4038/23, UKHO 
30 Minutes and correspondence in H 4038/23, UKHO 
31 These checks were done by calculating the mean of the interval between the time of Upper Transit at 
Greenwich (an astronomical event) and that of the predicted high water times. The mean interval of TI‘s 
predictions was then compared with the mean intervals calculated using other, fast, methods. If the 
different means were close, as in the case of TI‘s calculations, this indicated that the calculations had been 
done correctly. Doodson to Warburg, 7th Jun 1923, H 4038/23, UKHO 
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finding an alternative source of predictions should be re-opened, having been closed in 
1920. In addition, he argued that while in 1920 there had been only two options 
available, either using Messrs. Roberts & Son or bringing the calculation of tidal 
predictions in-house, there was now a third: commissioning predictions from TI.32   
Proudman had informally let Warburg know that TI was considering purchasing a tidal 
predictor machine to start producing predictions. Warburg argued Hydro should 
purchase these predictions. To the Hydrographer he wrote that while such a move was 
likely to ―end for all time any hope‖ of a tidal predicting branch at the Admiralty, he 
thought it was likely to lead to satisfactory predictions. He gave two reasons for this: 
first, ―the two leading scientific authorities in the country on modern tidal work‖ would 
be involved, and, second, ―the good name of the University being involved‖. That the 
University was involved was crucial as it meant that TI was neither state nor private, 
which mattered as Hydro had concerns about the possibility of sudden changes in price 
and availability when dealing with private businesses. On the other hand, Warburg 
argued that a university-based business would not face the ―prejudice‖ he thought state-
run commercial businesses met, so as a university-based business TI was more likely to 
attract customers than a state-based equivalent at Hydro would be.33 Using TI was also 
likely to be cheaper for the department than setting up its own calculation office.34 
Having apparently given up hope of extending his own tidal branch, Warburg presented 
TI as the relatively cheap solution to concerns they had regarding the provision of 
predictions. Hydrographer Learmonth put the case for TI similarly: ―all the advantages 
to be expected from the provision of an Admiralty machine will be obtained without 
the disadvantage of expenditure from Government funds‖.35 
Later that year, after the formation of the Joint Committee of the University and 
MDHB, Proudman sent a formal question to Hydro whether they would consider 
purchasing predictions from TI.36 Hydro straight away told TI they would buy their 
predictions. Indeed, they offered not only to give TI all the new work on analysis and 
predictions Hydro wanted done, but also to gradually transfer their existing out-sourced 
                                               
32 Memorandum to Hydrographer, by Warburg, 26th Jun 1923, H 4038/23, UKHO 
33 He did not identify potential customers, but these included almanacs and port authorities both in 
Britain and elsewhere. 
34 Memorandum to Hydrographer, by Warburg, 26th Jun 1923, H 4038/23, UKHO 
35 Minute by Learmonth, Hydrographer, 16th Jul 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO 
36 Proudman to Hydrographer, 27th Jun 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO 
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work to TI, so that eventually TI would be doing all of Hydro‘s tidal contracts.37 With 
this Hydro offered to become a major patron of TI, providing a steady income in return 
for good value predictions on a long-term basis. They however laid down a number of 
conditions for this, asking for a detailed technical description of the proposed machine, 
various financial reassurances,38 and also a commitment of permanence. As Proudman 
thought they would, the Governing Committee ―at once appreciate[d] the opportunity it 
gives for the future of the Institute‖ and the University and TI agreed to Hydro‘s 
various demands.39 This included the University Council passing a resolution dictated by 
Hydro when it thought the University‘s first attempt at providing a commitment of 
permanence was not definite enough. This resolution prescribed that three years notice 
must be given (or three years worth of predictions offered at normal rates) by TI if it 
wanted to cease providing predictions.40 Hydro had a number of longstanding 
relationships and contracts with outside organisations, for example with JD Potters, the 
agent selling Hydro‘s charts, and TI had now been added to these.41  
As part of the discussions regarding the creation of a Joint Committee to govern TI and 
the Observatory and the informal discussions regarding their potential purchase of 
predictions, Hydro had been invited to send a representative. Initially they hesitated, but 
once the agreement regarding predictions was shaping up they decided that to have a 
representative on the governing committee would allow them a desirable level of 
influence. Such a representative from the tidal branch could ―to some extent, supervise 
Admiralty tidal work being carried out at the Institute and ensure that charges were 
reasonable; personal discussion with the scientific authorities on tidal matters would 
also be of great advantage‖.42 With this move Hydro became not only a major financial 
patron of TI but also directly involved in the governance of the Institute, giving Hydro 
influence over TI‘s operation and work, both formally and informally through ―personal 
discussions‖ that could potentially influence the tidal work at both TI and Hydro. 
                                               
37 Learmonth (Hydrographer) to Director of TI, 6th Sep 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO 
38 For example that Hydro would always be charged the lowest rate TI offered, e.g. if there were different 
rates charged to different clients. 
39 Notes and correspondence in H 4434/23, UKHO. They also purchased a tidal predictor at a cost of 
around £1500, with funds donated mainly from different shipping men and companies (£1200) but also 
BAAS (£300), see Tidal Institute Ledger, S2147, LUA. 
40 Learmonth (Hydrographer) to Registrar, 15th Nov 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO.  
41 Roger O. Morris, Charts and Surveys in Peace and War: The History of the Royal Navy's Hydrographic Service, 
1919-1970 (London: HMSO, 1995). 
42 Minute by Warburg, 9th Oct 1923, H 4434/23, UKHO 
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Warburg became Hydro‘s first representative in 1924, sitting as one of the five 
representatives selected by the University.43 
In summary, 1923 was an important year for TI, with changes to its financial and 
governance structure increasing both the naval and industrial patronage of TI‘s work. 
The industrial patronage from LSOA and MDHB has already been discussed: TI used 
the work done on tidal predictions and meteorological effects, discussed in the previous 
chapter, as rhetorical resources in arguments for increased patronage. The situation with 
Hydro and Holden‘s Almanack was somewhat different, as with these TI used their 
revised version of the harmonic method to provide tidal predictions in return for 
payment. To enlist Hydro as a financial patron TI told them the Institute was prepared 
to start producing predictions. This combined with other factors, such as the gradually 
built up relationship between Warburg, Proudman and Doodson, lack of resources 
within Hydro and the performance of competitors, in leading to them being offered the 
agreement by Hydro. By giving TI a long-term contract to provide them with tidal 
predictions Hydro were giving TI a secure income source which was to last for the 
entire period covered by this thesis and beyond. TI used rhetoric, negotiations and 
network-building to put their new practices of calculating tidal predictions into various 
uses (both direct and rhetorical), which in turn generated income. The next section 
looks at how they attempted to use their work on meteorological effects to produce 
predictions of these. 
 
4.3 TI‘S FIRST FORECASTS OF METEOROLOGICAL EFFECTS 
For TI, one important use of their work on meteorological effects was in the grant 
application to LSOA, where TI claimed that forecasts of meteorological effects would 
be introduced later in 1923 in the Liverpool area. What such forecasts were supposed to 
produce was a number to ‗correct‘ the tidal predictions for Liverpool with. Adding this 
number should decrease the residual between the predicted and measured height of the 
tides when the actual tides were affected by meteorological effects. The possibility of 
producing such forecasts was presented as a key reason for why LSOA should fund 
                                               




TI.44 Having been given funding from LSOA, TI then tried to use their formula to fulfill 
the promise they had made.  
Two attempts were made by TI to create a forecasting service, one late in 1923 and 
another in 1926. On both occasions Doodson was operationalising the forecasting 
formula he had earlier developed for meteorological effects in Liverpool. This method 
correlated the tidal residuals to local atmospheric pressure and to pressure gradients in 
two directions, predicting the error of mean tide level for one day. Though he wanted to 
develop the method further Doodson claimed in 1922 that even as it stood, applying 
the correction produced tidal predictions that were noticeably closer to observations.45 
This statement he supported by producing a graph, figure 4.1, comparing observed and 
predicted errors, or residuals. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: This diagram illustrates the results of TI‟s early forecasting formula for meteorological effects in 
Liverpool, comparing the observed “error”, i.e. storm surge effect or residual, in the mean tide for that day 
with the residual forecast by TI‟s formula46  
                                               
44 Appeal attached to LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, (illegible date) April 1923, Vol 29, 
D/SS/1/29  
45 Liverpool, "Tidal Institute: Third Annual Report, 1922," 6-7. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
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However, both forecasting attempts were deemed unsuccessful, the first one by TI and 
the second by MDHB, who claimed that uncorrected predictions were often closer to 
observations of high water than those corrected with TI‘s formulae.47 TI accepted 
MDHB‘s judgement after a brief discussion, though Doodson argued the forecasts were 
―a step in the right direction‖, particularly for large surges.48 In 1923 the blame for the 
unsuccessful predictions was laid on poor periodic tidal predictions which TI were not 
yet producing. They thought their own predictions would be closer to observations 
whatever the weather, which would mean the meteorological forecasts correcting the 
tidal ones would also be better.49 Another problem raised early on was a lack of 
meteorological information, which provided an argument to purchase a radio-telegraphy 
set.50 During the second attempt in 1926, blame was laid on the computer, though 
Doodson put it more politely, claiming he needed to keep a closer look on the 
calculations as they were being done.51 Particularly after the first attempt Doodson 
defended TI‘s work by framing the forecasts as an experiment in network building, 
claiming that an important aspect had been to test the practicality of transmitting the 
necessary meteorological and tidal information and the Met Office‘s skill at predicting 
pressure and wind. According to Doodson this networking had worked well. 52 
However, establishing that forecasting network had taken much work. This work was 
that of setting up a system that would combine what they deemed the right bits of 
information in the right way at the right time to produce the sought after corrections in 
time for them to be distributed to sailors.53 The information was not only tidal 
information but also meteorological, specifically wind speed and barometric pressure 
observations and predictions for three locations and different times.54 Acquiring this 
information took correspondence and negotiations with the Met Office, as well as work 
by them to produce and transmit this information.55 Before the second attempt in 1926 
the creation of the forecasting network also took purchase of equipment (a radio-
                                               
47 Captain Mace to Doodson, 2nd Dec 1926, Box 132, Bidston Archive 
48 Doodson to Mace, 1st Nov 1923, Mace to Doodson, 2nd Dec 1926, and Doodson to Mace, 10th Jan 
1927, Box 132, BA 
49 Doodson to Director at the Meteorological Office, 8th Dec 1923, Box 120, BA 
50 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Fifth Annual Report, 1924, 7. 
51 Doodson to Mace, 3rd Dec 1926 and 10th Jan 1927, Box 132, BA 
52 Doodson to Captain Mace, 1st Nov 1923, Box 132, Bidston Archive 
53 Doodson to Mace, 1st Nov 1923, Box 132, BA 
54 Doodson to the Director of the Meteorological Office, 4th Oct 1923, Box 120, Bidston Archive 
55 Correspondence between Doodson and the Met Office (variously the Director or Superintendent 
Dines) in October, November and December 1923, Box 120, BA 
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telegraphy set installed at Bidston in 1926)56 and a spatial re-arrangement of the 
forecasting network. In 1923 Doodson had had the meteorological information 
delivered to him at the University of Liverpool where the calculations of the correction 
had been made. For the second attempt the calculations were moved to the Liverpool 
Observatory at Bidston Hill. At this time the newly-acquired tidal predicting machine 
was already housed there and the Observatory had existing links with the Met Office as 
a provider of meteorological observations.57 This however meant that Doodson could 
not always be present when the calculations were made, as he was based some distance 
away at the University campus, which he claimed caused problems during the second 
forecasting attempt. 
There is no indication that the gradual decrease in LSOA‘s patronage to TI had 
anything to do with their failure to provide meteorological corrections that satisfied 
MDHB. In fact, it is more likely that it fell as TI simply asked for less and less money as 
other income went up.58 On the other hand, the most directly involved of TI‘s patrons, 
MDHB, maintained and in fact increased their relationship with TI at this time, as we 
will see next. TI‘s failure to keep its promise of delivering meteorological corrections to 
tidal predictions appears to have had very little effect on its patronage. Instead, that they 
repeatedly tried to use their formula for the benefit of shipping in Liverpool appears to 
have been enough to satisfy their patrons. By now they were closely connected with 
their patrons. The governing committee had been sufficiently involved in the network 
building, for example assisting in the purchase of the radio-telegraphy set, to know the 
amount of work that had gone into it these forecasting attempts. The closeness of the 
personal networks and the involvment of TI‘s patrons in the forecasting attempts seems 
the best explanation why the failures of the forecasts had little impact. 
 
4.4 FURTHER MDHB PATRONAGE: THE MERGER OF THE OBSERVATORY 
AND TI 
Here I continue to trace how TI‘s patronage structure was established, as this had not 
settled in 1923. The University and MDHB again renegotiated their relationship in 
                                               
56 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Seventh Annual Report, 1926, 6. 
57 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Fifth Annual Report, 1924. 
58 See the Appendix. 
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1928, merging the Observatory and TI. This section looks at how this came to be. As 
after the merger TI‘s patronage and governance structure remained almost unchanged 
until 1960 it also explains how TI‘s governance and finance worked during most of the 
period covered by this thesis. 
Debates favouring a complete merger of the Observatory and TI began soon after the 
introduction of the Joint Committee in 1923, when they were prompted by discussions 
to install the new tidal predictor as well as electricity and wireless at the Observatory for 
TI.59 The merger did not go ahead as the elderly Director of the Observatory, William 
Plummer, had no pension and therefore could not retire.60 However, co-operation 
increased and as we saw above TI started to make increasing use of the Observatory 
building, both to house the tidal predictor machine and also for their predictions of 
meteorological effects.61 
Following the death of Plummer in spring 1928, members of the two Joint Committees 
slowly negotiated an agreement to merge the two institutions in early 1929. The newly 
merged institute was called Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute (LOTI) but many 
actors continued to refer to the tidal side of the operation as TI or the Tidal Institute, as 
will I. Though many details would change the basic financial and governance structure 
set up in 1929 remained until 1960. The new governing committee paid salaries, other 
running costs, such as electricity and maintenance of equipment, and fulfilled MDHB‘s 
legal obligations to provide the services of an Observatory to the port.62 The University 
was on the governing committee and paid a small grant to TI, while MDHB contributed 
more substantially both financially and in kind, by maintaining the Observatory building 
it lent without charge to TI.63 The new LOTI Committee was very similar to the 
committee that had previously governed TI, though with 12 members, with a continued 
dominance of shipping men.64  
                                               
59 Minutes of the Marine Committee, 14th Jul 1924, p. 475, File M.P.13.18, MDHB Archive, MMM 
60 MDHB and the others involved were clearly not prepared to turf him out onto the streets without 
income. Notes by Warburg in H 835/27 and H 8761/23, UKHO 
61 E.g. LSOA General Minutes, part 2: 1920-1964, 17th July 1923, Vol 29; and LSOA General Minutes, 
part 2: 1920-1964, 21st May 1928, Vol 36, D/SS/2/4, MMM 
62 Liverpool Observatory Joint Committee, Minutes, 5th Nov 1928, D/BO 1/1/2, MMM – North Street,  
63 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 175. 
64 Minutes of the Finance Committee, 14th Nov, 1928, p 129, file 46, MDHB Archive, MMM. In 1929 the 
governing committee included three members of MDHB as well as the Board‘s chairman, its general 
manager, and its Marine Surveyor and Water Bailiff. The University was represented by Warburg, Charles 
Booth and four academics, including the University‘s Vice-Chancellor and three Professors (Proudman, J 
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This dominance of shipping men on the governing committee was the most 
contentious issue during the merger negotiations.65 Negotiations of the agreement took 
about half a year, with the proposed governance structure at stake.66 As the Board‘s 
duties regarding the Observatory were set down by an Act of Parliament MDHB‘s 
solicitors insisted that the chair of the committee must always be from MDHB and 
would have the deciding vote if the Committee was equally divided. This led to heated 
discussions which according to Warburg were about ensuring ―that the local prestige of 
neither side will suffer‖.67 MDHB and the University were negotiating about who 
should have more control and power over TI and its research programme. In the end 
MDHB, who was also providing most of the financial support, got their way, and the 
shipping industry was strongly represented with a deciding vote on TI‘s governing 
committee as well as in its income until 1960. 
Why were the actors involved in TI keen enough on this merger to insist on it despite 
these disputes and worries over? In the merger agreement the University and MDHB 
claimed the reason for the merger of the Observatory and the Tidal Institute was that 
they were ―desirous that the facilities which the Observatory and Tidal Institute afford 
for the advancement of knowledge and diffusion of science and learning may be 
extended and increased‖. In addition to these noble arguments the agreement would 
limit their financial liabilities, e.g. for MDHB by limiting its direct financial contribution 
to £1,500 per year.68 While the Observatory was somewhat short of cash and unlikely to 
find new ways of raising income,69 the Tidal Institute‘s income from tidal predictions 
was steadily increasing at this time and was expected to continue to do so, following the 
agreement with Hydro.  
                                                                                                                                     
Johnstone of Oceanography and LR Wilberforce of Physics). LOTI, Annual Report 1929 (Liverpool: 
University of Liverpool, 1929).  
65 LOTI, Annual Report 1930 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1930), 2. 
66 The main changes to the different written versions of the Agreement were procedural, for example the 
Marine Committee of MDHB insisted that the Joint Committee appoint as Secretary a Salaried Officer of 
MDHB as well as an Accountant, to be a Salaried Officer of the University, and also insisted that the new 
Joint Committee should include the Chairman of MDHB and the Vice-Chancellor of the University as 
ex-officio members. Liverpool Observatory Joint Committee, Minutes, 5th Nov 1928, D/BO 1/1/2; 
Minutes of Meeting of Joint Committee of MDHB and the University, 25th Jun 1928 and 30th Jul, D/BO 
1/1/1; and Liverpool Observatory Joint Committee, Minutes, 25th Jun 1928, D/BO 1/1/2, all in MMM – 
North Street. Minutes from University of Liverpool Council Meeting, 24th Nov 1928, Council Minute 
Book 16, S2223, LUA. Minutes of the Marine Committee, 26th Nov 1928, p. 402, File M.P.13.19, MDHB 
Archive, MMM. 
67 Minute by Warburg, 8th Nov 1928, H7452/28, UKHO.  
68 Liverpool Observatory Joint Committee, Minutes, 5th Nov 1928, D/BO 1/1/2, MMM – North Street 
69 Minutes of the Marine Committee, 22nd Oct 1923, p. 398, M.P.13.18, MDHB Archive, MMM 
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Proudman later argued that what TI gained from the merger was space, finance, prestige 
(by virtue of being associated with ―a prominent building‖) and stability in terms of 
governance.70 The spatial aspect of his argument is supported by him asking the Joint 
Committee for an additional room at the Observatory for use of TI‘s staff in late 1927, 
as the ―housing accommodation of the Institute‖ was ―inadequate‖. This is likely to 
have been due to the increased number of predictions TI were doing, employing more 
staff.71 The Vice-Chancellor argued for the merger to the Hydrographer, claiming it 
would allow all of TI‘s practical work to be done on one site and also that the 
Observatory‘s meteorological work would help work on meteorological effects.72 A 
merger would enable Doodson to take over Plummer‘s position as Director of the 
Observatory, thus giving TI access to the substantial financial contribution MDHB gave 
to the Observatory. This would enable TI to take on both an astronomically focused 
assistant, to do the work the Observatory had to do to fulfil MDHB‘s statutory 
responsibilities, and a tidal assistant to do routine prediction work so that more research 
could be done by Doodson, which Warburg at Hydro saw as beneficial.73 Nobody 
appears to have argued against the merger.  
For TI the merger was deemed beneficial from a financial and spatial point of view, and 
it was thought a merged LOTI could produce more research, with meteorological 
effects singled out as an area that could benefit. With the merger of the Observatory 
and TI, the patronage and governance structure that would remain until 1960 had 
settled. Within this structure the local shipping industry was a key patron of TI, which 
makes TI an unusual case within history of oceanography, and also made tidal 
predictions a key part of what they did and worked on. 
 
                                               
70 Proudman to Vice-Chancellor Mountford, 29th Oct 1959, P744/5, LUA.  
71 The Observatory agreed, giving the Institute rent-free use of the Clock Room, with the proviso that the 
present instruments (clocks and a wireless set) were to stay and the Observatory have access to these 
instrument at all times. Proudman was happy with this arrangement. Minutes of Meetings of Joint 
Committee of MDHB and the University, 16th Nov 1927 and 19th Mar 1928, D/BO 1/1/1, MMM – 
North Street. 
72 Vice-Chancellor to Hydrographer, 4th Dec 1928, H7452/28, UKHO 
73 See various notes and minutes by Warburg in H 8761/23 and H 835/27, UKHO 
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4.5 THE ROLE OF TIDAL PREDICTIONS IN TI‘S FINANCE, 1920S – 1950S 
To enable the rest of the thesis to focus on TI‘s storm surge work, this section 
considers the role of tidal predictions in TI‘s finance up until the end of the 1950s, and 
also discusses some of their non-storm surge work in this period. By mid-December 
1923 TI was receiving its first instructions from Hydro to provide predictions under the 
new arrangement between the two organisations.74 Thereafter the number of 
predictions gradually increased, with a step change at the end of the 1920s when the 
Roberts family sold their tidal predictor machine and business to TI at the death of Mr 
Roberts senior.75 The slow increase in predictions then continued until another step 
change during the Second World War (see section 6.3 for analysis of this). The graph in 
Figure 4.2 illustrates this development. By the late 1950s they were providing full 
predictions, giving times and heights of both high and low water, for over 180 ports, as 
well as a substantial number of less comprehensive predictions, making TI one of the 
largest providers of tidal predictions in the world.76 
 
                                               
74 Notes and correspondence in H 4434/23, UKHO 
75 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory. 
76 It is difficult to give an exact number for the less comprehensive predictions, but Scoffield quotes 600 




Figure 4.2: The number of full tidal predictions prepared by TI for each year 1924-1962. Predictions were 
made one or two years in advance, so the numbers represent work done a couple of years earlier. Numbers 
are for full predictions made for „standard ports‟ prepared using the harmonic method, and do not include 
less comprehensive predictions prepared for almanacs (made using a simpler method).77  
 
Such tidal prediction and analysis work gradually became the backbone of TI‘s finance.78 
Hydro commissioned many of the predictions TI made, either directly or by acting as an 
agent, e.g. for port authorities or dominions, but some clients went direct to TI.79 I 
mentioned above that TI had been commissioned to calculate tidal predictions for 
Holden‘s Almanack in Liverpool. Such commissions from almanacs also increased over 
                                               
77 Based on information in LOTI‘s Centenary Report and Annual Reports 1940-1945, and on LOTI‘s 
Annual Reports from the period 1946-1960, published in Liverpool by the University of Liverpool (after 
1958 published by C. Tinling and Co. Ltd.). 
78 TI‘s ledger, S2147, LUA. 
79 ―The Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute‖, Draft article for The Dock and Harbour Authority, 
Proudman to Roberts, 16th May 1935, D/BO 5/1/1, MMM – North Street. As an example of how 
Hydro‘s agency role worked, the very first predictions TI made under the 1923 agreement included a few 
for ports in New Zealand. The order had already been sent to Hydro, who decided to give the contract to 
TI. Hydro sent TI the order and the necessary tidal information (e.g. constituents for the ports). Once the 
predictions had been made by TI these were sent to Hydro, together with the accounts. Hydro checked 
the predictions, passed these onto the High Commissioner for New Zealand and certified TI‘s accounts. 
The accounts went back to TI, who sent them to the High Commissioner which then paid for the 
predictions. Notes and correspondence in H 3662/24, UKHO 
The number of full predictions prepared by 





















































































































the years.80 Table 4.1 shows the gradual increase in income from what TI‘s ledger and 
accounts calls ―commercial work‖ as well as the contributions from the primary 
components of this work: tidal analysis and predictions. The table also indicates the 
increase in TI‘s reserve account between 1929 and 1957, indicating the generally healthy 
state of TI‘s finance. During and just after the Second World War TI‘s commercial 
income increased dramatically, but even before this date TI‘s overall financial balance 
had been so strong that they between 1938 and 1951 repaid a substantial part of a grant 
they received from MDHB.81 For example, in 1947 TI‘s commercial income was £5079 
and they returned £500 of their £1500 grant to MDHB, still leaving them with a reserve 
account balance of £7695. The commercial work paid for itself and often made a profit. 
It made TI relatively secure financially, though they also continued to receive support 
from the University and MDHB. 
  
                                               
80 For example, there was a sharp rise in the number of places for which predictions were specially 
prepared for almanacs during the Second World War, from 20 places in 1941 to 59 in 1945, when over 30 
publishers of almanacs bought predictions from TI. see LOTI, Centenary Report and Annual Reports (1940-
1945) (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1945), 22.  
81 In 1938, the 1929 LOTI merger agreement was amended to allow part of TI's surplus to be returned to 
MDHB, as long as the Reserve Fund was maintained at an 'adequate' level, by which was meant £2000 
together with the credit of the Income and Expenditure account. Minutes, LOTI Committee, 12 Dec 
1938, D/BO/2/1/3/2, MMM – North Street 
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1929 775 312 1781 1675 3456  1482 
1930 1225 255 1869 1650 3519  1858 
1931 1246 101 1867 1550 3417  2299 
1932 1174 173 1530 1550 3080  2254 
1933 1158 220 1593 1550 3143  2288 
1934 1103 76 1406 1550 2956  2353 
1935 1246 196 1779 1550 3329  2283 
1936 1361 327 1988 1550 3538  2381 
1937 1557 223 1973 1550 3523  2481 
1938 1540 342 2155 1550 3705 Unknown 2461 
1939 1803  2358 1550 3908 Unknown  
1940 2539  3275 1550 4825 Unknown  
1941 2067 58 2611 1550 4161 Unknown 4278 
1942 2337 219 2631 1550 4181 500 4476 
1943 2619 97 3039 1550 4589 500 4894 
1944 3049 169 3338 1550 4888 1000 5020 
1945 4680 648 5965 1550 7515 1000 5265 
1946 3521 338 4220 1550 5770 1250 7416 
1947 3626 642 5079 1550 6629 500 7695 
1948 3513 1624 5782 1550 7332 500 8294 
1949 3889 581 4992 1550 6542 500 9378 
1950 4770 416 5850 1550 7400 500 6520 
1951      Unknown  
1952 5382 362 6547 2000 8547   
1953 6504 386 7915 2000 9915  6793 
1954 6831 1152 8325 2000 10325  7952 
1955 7021 390 7909 2000 9909  10213 
1956 7175 370 8295 2000 10295  8796 
1957 8305 638 10029 2000 12029  9258 
Table 4.1: Some of TI‟s income streams, the sum they returned to MDHB between 1938 and 1952 and the 
balance of TI‟s reserve account, all in pound by year. The label „commercial income‟ includes tidal 
predictions and analyses as well as income from providing meteorological information, “special tidal work” 
and other small income streams such as from tests (of instruments) or sale of publications. Grants were 
given by LSOA (only in 1929 and 1930), MDHB (£1500) and the University (£50 until 1951, £500 
thereafter).82  
                                               
82 Accounts 1929-38, D.BO 2/1/3/1 and Accounts 1942-57 (including figures from 1941), D.BO 
2/1/3/2, MMM - North Street. Either side of these dates the accounts are either not available or in a 
format that is not directly comparable, e.g. displayed in a different format and using a different financial 
year before 1929 (see Appendix for some financial information for this period). The accounts for 1951 
and 1952 are missing, though figures for 1952 were taken from the accounts for 1953. Accounts are also 
missing from 1939 and 1940 for which the commercial income has been calculated from the Revenue 
account summary, in Ledger, S2148, LUA. 
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TI‘s workers did not organise their predictions according to whether they were for a 
military, civil state or industrial client. Instead predictions were organised according to 
the place and type of prediction (a ‗full‘ one of or a less full one). While they sometimes 
listed their clients in their annual reports, predictions were listed according to the type 
ordered, not the type of client.83 In addition, work done for or via the Navy and 
published in the Admiralty Tide Tables will have been used by merchant shipping just 
as much as by the Navy, and also for example by engineers and port authorities. TI‘s 
prediction work was commercial in the sense that it brought income to the Institute but 
the predictions themselves cut across any boundaries between military, civil state and 
industry. While TI‘s researchers portrayed it as a scientific institute, much of TI‘s work 
and income came from calculations that were linked less to the concerns of academics 
than to the concerns of those who used or tried to manage the sea, such as the Navy, 
merchant shipping and port authorities.  
Because TI‘s workers kept their records by the type of prediction and not by the type of 
the client, it is also difficult to get a sense of the importance of different groups of 
clients, such as the Admiralty versus almanacs and others. However, a rare analysis of 
TI‘s income from predictions by different regions gives a flavour of the scale of the 
importance of different group of clients, see table 4.2. In 1956 only 14% of TI‘s income 
from tidal prediction came directly from the Admiralty. A fifth of predictions were for 
named imperial countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which are likely to have 
been administered by the Admiralty. A third of TI‘s income came from almanacs , while 
another third came from ―elsewhere‖.  Other figures from the 1950s confirm that about 
a third of TI‘s income from predictions then came from almanacs.84 Unlike the 
Admiralty and MDHB, the almanacs were not directly represented on TI‘s governing 
                                               
83 For example, while organising their predictions by location, in 1933 TI also listed who they supplied 
analyses and full predictions to, namely to the following clients: Hydro; Anglo Saxon Petroleum Co.; 
Corporation of Bristol; L‘Adminstration des Ponts et Chaussées, Belgium; Port Director, Basra, 
Mesopotamia; Canadian Hydrographic Service; Crown Agents for the Colonies; Colonial Office; Donsink 
Observatory, Co. Dublin; Ministere de la Marine, Paris; Holden‘s Almanack; Harwich Harbour 
Conservancy Board; Survey of India and Hydrographer, Imperial Japanese Navy; Port of London 
Authority; London and North Eastern Railway Co.; Agent General for New South Wales; Queensland 
Government; Southampton Harbour Board; Agent General for South Australia; Sydney Harbour Trust; 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, USA; Agent General for West Australia and High Commissioner for New 
Zealand. It is noticeable that many, though not all, of TI‘s clients were from within the British Empire. 
LOTI, Annual Report 1933 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1933). 
84 "Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute", D.BO. 2/1/3/2, MMM - North Street 
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committee, but like them their primary interest in TI‘s work was in the provision of 
tidal predictions. 
 
Analysis of prediction income 1956 
Admiralty £1,000 14% 
Canada 752 10% 
Australia 540 8% 
New Zealand 168 2% 
Elsewhere 2440 34% 
Sub-Total £4,900 68% 
Almanacs 2275 32% 
Total £7,175  
Table 4.2: TI‟s income from predictions by region and type of client85 
 
The interest of so many of TI‘s funders in tidal analysis and predictions had an obvious 
impact of TI‘s research programme. They continued to regularly do work in this area, 
for example further developing the tidal predictor machines, finding ways of analysing 
for constituents from non-harmonic predictions of tides or where the tidal observations 
only listed high and low water heights and times.86 All this work resulted in further 
publications, both in academic journals87 as well as less academic publications such as 
the Admiralty manual of tides Doodson wrote together with Warburg, which summarised a 
non-harmonic method of predicting tides developed by the two, known as the 
Admiralty method.88 TI‘s research programme also included much other work, such as 
continuation of the theoretical work led by Proudman, the production of cotidal charts 
published by the Admiralty,89 work on currents, including measurements from ships for 
which Doodson devised a current meter, 90 and work criticising hydraulic models 
simulating tides.91 One aspect of their work was on storm surges. The rest of this thesis 
                                               
85 D.BO 2/1/3/2, MMM - North Street  
86 Arthur Thomas Doodson, "The Analysis and Prediction of Tidal Currents from Observations of Times 
of Slack Water," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A 121, no. 787 (1928); LOTI, Annual Report 
1950 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1950); LOTI, Centenary Report and Annual Reports (1940-1945); 
LOTI, Annual Report 1946 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1946), 5-6. 
87 For example Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Further Comments on the 19-Yearly Tide," Bulletin Géodésique 
(1946 - 1975) 55, no. 1 (1937). 
88 Harold Dreyer Warburg and Arthur Thomas Doodson, Admiralty Manual of Tides (London: H.M.S.O., 
1941). 
89 Arthur Thomas Doodson and Robert Henry Corkan, "The Principal Constituent of the Tides in the 
English and Irish Channels," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A 231(1933). 
90 See TI‘s Annual Reports from the 1930s. 
91 See correspondence in Box 129, BA 
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concentrates on this work on storm surges, especially that work related to making 
surges (as opposed to periodic tides) more predictable, in order to focus the thesis on 
how scientists and politicians have attempted to make irregular events more predictable.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed how TI used their work on tidal predictions and 
meteorological effects to gain funding. Through the use of this work, as well as through 
networking, patronage appeals and various negotiations between different actors, their 
funding gradually coalesced into a particular patronage structure which was quite stable 
between 1929 and 1960, supporting TI and its work. This and the previous two 
chapters have followed how this hybrid, triangular patronage structure came to be, by 
following developments at TI up to 1929. The three corners of TI‘s patronage were 
industrial, Navy and academic patrons. More and more of TI‘s funding came from 
selling tidal predictions, partly to industrial actors such as almanacs but importantly to 
Hydro, which provided a strong link to the Navy. While this formed the backbone of 
TI‘s finances, such a backbone would have toppled on its own, and TI received 
important support from other patrons. The industrial patrons – Liverpool shipping 
owners, primarily through MDHB and also through LSOA – became key, providing 
much funding and a building. Liverpool University provided a link to academic science, 
which was an important point in TI‘s favour for Hydro, and was involved in TI‘s 
governance but provided only limited funding.  
This hybrid patronage impacted on TI‘s work, much of which was focused on 
producing tidal predictions and making these ever more accurate. At the same time, its 
identity was as a scientific institution where academic research was done and published 
in scientific journals, for which the commercial work was ‗just‘ income.92 To TI this 
setup, as ―a scientific institution owned and run by businessmen [and the Navy]‖93, 
remained a viable (though at times debated, as I will discuss in later chapters) way to 
fund research for several decades. One of the MDHB representatives described 
                                               
92 For example, in 1945 in an annual report, Doodson and Proudman emphasised that TI‘s ―importance‖ 
came not from the analyses and predictions but from its academic tidal researches. LOTI, Centenary Report 
and Annual Reports (1940-1945), 13. 
93 Proudman to Mountford, 29th Oct 1959, P744/5, LUA 
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Doodson during his retirement dinner in 1960 as ―perhaps the only man whoever 
conducted scientific research at a profit‖.94 While partly simply a flattering comment, it 
also summarises Doodson‘s, and TI‘s, balancing and combining of science with 
commerce. 
TI‘s strong dependence on the shipping industry for patronage contrasts with the 
existing literature‘s emphasis on military support for physical oceanography.95 It was the 
support from the shipping industry that enabled TI to do the work that was then put 
into practice generating income by producing predictions for Hydro and other clients. 
While both BAAS, Liverpool University and Hydro via DSIR also supported this work, 
they did so only after the Booths‘ funding had established TI, making the support of 
academic and state actors dependent on TI‘s earlier industrial patronage. In addition 
TI‘s initial research programme, once the Institute had been established, emphasised the 
production of tidal analysis and predictions for merchant and naval shipping to suit 
their shipping industry patrons, after which the concerns of Hydro gradually became 
important too. While naval patronage was important to TI, other sources of patronage 
were at least as important, something which could be further investigated in other case 
studies by historians of oceanography. In addition, paying detailed attention to the 
patronage structure of research institutes such as TI gives us a more detailed picture of 
how patronage from different sources interacted and depended on each other. While 
TI, through its contract with Hydro, became a contractor to David Edgerton‘s warfare 
state,96 one reason Hydro preferred TI was because it was seen as neither state nor 
industry but as academic. Also, the relationship between Hydro and TI developed as a 
result of opportunistic negotiations on both sides, not in response to a unified policy 
from ‗the state‘.  
                                               
94 Given the healthy bank balance of TI in the 1950s, see table 4.1, as well as the tone of the speech I do 
not think this was meant as a joke. Mr Paton‘s speech, folder Retirement, Doodson Papers. The 
retirement dinner was held in the Dock Office, Liverpool on the 22nd September 1960, and the guests 
were served Grapefruit Maraschino, Fried Dublin Bay Prawns, Roast Grouse or Lamb Cutlets with game 
chips, potato croquettes, runner beans and peas, Apple Charlotte and Kidney Vol-au-vent, with a 
selection of wines, see Menu, Doodson Papers. 
95 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War; Weir, Ocean in Common; Doel, "Constituting the Postwar Earth 
Sciences."; Mukerji, A Fragile Power.   
96 Edgerton, Warfare State. 
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CHAPTER 5 (1928), THE TURN FROM SHIPPING TO 
FLOODING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SURGES 
Around 1am in the morning of Saturday 7 January 1928 the Thames broke through its 
banks in central London. In the flooding that followed fourteen people died and there 
was much material damage. This chance event changed the aim and patronage structure 
of TI‘s storm surge science, shifting its focus towards forecasting of flooding and 
shifting funding towards local government actors. However, other aspects of TI‘s work 
were retained, such as statistical techniques and the concept of residuals. Chapter three 
looked at TI‘s definition of meteorological effects as residuals in a fairly abstract way. 
This chapter instead focuses on how TI constructed storm surges, as they now called 
them, through practices of calculation. It looks at how TI constructed surges in two 
closely linked ways: as graphs on documents using particular practices of calculation and 
as the definition of the events that the scientific inquiry set up after the flooding would 
investigate. 
The flooding event in 1928 quickly became a political issue debated in the newspapers 
and a committee was set up by the Prime Minister bringing together local and central 
government actors. This committee in turn commissioned a scientific investigation, 
funded by local authorities, which TI became involved in together with a number of 
other organisations such as the Met Office and the Port of London Authority (PLA). 
The investigation was supposed to lead to improvements in warnings for flood events 
like this one, as well as estimating the likelihood of such events recurring. Another key 
question for the investigation was the cause of the event, closely linked to which was 
the definition of what exactly it was they were researching. What had made the Thames 
rise? What other events were like this one and should be investigated by the 
researchers?  
A list of ‗high high tides‘ produced by PLA formed the initial definition of the sort of 
events the investigation were researching, but TI‘s staff questioned this definition. The 
chapter describes how TI convinced others to use their definition of the event through 
a combination of rhetorical displays of expertise and by work on constructing surges. 
To begin with TI constructed their own list of events based on their earlier definition of 
meteorological effects as residuals. However, this list was insufficient for the 
calculations of the other key research actor, the Met Office, as they needed more 
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information on the timings of the events on the list. Before the Met Office did work 
with TI‘s definition of the event TI had to provide them with these timings, which they 
did by constructing detailed graphs of the surge events on their list. I describe in detail 
how they constructed surges as such graphs of residuals. By construction I mean how 
TI defined and calculated surges by putting them together from graphs and numbers, 
using pen and paper on specific documents. These practices produced inscriptions on 
documents that were a particular representation of the type of event TI argued had 
caused the flooding. They called this representation storm surge, which through their 
work was defined and constructed as a residual. Through these practices of calculation 
surges were constituted as scientific objects that both TI and the Met Office could 
calculate with.1 However, TI‘s transformation of the event into a surge was contested by 
others and they had to do much work to have their definition accepted. In addition, 
they did not achieve their aim of making surges predictable. This together with other 
results of the research provided an argument for future work to be undertaken. 
 
5.1 THE 1928 FLOODING EVENT AND ITS PARTY POLITICS 
On Friday 6 January 1928 a depression in the North Sea produced strong winds up to 
gale force over the eastern and south-eastern part of England. In words used at the 
time, these winds produced an ‗abnormal‘ and ‗extraordinary‘ rise in sea level at about 
the same time as the high water of a springtide, at 1AM on Saturday, which led to very 
high river levels in the Thames.2 The flood defences along the Thames had been 
designed to withstand a tide of 18 feet above Ordnance Datum, a height decided on 
after a previous record tide, reaching 17 feet 6 inches, had caused flooding in 1881. The 
height of the tide early in the morning on the seventh of January 1928 exceeded this 
previous record by 11 inches, according to the official estimates. The flood defences 
were breached in several places. Many poor families slept in basement rooms into which 
the water entered fast and 14 people drowned.3 There was flooding in the City, 
Westminster, Southwark and less central areas, including Putney and Hammersmith, 
                                               
1 Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation."; Lynch, "The Externalized Retina."  
2 See e.g. S. T. A. Mirrlees, "The Thames Floods of January 7th," The Meteorological Magazine (1928).  
3 Joan Gwilwym Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to 
Consider the Question of Floods from the River Thames in the County of London," in Command Papers; 
Reports of Commissioners (1928), 8.   
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and thousands of homes were damaged.4 Most of the poor were uninsured and the 
insurance of many businesses did not cover floods.5  
London based politicians from all parties immediately put the event to use in a wide 
range of debates, ranging from land drainage to the plight of the poor living in 
basement slum dwellings, and how to govern London. The event also became a focus 
for debates regarding how to govern flood defence policy: who should organise and pay 
for flood defence in the capital? More generally, should flood defence be seen as a local 
responsibility or as a national issue? At this time flood defence was by many seen as a 
local issue and an 1879 Act had, for London, enshrined this view in law.6 While LCC 
had an overview role in London, the defences were paid for by the owners of the 
riverbank, but actors, including the Treasury, questioned why such riparian owners, for 
example government departments, had to pay for protection of buildings well beyond 
the river bank, not owned by them.7 
Many of these debates hinged on how the causes of the event were understood.  8 
Linking the flooding event to inland non-tidal flooding linked it to the issue of land 
drainage, the role of central government in this and who should pay for it.9 If instead 
the deaths were said to be caused by poverty, with poor people living in vulnerable 
basement flats, this linked to demands for social reforms. On the other hand, if the 
event was said to be due to poor upkeep of flood defences, blamed on local authorities, 
this linked to demands for reform of local government. These kinds of socio-political 
causality-stories were told primarily by Labour politicians and in left-leaning media such 
as the Manchester Guardian. For example, a grouping of politicians on the left called 
London Labour used the event to call for political reforms to London‘s local 
government to create a ―real Corporation of London‖ instead of the multitude of 
                                               
4 Mirrlees, "The Thames Floods of January 7th," 17; "Plight of Victims of the Flood," Daily Mirror, 
January 9 1928; "London's Peril Not yet Over," The Manchester Guardian, January 9 1928. 
5 "Our London Correspondence," The Manchester Guardian, January 9 1928. 
6 London County Council (General Powers) Act 1929 - Prevention of Floods. 
7 ―Thames Flood,‖ Minute by AT Harris, 23rd Jan 1928, HLG 50/130, NA. See also Minute by WL to Mr 
de Normann, ―Thames Floods,‖ 29th Feb 1928, WORK 6/403, NA and other documents in that file for 
more on the views of the Ministry of Works. See also "Parliament and the Flood," Times, January 09 1928. 
8 For more on how the event was framed, see my Anna Carlsson, "What Is a Storm: Severe Weather and 
Public Life in Britain in January 1928," in Weather, Local Knowledge and Everyday Life: Issues in Integrated 
Climate Studies, ed. Vladimir Jankovic and Christina Barboza (Rio de Janeiro: MAST, 2009). 
9 This will be discussed further in the next chapter. See John Bowers, "Inter-War Land Drainage and 
Policy in England and Wales," Agricultural history review 46, no. 1 (1998); John Sheail, "Arterial Drainage in 
Inter-War England: The Legislative Perspective," Agricultural history review 50, no. 2 (2002). 
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councils that existed. They argued that the existing regional government, London 
County Council (LCC), had not done sufficient work on the flood defences. In 
addition, they argued that the deaths were due to poor city planning and a lack of 
warning system, both of which they linked to the weakness of the current system of 
governance of London.10 
An alternative framing of the event as extraordinary and unpreventable, caused solely by 
natural causes, decreased attention to potential socio-political issues related to the 
flooding. These natural causes were said to be primarily the combination of wind and 
tide, with some small addition of up-river floodwater (not seen to be linked to 
drainage). The government and local authorities, together with supporting media such 
as The Times, frequently portrayed the event in this way. As an example of this, in its 
January manifesto for the March 1928 LCC elections, the controlling conservative 
Municipal Reform Party, presented the event as ―due to abnormal and unprecedented 
conditions which could not be foreseen by the eminent technical and engineering 
advisors of all the authorities, both past and present‖.11 By portraying the event in terms 
of natural causes and exceptionality (at least in public), central and local government 
exonerated themselves.  For example, just after the event the General Manager of PLA 
told the press: ―We are not responsible in any shape or form. We could not possibly 
foresee what was going to happen, especially when nothing like it had occurred for a 
century or more‖.12 Ted Steinberg has found very similar arguments used in the US, 
where government actors frequently have framed disasters as ‗natural‘ and exceptional, 
and avoided being blamed.13 These kinds of arguments are thus the norm and not the 
exception after disasters, but how did this event become linked to TI‘s storm surge 
science?  
 
                                               
10 Joint Committee on Thames Flood, Statement approved by the Conference, The London Labour 
Party, 11th Jan 1928, HLG 50/130, NA. See also "Labour Demand for Inquiry," Times, January 12 1928; 
"Responsibility for Floods," The Manchester Guardian, January 12 1928. 
11  "L.C.C. Election," Times, January 26 1928.  
12 "Could Warning Have Been Given?," The Manchester Guardian, January 9 1928. See also, "Two Lives 
Lost at Putney," Times, January 09 1928.  
13 Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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5.2 HOW THE EVENT TURNED INTO A SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 
As just discussed, the 1928 flooding event led to attention by the press and politicians 
to flood defence policy, flood science and a wide range of other socio-political issues. 
Sheldon Ungar has argued that ―dramatic events transform underlying dread into social 
scares‖, enhancing audience receptiveness to claims-making from scientists, and that 
such media attention after an extreme event can be an important trigger for scientific 
research.14 This happened after the 1928 event, when the scientists at TI, via their 
contacts at Hydro, were able to make a claim for funding for research in an area they 
were already interested in as politicians got interested in tidal flooding.  
Following demands in the media and Parliament for an inquiry into the event, the Prime 
Minister, Stanley Baldwin, invited national, regional and local government actors to a 
conference ―to settle what action can, and should, be taken to obviate any recurrence of 
such […] disaster‖. The Conservative Prime Minister side-stepped issues of causality, 
blame and criticisms regarding the governance of London and the plight of the poor by 
emphasising future prevention: ―The object of the conference is not to discuss the 
responsibility for the incidents of last week-end, but to consider steps that should 
prevent a recurrence‖.15 By framing the event as he did, Baldwin framed it as ‗just‘ about 
flooding, not about London governance or poverty-reduction.16 He linked it to technical 
matters only – what flood defence and other measures were necessary to prevent a 
recurrence? This limited framing was used partly in response to demands from Labour 
politicians for other kinds of state assistance after the flood and in opposition to 
London Labour‘s wider view of the causes of the event as linked to poverty and the 
organisation of local government. Some officials saw Labour‘s arguments as aimed at 
making political capital of the event: ―the Labour Party seem inclined to make a stunt of 
the business in Parliament and no doubt at the L.C.C. elections [in March]‖.17  
                                               
14 Sheldon Ungar, "The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem," The 
Sociological Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1992). 
15 "Prevention of Floods," Times, January 13 1928. I have been unable to find archival files shedding 
further light on the Prime Minister‘s or Cabinet‘s views on the event. 
16 The Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, later similarly limited the frame of the event to certain 
areas of public policy (e.g. land planning and flood defence). "The London Flood B," Times, February 3 
1928; "Flood Lesson," The Manchester Guardian, February 3 1928. 
17 Minute by WA Ross to Kingsley Wood, 19th Jan 1928, HLG 50/130, NA. See also Joint Committee on 




The conference was chaired by Sir Kingsley Wood, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of Health, and held at the Ministry of Health. This was the government 
department that dealt with local government and supervised local authorities, so the 
choice of the Ministry of Health as the co-ordinating body for the conference mirrored 
and strengthened the existing allocation of responsibility for flood defence to local 
government.18  
The Conference was attended by local and regional authorities and a range of 
government departments and it quickly set up a Technical Sub-Committee to look 
further into questions of flood defence and the establishment of a warning system, 
which had been much discussed in the press,19 and also to look at the causes and 
frequency of surges. The conference allocated these matters to the Technical Sub-
Committee to have them clarified and further considered.20 This group of technical 
members of the conference were thus given control over the definition of particular 
aspects of the event by the establishment of a boundary between issues to be 
considered by technical experts and other issues, such as who should pay for flood 
defence and the role of basement dwellings, that should be considered by all. Through 
this boundary-drawing and appropriation, one part of the event was transformed into 
the concerns of particular expert techno-scientists.21 
                                               
18 Whitaker's Almanack,  (London: Joseph Whitaker & Sons, 1930), 516; Gail Savage, The Social Construction 
of Expertise: The English Civil Service and Its Influence, 1919-1939 (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1996). 
19 In its coverage of the event, the newspapers paid attention to a range of technical matters related to 
flood defence, especially the rebuilding and strengthening of physical flood defences and the lack of 
warnings. This was for example a key aspect of the coroner‘s inquests, e.g, in Westminster, which in turn 
were heavily covered by the newspapers, see "The London Flood A," Times, January 11 1928. "First 
Inquiries into Thames Disaster," The Manchester Guardian, January 11 1928. "Thames Flood Victims," 
Times, January 19 1928.  
20 Minutes of Committee Meeting 19th Jan 1928, ―London Floods,‖ H 644/28, UKHO. The authorities 
represented at the conference were LCC, PLA, Thames Conservancy Board, the Corporation of the City 
of London, the City of Westminster, the riverside boroughs (Poplar, Stepney, Chelsea, Fulham, 
Hammersmith, Wandsworth, Battersea, Lambeth, Southwark, Bermondsey, Greenwich, Woolwich, and 
Deptford), Ministry of Health, the Home Office (representing national government interest into the 
police), the Ministry of Agriculture (ditto for drainage), the Board of Trade (government supervision of 
the foreshores), and the Ministry of Transport (which was Parliament‘s link to PLA). Each representative, 
e.g. the mayors from the boroughs, was allowed to bring a technical advisor. Gibbon, "Report of a 
Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the Question of Floods "; 
"Prevention of Floods." 
21 While this was similar to what Gieryn has called boundary-work, he emphasises ‗public science‘, and 
this was only partly public. Thomas F. Gieryn, "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from 
Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists," American Sociological Review 48, 
no. 6 (1983); Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (London: The University 
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The Technical Sub-Committee consisted of representatives from the Admiralty‘s 
Hydrographic Department, the Met Office, PLA, the Thames Conservancy (the body 
responsible for the non-tidal Thames above Teddington), the Ministry of Health and 
the Board of Trade. In other words they represented government departments and 
river-related organisations, and not the local authorities who were also part of the 
Conference, though LCC was also present. The representatives either were or brought 
with them technical experts from their respective bodies, with for example PLA‘s 
Engineer, LCC‘s Chief Engineer and PLA‘s River Superintendent and Chief Harbour 
Master, Commander E C Shankland, all presenting evidence to the committee. This 
Technical Sub-Committee agreed with the other establishment and government actors 
that the main causes of the flooding event were ―natural‖, defining the cause as an 
unusually high tide due to meteorological effects.22 On the other hand, it claimed it was 
necessary to investigate the details of the process leading to such ―abnormal‖ tides 
further to answer the Conference‘s questions, as the frequency and height of future 
floods could not be estimated until tidal flooding was better understood.23 In turn this 
lack of knowledge meant, they claimed, that the benefits of increasing the flood 
defences could not be compared to the costs of building them. The experts thus argued 
that to research abnormal tides was to ensure that the flood defences would not be built 
unnecessarily high, i.e. unnecessarily expensive.24  
In addition, the Technical Sub-Committee claimed that more research was needed to 
improve the emergency warning system that had been set up for the Thames.25 The 
introduction of an emergency warning system straight after the event had been the main 
                                                                                                                                     
of Chicago Press, 1999); Thomas F. Gieryn, "Boundaries of Science," in Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, et al. (London: SAGE, 1995).  
22 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 22-23. 
23 Ibid., 13 and 22-23.  
24 However, after further work these experts in fact implemented an increase in the standard height of the 
defences along the Thames. While the experts claimed to be able to limit demands on finances through 
their work, their work also led to demands on finances, which is an unsurprising outcome. "Thames 
Flood Dangers," Times, March 10 1930; George Humphrey and Frederick Palmer, "On the Future 
Standard of Thames Floods Prevention Works in the County of London," in Main Drainage Committee, 
Thames Floods Prevention (London County Council, 1929).  
25 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 23-25.; and draft minutes attached to letter from [unreadable]Chief Civil Assistant 
to Hydrographer to Doodson, 6th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA; ―London Floods Technical Sub-Committee 2nd 
meeting on the  3rd Feb 1928‖, Box 16, BA. 
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immediate ―step[...] that should prevent a recurrence‖ in Baldwin‘s words.26 There were 
of course political considerations involved in the creation of the warning system, with 
for example the issue of blame if another flood struck without a warning being weighed 
against the possible blame over ―needless alarms‖ if the system warned too often.27 The 
warning system involved a combination of weather watchers at the Met Office, 
triggering tidal watchers at Southend who if necessary triggered river watchers from the 
Police and awareness at various local authorities. The warning system thus relied on the 
Met Office‘s synoptic, i.e. graphical and pattern-based, weather forecasts and the 
broadcast of current measurements of sea level – nowcasts instead of forecasts – 
together with an intricate system of linkages of different authorities in the Thames area. 
This warning system did not try to predict the height and timing of the meteorological 
effects but instead warned of dangerous meteorological conditions and of high water 
levels.28 
TI got involved in the Sub-Committee‘s work via their personal contacts at the 
Hydrographic Department. The Technical Sub-Committee was chaired by the 
Hydrographer, Rear Admiral HP Douglas. To the first meeting of the conference he 
had provided a sketchy outline of the data and research needed to establish a flood 
forecasting system, mentioning TI, as did the Met Office in their initial report on the 
causes of the event, presented by George C Simpson, the Director of the Met Office.29 
                                               
26 "Prevention of Floods." Johnson, Tunstall and Penning-Rowsell have found that major flood events in 
the UK have led to changes in policy since the Second World War, but also that the changes have 
consisted of acceleration of existing incremental changes rather than the introduction of radically new 
ideas. This seems also to have been the case in 1928, as more radical policy options such as changes in 
land use or poverty reduction to reduce the number of basement dwellers were deflected in favour of 
increased flood defences and the introduction of a warning system. Clare L. Johnson, Sylvia M. Tunstall, 
and Edmund C. Penning-Rowsell, "Floods as Catalysts for Policy Change: Historical Lessons from 
England and Wales," International Journal of Water Resources Development 21, no. 4 (2005).  
27 ―Emergency measures pending settlement of permanent policy‖, Minute by IGG [Gibbon] at Ministry 
of Health, 20th Jan 1928, HLG 50/130, NA 
28 In more details, the system consisted of weather watchers at the Met Office who would alert tidal 
watchers in Southend (and others, such as the police) if the meteorological conditions warranted it. These 
tidal watchers, men from the Royal Naval Shore Signal Service which manned the Southend signal 
station, would then alert the Metropolitan Police if the tide reached a certain level (1 feet above the 
Trinity High Water datum), and the Police would send out river watchers, who would alert residents if 
river levels became dangerously high (according to pre-set danger levels). Draft minutes attached to letter 
from [unreadable signature] Chief Civil Assistant to Hydrographer to Doodson, 6th Feb 1928, Box 16, 
BA; ―London Floods Technical Sub-Committee 2nd meeting on the  3rd Feb 1928‖, Box 16, BA; and 
Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 23-25.  
29 Minutes of Committee Meeting 19th Jan 1928, ―London Floods,‖ esp. Appendix A and B, H 644/28, 
UKHO. For more on Simpson see M E  Crewe, "The Met Office Grows Up: In War and Peace," 
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As discussed in earlier chapters TI already had close contacts with the Hydrographic 
Department, especially with its Superintendent of Tidal Work Commander Harold 
Warburg, and were at this point selling an increasing number of tidal predictions to the 
Navy. As a member of TI‘s governing committee Warburg was aware of TI‘s research 
on forecasting meteorological effects in Liverpool. These contacts now also got TI 
involved with the committee investigating the London flooding. Warburg visited TI in 
late January after which Arthur Doodson prepared a research proposal for the 
Technical Sub-Committee.30 While both the Hydrographer and the Met Office had 
referred to TI‘s earlier work at the first meeting of the Conference, it was only at this 
point that TI directly began negotiating what the event might be and mean with other 
members of the investigation. The official reason given to get TI involved was that it, 
―the best-informed body in the country on the subject of tides‖ according to the 
conference, had ―considerable experience of similar problems‖.31 However, without TI‘s 
existing connections with the Hydrographic Department the Institute might well not 
have become connected with the event at all. It appears that the Hydrographer wanted 
to keep his control over the Technical Sub-Committee‘s work by for example choosing 
to work with TI, whose work they knew, and not e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture‘s 
expert on land drainage and flooding, whose services the representative from that 
Ministry had offered the Sub-Committee. Personal networks played an important role in 
getting TI involved in this work and without these networks their work on 
meteorological effects may not have become linked to the 1928 flooding event at all.32 
To the Sub-Committee Doodson proposed an initial investigation limited to the 
Thames estuary, but from the start argued that a larger-scale investigation covering the 
wider North Sea was likely to be necessary to fully investigate the problem of tidal 
flooding in the area. In support of this, Doodson said it was already known (from TI‘s 
earlier research) that surges often were generated further afield.33 TI‘s proposal for 
research, presented to the Technical Sub-Committee in late January in person by 
Doodson, was accepted. The work was to be done in association with the 
                                                                                                                                     
Occasional papers on meteorological history(2009), http://www.rmets.org/pdf/hist08.pdf. Accessed March 
2009.  
30 Doodson to Warburg, and Douglas to Doodson, both 31st Jan 1928, Box 16, BA 
31 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 13 and 23.  
32 Minutes of Committee Meeting 19th Jan 1928, ―London Floods,‖ p 3, H 644/28, UKHO 
33 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 26-27. 
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Meteorological Office and Hydro, with the latter in charge.34 The cost of the work 
would be shared by LCC and PLA, who agreed to each pay no more than £250.35 The 
two bodies, who had both been accused in the press and by London Labour of not 
doing enough to prevent the flooding, without much delay took on the cost of this 
initial research, which was tightly defined as focusing on improving flood defences in 
London. Given the traditional definition of flood defence as a local issue, LCC and 
PLA could not protest against being asked to pay for this research, especially as refusing 
would no doubt have led to bad headlines in what was an election year for LCC. 
However, they and the rest of the conference made a point of recommending that if 
more research was needed beyond this initial work, central government ought to 
consider paying for it.36 While accepting the initial work as of primarily local interest to 
be paid for locally, the conference laid the groundwork for future demands on central 
government for further work. 
The Technical Sub-Committee had had three points ―relegated‖ to them for 
consideration.37 These points emphasised causes and frequency of tidal floods and the 
establishment of a warning system, and Doodson‘s work similarly mirrored this 
emphasis. Both the Sub-Committee and the Conference as a whole wanted to make 
these kinds of currently unpredictable events predictable and ‗improvements‘ to the 
emergency warning system were sought both by Doodson and his patrons. Doodson‘s 
mathematical work on predictions was aimed at ‗improving‘ the warning system: ―I shall 
spend my time first of all on the meteorological phenomena associated with the storm 
surge, for the sake of the warnings‖.38 This emphasis on improving the warning system 
was also found in statements from the Technical Sub-Committee. For example, the 
letter formally appointing TI to do the work emphasised improvements to the warning 
system, which TI was to provide by increasing the knowledge of which meteorological 
conditions brought unusually high tides.39  
                                               
34[Unreadable signature] for Hydrographer to Doodson, 3rd Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
35 "Thames Floods," Times, March 1 1928; Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference 
of Public Authorities to Consider the Question of Floods ". 
36 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 24.  
37 Ibid., 22. 
38 Doodson to Shankland, 10th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA 
39[Unreadable signature] for Hydrographer to Doodson, 3rd Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
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At this stage the flooding event had to some extent been transformed from a socio-
political issue into a specific techno-scientific problem to be investigated by experts, 
including TI. Their existing networks, especially with Hydro, got them involved in the 
investigation. Having been given this opening by Hydro, TI argued that their earlier 
work on surges could be developed to provide answers for the departmental committee. 
They clearly tailored their proposal to fit the audience, focusing on predictions and local 
London issues. However, TI were more concerned with achieving results that would 
justify their funding than with sticking to their original proposals. For example, 
Doodson almost immediately extended the local focus, which had enlisted London-
based patrons, to include meteorological conditions not only near London but also 
further afield. To the Hydrographer he claimed to have been ―compelled‖ to investigate 
storm effects not only local to the Thames but further afield in the North Sea ―if any 
progress was to be made‖.40 While the patronage TI received clearly influenced their 
work, making them focus on forecasting floods in London, they were primarily 
concerned with justifying this patronage, which they did both through scientific and 
rhetorical displays of expertise. The rest of this chapter focuses on this justificatory 
work, starting with how Doodson named the event. 
 
5.3 THE APPEARANCE OF THE TERM ‗SURGE‘ 
When Doodson presented his research proposal to the Technical Sub-Committee, he 
introduced a new term to describe what it was he was proposing to research: surges. 
Earlier work had used terms such as meteorological effect or perturbation, but not the 
term surge.41 The new term was introduced in the short proposal Doodson presented to 
the Technical Sub-Committee, which, in the first paragraph, stated that ―storm effects 
[on tides] are surges with pseudo-periods of about six hours‖.  The term surge was then 
used throughout the report, interchangeably with other terms such as storm effects and 
meteorological perturbations, without further definition.42 From 1928 onwards 
                                               
40 Doodson to Hydrographer Douglas, 2nd Apr 1928, Box 16, BA 
41 For example, Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Meteorological Perturbations of Sea-Level," Nature 112, no. 
2812 (1923); Joseph Proudman and Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Time-Relations in Meteorological Effects 
on the Sea," Proc. London Math. Soc. s2-24, no. 1 (1926); Doodson, "Meteorological Perturbations of Sea-
Level and Tides." 
42 Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ", 26-27 quote p26.  
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Doodson and his colleagues at TI regularly used the term in published scientific work, 
especially in titles, but the older terms also remained in use, with ‗storm surge‘ only 
slowly becoming more widespread in specialised scientific work.43 It was however 
picked up quite quickly by those involved in the investigation. In March the 
Hydrographic Department‘s tidal officer, Warburg, wrote to the Met Office‘s Director: 
―[Inland flood-water] can only be dangerous if occurring at same time as a ‗storm 
surge‘‖.44 It seems the term was picked up as a convenient short-hand, though marked 
out as new here through the quotation marks, by others involved with the investigation 
at this time. From here on the term ‗surge‘ is an actor‘s term, though ‗storm surge 
science‘ remains an analytical term rarely used by the actors I am studying. 
Doodson did not provide a contemporary explanation of why he introduced this 
particular term. Much later, in 1953, TI‘s annual report stated that the term surge had 
been chosen by Doodson ―to emphasise that the disturbances of sea level by wind were 
dynamic effects as distinct from a slow increase of level to a fairly steady condition 
lasting for one or more days‖.45 He also gave a similar explanation in his Royal Society 
Personal Information File, where he said that his research on meteorological effects had 
led him to see ―that the phenomenon was essentially dynamic and kinematic‖.46 In 1933, 
discussing with his contact at the Met Office whether to reply to an engineer‘s article on 
meteorological effects which described them in static terms, Doodson emphasised the 
dynamic nature of surges: ―Great surges seem to be dynamically generated- the speed of 
the disturbance relative to that of a free wave is a vital factor‖.47 It seems the term 
‗surge‘ was picked to emphasise the speed and dynamism of the phenomena.  
By introducing a new term Doodson also designated the kind of events he thought the 
investigation should study, which was dynamical meteorological effects with pseudo 
periods of six hours. This definition of the event was a development of his earlier work 
                                               
43 For example, Robert Henry Corkan, "Further Investigations of North Sea Surges," Association 
d'Oceanographie Physique, Proces-Verbaux 5(1952); Robert Henry Corkan, "Storm Surges: Their Importance 
in Modern Tidal Science and Some Results of a Recent Investigation," The Dock and Harbour Authority 
(1948); Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Storm-Surges," Hydrog. Rev., Monaco 24(1947). Corkan was Doodson‘s 
assistant. 
44 Warburg to Simpson, 5th Mar 1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
45 LOTI, Annual Report 1953 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1953), 5. 
46 Doodson, special section on storm surges, Personal Information File, RS 
47 The spaces between the hyphen and the surrounding words are as in the original. Doodson to Dines, 
31st Jul 1933, BJ 5/22, NA. The engineer who wrote the article they were discussing, Mr Ryves, had not 
been involved with the 1928 inquiry. 
 165 
 
and much of his proposed research involved repeating for the Thames work that had 
been done for Liverpool, for example investigating the statistical correlations between 
pressure gradients over the sea and residuals in tidal records for Southend. His 
proposed work thus relied on him being able to use his earlier methods of calculations, 
for example defining meteorological effects as residuals. In order to do the work TI had 
been given funding to do, and thus justify this funding, the event had to be defined in a 
way that made it amenable to Doodson‘s statistical calculations. However, as we turn to 
next, the definition of the event used by the investigation became a contested issue.  
 
5.4 THE CONTESTED DEFINITION OF THE INVESTIGATION‘S OBJECT OF 
RESEARCH  
Initially the definition of the topic used by the investigation was different from that 
used by Doodson in his proposal, with PLA producing a definition in the form of a list 
of ―abnormally high high water tides‖ by late January.48 PLA‘s Chief Harbour Master E 
C Shankland defined these abnormally high high water levels as those that reached 3‘6‖ 
above Trinity High Water.49 Throughout February the Met Office worked with the 
material they had been sent from PLA, which included PLA‘s list of abnormally high 
high water tides and tidal data for these high tides.50 Using this information the Met 
Office produced data which Shankland used to support his own findings.51 PLA‘s list 
was also used by the Thames Conservancy, which created lists of river flow for the 
dates on it.52 In other words, Shankland‘s list of abnormally high high water tides was 
coming to dominate the work of the investigation. It was becoming the definition of 
what the investigation was researching. 
                                               
48 Despite its awkward length this actor‘s term has been kept, as there is no shorter way of putting it 
without comprising the meaning. 
49 For sea levels in tidal areas, including tidal rivers like the Thames, there are many possible datums, 
generally defined as ―a base elevation used as a reference from which to reckon heights or depths‖, see 
NOAA, "Tides & Currents, Tidal Datum,"  http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html, last 
accessed 9th Dec 2010. Trinity High Water was a particular datum used to measure the height of water in 
the Thames. While there may have been discussions in the engineering community regarding exactly how 
to relate Trinity High Water to other datums, such as the Ordnance Datum (Newlyn), following the 
Second Geodetic Levelling (1912-1921), the definition appears not to have been at issue or questioned 
within the context of the 1928 flood event. W.B. Hall, "Abstract: The Origin and History of Trinity High 
Water," Journal of the ICE 21, no. 1 (1943). 
50 Shankland to Met Office (no named person), 2nd Feb 1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
51 Shankland to Doodson, 7th Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
52 Simpson to Swarbrick, 19th Feb1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
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TI could not produce their planned work using PLA‘s list, as it did not define the cause 
of the event as a surge or a residual. PLA‘s list of abnormally high high water tides 
focused solely on unusual heights at spring tides, the time of astronomical high tides, 
providing numerical information about the height of the tide at these specific times.53 
TI‘s methods relied on defining surges as residuals, whatever the stage of the tide, and 
correlating these residuals with meteorological data. If they wanted to use their 
established methods they had to replace PLA‘s list, by producing their own list and by 
stopping PLA‘s from being used. They did this through numerical and scientific work as 
well as rhetorical displays of expert knowledge.  
Underlying TI‘s work was a dense correspondence network which started with their 
existing links with the Hydrographic Department but quickly widened to PLA and the 
Met Office, as well as to other organisations, such as LCC, the Ministry of Health and a 
wide range of port authorities and foreign authorities. This correspondence network 
was used to exchange data and information for the investigation, but such exchanges of 
information, especially between key organisations involved in it such as TI, the Met 
Office and PLA, were also key in establishing who was expert at what. While the 
investigation was quite clearly led by the Hydrographic Department, the responsibilities 
of PLA, the Met Office and TI, were not very clearly defined.54 To be able to do work 
Doodson had to convince the others that TI‘s definition of surges instead of PLA‘s 
should be used and more generally that TI should be seen as the expert on storm surge 
science. He attempted to do this through displays of such expertise in correspondence. 
For example, one of TI‘s contacts at the Met Office, Director Simpson, early on sent 
Doodson a copy of an ―interesting and useful‖ minute by one of his colleagues, which 
quoted papers from the 1890s by WH Wheeler (whose work was briefly mentioned in 
chapter three).55 In response, Doodson two days later sent Simpson a list of 61 papers 
written since 1909 in several different languages on meteorological effects and pointed 
                                               
53 ―Abnormally high (3‘6‖ above T.H.W. or over) high water tides in the River Thames‖, Box 16, BA. 
Also attached to Shankland to Met Office (no named person), 2nd Feb 1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
54 Warburg to Doodson, 3rd Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
55 Simpson to Doodson, 11th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA. Simpson is likely to have been the Director TI was 
in contact with during the early forecasting attempts for Liverpool, so a personal relationship was already 
established. Wheeler had published on tides and been involved in committee‘s on tides by the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, see W.H. Wheeler, A Practical Manual of Tides and Waves 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906); Wheeler, "The Effect of Wind and Atmospheric Pressure 
on the Tides." 
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out that ―[a] great deal has been done since Wheeler‘s time and some of his conclusions 
are not generally held‖.56 Several of the papers on the list were by Doodson and 
Proudman, so it displayed their work in this area. Being able to quickly produce a list 
like this was a polite way of showing the extent of TI‘s expertise in tidal science. It 
showed they had a large specialised library, which was considerably more up-to date 
than the Met Office‘s in this area. Doodson also showed his personal expertise in storm 
surge science by commenting on what the problem with Wheeler‘s work had been. 
A similar exchange regarding who was the investigation‘s expert on surge science took 
place early on with Doodson‘s contact at PLA, engineer E C Shankland. He sent TI 
information on the potential effects of dredging and well water on the flooding, and had 
―pleasure in forwarding a slight contribution of my own on this subject [the effect of 
barometric pressure on sea level] from the proceedings of the Royal Meteorological 
Society‖, which he thought offered good leads for future researchers.57 Doodson in 
return sent Shankland a copy of one of his own papers on meteorological effects from a 
few years earlier, pointing out that this work included both wind and barometric 
pressure, which was what he intended to do for London, but also that his own work, as 
presented in the paper, needed development away from a statical view of the 
phenomena towards a dynamical.58  
Doodson had to keep Shankland on side, as he was the keeper of crucial tidal gauge 
information to which TI needed access in order to produce his own list of events. On 
the other hand, Doodson also needed to show his expertise in order to establish a claim 
on defining the topic of the investigation in such a way that he could do work. By 
sending his paper to Shankland Doodson attempted to establish his and TI‘s expertise 
in storm surge science, by pointing out that his work already covered more phenomena 
than Shankland‘s did and that he intended to cover even more when moving towards a 
dynamical understanding of the effects. While Shankland allowed Doodson access to 
the crucial tidal information, sending him what he requested (e.g. tidal observations 
from the night of the flooding, a tidal diagram of the Thames and a PLA Engineering 
Handbook), his letters grew colder in tone. He displayed his engineering expertise as 
Doodson had earlier shown his expertise in surge science, by, for example, informing 
                                               
56 Doodson to Simpson, 13th Feb 1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
57 Shankland to Doodson, 7th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA 
58 Doodson to Shankland,10th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA 
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Doodson that the plotting of some meteorological information ―diagrammatically 
proves that [his] conclusions were correct with regard to the lowering of the low and 
high water levels of mean springs at London Bridge‖.59 Shankland responded to 
Doodson‘s displays of expertise by mirroring this behaviour, displaying his own 
expertise.  
PLA, the Met Office and TI contested between themselves who should become the 
investigation‘s expert or obligatory passage point, as Bruno Latour has called it, on 
meteorological effects on the tides. For TI this contest was also about proving that they 
deserved the patronage they received from LCC and PLA and also from their contacts 
at Hydro. The three organisations tried to trump each other‘s claims by showing 
connections. TI for example showed connections to earlier work by themselves and 
others, to libraries, different phenomena and to theory. Latour has argued that the 
strength of a scientific claim depends on the number of collaborative associations it has 
with others – the more connections an entity has the more real, or strong, it is.60 In this 
case, the more connections that were displayed, e.g. through Doodson‘s long list of 
references, the stronger the contested claim for expert status was, and in extension the 
claims for having one‘s definitions of the event accepted. However, there was no clear 
‗winner‘ of the contest at this stage. 
Following these initial jostlings for expert status, Doodson set out produce an 
alternative list of events and to convince the others to use this instead of PLA‘s. In 
correspondence with Simpson at the Met Office Doodson claimed that the PLA‘s 
definition of the investigation‘s research topic was wrong, as PLA had simply listed 
unusually high high waters, and that he doubted that some of PLA‘s high high waters 
were storm effects  (i.e. surges) at all. Doodson claimed PLA‘s list was ―misleading‖ as it 
did not take into account the predicted height of the tide.61 He did not put it so bluntly 
to PLA‘s Shankland, the producer of PLA‘s list and the gatekeeper to the tidal records 
Doodson needed, but instead simply wrote to him that he needed more information in 
the form of the full tide-gauge records and hoped he would not be thought a ―pest‖.62 
                                               
59 Shankland to Doodson, 13th Feb, 21st Feb & 7th Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
60 Latour, Pandora's Hope, 158; Latour, Science in Action. 
61 Doodson to Simpson, 7th Mar 1928, Box 16, BA  and Doodson to Simpson, 7th Mar 1928, AIR 2/331, 
NA, with list attached.  
62 Doodson to Shankland, 18th Feb 1928, Box 16, BA 
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Not even the full tidal gauges were sufficient but Doodson had to request even more 
information (handbooks with predictions) from PLA to do his work.63  
Once received, Doodson used PLA‘s records to produce a list of 62 storm surge events 
identified through a visual inspection of the tidal gauge records from 1915 until early 
1928. This visual inspection was possible as ―[s]uccessive curves overlap one another on 
the recording sheet and any abnormality is shown at a glance by a displacement of the 
curve from its normal position relative to its neighbours‖.64 This quote also gives some 
insight into Doodson‘s practices in working with the tidal gauge records, showing how 
it depended on skills such as identifying what the normal position of the curve was. TI‘s 
initial list included any storm effects, whether they produced an increase or decrease in 
sea level and at any part of the tidal cycle, but only gave rough timings and notes on the 
event.65 Defining the investigation‘s research object like TI did, as storm effects or 
surges, produced a different list of events that covered a wider variety of events within a 
wider time frame than PLA‘s. 
But how was TI‘s list of storm effects received? Was their definition of the 
investigation‘s research object accepted? The key organisation to convince to use the list 
and TI‘s definition was the Met Office.66  
Initially the researcher at the Met Office, J S Dines, Superintendent in the Forecast 
Division, had some problems in understanding Doodson‘s list and he had to explain his 
terminology and why he had not yet given them the exact times of his storm effects.67 
The Met Office needed these times to enable them to do their work, connecting surges 
to particular meteorological situations. Like Doodson needed surges defined as residuals 
                                               
63 Shankland to Doodson, 2nd Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
64 ―Discussion on the cause of High Thames Floods held at the Meteorological Office at 10.30am on 
Friday, March 16th‖, Box 16, BA 
65 Doodson to Simpson, 7th Mar 1928, AIR 2/331, NA, with list attached. Doodson‘s initial ―List of 
Storm Effects‖ was roughly hand written with various corrections on it and did not give exact details of 
the timing or heights but only dates and rough notes on what had happened when (e.g. H[igh] on 18th 
p.m. L[ow] on 19th) 
66 The Hydrographic Department already had close connections to TI and had brought them into the 
inquiry, so they were positively inclined towards TI‘s work from the beginning, whereas there was little 
chance of bringing PLA‘s Shankland over on TI‘s side, given that it was his list TI questioned. In 
addition, while PLA paid half the cost of the inquiry and was expected to help by providing data, they had 
not been designated by the Technical Sub-Committee as one of the organisations that was supposed to 
do the research work – those organisations were the Met Office, the Hydrographic Department and TI. 
Gibbon, "Report of a Committee Appointed at a Conference of Public Authorities to Consider the 
Question of Floods ". There is no evidence of what PLA thought of TI‘s new list.  
67 For more on Dines see Crewe, "The Met Office Grows Up: In War and Peace."  
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to do his calculations, the Met Office needed more exact timings of the events in order 
to do their work. Doodson claimed it was ―almost impossible to give the exact hour by 
inspection of the tide-gauge records; in the first place we have to estimate by eye what 
the tide would have been in due sequence, and secondly, we have to estimate the 
difference between this and the actual curves‖.68  
This explanation was not sufficient for Dines and the others at the Met Office. A face 
to face explanation, or in other words an explanation of the tacit understandings that 
had not travelled with Doodson‘s list in the post,69 was necessary. Before accepting TI‘s 
list of storm effects those involved at the Met Office (Dines, Simpson and Ernest Gold, 
Assistant Director) arranged a meeting with Doodson. At the meeting he explained that 
the timings the Met Office‘s researchers needed took longer to produce but that TI 
were working on it. As part of an exchange of meteorological and tidal data, Doodson 
agreed to send copies of ―curves of hourly departure of observed minus predicted‖ 
tides, i.e. curves of residuals, as soon as they were finished, with times and heights of 
high water, which was what the Met Office needed. In return they would provide TI 
with meteorological data for the times identified by TI, so that both could work on 
formulating what meteorological conditions were responsible for flooding. At this 
meeting and through correspondence the work to establish who was expert at what and 
who should do what kind of research continued, with a boundary established so that TI 
concentrated on statistical correlations (numerical work) while the Met Office would 
analyse synoptic charts (less numerical, more graphical work).70  
While Dines and Simpson had not yet completely accepted TI‘s list of storm effects as 
the investigation‘s main research object, the March meeting led to them agreeing to try 
to do work with TI‘s list once they had been given more information. The organisations 
involved with the work (including the Hydrographic Department) met face to face a 
couple of times while TI and the Met Office exchanged documents frequently over the 
next couple of months. Doodson sent the Met Office the required ―curves of 
departures‖ as they were produced while they sent him tidal and meteorological 
                                               
68 Doodson to Dines, 23rd Mar 1928, AIR 2/331, NA 
69 Collins, Changing Order : Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice.  
70 ―Discussion on the cause of High Thames Floods held at the Meteorological Office at 10.30am on 
Friday, March 16th‖, Box 16, BA 
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information.71 If the Met Office had previously worked with PLA‘s high high waters, 
using their list, they had now moved towards working with TI‘s surges. While TI‘s list 
had not yet been definitely accepted as the definition of events studied by the 
investigation, TI had negotiated a position whereby they could do the work they had 
planned, using their definition of surges as residual. Before discussing in more details 
how and why the Met Office worked with TI‘s list of surges, I turn to TI‘s practices of 
constructing surges. 
 
5.5 THE CONSTRUCTION OF SURGES AT TI 
This section looks at how TI constructed the ―curves of departures‖, i.e., curves of 
residuals, that gave the detailed timings the Met Office‘s researchers said they needed to 
do their work. These curves were developments of TI‘s earlier work and were part of 
the work they had suggested in their proposal. This section discusses in some detail how 
TI constructed surges out of the tidal information that Doodson so laboriously had 
extracted from PLA and also had sent to him from other organisations. It will first look 
at the data TI used, how it acquired it and interpreted it. It then turns to TI‘s repeated 
re-inscribing of this data as other numbers and graphs, concentrating on their practices 
of calculating residuals through two different methods. 
TI‘s construction of surges used observations of tides, which came to them through a 
network of correspondents at PLA, various other port and harbour authorities and 
other organisations dealing with tidal data, such as foreign meteorological offices. The 
observations came to TI in various formats: sometimes as raw tidal gauge graphs or 
specifically tailored graphs, sometimes as tables with information on the hourly height 
of tides. Much of this information, especially the raw tidal gauge data, was only lent to 
TI and had to be returned, often as soon as possible so that somebody else could 
borrow it. The documents were complicated to send back and forth, often large and 
heavy, for example scrolls of tidal gauge data perhaps like the one Mrs Dennis is 
working with in figure 3.1. Gaining access to data was hard work. Even without dealing 
with the sort of antagonistic problems that arose with PLA getting data to TI took 
                                               
71 ―Discussion on the cause of High Thames Floods held at the Meteorological Office at 10.30am on 
Friday, March 16th‖ and Dines to Doodson, 11th  & 28th Apr 1928, Box 16, BA 
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much work: letter writing (in duplicates, sometimes typed), organising for packages 
being sent to and picked up from the railway station and making sure there was space at 
TI to store and process the documents, not to mention all the work by others involved 
in producing the documents in the first place.72 
Apart from the tidal documents, TI also received specialised documents for this 
particular investigation, such as a table with the daily flow of water at Teddington Weir 
from Thames Conservancy to investigate the influence of inland fluvial flooding on the 
event in London, meteorological information from the Met Office and various 
information on datums and levels for the Thames from PLA and LCC. With these 
documents came instructions on how to use them. For example, when the Thames 
Conservancy sent its information on river flow, it also pointed out that an additional 
5.5% was added by tributaries after Teddington Weir before the river reached London 
Bridge, which, it was claimed, needed to be borne in mind when calculations were 
made.73 Sometimes further instructions were necessary, as when the Met Office asked 
Doodson to clarify what H and L in the list of storm effects he had sent them meant.74 
As we saw above Doodson‘s written reply to this question was not sufficient, but he 
had to visit to discuss the matter further, so the documents and instructions were not 
enough by themselves – written documents were not sufficient for TI‘s methods to 
travel. The other organisations involved with the investigation were also part of similar 
correspondence networks and received large amounts of data too, sometimes the same 
data but also different material.75 While TI is the centre of calculation I am 
concentrating on here, there were others for this investigation, such as the Met Office. 
As an example of the tidal information they worked with I include a Danish example 
with data from the gauge at Esbjerg (see Figure 5.1). TI rarely kept the tidal data they 
used so this is quite a rare specimen in their archive.76 While this document had been 
specifically prepared for them to keep, it reflects one of the many types of tidal data 
they worked with. When it arrived at TI it included not only data on the hourly height 
                                               
72 Some of the work involved with establishing gauges and using the data they produced in the nineteenth 
century has been discussed by Reidy, Tides of History. 
73 [Swarhuik?] at Thames Conservancy to Doodson, 10th Mar 1928, Box 16 BA 
74 Dines to Doodson, 22nd Mar 1928, Box 16, BA 
75 For examples of the data the Met Office received, see AIR 2/331, NA 
76 However, TI did keep much of the correspondence regarding the tidal information they were sent. 
These letters provide much of the information on what they were sent and the work involved on which 
this section is based. See e.g. box 120, BA 
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of the water (potentially requiring conversion into other units as it was in cm) but also 
some information on the mean water level and on harmonic constituents for Esbjerg.77 
These harmonic constants could be used to calculate the predicted tides, though how 
close to observations such predictions would be even under calm weather conditions 
would have been difficult to know, especially as Esbjerg is a shallow water port where 
harmonic predictions were problematic and TI was only given a few constants. The 
handwritten comments near the mean water level questions the information given to TI 
by the Danes, claiming the mean water level was in fact closer to 200cm and informing 
us that the writer used this value in their work.  In other words, a trace of the decision 
on what datum to use in the calculations was written on the document, which was a way 
to keep track of such decisions for future reference.78 Such problems with the mean 
water level or other datum were common, with TI frequently writing back to the 
senders of the tidal gauge data, asking for further information clarifying the datum to 
which the information should be referred.79 Archiving such letters was another way of 
keeping track of such information. Establishing how to interpret their data took much 
work – deciding what was zero and how to compare that zero with other zeros was an 
important part of TI‘s construction of surges. Such work took both care, as when 
checking the Danish information, and effort, in terms of letter writing or double-
checking TI‘s own documents or calculations. 
 
                                               
77 The harmonic constituents are in the table in the middle of the page, with the top row starting M2, S2 
and K2. 
78 Folder ―Observations‖, Box 16, BA 
79 For another example of such problems from this inquiry, see Shankland to Doodson, 22nd May 1928, 




Figure 5.1: Tidal gauge data from Esbjerg80 
 
Having received documents and decided how to interpret them, TI started re-inscribing 
the data. Their work on storm surges concentrated heavily on constructing surges as 
residuals, or the difference between tidal observations and what the tide would have 
been without the meteorological effect. They did this construction through 
computational and graphical work, constituting surges as graphs and numbers that 
calculations could be done with. For a place like Southend, where TI had predictions 
they trusted, the residual was further defined as observations minus predictions 
(shortened as obs-preds or ‗O-P‘). TI‘s definition of surges was closely linked to how 
they re-inscribed the tidal data. To calculate these residuals they wrote down numbers 
taken from the observations and other numbers from predictions on a special 
document (see Figure 5.2). These documents brought the observations and predictions 
together in a particular format which made the calculation of the residual more 
                                               
80 Folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA 
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straightforward and more comparable across time and space.81 The document had lines 
for observations, predictions and residuals, and each part will now be discussed in turn.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: A table with observations, predictions and the difference between them: the residual82 
 
The observations were extracted from the documents which had been sent to TI, while 
the predictions had to be specially made in-house. Re-inscribing the observational data 
could mean turning graphical data into numbers, or one number into another (for 
example, converting height of tide in cm into feet).83 Because of the bulky nature of 
most of the tidal records, and the fact it had to be returned to the sender, TI needed to 
be sure they extracted the information they wanted correctly the first time round. This 
                                               
81 Folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA 
82 Folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA 
83 At TI both ink and pencil were used, unlike in Whittaker‘s mathematical laboratory in Glasgow. 
Warwick, "The Laboratory of Theory," 340. 
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was reflected in their practices for checking their work, which can be seen through the 
marks left by this practice, such as ticks, corrections and notes.  
Published predictions usually only gave the times and heights of high and low water, but 
to do their ‗O-P‘ calculations TI needed hourly predictions, so published ones did not 
give enough details. As discussed in the previous chapter, by this stage producing 
periodic tidal predictions was increasingly becoming TI‘s bread-and-butter work. In 
1928 they were producing predictions for 51 ports plus a number of almanacs.84 Where 
they had access to the necessary harmonic constituents, for example at Southend, TI 
used their existing methods and tidal predictor machines to produce the predictions for 
their calculations of residuals. 
However, for many places, such as Dunbar, no analysis of the harmonic constituents of 
the tide existed, so TI could not use its existing methods to produce tidal predictions, as 
these methods relied on knowing such constituents. For such places TI developed a 
new method of separating the meteorological effects from periodic tides without having 
detailed tidal predictions. This method combined graphical and numerical techniques to 
calculate the residual and required hourly tidal observation data for six days.85 This tidal 
data was then manipulated by TI‘s workers to construct graphs like the one for Dunbar 
in Figure 5.3, out of which they then extracted residuals.86 For a clear example see figure 
5.4.87  In these figures the curved lines represent observations, whereas the faint smooth 
lines in the middle represent the unperturbed tide, which was the method‘s estimation 
of the periodic or astronomic tide. Each graph contained information for four hours 
per day, at six-hourly intervals, e.g. at 1am, 7am, 1pm and 7pm, across at least six days. 
As each curve gave information for four hours, together the six curves in Figure 5.3 
gave information on the surge for all 24 hours for these six days. Within one graph, the 
data points for one set of twelve hourly intervals, say 1am and 1pm, were drawn in thick 
pen and represented observations in feet, translated into a suitable scale. The values for 
the data points on the broken line represented the other twelve-hourly interval, i.e. 7am 
                                               
84 Liverpool Tidal Institute, Tidal Institute: Ninth Annual Report, 1928. 
85 Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Report on Thames Floods," in Meteorological Office Geophysical Memoir no. 47, 
Geophysical Memoirs (London1929), Appendix II.  
86 Folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA. In order to understand this method I had to refer both 
to Doodson‘s account of it and the graphs, as well as testing it out myself. 
87 This example was sent to LCC but it was not included in the printed report. Illustrative example for 
Dunbar method, from ―Report of an Investigation of Floods in the Thames, by A.T. Doodson‖, 31st May 
1928, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA 
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and 7pm. This second set was not direct observations but were instead the observation 
for that hour subtracted from twice the mean sea level, both in feet.  
The person at TI creating these graphs will have been referring to tidal observations, 
probably already reduced to the format in Figure 5.2, i.e. tidal observations re-inscribed 
as a line of numbers of hourly observations of tidal height. They then used some 
method of keeping track of which line they were referring to, perhaps by folding the 
document diagonally by the hour or by the use of a ruler or other indicator. Sometimes 
these documents in the Bidston archive have sharp diagonal creases indicating folding 
might have been one way of keeping track of where the worker was, which was 
particularly important because of the six-hourly jumping about in the data and the 
potential use of calculating machines to produce the data points for the broken line. If 
the computer had pen in one hand and were operating the calculating machine with the 
other (or indeed both hands), they must have kept track of their whereabouts in the 
numbers in a way that did not involve another hand. Once the data points had been 
marked, the worker connected them into a curve. While the graphs in the examples here 
are quite angular, many other of these graphs have been drawn as smooth curves, 
requiring particular skills of curve-drawing.  
If there was no meteorological effect the two curved lines would be identical when 
constructed like this, due to a particular numerical relationship valid for semi-diurnal 
tides. Semi-diurnal tides are common around the British coast and on average have two 
highs and two lows each day, i.e. extreme water levels take place at roughly six-hourly 
intervals, hence the six-hourly intervals of the data in the graphs. When there was a 
meteorological effect, the ‗unperturbed‘ (periodic) tide could, according to Doodson, be 
taken as the pencilled line drawn at the mean of the two curved lines as the numerical 
relationship between different phases of semi-diurnal tides cancelled out the 
meteorological effects during the different phases. The workers at TI visually 
‗calculated‘ the mean of the two curved lines and drew this representation of the 
unperturbed tide as a smooth curve through the points where the curved lines crossed. 
The residual was then extracted by reading off the distance between the curve for 
unperturbed tide and the actual observations using a small paper scale. This difference 
between the data point on one of the curved lines and the curve for the unperturbed tid 
represented the residual, i.e. the surge, at the hour of that data point, with the residuals 
for the points on the broken line converted for sign. Once the residuals had been 
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constructed this way, they could be re-inscribed onto tables and graphs like those 
produced through the obs-preds method used for Southend. Sometimes the graphs 
required adjustment for other, non-semi-diurnal parts of the tide, but Doodson claimed 
these parts easily could be smoothed out.88  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Graphs used to produce residuals when tidal predictions were unavailable. The curved lines 
represented observations, whereas the faint smooth line in the middle represented the unperturbed tide.89  
                                               
88 Doodson, "Report on Thames Floods," 25. 




Figure 5.4: Illustrative example of the Dunbar method for calculating the residual when predictions were 
unavailable. This illustration was not included in the final report.90 
 
This was a different way of constructing a surge, not as obs-preds but obs-‗unperturbed‘ 
tide, though like the obs-preds method it emphasised the difference between observed 
values and the expected undisturbed values: the residual. For this method, however, the 
unperturbed values were constructed out of the observations themselves using a 
method specific for the purpose. Doodson deemed the direct O-P method more 
―exact‖, but thought this second method produced good results and would ―be of 
further service‖.91 Indeed, as will be discussed in later chapters TI continued to use this 
method into the 1950s and sometimes even used it for places where they had 
predictions (e.g. Southend). This was one solution to the problem that predicted and 
unperturbed tides were quite different things and not necessarily comparable. 
                                               
90 ―Report of an Investigation of Floods in the Thames‖, by A.T. Doodson‖, 31st May 1928, 
LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA 
91 Doodson, "Report on Thames Floods," 5. 
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The document illustrated in Figure 5.2 was a way of pulling together the numbers 
representing observations and predictions produced by TI in various ways. Reducing 
the data onto these documents enabled comparisons between different dates and places. 
These documents were what was kept and preserved by TI, once they had returned the 
often cumbersome documents with tidal information to their contacts. The documents 
were light, compact at about half a (modern) A4, and crammed full with information 
that could be (and were) stored for many years before being repeatedly re-used for 
different investigations. The production of these rows of numbers, carefully checked 
and neatly written, involved a range of practices of calculation – some routine, like the 
use of tidal prediction machines, others new, like the new graphical method of 
separating out surges when TI did not have the necessary information to make tidal 
predictions.  
The example document in Figure 5.2 lists, hour by hour, the height of observations and 
predictions for Southend 14th to 20th December 1917. In this case, as a note at the top 
tells us, the predictions were produced on TI‘s tidal predictor machine, i.e. TI had 
harmonic constants available that they trusted enough to produce detailed, hour-by-
hour, predictions, unlike for Dunbar. The second, lower, table, is of the differences 
between the observations and calculations, but in this case this was not a simple 
subtraction. As is noted at the very top, there was a one foot difference in the datum for 
the observations and for the predictions, so the O-P (obs-preds) calculation had to be 
corrected for this. That the correction was done is noted above the O-P table. Again, TI 
kept track of decisions taken as part of the calculations by notes on these documents. 
These calculations are likely to have been done with the aid of one of the four 
calculating machines which TI had at this point.92 Another note tells us that the residual 
was graphed by ―MD‖, probably Miss Dodd, one of the Assistants at TI. The work was 
often divided up into specialised tasks given to different people, which is reflected in 
the number of different handwritings on some of the documents. Sub-dividing 
mathematical work like this was one of the skills Doodson had developed in London 
during the war and which he further developed at TI. 
                                               
92 Proudman to Roberts, 3rd Oct 1935, D/BO 3/3/1, MMM - North Street 
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Two of the graphs ‗MD‘ constructed can be seen in Figure 5.5.93 These are graphs of a 
storm surge according to TI‘s definition, constructed using its practices of graphical and 
numerical calculations. The graphs are representations of a surge in two places, as these 
were constructed by TI in 1928 as the residual of tidal gauge observation minus periodic 
tidal predictions for Southend and observation minus ‗unperturbed‘ tide for Dunbar. 
Usually only one surge in one place was graphed on one page, but this case took the 
analysis one step further by comparing the surges at two places on one page. Through 
such comparisons Doodson concluded that surges travelled down the East Coast, in 
other words that it was not enough to study the Thames estuary to understand coastal 
flooding in London, but that this needed an investigation with a wider geographical 
range. 
 
Figure 5.5: A document with the graph of the obs-preds residual for Southend at the bottom and the graph 
of the obs-„unperturbed‟ residual for Dunbar, January 11th to 17th 1916: a storm surge as constructed by TI 
for these two locations. Note the smoothing of the curve for Dunbar.94  
 
                                               
93 Folder ―Storm surges 1914-1928‖, Box 16, BA 
94 Box 15, BA 
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What TI‘s workers did to construct surges was to produce chains of documents. They 
took inscriptions of tidal observations and re-inscribed these, via intermediary steps, 
onto a standardised document, onto which they also put hourly predictions produced 
by TI. Then calculations were done on these numbers, with the results recorded on the 
same document and then finally represented graphically on another document. If tidal 
predictions did not exist a different method was employed, which used numbers from 
inscriptions of observations to produce graphs and numbers representing the residual, 
in this case defined as the difference between observations and ‗unperturbed‘ tides. 
These ways of constructing surges remained similar at TI until the 1950s and the 
definition of a storm surge as the residual has been in use until recently at TI‘s 
successors, so these surges were what TI attempted to make predictable.95 These graphs 
were TI‘s prime representations of storm surges, and the objects it offered the Met 
Office to work with. The graphs gave the residual, or surge, hour by hour, which meant 
the Met Office could extract the timings they needed from them. The graphs thus made 
TI‘s surges into objects the Met Office could calculate with. The residuals, whether in 
numerical or graphical format, was also what TI needed to do the work they had 
proposed and been given patronage to do. 
Through these practices of calculation TI constituted surges as calculable, as entities 
that could be constructed through calculation and calculated with.96 Through their 
constitution of surges TI picked a particular aspect of events such as the flooding in 
1928 and structured them in particular ways, by defining them as residuals, naming 
them surges and constructing them through the particular practices of calculation 
described above. However, to constitute surges as calculable entities was not the same 
as making them predictable entities. We now turn to TI‘s attempts to make surges 
predictable as opposed to calculable. 
 
                                               
95 A more recent definition is the skew surge, see Horsburgh and Wilson, "Tide-Surge Interaction and Its 
Role in the Distribution of Surge Residuals in the North Sea." 
96 Compare Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation."; Lynch, "The Externalized Retina." 
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5.6 THE USE OF THE ‗FAILED‘ ATTEMPTS AT PRODUCING A QUANTITATIVE 
FORECASTING FORMULA 
When Doodson started to provide the Met Office with his detailed graphs with the 
timings of his surges, Dines and Simpson quickly accepted TI‘s designation of PLA‘s 
list as insufficient, as can be seen from the progress report Dines sent in early April to 
the Hydrographic Department. He there argued, just as Doodson had done, that the list 
of high tides PLA had provided them with during the early stages of the work had been 
―faulty in that only occasions of unusually high tide were noted, no account being taken 
of the predicted height‖. Another reason Dines gave for abandoning PLA‘s list was that 
results of early attempted forecasts based on PLA‘s definition of surges had been ―very 
unsatisfactory‖ with only three out of 17 deemed ―good‖ and six cases of ―notably 
raised‖ tides were missed. No definition of good, unsatisfactory or notably raised was 
given. Dines wrote that in future work on forecasting, ―the most favourable conditions‖ 
in terms of wind direction, and the time taken for the wind to produce the maximum 
effect, would be based on Doodson‘s ―detailed curves‖ of surges, so the Met Office 
researchers had by now accepted to work with TI‘s definition of surges and its list of 
these.97 They later claimed that TI‘s data was of ―much greater precision and suitability 
for the task at hand‖ than the early data provided by PLA.98 This shows that TI‘s 
definition of the event became the investigation‘s topic of investigation. The Met 
Office‘s researchers appear to have accepted TI‘s definition after TI combined displays 
of expertise and provision of graphs with timings. 
After this both the Met Office and TI independently did work to analyse which 
meteorological conditions produced flooding, using different methodological 
approaches to the problem. The different approaches were aligned to common 
practices at the different institutions, with TI concentrating on mathematical work while 
the Met Office used a more synoptic approach.99 The Met Office concentrated on the 
17 cases identified by Doodson where the surge had led to an increase of water level of 
at least four feet. Out of TI‘s graphs Dines extracted a few specific pieces of data to 
work with: the time and height of the what he called extreme positive departure, i.e. the 
                                               
97 ―High Thames Tides. Note on work done in the Forecast Division (To April 1928)‖, Box 16, BA 
98 J.S. Dines, "Meteorological Conditions Associated with High Tides in the Thames," in Meteorological 
Office Geophysical Memoir no. 47 (London1929), 29. 
99 ―Discussion on Thames Tides at the Meteorological Office, 10 a.m. April 27th 1928‖, Box 16, BA 
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time and level of the highest part of the surge, and the departure (i.e. TI‘s residual or 
surge) at the time of predicted high water. He inserted this information into his own 
documents and lists, added information about geostrophic wind100 and the general 
weather situation, and then looked for patterns in this data. He looked in more detail at 
TI‘s curves for some cases, analysing them together with synoptic charts. Dines‘s work 
concentrated on synoptic analysis, though he did calculate means.101 
Doodson‘s work on the other hand was much more statistical and numerical, including 
the creation of at least 150 correlation tables and other statistical calculations, the 
drawing of meteorological charts and of graphs of barometric pressure (sometimes 
under graphs of residuals, so correlated visually as well as numerically). The correlation 
tables linked meteorological conditions in various areas of the sea to the surge in the 
Thames estuary, as had been done for Liverpool. Doodson judged that the correlations 
for Southend were worse than those he had found in Liverpool, ―indicating the greater 
complexity of tidal phenomena in Southend‖.102 TI‘s construction of statistical formulae 
will be explored at in more detail in the next chapter.  
However, their work did not produce the desired results of a flood forecasting formulae 
and both the Met Office and TI stated in their final reports to the Technical Sub-
Committee that further work was necessary to be able to do forecasts of Thames 
flooding for the warning system. Doodson‘s conclusions were cautious and tentative: 
―The problem of forecasting the effects is very complicated and further investigation is 
required before the meteorological conditions can be specifically formulated in such a 
manner that forecasts can be prepared as a matter of routine‖.103  His final multiple 
regression formula was said to provide ―by no means a good representation of the 
variations of sea level‖, as the standard deviation of original residuals had only been 
                                               
100 Geostrophic wind, which is defined in the list of technical terms, will be discussed further in the next 
two chapters.  
101 ―Notes on discussion‖, unknown author 16th Mar 1928, Box 16, BA; ―High Thames Tides. Note on 
work done in the Forecast Division (To April 1928)‖, Box 16, BA. Dines, "Meteorological Conditions 
Associated with High Tides in the Thames." 
102 ―Investigation of Thames Floods. Report of Progress, 2nd Apr 1928‖, Box 16, BA. The largest 
correlation coefficient between mean sea-level at London Bridge found was -0.494, with what was called 
the East gradient taken over the Norwegian sea with a time lag of 19hrs, see Report on an investigation 
of floods in the Thames, Doodson, 31st May 1928, AIR 2/331, NA.  
103 ―Summary of report on the Thames flood‖, Doodson, ca summer 1928, Box 16, BA 
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reduced by a small amount, to 0.866 times the original of 0.47ft, as opposed to halved 
for Liverpool during TI‘s earlier work.104  
Like Doodson, Dines at the Met Office argued that further research was needed before 
forecasts of surges could be issued. However, the Met Office could provide a general 
rule of thumb describing under which meteorological conditions ―disturbances in the 
water level amounting to 4 ft. or more‖ were likely, which was when a geostrophic wind 
of 60mph and over blew from the NW or N over the North Sea.105 As the surges 
predicted by this rule tended to avoid high tides this rule would warn far too often, 
crying wolf, if used on its own as part of a warning system for flooding. However, these 
findings were used to slightly amend the emergency warning system. If the Met Office 
on the basis of their synoptic charts predicted geostrophic winds of 60 miles per hour 
from the NW or N over the North Sea, they issued a warning of this to the police at 
Scotland Yard, which then triggered a tidal watch as in the emergency warning 
system.106 The warning system remained focused on the Met Office‘s synoptic wind 
forecasts and ‗nowcasts‘ of tidal heights by tidal watchers for the next couple of decades 
with only minor modifications.107 TI was not involved with this system and remained 
marginal to the day-to-day flood warning operation. The Met Office only forecast 
winds, not flooding or storm surges.108 Thus, nobody was forecasting surges or coastal 
flooding in the UK in this period, though there was some warning of meteorological 
conditions favouring their development and if one took place it was supposed to be 
‗nowcast‘ down the East Coast.  
                                               
104 Doodson, "Report on Thames Floods," 14. 
105 Dines, "Meteorological Conditions Associated with High Tides in the Thames," 35-39, quote from 39. 
106 ―Superintendent‘s Instruction No. 791. Thames Flood Warnings,‖ 27th Nov 1928, BJ 5/22, NA 
107 For practical details on the operation of the warning system from the point of view of LCC, the 
Metropolitan Police and the Met Office, see e.g. LCC/CL/MD/1/12, LCC/CL/MD/1/116 and 
LCC/CL/ESTAB/1/211 at LMA, and MEPO 2/6291, BJ 5/22 and BJ 5/181 at NA. 
108 This was emphasised in 1933 when Gold suggested they should synoptically forecast flooding. 
Simpson, who had been one of Doodson‘s main contact and who was in charge of the work, made it very 
clear he thought the Met Office were not issuing flood warnings, but warnings to the Police of ―certain 
specified conditions regarding the wind over the North Sea‖. Indeed, he emphasised that the Technical 
Sub-Committee had concluded that ―a meteorologist could not forecast floods‖ and that asking 
meteorologists to try do what the ―specialists said they could not do‖ would be unfair to them. Simpson 
was using his status not only as boss but also as expert to keep the warning system operating as before. 
The flood warnings would instead continue to be done by others (the Police primarily) on the basis of 
measured water levels, i.e. the tidal gauge ‗nowcasts‘ from the East Coast and Southend mentioned earlier. 
Minute 23 (1st Nov 1932)  & 40 (7th Oct 1933),  Gold, BJ 5/22, NA; Minute 24 (8th Nov 1932) & 42 (17th 
Oct 1933), Simpson, BJ 5/22, NA 
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Reports of the research by TI and the Met Office were sent to their patrons in London 
in early summer 1928, after which a meeting of the representatives from LCC, PLA, TI 
and Hydro on the Technical Sub-Committee was organised. The minutes of this 
meeting emphasised the problems with forecasting surges: ―The probable occurrence of 
a storm surge can be predicted; as yet the time when its high water will reach the 
Thames estuary, or any other place, cannot‖. However, a further investigation could 
―possibly‖ lead to ―the advance prediction of dangerous tides in particular places‖.109 
The problems with producing forecasts, together with some of the other findings of the 
research, were used to argue for a further investigation and thus for further funding. 
Aside from the question of improving the warning system, what the Conference into 
the event had wanted answered was what the causes of the flooding were and how 
often such events happened, to establish what the height of flood defences should be. 
TI‘s answers to these questions, and also the findings regarding tide-surge interaction, 
will now be briefly considered, as they are part of the background for demands for 
further inquiries into storm surges.  
TI had made clear in their initial proposal that they thought a further, wider, 
investigation would be necessary to fully answer the questions that had been set by the 
Technical Sub-Committee and, rather unsurprisingly, they came to the same conclusion 
at the end of the initial investigation.110 More work was said to be needed not only to 
improve the warning system but also to provide further information regarding the 
necessary height of flood defence. For this TI had worked out a number of different 
estimates for how often these events recurred. In his final report Doodson provided a 
range of answers, from a flood every 18 years to one every 1,700 years, using different 
methods to calculate the probabilities. On the basis of statistical and physical reasons he 
preferred the result of 1 in 60, but he made it clear that he considered this a quite 
uncertain answer. In terms of causes, Doodson had also looked at the impact of inland 
flooding on the event in London but had found that it was ―not of primary 
                                               
109 Emphasis in original. ―Thames Floods: Technical Sub-Committee's Report‖, enclosure two to letter to 
LCC from Ministry of Health, 10th Aug 1928, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA 
110 ―Summary of report on the Thames flood‖, Doodson, summer 1928, Box 16, BA 
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importance‖.111 His research came to a conclusion that could be used to downplay the 
arguments that had connected the event to the issue of land drainage.  
A particular issue the research had raised was the problem of the timing of really large 
surges, such as an 11 feet surge Doodson had found. Could such a surge arrive at high 
tide? If it did it would cause much worse flooding than in 1928, when the surge had 
been about half that height. When discussing this Doodson emphasised what has 
become known as tide-surge interaction, which is that the effect of the wind is stronger 
when the water is less deep, i.e. the local wind effect is weaker at high tide and stronger 
at low tide.112 If this holds, then an external surge from further afield will never be 
combined with a high local surge at high tide but only at low tide when the combination 
is unlikely to cause flooding. Doodson argued that this needed to be more fully 
investigated.113 Such work would set physical limits to the highest possible storm surges, 
with important political and practical consequences, e.g. for the height, and thus cost, of 
coastal defences.114  
Following the initial investigation members of the Technical Sub-Committee 
recommended that ―the desirability of continued investigations should [...] be 
considered‖ and claimed that such an investigation would be of national interest, as 
storm surges affected a large area and travelled along the coast.115 With this 
recommendation, the stage was set for different actors to ask for further research to be 
done on storm surges, with the research framed as of national interest and thus to be 
paid for by national government. The next chapter looks further at this. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The 1928 flooding event led to many changes in storm surge science at Liverpool, with 
patronage shifting from the shipping industry towards local government and a new 
                                               
111 The Met Office had not done much work on the recurrence issue or the role of inland water. Dines, 
"Meteorological Conditions Associated with High Tides in the Thames." Doodson, "Report on Thames 
Floods," 17. 
112 Doodson, "Report on Thames Floods," 4.  
113 Ibid., 11.  
114 Work into tide-surge interaction continues to this day, see Horsburgh and Wilson, "Tide-Surge 
Interaction and Its Role in the Distribution of Surge Residuals in the North Sea." 
115 ―Thames Floods: Technical Sub-Committee's Report‖, enclosure two to letter dated 10/08/1928 from 
Ministry of Health, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA 
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focus on flood forecasting. Their construction of surges was also to some extent new, 
such as the term surge and Doodson‘s graphical obs-undisturbed method of 
constructing residuals. At the same time TI‘s work also retained close links to what they 
had previously done for other patrons. Earlier its work on meteorological effects had 
been aimed at aiding shipping men get ships in and out of ports safely and 
economically, not at warning of potential floods, which was what TI‘s storm surge 
science was focused on from this event on. Doodson‘s earlier methods had to take into 
account meteorological effects that both increased and decreased sea levels, as both 
mattered to the shipping industry and to ports. The politicians based in London were 
concerned with flooding, and therefore increased sea levels. They were less concerned 
with decreased sea levels, but Doodson‘s usage of his earlier methods and concepts 
meant that the research they funded at TI dealt with both increases and decreases in sea 
levels. The Met Office, which had not done much work in this area previously, instead 
concentrated on increases only, so in contrast to TI‘s use of earlier methods and 
definitions they focused on only the aspect politicians were interested in. TI‘s whole 
approach to the investigation relied on developing their earlier methods, such as the 
definition of surges as residuals and the use of statistical correlations of such residuals 
with pressure gradients to produce forecasts, which is why they needed to convince 
others to use their definition of the event.  
The chapter has looked at how TI constructed the meteorological effects they were 
trying to predict as calculable objects. They called these objects ‗surges‘ and tried to 
convince others to use them. To TI, a surge was a meteorological effect, and also a 
graph on a piece of paper: the carefully and laboriously constructed residual after 
predictions or unperturbed tide had been subtracted from observations. For them sea 
level was connected to surges through chains of documents. Many different practices 
were involved in TI‘s construction of surges as the objects used by the investigation. 
These were not only those of calculation and mathematics but also of correspondence 
(in getting documents and information to TI), of social networking, building 
relationships with the Met Office and maintaining those with the Hydrographic 
Department, and of something which may perhaps be called diplomacy in dealing with 
PLA and London-based politics, e.g. by framing the investigation as locally focused, to 
get local funding. In order to construct their surges, TI was not only putting together 
documents from other documents but also putting together and maintaining 
relationships both with other researchers and with politicians. TI‘s researchers had to 
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convince others that their particular centre of calculation should become the 
investigation‘s obligatory passage point regarding the definition of the events to be 
researched. They were sufficiently successful in this that the Met Office came to use 
TI‘s instead of PLA‘s definition of events. TI was also able use their definition of surges 
to do enough work to justify their funding and they got paid. However, they did not 
become involved in the operation of the warning system and the term surge was long 
used only by a few specialists. They were in the end only a partial passage point for 
storm surge-related work in Britain after this event.  
The work done at TI with meteorological effects can be seen as a stereotypical example 
of how Latour describes science as the construction of chains of inscriptions and 
networks of connections. Their work used tidal gauge inscriptions – the height of the 
tide traced on a piece of paper by a machine, the tidal gauge – which were analysed at 
TI by making more and more inscriptions, often on specialised linked forms, 
culminating in attempted formulae or equations for forecasting.116 In addition I have 
described how TI built a network of connections, at times through contests with other 
actors to define what the investigation should research.117 It was a real struggle for TI to 
hold their connections together to do their work and they nearly did not. TI might not 
have been able to convince the Met Office to use their list of storm effects, which could 
have been the end of TI‘s involvement with the investigation and their local authority 
patronage. As such my narrative has emphasised the vulnerability – not the power – of 
scientists in centres of calculation and the contingency of their chains of documents, 
something which I will develop further in the next chapter. 
TI‘s practices of calculation constituted surges in a particular way, which made them 
calculable both for TI and the Met Office, but this was not enough to make them 
predictable. They could now be both calculated and be used to calculate with, but not 
forecast. TI‘s calculations did not, according to themselves, produce the desired result 
of a numerical forecasting formula. This further differentiates Herbert Kalthoff‘s 
process of making calculable objects. He implicitly separates the process of loan-giving 
into the constitution/calculation of and negotiation /calculation with credit proposals, 
but does not consider the possibility that it may not be sufficient to calculate with the 
                                               
116 Latour, Science in Action, ch 6.  
117 See e.g. Latour, Pandora's Hope, 90-91, 98-108.  
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constituted entity to get the desired result. This is because he studies an already 
established process through which credit proposals are negotiated and then accepted or 
rejected, i.e. the process has already been organised to produce particular results. TI‘s 
surges were being constituted as part a process that was being established, and studying 
their work sheds some light on the choices made as part of the establishment of such a 
process. Kalthoff is well aware of the contingent and historical nature of the process he 
studies but concentrates on how it runs once established.118 Similarly, Michael Lynch 
relies on published sources so does not emphasise the contingent or historical aspects 
of how a particular specimen came to be constructed as calculable in a particular way.119 
In this thesis I instead want to highlight that the process of constituting surges as 
scientific objects was historically contingent. The next chapter will discuss some of the 
effects of TI‘s constricted choices in constituting meteorological effects as surges and 
how their particular chains of documents limited as well as connected them.  
TI‘s research produced various results sufficiently valued by their patrons for TI to be 
paid. However, their key aim of producing numerical forecasts for surges was deemed 
unsuccessful, as it had been for Liverpool earlier on in the 1920s. This had two effects. 
Firstly, TI was cut off from the practical operation of the warning system, which came 
to be dominated by more qualitative synoptic forecasts by the Met Office together with 
‗nowcasts‘ of the height of tides. Secondly, the ‗failure‘ of this smaller scale investigation 
opened up the possibility for TI and other actors, such as LCC, to ask for funding for 
further work to by suggesting this could lead to numerical forecasts. The next chapter 
will turn to these requests for funding and TI‘s continued work on producing forecasts.  
                                               
118 Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation," 74.  
119 Lynch, "The Externalized Retina." 
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CHAPTER 6 (1929-1952), THE ROLE OF STATE 
PATRONAGE IN OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 
How did the patronage pattern of storm surge science develop before, during and after 
the Second World War, and how did these changes interact with TI‘s practices? This 
question can be divided into two: first, how did different parts of the state relate to TI‘s 
work, especially its work on storm surge forecasting, and second, how did TI‘s practices 
relate to the patronage received? By covering a longer time span than the other 
chapters, this chapter concentrates on longer term developments such as a gradual 
increase in state involvement in research – but only some parts of the state in some 
types of research. The chapter traces debates regarding various decisions concerning 
whether different parts of the state would provide TI and its storm surge research with 
patronage. It also discusses in some detail TI‘s practices of calculation when 
constructing forecasting formulae, focusing on how various contingencies influenced 
this project. 
After the initial investigation into storm surges in 1928 further work on forecasting of 
storm surges was sought after by some actors, such as TI, London County Council 
(LCC) and the Hydrographic Department (Hydro). However, the funding of the project 
became tangled up in wider debates over flood defence and the role of the central 
government in flood defence, and it did not begin until 1938. Very little surge related 
work was done at TI before the commissioning of this research so the first part of this 
chapter follows debates between local and central government taking place in London 
regarding the funding of the proposed research project. This explores which parts of 
the state were interested in surge science at this time. Central government repeatedly 
refused to fund the research project as they did not want to get involved with flood 
defence and instead local government commissioned the project, showing how only 
specific parts of the state were interested in this specific type of research at this time. 
Once they had commissioned TI to do the research in 1938, LCC took a hands-off 
approach to the project. Apart from providing occasional progress updates to their 
southern funders, TI got on with the work without much involvement from them. The 
chapter briefly returns to TI, looking at the initial phase of the project. However, soon 
TI‘s work on the project was interrupted by the war when the key researcher on it went 
to work for the Navy. The war also led to interest in TI‘s storm surge work from the 
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UK and US Navies. Firstly, Hydro requested a storm surge forecasting method, which 
TI provided but which does not then appear to have been used. Secondly, the project‘s 
final report was literally appropriated by the US authorities, who published it in a very 
limited edition in the US. While the UK and US Navies had some interest in the project 
it was partial and they did not provide funding for it. 
The chapter then shifts focus and analytic register towards TI‘s practices and their 
relation to TI‘s patronage. The naval interest in storm surge science had a definitive 
effect on it. At first TI‘s researchers experimented with a Laplacian approach towards 
forecasting surges, but they encountered some problems with this approach, in part 
related to the way they chose to calculate winds. Then, in response to Hydro‘s request, 
TI‘s researchers changed back to more statistical methods of forecasting. This 
represented a shift between two different traditions of practice that were strong at TI: 
Laplacian theoretical work and statistics. I argue that the choices TI‘s researchers made 
were contingent on issues such as the Hydro request, and also consequential for the 
results they achieved. This section also discusses how one of TI‘s researchers 
constructed a forecasting formula by first taking the meteorological effects apart into 
constituent residuals and then putting them back together, and how TI defined success 
in relation to this formula.  
The final section shifts back to debates regarding patronage, first briefly covering the 
publication of the final report of the project by the US Navy before discussing the 
establishment of the National Institute of Oceanography.  Many have argued 
oceanography saw a dramatic increase in naval patronage after the war. While this also 
happened in the UK, this naval patronage went to a new Institute while TI‘s overall 
patronage structure stayed similar between 1929 and 1952. TI‘s type of oceanographic 
research was still not deemed of sufficient interest to state actors to warrant further 
support than was already given through the purchase of tidal predictions. 
 
6.1.1 THE POLITICS OF FLOOD DEFENCE 
Following the presentation of the reports of the research project set up after the 1928 
flood event, a second report was written by LCC, PLA, TI and Hydro. Both then and 
later this was presented as a report of the Technical Sub-Committee though this was 
formally not the case as the sub-committee had already been disbanded, but this lent the 
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report more authority than it actually had.1 The report recommended that ―the 
desirability of continued investigations should [...] be considered‖.2 It also 
recommended that such continued investigations should be paid for by central 
government, with a wider geographical focus aimed at forecasting storm surges. In 
addition the report claimed such an investigation would help to decide how high to 
build flood defence. Despite the strong sentiments voiced by various actors, such as 
Hydro, TI and LCC, in favour of the inquiry, it did not begin until a decade later, as it 
was repeatedly denied funding from the Treasury. The first section of this chapter 
follows these debates and the actions of those involved in it, as an example of debates 
regarding what central government‘s involvement should be in this type of research. I 
will first discuss the setting of this debate in wider debates between local, regional and 
national government regarding funding of flood defence and related measures, and then 
look at the specifics regarding the proposed storm surge project. 
In the background of this debate whether central government should fund storm surge 
science was the depressed state of the national finance in this period, as well as the 
Treasury‘s general views on spending. According to George Peden, the Treasury‘s 
interwar view on central government spending on social services was underpinned by 
one general principle: that a community served by a service should contribute to it 
through the rates, before central government considered providing a matching grant.3 
The emphasis on flood defence as a local responsibility, mentioned in the previous 
chapter, echoes this same principle. In early 1928 the Treasury‘s principle was being 
questioned in relation to land drainage, closely related to flood defence. A Royal 
Commission on Land Drainage had reported just before the 1928 event, following 
bitter debates in the River Ouse catchment area regarding who should pay for 
‗improvements‘ to arterial drainage. Should those from upriver valleys help pay for 
improvements to drainage down in the Fens? ‗Their‘ water caused floods in the Fens, 
but they would not see the benefit of works. Long-standing tradition had it that it was 
those who directly benefited from drainage works that should pay for them, but farmers 
in the Fens were unable to finance these expensive works. The Treasury was not keen in 
                                               
1 Minutes by Warburg in June, H 3801/28, UKHO 
2 ―Thames Floods: Technical Sub-Committee's Report‖, enclosure two to letter dated 10/08/1928 from 
Ministry of Health, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA.  
3 George C. Peden, British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher (Oxford: Philip Allan 
Publishers, 1985), 117. 
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1928 to take on the increased financial responsibilities implied by the Commission‘s 
recommendations, but in 1930 the Land Drainage Act implemented them.4 By then 
what is known as the ‗Treasury view‘ – that central government spending funded by 
borrowing from the public was incapable of producing employment (as it would ‗crowd 
out‘ private business) – had softened a little, but this view, and the principle of 
preserving balanced budgets remained strong.5  
The Land Drainage Act broke some of the linkages between local benefit and payment, 
as well as increasing the Treasury‘s financial involvement in land drainage. In addition to 
the debates regarding who should fund land drainage projects, the whole system of local 
government finance was being restructured in 1928, with derating of agriculture, 
reduction in industrial rates, Poor Law reform and the introduction of a fuel tax.6 
Central government funding of local government in general and land drainage in 
particular was contested at this time. 
However, these wider debates regarding land drainage and local authority funding were 
undertaken on the national level, while local issues were at least as, or more, important, 
as background for the debate on storm surge science. London had been given an 
exception from some of the reforms in the Land Drainage Act.7 There was a history of 
disputes between the different layers of London government regarding who should pay 
for and control flood defence. An Act in 1879 had given the regional authority (LCC‘s 
predecessor) control of flood defence policy, but it was not prepared to pay for building 
the defences. After a long debate in the 1870s these costs remained a charge on riparian 
(riverside) landowners, in the face of protests from the smaller local authorities.8 This 
meant that in 1928 LCC was responsible for setting the standard height of flood 
defences in London, though the riparian landowners were supposed to pay for the 
defences. Immediately following the event in 1928, LCC was given further 
                                               
4 Bowers, "Inter-War Land Drainage and Policy in England and Wales."; Sheail, "Arterial Drainage in 
Inter-War England." 
5 George C. Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906-1959 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), ch 4&5, esp 222-223 and 268-229.   
6 Ibid., 209-211.  
7 Adjourned report of the General Purposes Committee, ―Thames Floods Prevention – Report of Royal 
Commission on Land Drainage – Proposed Conference‖ in folder Thames Floods, 18th Mar, 1930, 
Council Minutes Cuttings, LCC/CL/GP/1/119 
8 Report of the Metropolitan Board of Works for the Year 1877, vol. (213), House of Commons Papers; Accounts 
and Papers, (1878); Report of the Metropolitan Board of Works for the Year 1879, vol. (212), House of 
Commons Papers; Accounts and Papers, (1880). 
 195 
 
responsibilities related to the inspection of flood defences, but the overall framework 
had not changed.9  
This history of disputes between different authorities was played out again following the 
1928 event, when the question of how flood defence along the Thames should be co-
ordinated was again raised and discussed by various conferences and committees until 
the mid-1930s.10 The proposed investigation into storm surges was part of this wider 
debate on flood defence. The Departmental Committee favoured centralisation of the 
powers to manage flood defences  to a joint committee hosted by one existing 
authority. For them the question was which authority should host it.11 Several regional-
level authorities, such as LCC, Port of London Authority (PLA) and the Thames 
Conservancy, wanted to host the co-ordinating powers. In the summer of 1934 LCC 
asked the Ministry of Health to make LCC the controlling authority.12  
However, after the publication of the report of this committee in 1933 the Ministry was 
sent a number of letters from smaller riverside Boroughs, who felt the proposed 
committee threatened ―local amenities‖ and asked for a number of added 
recommendations, including a right of appeal for local authorities against the decisions 
of the proposed committee.13 Several other bodies, such as the Association of Public 
Wharfingers of the Port of London, various Commissioners of Sewers (old bodies 
traditionally responsible for flood defence and drainage), and several Catchment Boards 
(newer bodies set up through the Land Drainage Act), similarly complained to the 
ministries involved with the Departmental Committee about their lack of representation 
                                               
9 London County Council (General Powers) Act 1929 - Prevention of Floods. 
10For example, the Thames Valley Floods Conference, the Thames Floods Prevention Conference, and 
the Departmental Committee on Thames Flood Prevention. The different conferences and committees 
had slightly different names, membership and detailed questions for consideration, but they were all 
dealing with flood defence along the Thames and were closely related to each other. Materials on these 
are held in LMA (folders LCC/CL/MD/1/8, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, & LCC/CL/GP/1/119) and in the 
National Archive (e.g. folders HLG 51/39 and WORK 6/403). 
11 Like LCC, PLA insisted on becoming the controlling authority, see ―Extract from Kew Gardens‘ File‖, 
26 Mar 1931, WORK 6/403, NA. On the conclusions of the conferences see also Edwards to Davis, 15 th 
Dec 1932. WORK 6/403, NA. ―The Departmental Committee on Thames Flood Prevention,‖ Joint 
Report by Clerk of the Council and Chief Engineer, 3rd Jun 1931, section 13, 14 and 16, 
LCC/CL/GP/1/119, LMA, ―Thames Floods Prevention‖, General Purposes No. 947, Agenda No. 19, 
LCC/CL/MD/1/11, and Humphrey and Palmer, "On the Future Standard of Thames Floods 
Prevention Works in the County of London." 
12 ―Report of the Departmental Committee on Thames Flood Prevention‖, Report of the General 
Purpose Committee, 16th Jul 1934, LCC/CL/GP/1/119, LMA 
13 For example, Town Clerk at the Borough of Brentford and Chiswick to The Secretary at Ministry of 
Health, 22nd Dec 1933, HLG 50/129, NA. Other authorities complaining in a very similar way included 
Richmond, Barnes and Twickenham. 
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on the proposed committee and the lack of protection of their interests.14 After this 
campaign the Ministry of Health put the proposals low on their priorities. When LCC 
chased in 1936, Principal Secretary IF Armer stated internally that while the proposals 
had been included in the list of possible Ministry of Health bills since 1933 ―pressure of 
other Bills has been such that inclusion has not become a live issue‖. Quoting a lack of 
requests from others than LCC for the proposals to be put into law, strong opposition 
by local authorities seaward of LCC and statements by LCC that strengthened flood 
defences had reduced the risk of flooding, Armer suggested that the matter be dropped, 
and this was agreed to by Assistant Secretary WA Ross.15 To LCC, the Ministry 
responded that it was unable to do give LCC control because of the ―diversity of 
opinion‖ among local authorities on the ―principles to be embodied‖ by the 
legislation.16 LCC complained, but the Ministry remained firm that it could not 
introduce the proposals to Parliament and the idea of a co-ordinating flood prevention 
authority petered out after this. 
Garside, Gillespie and Clapson have argued that conflicts between different local 
authorities typified interwar London politics.17 The failure to create a flood defence 
authority was typical of LCC-led attempts at further co-ordinating London government 
in the interwar period. When a co-ordinating body was actually created, e.g. dealing with 
transport or electricity, the LCC did not have a strong role on it. They instead tended to 
take the form of public corporations managed by independent experts and with a strong 
influence from private industry.18 What LCC saw as rationalisation and coordinated 
planning was often resisted by other local authorities, e.g. the London boroughs and the 
nearby Counties. These resented what they saw as LCC's attempts at controlling them 
and extending its own powers. This problem of how to govern London was identified 
and discussed at the time, for example by William Robson, a Fabian protégé of the 
Webbs, who favoured a stronger regional-level authority, echoing Labour‘s calls in the 
                                               
14 Documents in HLG 50/129, NA 
15 Minute by Armer to Ross, 3rd Feb 1936, HLG 50/129, NA 
16 Francis to the Clerk of the LCC, 24th Feb 1936, HLG 51/39, NA 
17 Ken Young and Patricia L.  Garside, Metropolitan London : Politics and Urban Change 1837-1981 (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1982); Mark Clapson, "Localism, the London Labour Party and the LCC between the 
Wars," in Politics and the People of London: The London County Council, 1889-1965, ed. Andrew Saint (London: 
The Hambledon Press, 1989).  
18 James Gillespie, "Municipalism, Monopoly and Management: The Demise of 'Socialism in One 
County', 1918-1933," in Politics and the People of London: The London County Council, 1889-1965, ed. Andrew 
Saint (London: The Hambledon Press, 1989). 
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previous chapter for a ―real Corporation of London‖.19 Flood defence and how it 
should be co-ordinated was part of a wider set of acrimonious power struggles between 
different local and regional authorities in London; power struggles that were not 
resolved. The storm surge science project also became part of such power struggles, as 
will now be discussed. 
 
6.1.2 THE CONTESTED PATRONAGE OF STORM SURGE RESEARCH 
During the debates on flood defence policy one of the few things the committees 
agreed on was the proposed storm surge research. In their various reports they 
repeatedly recommended that the second round of research should be undertaken and, 
crucially, that it should be paid for by central government.20 LCC used these various 
recommendations, and especially the report of the (not quite) Technical Sub-
Committee, to repeatedly ask the Ministry of Health to instigate this further 
investigation. Such requests for funding were sent to the Treasury in 1931, 32, 34 and 
36.21  
As Gail Savage‘s analysis of the policy of Ministry of Health officials has shown, it 
emphasised financial ‗efficiency‘ over expensive social policies in the interwar period, 
just as the ‗Treasury view‘ at this time emphasised balanced national budgets as outlined 
above, so it is unsurprising that both these departments resisted expenditure and in the 
end refused it.22 Nobody, not LCC or the other local or regional authorities, the 
Ministry of Health, the Admiralty or the Treasury, wanted to spend their money on the 
                                               
19 William A. Robson, The Government and Misgovernment of London (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1939). He did not discuss flood defence. For more on him see John Davis, "London‘s Evolution - from 
Parochialism to Global Metropolis," in London Government - 50 Years of Debate : The Contribution of LSE's 
Greater London Group, ed. Ben Kochan (London: LSE London, 2008); Michael Hebbert, "William Robson, 
the Herbert Commission and ‗Greater London‘," in London Government - 50 Years of Debate : The Contribution 
of LSE's Greater London Group, ed. Ben Kochan (London: LSE London, 2008). 
20 Humphrey and Palmer, "On the Future Standard of Thames Floods Prevention Works in the County 
of London," para 72; William Edward Hart, "Report of the Departmental Committee on Thames Flood 
Prevention," in Command Papers, Reports of commissioners (1933), para 19. For how LCC emphasised this part 
of the Departemental Committee Report, see Report of the General Purposes Committee, 16th July, 1934, 
Report of the Departmental Committee on Thames Flood Prevention, Section K, in folder Thames 
Floods, Council Minutes Cuttings, LCC/CL/GP/1/119 
21 LCC to the Secretary of the Ministry of Health, 15th Aug 1930, HLG 51/39, NA 
22 Savage, The Social Construction of Expertise; Peter Clarke, "The Treasury's Analytical Model of the British 
Economy between the Wars," in The State and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experiences, ed. 
Mary O. Furner and Barry Supple (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Peden, The Treasury 
and British Public Policy, 1906-1959 ; Peden, British Economic and Social Policy.  
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investigation. However, the rationale behind the refusals, which links the funding to 
general debates about the allocation of responsibility for flood defence, is what is 
interesting in this case. If land drainage, seen as a key part of flood defence, could now 
be given increased Treasury support following the Land Drainage Act in 1930, what 
about flood defence more generally, in particular research into it? What should central 
government‘s role in funding research of this kind be? 
The initial proposals for research were jointly developed by LCC, PLA, TI and Hydro.23 
In 1931 TI and Hydro developed additional proposals for setting up a tidal gauge 
network and a centre of calculation for storm surges at TI. At this point Arthur 
Doodson made it clear that the aim of the work was to improve the warning system: ―I 
take it that the question is not being reconsidered because of its general interest and 
importance from a scientific point of view, but rather for the evolution of an adequate 
forecasting service‖.24 The project, as TI saw it, was aimed at making surges predictable. 
A similar emphasis was found in the Ministry of Health‘s internal briefs.25 While there 
was a clear aim of forecasting and providing information to build flood defences, the 
proposals did not contain tight definitions of what exactly the research would do to get 
to these aims, though it emphasised the necessity for collecting more data from a wider 
area, including foreign ports.26  
Following the initial refusal by the Treasury in 1931 to fund the proposed project, the 
driving force behind the repeated requests to the Ministry of Health for the research 
was LCC, not TI or the Hydrographic Department, though they continued to support 
it. In its contacts with the Ministry of Health, LCC claimed that more research was 
needed to know how high to build flood defences and framed the investigation as of 
national importance because storm surges affected a large area. Subsidiary arguments 
for it to be of national concern were also employed, such as that even if the research 
                                               
23 ―Thames Floods: Technical Sub-Committee's Report‖, enclosure two to letter dated 10/08/1928 from 
Ministry of Health, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA While this meeting, and thus the report, was not formally 
one of the Technical Sub-Committee, as the committee had already been disbanded, it was often 
presented as a formal report and treated as such, certainly by the LCC. 
24 Douglas to Doodson, 13th Jan 1931, Box 120, BA, and TI (Doodson?) to the Hydrographer, 15th Jan 
1931, Box 120, BA 
25 For example, see ―North Sea Surge‖, attached to ―Minute sheet‖ by W.A. Ross, 2nd May 1933, HLG 
51/39, NA. 
26 ―Data for the investigation of Storm Surges‖, appendix to Douglas (Hydrographer) to Doodson, 13 th 
Jan 1931, Box 120, BA 
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would only assist London, the capital was of national importance, and also that London 
had already paid its due by LCC and PLA paying for the first round of research.27  
Within LCC the main promoter was the Engineering Department, especially its Chief 
Engineer, T Peirson Frank, who had previously worked for Liverpool Council as City 
Engineer, including on embankments. He was a general city engineer with some 
concentration on water related engineering.28 He is likely to have come into personal 
contact with TI in one way or other during his work in Liverpool, especially as he also 
lectured at the University, thus knowing its researchers and their work. As president of 
the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health in 1932 he argued for increased planning 
powers to be given to local authorities by central government.29 He was President of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers 1945-46, devoting his presidential address to the 
important role engineers had played during the war, including the protection of flood 
defences in London.30  
Another key promoter of the research within LCC was Lewis Silkin, representing 
South-East Southwark, one of the areas that had been hit by the flooding in 1928. He 
was at different times leader and deputy leader of LCC‘s Labour group and in 1934, 
when Labour gained control of LCC, he became chairman of the housing and public 
health committee. He repeatedly questioned the delays in granting funding for the 
investigation during public Council Meetings, e.g. in 1932 and 1933, and was part of 
deputations LCC sent to the Ministry of Health.31  He left LCC before the conclusion 
of the saga, becoming MP for Peckham from 1936 to 1950 and Minister of Town and 
Country Planning between 1945 and 1950 in Clement Attlee‘s Labour government, 
where he led the creation of the Town and Country Planning Act (1947), which 
                                               
27 Summaries of these debates are provided by the memo on ―North Sea Surge‖, attached to ―Minute 
sheet‖ by W.A. Ross, 2nd May 1933, and the report ―Thames Flood Prevention – North Sea Surges – 
Further Investigations‖ to the General Purposes Committee, 4th May 1933, both in HLG 51/39, NA. 
This folder contains material on the Ministry of Health side. There is also further material on the LCC 
side in the London Metropolitan Archive (folders LCC/CL/MD/1/8, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, 
LCC/CL/MD/1/115, LCC/CL/MD/2/53, LCC/CL/GP/1/119). It has not been possible to locate any 
Treasury files. 
28 "Obituary. Sir Thomas Peirson Frank. 1881-1951.," ICE Proceedings 1, no. 1 (1952). See also Mike 
Royden, "Mike Royden's Local History Pages : Otterspool "  
http://www.btinternet.com/~m.royden/mrlhp/local/otterspool/otters.htm. 
29 T Peirson Frank, "Presidential Address by T. Peirson Frank, M.Inst.C.E., F.S.I., Chief Engineer to the 
London County Council. (Fellow.)," The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health 53, no. 4 (1932). 
30 T Peirson Frank, "Presidential Address of Sir T. Peirson Frank. President 1945-46. (Includes 
Photographs and Appendix)." Journal of the ICE 25, no. 1 (1945). 




increased the planning powers of local authorities.32 Apart from their desire for further 
investigation into storm surges, Silkin and Frank seem to have shared an interest in 
planning, especially in strengthening the powers of local authorities in planning matters.  
Within the Ministry of Health a wide range of people were involved with the case 
including the various Ministers of Health, their Private Secretary AN Rucker and the 
Permanent Secretary WAR Robinson.33 The proposed project‘s usefulness and whether 
it was a matter for central government or not were two contested issues within the 
Ministry. Early on it was allocated to Assistant Secretary WA Ross.34 His views varied 
over the years. Initially, before the first request in 1931 he gave a carefully worded 
endorsement of the project: there was ―room for differences of opinion as to whether 
this work is necessary. In our view this work would be very useful‖.35 While some 
doubted the necessity of the work, he approved at this stage. However, in 1933 he 
suggested the Ministry refuse to see LCC‘s deputation regarding the proposed 
investigation, so he was not a whole-sale promoter.36  
Later, after about 1934, the project moved between different people, including IG 
Gibbon, the Principal Assistant Secretary who had authored the report of the 1928 
Conference, and HWS Francis, the Director of the Local Government Division. The 
latter was enthusiastic of the investigation – clearly representing the interests of local 
governments, as is to be expected given his role – and claimed the local authorities had 
a ―moderately effective criticism of the Treasury refusal‖ when he triggered the final 
request for funding from the Treasury in 1936 but made no further comments once the 
Treasury had again refused funding.37 At that point Armer, in the same memo discussed 
above where he suggested dropping the idea of the flood defence co-ordination 
committee, was much more negative, writing that the issue had been ―considered ad 
                                               
32 Richard Weight, "Silkin, Lewis, First Baron Silkin (1889–1972)," Oxford: OUP, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31684. 
33 LCC usually addressed their correspondence to one of these two Secretaries. 
34 The Ministers of Health in this period were Neville Chamberlain (1924-29), Arthur Greenwood (1929-
1931), Neville Chamberlain again (1931), Edward Hilton Young (Nov 1931-1935) and Howard Kingsley 
Wood (1935–1938) – the latter‘s political career had started as a councillor at LCC. Neville Chamberlain 
went from being Minister of Health to Chancellor. Judging from the records, few Ministers were 
personally involved in the issue of the suggested second investigation, apart from Hilton Young. 
35 Minute by WA Ross, 7th Aug 1931, HLG 51/39, NA 
36 Minute by WA Ross to Gibbon, 6th Mar 1933, HLG 51/39, NA 
37 Minute by S Francis, 7th Feb 1936, HLG 51/39, NA 
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nauseam‖ and that it was no more a national problem than many other issues.38 
Unsurprisingly, the Engineering Staff at the Ministry ‗concurred‘ with their engineering 
and scientific colleagues at LCC and elsewhere in the need for further knowledge about 
storm surges.39 Again unsurprisingly, those who had closer contacts with the Treasury 
were more negative, especially about the futility of repeated requests to it.40  
While some within the Ministry thought the investigation would be useful and should 
be funded, they did not convince enough officers for the Ministry to fund the project 
itself. For example, the Minister, Edward Hilton Young, in 1933 thought the research 
would be ―useful‖ but could not offer any money for it out of the Ministry‘s ordinary 
budget.41 Instead money had to be applied for separately from the Treasury. Despite the 
internal disagreement the officials at the Ministry of Health agreed sufficiently with LCC 
regarding the usefulness of the research to contact the Treasury regarding it at least four 
times between 1931 and 1936. There these requests for funding were repeatedly refused 
and the LCC‘s arguments rejected. 
Initially, the Treasury gave two reasons for refusing funding: it did not think the 
research was urgent, and there was an ―essential need for economy‖, which given the 
timing in late 1931, after the financial crisis and cutbacks in government funding that 
year, was an unsurprising reply.42 In 1932, after discussions between Ross from Ministry 
of Health and Assistant Secretary BW Gilbert and Prinicipal JB Beresford at the 
Treasury these reasons were repeated, with the addition that the Treasury saw this as a 
local matter, not a national issue, and that therefore it should be paid for by local 
authorities and not central government.43 According to the Treasury, it did not matter 
that many local authorities over a wide area were involved: it was still something the 
local authorities should deal with. A similar response was given in 1934.44 In 1936 
Ministry of Health officials again contacted the Treasury and again were told no money 
                                               
38 Minute by Armer, 3rd Feb 1936, HLG 50/129, NA 
39 Minute by WA Ross 7th Aug 1931, HLG 51/39, and Memo on ―North Sea Surge‖, attached to ―Minute 
sheet‖ by WA Ross, 2nd May 1933, HLG 51/39, NA. 
40 Minute by SC Alford, Assistant Deputy Accountant-General, 25th Aug 1931, HLG 51/39, NA, Minute 
by IFA (IF Armer, Principal), to Ross, re views of Treasury, 6th Jul 1932, HLG 51/39, NA. 
41 Armer to the Clerk of LCC, 6th May 1933, HLG 51/39, NA 
42 Armer at Ministry of Health to the Clerk of the LCC, 16th Nov 1931, LCC/CL/MD/1/11, LMA. 
Officially the decisions of the Lords Commissioners of HM Treasury decisions were communicated from 
the Secretary there to the Secretary at Ministry of Health, giving little further information on who within 
the Treasury was dealing with the matter. 
43 Legge to the Clerk of the LCC, 8th Aug 1932, HLG 51/39, NA 
44 Robinson at Ministry of Health to Gater at LCC, 18th May 1934, HLG 51/39, NA 
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was forthcoming. The minute made after this meeting points toward a key underlying 
reason for the lack of Treasury support. They still did not see the issue as a national 
one, but more importantly did not want to set a precedent: ―The argument, if conceded 
for the cost of the enquiry, could or possibly would also be applied to the consequential 
work on defences in the Thames and elsewhere‖.45 If this investigation was accepted as 
a national responsibility this was thought to imply that flood defence could be seen as a 
national government responsibility, instead of the responsibility of the riverside or 
coastal landowner and the local authorities as it had traditionally been, and the Treasury 
did not want this. It was only grudgingly providing increased support for land drainage 
and it did not want to pay for the building of flood defences. While LCC claimed to 
simply be asking for patronage for a small scientific investigation, the Treasury saw the 
request as the beginning of a wider request for funding of flood defences. It was 
determined to stick to the general principle that flood defence generally – despite the 
recent debate regarding land drainage – remain a local responsibility, so the research 
also had to remain a local responsibility.  
It is not clear from the sources whether LCC knew the Treasury‘s view on this (they do 
not appear to have been told formally, but may of course have heard of it informally), 
nor if they had any plans to widen their appeal towards flood defence more generally if 
this appeal for research funding was successful. A year and a half later, in June 1937, the 
positions of the Treasury arguing it was a local matter while local authorities argued it 
was a national matter, were described as a ―deadlock of policy‖.46 At this point however 
LCC had a change of mind. On the suggestion of Frank, the chief engineer, the council 
decided to ask TI if it was willing to still do the investigation at the previously agreed 
price of £1,100.47 TI replied in the affirmative; they were ―prepared to undertake an 
enquiry into the probability, frequency and amplitude of storm surges in the North Sea 
likely to affect the River Thames‖.48 The only reason given for LCC‘s change of mind 
was ―the undoubted necessity‖ of the investigation and the ―continued refusal of H.M. 
Government to defray the small expenditure involved‖.49 It appears LCC simply gave 
                                               
45 Minute sheet, Accountant-General SC Alford, 18th Feb 1936, HLG 51/39, NA 
46 Minute sheet on Thames Flood Prevention, Note to the Clerk of the Council, signed A w B (?), 22nd 
Jun 1937, LCC/CL/MD/1/115, LMA 
47 Peirson Frank (Chief Engineer) to Doodson, 16th Aug 1937, Box 120, BA 
48 TI (Doodson?) to Chief Engineer, 17th Aug 1937, Box 120, BA 
49 Extract of Minutes from General Purposes Committee, ―Storm surges in the North Sea. Reply to 
memorandum of 11th May, 1936‖ , 8th Jul 1937, LCC/CL/MD/1/115, LMA 
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up on the Treasury ever giving in on this issue.50 In autumn 1937 LCC‘s clerk collected 
promises of money from various coastal local authorities and the PLA.51 With these in 
hand Frank recommended to LCC‘s Fire Brigade and Main Drainage Committee that 
the research be started. This Committee agreed and with approval from the Council as a 
whole,52 the clerk confirmed the order for the research to TI in April 1938.53 Payments 
were made over a period of several years and are included in the column for commercial 
work in table 4.1.  
This issue was part of the often fraught relationship LCC had with central government. 
Even the official history of LCC published in 1939 described its relationship with 
central government as frequently dominated by fights.54 After the protracted debates it 
appears LCC simply gave in and decided they wanted the investigation more than they 
wanted government money for it.55 In addition, the funding of storm surge science in 
the 1930s was not just about the funding of a small piece of research, but was by the 
Treasury seen to have larger implications in terms of general flood defence policy and 
who should pay for building defences. In the end only local authorities (including the 
PLA) led by LCC found the appeal of storm surge forecasts strong enough to pay for 
research into them. While the Admiralty, especially the Hydrographic Department, had 
been involved in the work from early on, and provided assistance with collecting data, 
they were not prepared to fund the investigation.56 In addition the people within 
departments mattered, with a specific officer within LCC, Frank, playing a key role in 
promoting the project. At least for now, the responsibility for flood defence had been 
firmly assigned to the local/regional level and the Treasury‘s view on flood defence as a 
local issue had prevailed. 
                                               
50 There had been no recent or obvious changes in officials or politicians at LCC to explain the issue. 
LCC had changed to Labour control in 1934, so not particularly recently.   
51 Documents in LCC/CL/MD/115, LMA 
52 Reports and minutes of meetings from various committees, Mar 1938, LCC/CL/MD/115, LMA 
53 [Unreadable signature] Clerk to the Council to Doodson, 29th April 1938, Box 120, BA 
54 Reginald W. Bell and Gwilym Joan Gibbon, History of the London County Council 1889-1939 (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1939), 581-590.  
55 There is no archival indication that the investigation was part of preparations for the war, but it is 
possible that LCC became keener on the storm surge investigation as they started to prepare for potential 
bomb damage to their flood defences, something which Frank was heavily involved in. See file 
LCC/CE/WAR/2/11 for material on this work and also "Obituary. Sir Thomas Peirson Frank. 1881-
1951.." 
56 The Admiralty kept certain tidal gauges running while the investigation waited for funding, occasionally 
at the request of the Ministry of Health. See for example minutes and correspondence between various 
people at the Minister of Health and the First Lord of the Admiralty in May 1933, HLG 51/39, NA 
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This was not just about funding but also about different interests being pitted against 
each other. What should the government support? Those who supported and pushed 
the investigation as a national charge often had close ties to local government and 
planning, as well as engineering. They were opposed by others, especially the Treasury 
but also some within the Ministry of Health, who did not see such work as a national 
responsibility. Mark Whitehead has described similar debates and tensions regarding 
what type of air pollution science central government should support, but in his case 
the end result was different: a slightly re-worked version of science, with more clearly 
defined and less ―speculative‖ aims, was given continued central government support.57 
The key difference between the two case studies is that while the quality and 
appropriateness of air pollution research was questioned, it was already supported by 
the central government, so had already been deemed as of national interest. The 
pollution debate was as much about which part of central government should support it 
as it was about what research should be supported by the central government. In the 
case of storm surge science the question was more clear-cut: should central government 
support this kind of research at all? The final answer was no, as it was not deemed a 
national issue. Regarding storm surges, the rise of governmentality and planned research 
supporting engineering projects and concerns was contested.58 The rise in central 
government involvement in research aimed at forecasting nature was contested between 
different interests and it was not obvious who should pay for research of this nature.  
 
6.2 THE FIRST STAGE OF THE LCC RESEARCH PROJECT: CONSTRUCTION OF 
SURGES 
We now return from London to focus on work at TI, where only limited work on storm 
surges had been done since 1929. In 1933 Robert Henry Corkan (1906-1952), under the 
direction of Doodson, researched meteorological effects, finding annual variations in 
tides that could be incorporated in work on periodic tidal predictions.59 This is an 
example of research work more linked to TI‘s key research programme on periodic tidal 
                                               
57 Whitehead, State, Science, and the Skies, 127-131, 217-120.  
58 Compare Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats; Edgerton, Warfare State; William McGucken, Scientists, 
Society, and State: The Social Relations of Science Movement in Great Britain, 1931-1947 (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1984).  
59 LOTI, Annual Report 1933.  
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predictions than with forecasting storm surges, but Corkan would become the key 
researcher doing the work during the second investigation. He came from the Isle of 
Man, where his father was a station master, and had taken a first class BSc in 1927 and 
then an honours degree in the Department of Applied Mathematics under Joseph 
Proudman at Liverpool University in 1928. Initially he was considering becoming a 
teacher, but when he was recommended for a post as Assistant at TI by Proudman he 
accepted and started work in 1929.60 He was awarded the degree of M.Sc. in 1933.61 
Corkan‘s appointment was probably the result of discussions before the 1929 merger of 
the Observatory and the Tidal Institute, when Proudman suggested that a honours 
graduate should be appointed to understudy Doodson‘s work, as only he ―thoroughly 
understood this work‖, implying that Corkan was from the start meant to be more than 
an ordinary computer.62  
TI‘s researchers were part of wider interwar personal and scientific networks. A range 
of research work was done at TI in the 1930s, for example some work on measuring 
tidal currents in the Irish Sea using a new meter developed by Doodson. This work was 
done in collaboration with the Department of Oceanography, now run by Proudman, 
using a university-owned ship during the summers of 1936, 37 and 38. The work on the 
meter and the expeditions was sponsored by the Royal Society, through its Government 
Grant Committee, and used instruments borrowed from the Hydrographic Department 
and the Met Office.63 It provides an example of oceanographic expeditionary work 
carried out in the UK in the interwar period, done as collaboration between a range of 
actors including major scientific actors (the Royal Society) and state-military actors (the 
Admiralty). Not only does this show TI‘s involvement in wider scientific networks but it 
is also a small example of interwar oceanographic work in Britain.64 
                                               
60 He was initially paid at £250 per year, which was to increase by £15/yr up to £480. LOTI, Annual 
Report 1952 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1952), 5; Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 176-177.  Memo, 
Meetings of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Observatory Joint Committee, 30th Nov 1928, D/BO 
1/1/5, MMM - North Street 
61 LOTI, Annual Report 1933. 
62 Memo, Meetings of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Observatory Joint Committee, 30th Nov 
1928, D/BO 1/1/5, MMM - North Street 
63 LOTI, Annual Report 1936 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1936); LOTI, Annual Report 1937 
(Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1937); LOTI, Annual Report 1938 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 
1938).   
64 Compare to those who have argued little such work was carried out, see Deacon, "Of Seas and Ships 
and Scientists."; Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War.  
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In early 1938 the work for the further investigation into storm surges got going. There 
was little further specification from LCC of what the research should consist of or 
achieve, with TI‘s earlier definition of the project‘s aims repeated, defining the project 
as an ―investigation into the probability, frequency and amplitude of storm surges in the 
North Sea and their effect on the River Thames‖.65 The primary impact of the local 
authority patronage on TI‘s work and practices appears to have been that the work was 
begun at all.   
The first stage of the work constructed surges using the practices discussed in the 
previous chapter, defining them as residuals or differences between observed and 
predicted/unperturbed tides at the same time, continuing practices developed earlier at 
TI.66 The key worker was Corkan, who visually inspected ten years‘ (1928-38) worth of 
tidal gauge records for Dunbar and Southend, identifying 85 surges over two feet at 
each place and reducing this data into residuals.  
In a change from the earlier investigation, all the residuals were constructed using 
Doodson‘s graphical obs-unperturbed method previously used only for Dunbar, which 
constructed surges by graphically comparing sea levels at six-hourly intervals and 
measured the distance between graphs to estimate the surge. In addition to making the 
residuals for both Dunbar and Southend comparable by constructing them using the 
same method, Corkan later explained that this method had ―many advantages for it 
involves no preliminary calculations, is easy to apply, does not use up the valuable time 
of the predicting machine, and completely eliminates the semi-diurnal tide, the most 
important factor‖.67 Corkan also considered the method theoretically sound, something 
he demonstrated visually by graphing the residuals for one event using the two different 
methods and stating that the two graphs were ―in very close agreement‖.68 No further 
justification was provided and no definition of what ‗close agreement‘ meant given, but 
in the graph the largest difference between the two methods was about 1ft, implying 
this was considered close enough. 
                                               
65 [Unreadable signature] Clerk to the Council to Doodson, 29th April 1938, Box 120, BA 
66 See also list of tasks, ―RHC, Jan 1939‖, Box 59, BA 
67 Robert Henry Corkan, Storm Surges in the North Sea: Vol 1 (Washington D.C.: Hydrographic Office, 
H.O. Misc. 15072, 1948), 12.  
68 Ibid., 13.  
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According to Doodson‘s first progress report to LCC, in January 1939, this first stage 
was completed after a year‘s work, which gives some insight into how time consuming 
the construction of surges was. In his progress report, perhaps forestalling potential 
critique of the length of time spent on this stage of the project, Doodson emphasised 
that the construction of the tables of residuals (like those in figure 5.2) were ―an 
essential part of the investigation‖, giving them ―ample data on which to work‖.69 
However, while no doubt providing ample data, it was also very specific data, defining 
surges in a particular way, as residuals. Having spent the first year producing residuals in 
this manner Corkan was locked into this definition of surges. While this definition was 
his and Doodson‘s choice, the time and effort spent on producing the residuals tied 
them to using this definition, and specifically the tables of residuals, to construct 
forecasting formulae.  This choice of definition was in itself tied to Doodson‘s earlier 
experience and the work he had done in 1928.  
 
6.3 THE WAR, OCEANOGRAPHY AND TI‘S RESEARCH 
At about this stage of the project the Second World War broke out. This section 
discusses TI‘s work both on surges and more generally during the war, especially how 
its work was linked to other oceanographic research done during the war, arguing that 
TI did not take part in the development of new networks between the Navy and 
oceanographers but instead strengthened their existing role as the state‘s tidal 
contractor. While the Navy showed interest in TI‘s surge work this interest was partial 
and did not directly lead to further funding being given to TI, though it affected how 
they did their work. In addition, this section discusses how TI saw a dramatic increase 
in income during the war, emphasising that this was due not so much to their surge 
work but instead to a dramatic increase in the number of analyses and predictions 
produced by TI (see also table 4.1 and figure 4.2). 
 TI‘s work on the LCC project continued throughout the early stages of the war until 
Corkan was lent to the Admiralty in mid-1941 as a research assistant for the Nautical 
Almanac Office and the Hydrographic Department in Bath.70 As discussed in the 
                                               
69 Doodson to the Clerk to the Council, 10th Jan 1939, Box 128, BA 
70 LOTI, Centenary Report and Annual Reports (1940-1945), 14-15, 17-18 & 20.  
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introduction many historians of oceanography have seen the war as a turning point, 
sooner or later leading to increased naval patronage of oceanography. In particular, 
during the Second World War the Navy and other parts of the military became 
increasingly interested in detailed forecasting of sea conditions near the coast to prepare 
for various amphibious military operations. Several historians have studied forecasting 
of waves, swell and surf by the Allied Navies during the Second World War, i.e. 
forecasts of short-period waves in comparison with the longer periods involved in tides 
and surge.71 Early work in the UK on swell forecasting was done by Instructor 
Commander Suthons, technical adviser to the Director of the Naval Meteorological 
Service, and later when the waves and swell forecasting system was operationalised the 
involvement of George Deacon at the Admiralty Research Laboratory at Teddington 
was key. It then also involved the Oceanographical and the Scientific and Research 
Departments of the Admiralty.72 Both Suthons and Deacon will turn up again in this 
thesis. The forecasting network also used research by Harald Sverdrup and Walter 
Munk at Scripps Institution of Oceanography in the US. 
TI‘s storm surge work was drafted into the war effort in 1940 when the Hydrographic 
Department, which had been involved with TI‘s work for LCC and PLA, for example 
by providing data, asked TI to provide a formula to forecast meteorological effects on 
tidal predictions on the continental coast. The request reached Bidston in late May and 
TI provided their ―Instructions for computing meteorological disturbances of sea level 
on the German North Sea Coast‖ in mid September 1940. The work was an extension 
of the investigation they were carrying out for LCC. Doodson claimed their method for 
calculating meteorological effects was easy to use, ―exhaustively tested‖ and ―a sound 
one‖ with satisfactory results – giving no formal statistical evidence or definition of 
                                               
71 Schlee, A History of Oceanography, 304-310; Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, "New International Aspects of 
Oceanography," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 91, no. 1 (1947); Weir, Ocean in Common.  
72 C. R. Burgess, "Climate and Weather in Modern Naval Warfare," The Geographical Journal 111, no. 4/6 
(1948): 239-240 & 243. Burgess was a Commander in the Naval Meteorological Branch who was in 
charge of climatological planning during the war, A. A. Miller et al., "Climate and Weather in Modern 
Naval Warfare: Discussion," The Geographical Journal 111, no. 4/6 (1948). On Deacon and the Admiralty 
Research Laboratory, see George Deacon, "Ocean Waves and Swell," in Oceanography: Concepts and History, 
ed. Margaret Deacon (Stroudsburg: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, Inc., 1978); Margaret Deacon and 
Anthony Laughton, "The Founding Director, Sir George Deacon," in Of Seas and Ships and Scientists : The 
Remarkable Story of the UK's National Institute of Oceanography 1949-1973, ed. Anthony Laughton, et al. 
(Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 2010). 
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what counted as a satisfactory result.73 The point here is that Doodson appears to have 
believed the forecasting formulae worked well enough to be useful to the Navy.  
However, there is no evidence that TI‘s formula was put into use by the Navy.74 While 
the wave and swell forecasts included some consideration of tides, such as tidal 
currents, they concentrated on forecasting short-period waves, not sea levels or long-
period waves and there is no evidence the forecasters used TI‘s formulae or anything 
like it. The formula for forecasting of swell included wind speed, fetch and windstorm 
duration, while TI‘s work concentrated on pressure gradients, which had some relation 
to wind speed but none to fetch or duration.75 Indeed, there is no evidence TI was 
connected to the scientific networks involved in the swell forecasts, by for example 
being asked to help with research.76 The available evidence suggests that TI‘s work and 
workers were not involved in these new developments in oceanography or part of the 
personal networks that wartime service created in oceanography. Corkan‘s work in Bath 
at the Hydrographic Department was for the Nautical Almanac Office and its offshoot, 
the Admiralty Computing Service. This meant his work was on advanced mathematical 
and large-scale computational work, not the ‗new‘ oceanography, and he does not seem 
to have developed personal networks with naval oceanographers.77 Such naval 
                                               
73 TI to the Hydrographer, 12th Sep 1940, Box 62, BA 
74 There is no indication in TI‘s archive as to the use the Admiralty made of these instructions, and 
according to the staff at the UKHO archive the file (H/10027/39) cannot be found, and while they 
cannot determine that it has been destroyed they say this is likely. TI‘s Instructions probably required 
further clarification before an officer was able to use them and if they did not get any such clarification 
the Instructions may have been unusable and simply ended up on the Hydrographer‘s shelf. In addition, 
they may have taken too long to produce, being ordered in May 1940. Perhaps they were ordered as part 
of plans to enter Belgium and the Netherlands to hold back Germany, which the Allies thought would 
attack from the North, see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms : A Global History of World War II 
(Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1994), 122-126. The outcome of the German attack – with the 
British driven back across the Channel – had changed the strategic situation the Instructions were 
ordered in dramatically by September.  
75 Schlee, A History of Oceanography, 304-310; Sverdrup, "New International Aspects of Oceanography." 
76A later letter implies that Deacon had not met Doodson until the 1950s, see ―Copy of letter to Dr. 
Doodson from Dr. Deacon‖, 24 Aug 1951, D/BO/1/4/17, MMM - North Street 
77 For more on the war-time work of the Nautical Almanac Office (NAO) and the Admiralty Computing 
Service (ACS), see Croarken, Early Scientific Computing in Britain, ch 6. It is possible that Corkan was the 
additional temporary assistant the head of NAO, HD Sadler, was allowed in summer 1941, ibid. p 67. 
Corkan is mentioned as working at ACS in Donald H. Sadler, "Extract from a Personal History of H.M. 
Nautical Almanac Office, 30 October 1930 - 18 February 1972," ed. George A. Wilkins (Sidford, Devon: 
United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, 2008). 
http://www.hmnao.com/nao/history/dhs_gaw/nao_perhist_0802_cyh_part_appendices.pdf, accessed 1 
Sep 2010. For a list of work done by ACS to the end of the war, see Admiralty Computing Service, 
Seventh Report on Activities, BLRD E7, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. Some 
of the work listed there was potentially related to tidal research, such as a computation of an integral 
occurring in the theory of water waves, and an investigation of the reflection of surface waves, both done 
for the Admiralty Research Laboratory at Teddington. While these calculations potentially were for the 
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oceanography networks have been shown to have been very important post-war for US 
oceanographic institutes by for example Ronald Rainger.78 TI‘s work on storm surges 
seems to have been a different kind of oceanography to that of swell forecasting, with 
the different kinds of oceanography done by different people. The people involved in 
swell forecasting were also involved in the appearance of a new ‗integrated‘ 
oceanography after the war, which has also been linked to the publication of The 
Oceans.79 The impact of the appearance of this integrated oceanography on TI will be 
returned at the end of the chapter.  
However, even though TI‘s forecasting formula does not appear to have been used by 
the Navy, their request had a strong influence on TI‘s attempts at producing a 
forecasting formula for LCC, as it was one important reason they went down the 
statistical route for this work. This in turn informed TI‘s practices until the 1950s. 
Before looking more closely at this, it will be set in the context of TI‘s other work 
during the war and its role as the state‘s tidal contractor, which increased dramatically 
during the war, as it became increasingly focused on providing tidal predictions for the 
Navy and also had fewer staff.80 Like the First World War had, the Second interrupted 
exchanges of tidal information between countries and companies, and in addition the 
military required extra tidal predictions, e.g. for the Normandy landing. As can be seen 
in table 4.1 and figure 4.2 there was a dramatic increase both in the number of 
predictions TI produced and the income they received from this during the Second 
World War. Their income from predictions increased from £1540 in 1938 to £4680 in 
1945. At the same time, starting in 1939, staff left to join the services. Doodson‘s 
assistants (i.e. the female computers, Corkan and one other member of staff81) 
decreased from nine in 193882 to six female computers in 1943 and 1944. After the war 
                                                                                                                                     
swell and wave-work, according to Croarken the work at ACS was isolated from those ordering it to the 
extent that those at ACS often found it difficult to know what the work was for, indicating that even if 
Corkan worked on these aspects it would not have connected him to the personal networks of those 
doing ‗new‘ oceanography. 
78 Rainger, "Constructing a Landscape for Postwar Science."; Rainger, "Adaptation and the Importance of 
Local Culture." 
79 Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet, ch 9, esp. p 260-264. 
80 Little archival material has been preserved from the Second World War, so the overview of TI‘s work is 
taken from published sources, particularly the Centenary Report published in 1945, see LOTI, Centenary 
Report and Annual Reports (1940-1945). 
81 H J Bigelstone, whose primary duties were to do the Observatory-side of LOTI‘s work, such as 
managing the meteorological observations done at the site. He does not seem to have been much 
involved in TI‘s storm surge work. 
82 LOTI, Annual Report 1938. 
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the number of assistants doubled to twelve in 1947.83 The focus on providing tidal 
predictions and the depleted staff meant that little research work, apart from that in 
response to military demands for new types of tidal analyses and predictions, was done 
during the later stages of the war.84 One reason TI did not become involved in the new 
oceanographic projects the Navy were doing was lack of time and staff. TI‘s workers 
instead focused on providing tidal predictions to the state – strengthening their existing 
networks instead of building new ones. At the same time this focus led to increased 
income for TI, improving its financial position – the balance of its reserve account went 
from £2461 in 1938 to £7416 in 1946. 
David Edgerton has argued that universities were not ―significant R&D contractors‖ 
during the war, arguing they instead focused on educating the future research corps.85 
TI, however, is an example of an institute with close connections to a university which 
increased its role as the tidal R&D contractor to the state during the war. In Edgerton‘s 
terms, TI‘s work was ‗nationalised‘ in the sense that the work became focused on 
providing tidal predictions for the war, but it remained under the leadership of the 
religious Doodson, an academic mathematician and also continued to be governed as 
before. In terms of research, the main impact of the war was not changes in funding 
(though the level of this increased) but loss of staff and a change in research 
programme, temporarily focusing almost solely on tidal analysis and predictions. 
 
6.4.1 THE IMPACT OF HYDRO‘S REQUEST ON TI‘S WORK 
This section again shifts register to analyse Corkan‘s practices in constructing 
forecasting formulae more closely, also discussing what TI meant by successful 
forecasting at this point. This section will look at TI‘s work on the LCC project, 
concentrating on its practices of calculation and how these changed in response to the 
Navy‘s request for a forecasting formula. Analysing traces of Corkan‘s work provides 
some insight into the practices of calculation that were used to make surges more 
predictable. It also emphasises the importance of contingent and constricted choices 
made by researchers. These choices placed them within particular traditions of practice 
                                               
83 LOTI, Annual Report 1947 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1947). 
84 LOTI, Centenary Report and Annual Reports (1940-1945), 14-15, 17-18 & 20. 
85 Edgerton, Warfare State, 160. 
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and enabled them to produce results, but also influenced or limited the possible results 
the work could produce. 
As a result of his earlier construction of surges Corkan now had surges laid out on 
specific documents. The next stage of the project was one of mathematical experiments, 
which involved much work. For example, he constructed a number of different 
typologies for the 85 surges in his study.86 To do this Corkan had to construct 
documents, draw maps, and repeatedly write and rewrite lists of surges and 
meteorological conditions. Such work puts a physical limit on the amount of 
experimentation that can be done; the number of different practices that can be 
attempted.87 The process of producing and choosing typologies took much work and 
involved consequential, contingent and restricted choices. The choice of documents and 
patterns was not innate to them, or sprung ‗naturally‘ from the work.88  How the 
researchers chose to organise documents had much to do with the results they got, but 
they could not necessarily predict or know which pattern would produce a supplement, 
i.e. a result that increased their ability to do things, in this case forecast surges.  
Corkan‘s experiments with different ways of forecasting surges illustrate how his 
constricted choices regarding practices of calculation influenced the results TI achieved. 
Many of these choices were linked to TI‘s earlier practices, setting Corkan‘s work within 
a specific tradition of practice. From theory, the choice of which was influenced by 
senior researchers such as Doodson, Corkan assumed that storm surges were linked to 
the tractive (frictional) forces produced by wind on the sea and could be seen as 
damped oscillations of the sea due to varying wind and pressure.89 Corkan initially 
decided to experiment with directly applying theory by the Japanese geophysicist 
Takaharu Nomitsu to predict storm surges. This treated surges as oscillations in a 
dynamic sea. Nomitsu‘s theory was a development of Proudman and Doodson‘s 1924 
work90 on time relations in meteorologically induced oscillations in theoretical seas,91 
                                               
86 Folder ―Types of surges‖, dated 1939, Box 59, BA 
87 This is similar to the data and computer friction Edwards discusses, see Edwards, A Vast Machine, 83-
84. 
88 Compare Latour, Pandora's Hope, 53. 
89 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 1, Section 2. This was based on theoretical work by Proudman and Doodson 
as well as other workers, for example Takaharu Nomitsu, Vagn Walfrid Ekman, Harold Jeffreys, Carl-
Gustaf Rossby and Harald Sverdrup. A list of references written by Corkan can be found in Box 59, BA. 
90 Joseph Proudman, "The Effects on the Sea of Changes in Atmospheric Pressure," Geophysical Journal 
International 2, no. s4 (1929); Joseph Proudman and Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Time-Relations in 
Meteorological Effects on the Sea," The Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 24(1924). 
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and fell within TI‘s work in the Laplacian tradition. From Nomitsu‘s formulae one 
could – in theory – predict the sea level resulting from wind or pressure some time 
beforehand, given empirical determinations of the period of the sea and the damping 
ration.92 TI called this the six-point method as their version of it used pressure gradients 
at six locations over the North Sea.93 The problem was then how to put this theory into 
practice. 
Having chosen to experiment with the six-point method, Corkan also had to choose 
how to estimate the wind at sea level from the pressure gradients. He chose to use what 
is known as geostrophic wind, which is a theoretical wind assuming negligible friction 
and that the ground-level isobars are straight, so that the pressure gradient force equals 
the coriolis force. If the isobars are straight the geostrophic wind can be directly 
calculated from the pressure gradient and is of constant speed and parallel to the 
isobars.94 Actual ground-level wind is affected by friction and other effects, like 
topography, and the relationship between wind estimated from pressure gradients and 
actual surface wind was not well established.95 However, a choice had to be made and 
the choice of geostrophic winds simplified TI‘s calculations as it meant they could 
straightforwardly correlate surges with pressure gradients, which could be read off 
weather charts and were thus much easier to find than measurements of wind at sea 
level. How did this choice of a computationally easier formula influence the result of 
Corkan‘s work? 
When Corkan summed up the work before he left TI during the war, he believed the 
six-point method could produce ―satisfactory‖ and ―accurate‖ predictions, but had 
realised the work on it required revision as ―the method fails to give accurate results 
when meteorological conditions are complex‖. (The next section looks at how he and 
Doodson judged accuracy.) There were problems when the isobars ―had large curvature 
                                                                                                                                     
91 E.g. a directional canal of uniform depth and under various other simplifying assumptions 
92 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 1, 86-90.  
93 Note describing method in folder Theory, ca 1939, Box 59, BA 
94 It is theoretical as the pressure would not be the same on ground level as it would be where there is 
negligible friction, say at 1000m height, so as the geostrophic wind is calculated based on ground level 
pressure it would never in fact exist. Gradient wind is another possible way of measuring the wind, and is 
like the geostrophic wind but taking into account the curvature of the isobars, e.g. around the centre of a 
low. Sanderson, Meteorology at Sea, 32-37; Williams, Higginson, and Rohrburgh, Sea & Air, 142-145. 
95 For a later discussion of these difficulties see Roll H.U. Hull, Physics of the Marine Atmosphere (London: 
Academic Press, 1965), 176, 213-176. 
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as [the depression] centre is crossing [the] N Sea‖.96 The choice of geostrophic wind – 
assuming straight isobars – was thus deemed to have produced the desired results in 
terms of forecasts when the isobars were straight,97 but it did not produce the desired 
accuracy when the isobars were curved. TI could not necessarily have foreseen that this 
would become a problem when they were picking which formulae to use to calculate 
winds in their work. 
However, before TI decided what to do about the curved isobar problem, something 
else happened which impacted on how they chose to analyse surges. As mentioned 
above Hydro sent TI a request for a forecasting formula for meteorological effects in 
May 1940 and by mid-September TI had produced one.98 This quickly produced 
forecasting method combined statistical work with dynamical theory. The method 
forecast the meteorological effect at one port, Norderney, by calculating and combining 
statical and dynamical values, and then used statistically-derived coefficients to calculate 
and forecast the meteorological effect at other ports.99 It was at least partly based on 
statistical relationships between wind and meteorological effects unlike the more 
theoretical ones from Nomitsu, which had been used in the six-point method. The 
work thus represented a shift away from the Laplacian tradition with which Corkan had 
experimented, and was starting to find problems with, towards statistical methods.  
Later Doodson claimed the shift towards statistics had come in response to demands to 
quickly produce a forecasting formula.100 However, to that should be added the 
problems TI were having with the six-point method and with using geostrophic winds, 
which Corkan thought did not work well when the isobars were too curved. Corkan‘s 
choices of particular ways of organising documents and picking formula, and the results 
achieved, were contingent on many issues, ranging from geostrophic winds being easy 
to calculate to Hydro‘s demand for a prediction formula. The shift towards statistical 
methods was also contingent on many other issues, such as Doodson‘s training and 
                                               
96 Draft  ―Report of present state of work on Thames Flood‖, unpublished note in Corkan‘s handwriting 
ca 1941, Box 59, BA 
97 Estimate of surface traction, Note on final results, and also the untitled list of six points (and 12345 in 
bottom corner) in folder ‗storm surges‘, Box 58, BA 
98 TI to the Hydrographer, 12th Sep 1940, Box 62, BA 
99 Instructions and remarks, TI to the Hydrographer, 12th Sep 1940, Box 62, BA 
100 ―Report on work done at the Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute,‖ Part A, ―General report‖, 
Doodson, Paper 5(iii) for 5th meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological 
Research on 30th Apr 1956, Box 159, BA 
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experience in statistics. Corkan shifted from the Laplacian tradition within which much 
of TI‘s theoretical work was done, such as the work of Doodson and Proudman which 
Nomitsu had developed, towards the statistical tradition Doodson had earlier used in 
his attempts to forecast surges in Liverpool and after the 1928 event. Faced with an 
urgent demand for a forecasting formula, TI‘s researchers shifted from work using one 
set of practices they were used to, towards another set of practices they were also used 
to. 
 
6.4.2 SUCCESS JUDGED AS SMALL RESIDUALS 
What did Corkan mean when he wrote that the six-point method produced 
―satisfactory‖ and ―accurate‖ prediction? Doodson made it clear their definition of 
satisfactory prediction looked at the size of residuals. For example, to LCC he claimed 
that a formula with a residual error of about 0.5 feet ―very faithfully reproduce[d] the 
disturbances of sea level at Southend‖ during large surges – so 0.5 feet residual error 
was ‗good‘.101 To Doodson and Corkan – who were the ones doing the defining, as the 
clients were not at this stage involved with the judgement of the fit of the formulae 
produced – a good formula produced a predicted residual that only differed a ‗little‘ 
from the observed residual. How much ‗little‘ was remained fuzzy. The difference by 
which the fit was measured was usually gauged by visually comparing graphs, and not by 
calculating formal statistical measures such as standard errors. For example, a prediction 
using the six-point method for the 1928 surge was declared ‗poor‘ on the basis of the 
top graph in figure 6.1.102  
TI were not interested in comparing observed and predicted total sea levels but instead 
measured the fit of their formula by comparing residuals, producing yet more second-
order residuals in the form of the difference between observed and predicted residuals. 
Such second-order residuals could be used to further refine the predictions – a very 
similar method to that Doodson had used on the periodic tidal predictions in the 1920s. 
This can be seen in the second graph on figure 6.1, which shows a comparison of the 
earlier surge at Dunbar with the second-order residual between the observation and 
                                               
101 Doodson to the Clerk to the Council, 29th Feb 1940, Box 128, BA 
102 ―An investigation of surge Jan 1/3 1928‖, in folder ‗Development of 6-point and oscillatory method‘, 
Box 59, BA 
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prediction at Southend. These two lines were deemed very similar. By constructing 
graphs such as this one TI decided that their method had to take into account external 
surges travelling past Dunbar but originating further afield. In other words, they 
decided that the error in their original forecasting formula (i.e. the second order 
residual) was not an error but another variable, represented by the surge at Dunbar. 
Later work included this as one of the variables to be accounted for in the forecasts. To 
TI a good forecast was one that took into account as many n-th order residuals (e.g. 





Figure 6.1: Graphs used by TI to identify external surges as a second-order residual. The top graph 
compares their first forecast with observations. The bottom graph compares the error in the forecast, or the 
difference between the lines in the top graph, with the residual at Dunbar.103  
 
To TI forecasts of surges were forecasts of residuals. Successful forecasting in turn 
meant producing a small secondary-level residual, a small difference between observed 
                                               
103 ―An investigation of surge Jan 1/3 1928‖, in folder ‗Development of 6-point and oscillatory method‘, 
Box 59, BA 
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and predicted residuals, and all these residuals were presented by TI in tables and 
graphs. This was linked to TI‘s definition of surges and their early work on the project, 
producing reams of tables of residuals. This work and these documents tied them to a 
particular kind of analysis of storm surges. These tables were the data they compared, 
their baseline, as well as their raw data. Bruno Latour emphasise how chains of 
documents connect104 but they can also be chains that bind and limit, and paying 
attention to this develops his concept to take further account of how these chains are 
constructed. As Herbert Kalthoff discusses, the choice of a particular practices of 
calculation constitutes objects but makes them calculable in a particular way which to 
some extent ‗sets‘ the next level of calculation.105 TI‘s whole approach to surges relied 
on residuals, which in turn came from Doodson‘s work on tides and, further back, from 
his training in statistics. The choice of a particular definition of surges, as residuals 
constructed in a particular way, led to other choices. The choice of a particular formula 
to calculate winds led to particular results, also influencing other choices. 
 
6.4.3 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FORECASTING FORMULA: THE INFLUENCE OF 
EARLIER PRACTICE 
After the war Corkan picked up the project again, producing a final report in 1947 
which included a forecasting formula for surges at Southend.  How did Corkan 
construct this forecasting formula? One way of answering this question is to say that he 
constructed a multiple regression formula which correlated the surge with gradients of 
barometric pressure over the North Sea, but what did this mean? This section will look 
at how he defined prediction as the addition of different effects and in particular how 
he constructed one of these effects through the use of multiple regression. I analyse his 
emphasis on a ‗well conditioned‘ formula over any other possible emphasis and how 
this emphasis together with TI‘s constricted choice to use geostrophic winds influenced 
his results. Corkan‘s particular chains of documents resulted in particular results, and 
were linked to the traditions of practice Corkan and Doodson were operating in.  
                                               
104 Latour, Pandora's Hope, 70.   
105 Kalthoff, "Practices of Calculation." 
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Corkan defined prediction as ―computing the effects to be expected from the known 
meteorological situation‖.106 However, while this definition emphasised the 
meteorological situation, he in fact included various other effects in his computations. 
Corkan constructed his forecasting formula by disaggregating the already calculated 
residuals into many separate effects through careful calculations of each effect, such as 
the external surges identified through graphs such as figure 6.1. He disaggregated surges 
into tidal effects not already accounted for, barometric pressure, external surges and 
wind effects. To ‗forecast‘ (actually hindcast) a surge, each of the different effects were 
separately constructed using different practices of calculation ranging from addition to 
the application of a multiple regression forecasting formulae for the wind effect. His 
final formula for forecasting surges was an addition of the different effects, resulting in 
a number representing the predicted (hindcasted) residual or surge.107 This addition of 
different effects was the last step, the end result of Corkan‘s construction of a 
forecasting formula. The result took no account of the predicted tide, so in order to 
know whether a particular predicted residual represented a potential flood threat it 
would then have to be combined with tidal predictions.  
I will concentrate on how Corkan constructed his multiple regression formula for the 
wind effect, particularly the constants, which were constructed through the gradual 
application of the least square method to selected surges. For the final report Corkan 
had abandoned the six-point method and claimed to use theoretical work as ―a guide to 
principles‖ only, instead relying more on empirical and statistical work.108 He now 
claimed the ―interesting results‖ he had earlier thought he had obtained using the six-
point method were ―largely spurious‖ because the method did not take into account 
external surges (i.e. the effect identified in figure 6.1).109  On the basis of his chosen 
theory he had constructed a formula linking the wind effect, i.e. the tractive force of the 
wind on the surface of the sea, to east and north pressure gradients and empirical 
constants.110 The earlier formula based on Nomitsu‘s work included variables based on 
the free period of the sea and the damping ratio for surges, both of which had to be 
approximated for the particular sea. Instead his final forecasting formula relied on 
                                               
106 Robert Henry Corkan, Storm Surges in the North Sea: Vol 2 (Washington D.C.: Hydrographic Office, 
H.O. Misc. 15072, 1948), 5.  
107 Ibid., Section 3.1. 
108 A list of references showing some of the theory Corkan read can be found in Box 59, BA. 
109  Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 1, 90, 93. 
110 Ibid., Section 2. 
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pressure gradients and other variables directly measured and calculated (such as the 
barometric effect). The wind effect was calculated as the sum of contributions from 
different pressure gradients, one north (N and n) and one east (E and e) pressure 
gradients from two different points on weather charts of the North Sea, multiplied with 
coefficients.111 His final formula for the wind effect took the form: 
Wind effect=0.35N-0.55E-0.70n-0.95e. 
Corkan determined the coefficients in this formula through multiple regression. He said 
the formula was built up by producing least square solutions for four carefully selected 
surges in the above form and then averaging the constants for these.112  
How did Corkan choose which out of the many possible surges to base his coefficients 
on? Different surges would produce different coefficients which in turn would lead to 
different forecasts, so this was an important choice for Corkan. His choice was based 
on his and Doodson‘s belief in what made a ‗good‘ formula: he made his choice by 
aiming for a particular type of formula, a ‗well conditioned‘ one with consistent co-
efficients. While not explicitly defined, to Corkan a well conditioned formula appears to 
have meant one which controlled for the effects of other causes of surges, such as 
external effects. This control of other variables was not through calculation, as is often 
done in a multiple regression model when mathematically controlling for other 
explanatory variables included in the model,113 but by minimising other effects at the 
input stage. He tried to achieve control of other variables by choosing surges for which 
particular meteorological conditions held. He judged whether he had achieved his aim 
of a well conditioned formula by judging the numerical consistency of the coefficients.  
To get a ―well conditioned‖ formula, Corkan wanted to base his coefficient on surges of 
a particular type, with only small external effects and ones where all the pressure 
gradients showed a fairly large change. In addition he preferred ones with ―fairly 
uniform meteorological conditions over the North Sea for then the pressure gradients 
                                               
111 The values for the northern point (n and e), were taken six hours earlier than the values for southern 
point (N and E), to take into account the time it took for the wind effect to travel south. The practices of 
taking pressure gradients will be looked at further in the next chapter. Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 2, Section 
3.1. 
112 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 1, Part 2, section 2. 
113 Frederick E Croxton and Dudley J Cowden, Applied General Statistics (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 
1939; reprint, eighteenth printing, September 1950), 741. 
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will be well determined‖.114 Here Corkan was looking for cases where the isobars were 
fairly straight, which would mean that the conditions for using geostrophic wind were 
fulfilled, so the problems previously encountered with using a definition of wind linked 
to straight isobars on curved ones would not recur. His choice to use geostrophic wind 
was involved in the choice of surges to calculate the correlation coefficients with, which 
in turn effected his final formula.  
However, finding four surges to produce consistent coefficients that followed Corkan‘s 
ideal conditions was difficult, especially for those that raised sea level. None of the 
raising surges Corkan studied fulfilled all the conditions needed for a ‗well-conditioned‘ 
equation. In the end one of the raising surges he used involved a fairly large external 
surge, but it was the other which required more ‗fiddling‘ to achieve consistency. This 
one saw small changes in the two northern pressure gradients and the coefficients for 
these two were very different from those found for the other three surges. Corkan 
deemed the constants produced from the northern gradients in this case ―badly 
conditioned‖.115 He then replaced these coefficients with the averages from the other 
cases and re-fitted the eastern coefficients for that surge. For his final averaged formula 
he did not include the northern coefficients from this surge and used the refitted 
eastern ones in his calculation of the constants. He chose surges and made choices with 
the analysis of these surges to make the coefficients in his formula consistent.  
While Corkan briefly discussed the possibility that different meteorological conditions 
or different types of surges (e.g. lowering and raising) would produce different 
coefficients, his own formula looked for consistency. He thought this consistency gave 
a ―reasonably good representation‖ of wind effects, with the caveat ―at least when 
conditions are fairly uniform‖.116 In other words, he was less sure that his formula for 
wind effects worked well when the isobars were so curved that the assumptions for the 
calculation of geostrophic wind did not hold. His choice to use geostrophic winds to 
connect pressure gradients to the effect of wind on the sea influenced not only his 
definition of a well defined formula, as one whose coefficients were based on surges 
that met the conditions for geostrophic wind, but also the results of the work – as he 
was well aware. He did however think his formula produce ‗good enough‘ results. 
                                               
114 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 2, 116.  
115 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 1, 134.  
116 Ibid., 141.  
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This again raises the issue of how Corkan judged the success of a forecast. Having 
constructed the predicted residual by adding the wind effect together with the various 
other effects, Corkan then displayed the closeness between the predicted and observed 
residuals graphically. He did not calculate formal statistical measures of the closeness 
and hardly even discussed it, instead leaving the judgement to the reader. The only case 
where Corkan calculated the mean square error – a formal statistical measure of 
closeness between observations and predictions – was for the first of his four surges. 
This was however done to decide the ‗best‘ time interval between the surge and the time 
for which the northern gradients were taken, not to judge the fit of the forecasts. A very 
high correlation coefficient of 0.99 was achieved with a time interval of -6hrs, so this 
time interval was chosen. Otherwise Corkan tested his formula by hindcasting a large 
number of surges and presenting the results graphically, something which took up a 
large part of his final report.117 In the end Doodson defined Corkan‘s work as a success 
and claimed that his forecasting formula was an ―outstanding achievement in this kind 
of research‖.118 To Doodson and Corkan just finding a solution, a forecasting formula, 
that produced predictions that were visually close to observations when graphed was 
success. They did not consider further analysis of the performance of the formula 
necessary.  
                                               
117 There is no indication whether problematic cases were left in or taken out by him to make the 
formula‘s performance look better. 




Figure 6.2: One of the graphs prepared by Corkan for his report to LCC showing the difference between the 
observed and predicted residual at Southend, near London, during the 1928 flood event. Many such graphs 
for different surges were prepared to illustrate the performance of Corkan‟s formula used to calculate the 
predicted residuals.119  
 
As they had to, TI made choices, which were contingent on many things, in the work 
they did to find patterns in their data. These choices came to make up a tradition within 
which the researchers operated. To use statistics was a choice, influenced by the need 
for speed that came with the Hydrographer‘s request, which then led the way to other 
choices, such as which surges to choose to determine the constants. Corkan‘s choice in 
this was determined by his desire for a well-conditioned formula with consistent 
constants, which leads back to his and Doodson‘s training, influencing what they 
thought made a ‗good‘ formula.  For TI‘s researchers, operating within their own 
traditions, visual judgements of the ‗goodness‘ of fit of their formula was sufficient. The 
next chapter turns to what happened with such judgements when TI‘s practice came 
into closer contact with other traditions.  
 
                                               
119 Corkan, Storm Surges: Vol 2, 102. 
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6.5 THE PATRONAGE OF POST-WAR BRITISH OCEANOGRAPHY 
For the remainder of the chapter I shift back to debates regarding state patronage of 
oceanographic science, concentrating on the limits to the patronage TI received. While 
naval patronage of oceanography in Britain increased after the war, this only had a 
limited effect on TI and its storm surge work. Instead state actors supported the ‗new‘ 
oceanography which had appeared during the war by establishing a new institute, the 
National Institute of Oceanography (NIO). Before discussing the establishment of NIO 
the section looks at the limits of the other patronage TI received, specifically that of the 
US Navy and LCC. 
Firstly, there was a further sign of naval interest in storm surge science when Corkan‘s 
final report on the LCC project was appropriated by the Navy. It was sent to LCC in 
February 1947, when Doodson also mentioned that ―the matter of publication is of 
some moment to‖ TI, presumably to ensure they got recognition for their work.120 
However, the publication of the report became a complicated affair. Out of the blue, 
the Royal Navy Scientific Service put in a request to LCC on behalf of the UK and US 
Navies to be allowed to copy the report, which was granted without consulting TI.121 
TI‘s only full copy of the report, which had been sent to LCC, was lent to the Royal 
Naval Scientific Service, which in turn gave it to the American Embassy. After it had 
been sent off both TI and LCC discovered errors in it, which meant that corrections 
and different versions of the report were sent between TI, LCC and the Navy 
representatives. It was eventually reproduced in Washington, DC, by the US 
Hydrographic Office with copies given to a range of naval, oceanographic and 
meteorological actors in the US (e.g. the US Weather Bureau, the Office of Naval 
Research, the Scripps and Woods Hole oceanographic institutes, and the US Coast and 
Geodetic Survey).122 While the report gave Corkan as the author and mentioned where 
the work had been done and who had funded it, it received only limited circulation in 
the UK. The usage or readership of the report is unclear, but at this time a wider US-led 
exchange of scientific information between the UK and the US naval authorities was 
                                               
120 Doodson to the Deputy Chief Engineer, 1st Feb 1947; Doodson to Chief Engineer, 14th Feb 1947, 
Box 120, BA  
121 ―Storm Surges in the North Sea, Housing Committee, Report by the Chief Engineer‖, 15th May 1948, 
LCC.CL.MD.1.115, LMA 
122 See correspondence between 1947 and 1949 in Box 120 and 130, BA, and also in folder 
LCC.CL.MD.1.115, LMA.  
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taking place.123 The publication of the report seems to have been caught up in this early 
cold war military-scientific exchange, indicating that TI‘s storm surge science was to 
some extent part of the increased interest shown in oceanography by the UK and US 
Navies after the war. However, it was only a partial interest involving no funding, so 
this episode is a further example of the limits to naval patronage of, or interest in, TI‘s 
storm surge science. 
In early 1948, while the publication of Corkan‘s report was being negotiated, Doodson 
was asked by the new LCC Chief Engineer, J Rawlinson, to give his thoughts on 
forecasting storm surges in the Thames Estuary and providing warnings of them.124 In 
response he outlined a scheme to organise a predictive network of calculation, 
suggesting TI as a suitable central computing office for the potential warning system.125 
Following this exchange Rawlinson wrote a report to LCC‘s River and Drainage 
Committee, recommending that he himself do some further surge-related work on the 
height of flood defences and the impact of inland flood water. The committee accepted 
this recommendation and also asked him to look at increasing the time before a 
potential flood a warning was given, which led to a meeting with Doodson being 
arranged. However, the chief engineer‘s work primarily led to him again recommending 
he himself needed to do further work and not that Doodson‘s suggestions were 
implemented.126 During this period the earlier warning system set up after the event in 
1928 continued.127 Despite TI claiming to have produced successful forecasting 
formulae, these were not taken up by the warning system. While also connected with 
the fact that the earlier supporters within LCC, such as Frank and Silkin, had moved on, 
this exemplifies another limit to the patronage TI‘s storm surge science received, as, 
unsurprisingly, patronage of research was insufficient to put the results of that research 
into use. 
                                               
123 For example, the file ADM 116/5670, NA, contains lists of a large number of scientific reports, 
primarily produced by naval authorities, which were exchanged between the UK and the US via the Royal 
Navy Scientific Service 1947-9. TI‘s report does not appear in this list, probably because it was not 
produced by an Admiralty organisation.  
124 Doodson to Chief Engineer at L.C.C, 1st Mar 1948, Box 120,  folder 7, BA 
125 ―Note on the prediction of storm surges in Thames Estuary‖, Box 120,  folder 7, BA 
126 Notes and memos in LCC/CL/MD/1/115, LMA. On the arrangement of a meeting with Doodson, 
see Rawlinson to Doodson, 23rd Nov 1950, Box 120, BA; and Rawlinson to Doodson, 4th Dec 1950, Box 
120, BA 
127 See documents in LCC/CL/MD/1/116, LMA 
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The institutional landscape of British oceanography changed in 1949 with the 
establishment of NIO. While TI and Proudman were closely involved in the process of 
establishing NIO, it had little to do with storm surge science or the development of 
statistical forecasting formulae, so will only be very briefly summarised here, focusing 
on the results in terms of patronage and location. In the end these post-war changes 
also led to few changes at TI, something that contrasts with other case studies in the 
history of oceanography. As discussed in the introduction, several historians have 
argued that after the Second World War there was a dramatic shift towards military 
patronage for physical oceanography in the US.128 This did not happen at TI. However, 
as in the US there was strong naval and state interest in oceanography in the UK 
following the war, but this interest and funding went to another institution favouring a 
different kind of oceanography: NIO. 
During the Second World War, on the suggestion of Hydrographer Edgell and 
Proudman and with the blessing of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the War 
Cabinet, debates organised within the structure of the Royal Society began on how 
oceanography should be organised and funded after the war.129 The eventual report by 
the Society committee, chaired by Hydrographer Edgell, favoured an Institute focused 
on physical oceanography, to be based at Liverpool and in receipt of central 
government funding from an unspecified Whitehall department. This was what 
Proudman had argued for. However, there had been strong arguments for a more 
integrated institution, incorporating more biological oceanography, during the 
committee‘s discussions. George ER Deacon (1906-1984), who was mentioned earlier 
while discussing the wave and swell forecasting network, was one of the key supporters 
of widening the remit of NIO. Deacon had done much biological oceanography before 
                                               
128 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War; Weir, Ocean in Common; Schlee, A History of Oceanography; 
Rainger, "Constructing a Landscape for Postwar Science."; Rainger, "Adaptation and the Importance of 
Local Culture."; Doel, "Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences."; Oreskes and Rainger, "Science and 
Security before the Atomic Bomb."; Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet; Mukerji, A Fragile Power. 
129 For more details on the establishment of NIO, see the work by George Deacon‘s daughter, Margaret 
Deacon, "Steps toward the Founding of NIO," in Of Seas and Ships and Scientists : The Remarkable Story of the 
UK's National Institute of Oceanography 1949-1973, ed. Anthony Laughton, et al. (Cambridge: The 
Lutterworth Press, 2010). My research on this was done before the publication of her work. While her 
work is more detailed than the version I provide here, it is also somewhat more celebratory and naturally 
focused on NIO‘s side of the story, while I am concentrating on TI‘s point of view. 
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the war and remained with the Navy after the war, leading the Admiralty Research 
Laboratory in Teddington.130  
When the Royal Society report entered the Whitehall machinery in late 1944 the debates 
on what kind of institute NIO should be and who should fund it were revisited, and the 
much re-worked NIO that eventually came into being in 1949 included much more 
biological and naval work than the original Royal Society report had visualised, was 
funded primarily by the Admiralty and the Colonial Office, and had Deacon as its 
Director.131 These changes were outside the influence of TI‘s circle, despite various 
attempts at influencing the debates. The location of the new NIO was left hanging for a 
few years, during which Proudman, Doodson and certain members of MDHB 
repeatedly argued for it to be located in Liverpool and merged with TI, implicitly 
providing TI with a secure future through increased state patronage, while Deacon and 
others argued for it to be located near London. In 1951 NIO finally acquired a 
headquarters, based in Wormley, in a rural location south of Guildford, which suited 
those arguing for a London location.132  
There were any number of issues involved in the establishment of NIO, such as the 
kind of geographies that were most conducive for oceanographic research or which part 
of the state should support oceanographic research, but one is especially important for 
this thesis.133 These debates were not simply about where the headquarters of the NIO 
should be, but about what kind of oceanography the NIO should be doing and in 
                                               
130 H. Charnock, "George Edward Raven Deacon. 21 March 1906-16 November 1984," Biographical 
Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 31(1985). 
131 The report suggesting NIO was sent to the Scientific Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet, whose 
members also met as the Colonial Research Committee, which amongst other things supported fisheries 
research and the Discovery Committee, see Clarke, "A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office 
and Scientific Research, 1940 - 1960," 467. This provided a high-level connection between the proposed 
NIO and the Discovery Committe and may be one reason why the Scientific Advisory Committee argued 
for the inclusion of the Discovery Committee‘s work into NIO. 
132 Files in the National Archive on NIO used to prepare this summary are ADM 116/5715 and 
CO/927/39/2, NA. The files in the UKHO archive include much useful information, including copies of 
the Minutes of the Royal Society Committee not kept in London, see H 02455/43, H 6203/45, UKHO. 
While there are mentions of the establishment of NIO in Royal Society archives (primarily in relation to 
the Post-War needs committees) and the Churchill Archives Centre (Bullard papers), for example in 
minutes of meetings, there are few in-depth documents. In terms of the Royal Society documents, see for 
example ―Reports from the sectional committees and the agricultural science committee upon the needs 
of special subjects in the balanced development of science in universities of the United Kingdom‖, p7, 
AE/1/9/7, RS. For minutes, agenda papers and correspondence regarding the National Committee of 
Geodesy and Geophysics (not discussing the oceanographic sub-committee in any detail), see AE 
1/9/11, AE/1/9/4 and AE/1/11/21. For why it was not dealt with in detail, see AE 1/9/9.  
133 I hope to develop this episode into a journal article after the PhD. 
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extension what kind of oceanography the state should be supporting. Should NIO 
focus on mathematically based oceanography, with an emphasis on the type of physical 
oceanography which Proudman and Doodson were doing, or should it instead have a 
more ‗integrated‘ approach to oceanography, including biological oceanography and 
more of the ‗new‘ naval oceanography that had been done during the war, such as the 
wave and swell work? In the end, NIO focused on the integrated approach, which more 
directly incorporated naval and state interests as well as personnel from those sectors. 
NIO‘s patronage structure, with its high dependence on naval funding and involvement 
of actors such as Deacon with close links to naval oceanographic work during the war, 
is thus an example of the trends identified by historians of US oceanography, while TI 
is something of a counter example. Despite its close links to the Admiralty and its role 
as the state‘s provider of tidal prediction, TI was excluded from the post-war increase in 
naval funding of oceanographic research. While its income from tidal predictions 
increased (see section 4.5, especially table 4.1), it received no further state funding. 
NIO‘s eventual focus on ‗integrated‘ oceanography represented a side-lining of the 
Proudman/Doodson kind of oceanography with its focus on a particular kind of 
mathematical practice. It also represented a potential crisis for TI in terms of patronage, 
as the process had earlier led to a frustrated MDHB applying to Parliament for 
permission to no longer run an Observatory, i.e. to no longer fund TI, and this 
application had been granted.134  However, in the end MDHB changed its mind about 
relinquishing TI. The establishment of NIO in the south appears to have led to 
sufficiently sore feelings in Liverpool that TI‘s existing patrons now were determined 
not to see LOTI disappear or merged with NIO, even if this meant they had to part 
with more cash for research and allow a representative of NIO – Deacon – onto the 
governing committee. This especially held for Sir John Hobhouse, one of the MDHB 
members who had earlier argued for NIO to be located in Liverpool.135  
In the end NIO‘s foundation thus re-affirmed TI‘s overall patronage structure, though 
the funding provided by the Dock Board and the University was in fact somewhat 
increased (see table 4.1). This came after Doodson had argued that in order to retain 
TI‘s prestige and expertise – so as not to eventually lose the financially lucrative analysis 
                                               
134 Material on the NIO debate from the Liverpool perspective is held in D/BO/1/4/17, MMM - North 
Street, in Box 130, BA, and in P744/4, LUA. 
135 Hobhouse to Sir John Lang, Admiralty, 19th Nov 1948, D/BO/1/4/17, MMM - North Street 
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and prediction work – increased funding had to be given for research, including on 
storm surges.136 The LOTI committee accepted this argument, with Hobhouse indeed 
emphasising TI‘s financial independence from NIO, and TI‘s funding from their 
Liverpool patrons was increased.137 This meant that Liverpool‘s rejection as the site of 
NIO became not only a rejection of increased funding to TI by military and state actors, 
but also a re-affirmation of TI‘s independence by its Liverpool patrons. In turn this 
meant that TI could go on much as it had before, even increasing its research 
somewhat, without receiving state patronage. The institutional landscape as well as the 




This chapter has looked at a number of debates and tensions regarding civil and military 
state involvement with storm surge science. In the 1930s the Treasury refused to see 
storm surges as a national issue, despite repeated arguments from engineers, scientists 
and others that it was one, and in the end it remained a local government interest, 
though with some support from the Navy. While the war led to increased naval interest 
in TI‘s storm surge science, the UK and US Navies appears to have appropriated the 
work but not put it into use, instead concentrating on work on wave and swell. Finally 
when NIO was established TI‘s version of oceanography was side-lined for state 
support in favour of an ‗integrated‘ oceanography in part descending from the wave and 
swell work during the war.  
In this period there was thus considerable tension regarding the role of the state in 
relation to storm surge science. What science should the state support? Some actors, e.g. 
LCC‘s engineers and the tidal branch of Hydro, clearly believed storm surge science 
could help the state forecast flooding and help in naval battles, and that this was a valid 
reason to give it central government support. Others did not see this potential or the 
need for it, and did not consider this sort of science a high priority for central 
                                               
136 Memorandum concerning the future of Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute, Doodson, 6th Mar 
1951, D/BO/1/4/17, MMM - North Street 
137 Minutes of meeting of LOTI committee, 16th Mar 1951, D/BO/1/4/17, MMM - North Street 
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government to use or support. These others generally won out. The increase in 
technological and scientific government of the sea was a slow and contested process.138 
What effect did these patronage debates have on TI‘s work? The project was from the 
start aimed at producing a forecasting formula, which followed directly on the earlier 
local authority funding and concern with flooding. However, the debates between LCC, 
the Ministry of Health and the Treasury regarding whether storm surge science should 
be supported as a national issue or a local one had little impact on TI‘s subsequent work 
apart from eventually getting it started. During the project TI received little direction 
from LCC and indeed very little communication at all. This meant that TI was able to 
define the aims of the project and how to get there without much involvement from 
LCC. However, when the Navy got involved the work changed track. Both the work for 
LCC and the war-work for the Navy shared the same goal, defined by TI and not 
questioned by LCC: being able to forecast sea level by simple calculations and reference 
to meteorological charts. What changed were the methods TI used to attempt to 
achieve this. Before the Navy‘s request they had been experimenting with different 
methods of forecasting the surge, concentrating on the six-point method, but in order 
to provide the forecasting formula to the Navy they changed towards statistical 
methods. They then stayed on this track all the way through the rest of the LCC project. 
The change of method was not solely due to the request for a forecasting formula 
produced quickly, as they were also encountering problems with their earlier method, 
but it is clear that it was a key reason behind the change in methods.  
Choices such as this change of method influenced later work by leading to TI‘s workers 
creating particular chains of documents, which bound as well as connected. While 
Corkan to some extent chose which chains to be bound by, for example by initially 
choosing the six-point method and later to aim for a ‗well conditioned‘ multiple 
regression formula, his choices were influenced by contingencies such as Hydro‘s 
request. His choices were also limited by earlier choices, such as the definition and 
construction of surges as residuals or the choice to use geostrophic winds. TI‘s 
researchers did not necessarily know which choices would result in a ‗supplement‘ for 
                                               




them, so their choices cannot be reduced to a will-to-power but were instead contingent 
on a range of issues.   
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CHAPTER 7 (1953-60), THE EAST COAST FLOOD: THE 
IMPACT OF STATE PATRONAGE ON STORM SURGE 
RESEARCH 
In early 1953 over three hundred people died in a storm surge flooding event on the 
East Coast. Like the event in 1928 this one led to various changes for the Tidal Institute 
(TI) and its work on storm surges. For the first time central civil government, as 
opposed to local government or the Navy, became a patron of the work. This central 
government patronage came with a new framework, through which a range of actors 
were brought together to co-ordinate and conduct the research. Within this framework 
TI constructed statistical forecasting formulae that were put into use by the newly 
created East Coast flood warning system. While these formulae were deemed as good as 
was possible with their statistical methods, TI‘s practices – especially their choice of 
formula to connect wind and sea – were questioned both by themselves and others. 
After this questioning TI both argued for change and began to change their practices. 
Both the intensification and the questioning of TI‘s statistical practices for creating 
forecasting formulae came together with the changed patronage structure. Throughout I 
emphasise the contested, complicated and partial nature of the patronage of TI‘s storm 
surge science and, more generally, British oceanography.  The key question for this 
chapter is how the contested response to the flooding event impacted on TI‘s work, 
both leading to its ‗fruition‘ and to it being questioned.  
The chapter starts by analysing why there was a change towards state patronage, arguing 
that a combination of belief in science as a problem solver and political pressure from 
the opposition were key in this development. While much of the secondary literature 
argues that there was little contemporary debate about responsibility after the event, I 
will emphasise that political pressure on the government from parts of the opposition 
was strong. This pressure impacted on policy, leading to relative government generosity 
in terms of grants and also to the creation of an investigation into the event, called the 
Waverley Committee. Belief in planned science and technology as a problem solver also 
had a role, with the technical members of the Waverley Committee being important in 
formulating its recommendations. The technical members formed a sub-committee 
which recommended further research, arguing this would improve the warning system. 
However, this belief in science and technology as a problem solver was not 
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uncontested. The Cabinet does not seem to have been motivated by such beliefs, and 
when the sub-committee‘s report did the rounds of various government departments 
the worth of the proposed research was discussed.  It was eventually picked up by 
research-friendly officers within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF, from 
1955 MAFF)1 who set about implementing it well before the publication of the 
Waverley Committee‘s final report. They established the Advisory Committee of 
Oceanographical and Meteorological Research, which then formed the framework for 
TI‘s work on storm surges, including forecasting formulae.  
TI‘s work initially retained its emphasis on statistics, leading to the publication in 1959 
by one of its workers of a set of statistical forecasting formulae. I will discuss how these 
formulae were deemed as good as possible using these particular practices of 
calculation. However, by the mid 1950s both TI‘s researchers and others at the 
Advisory Committee were finding problems with the Institute‘s methods, especially 
with TI‘s practices of calculating winds, and a debate broke out about whether TI‘s 
formulae should be based on statistical correlations or on more theoretical work. TI 
suggested that other, non-statistical, practices of calculation had to be attempted to 
improve prediction, but the Advisory Committee in the end prioritised statistical 
formulae. I analyse TI‘s practices of calculating winds, looking at the various choices 
involved in this and the consequences of these. Following both the debates on TI‘s 
practice and the provision of formulae by them, by the end of the 1950s TI was 
beginning to shift towards new practices of calculation, by employing digital computers 
for the calculations of one particular aspect of their research for the Advisory 
Committee.   
 
7.1 THE EAST COAST FLOOD AND THE POLITICAL RESPONSE 
On Saturday 31 January a cyclone passed north of Scotland before turning south. Its 
unusually intense pressure gradient led to extremely strong winds and a major storm 
surge together with high waves.2 The surge travelled down the East Coast, starting at 
                                               
1The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, MAF, was in 1955 merged with the Ministry of Food, 
becoming the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, MAFF. 
2 This summary is primarily based on Peter J. Baxter, "The East Coast Big Flood, 31 January-1 February 
1953: A Summary of the Human Disaster," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, 
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Spurn Head at 4pm, reaching King‘s Lynn and maximum height at 7.20pm and Canvey 
Island at 1.10am, Sunday morning. It caused major flooding, as sea defences were 
breached in over 1,200 places, either by direct wave action or by overtopping and 
erosion. The timing of the surge, arriving after dark and late in the evening, especially 
further south, increased the deadliness of the event, and in England 307 people died, 
either of drowning or exposure. Most of those who died were over sixty and lived in 
post-war wooden or prefabricated single-storey buildings, some intended only for 
summer inhabitation. The impact was much worse in the Netherlands where 1795 
people died. No public warnings were given, though the Met Office, as part of the 
Thames surge warning system, had given some warning to at least some River Boards.3 
Most of the immediate search and rescue operation was organised locally with the help 
of the US and UK army which had a strong presence in the area.4  
On Monday a major government response was initiated. The repair of sea defences 
before high spring tides in mid-February to stop further flooding was a major logistical 
challenge, involving 30,000 workers, half from the UK and US military, and masses of 
material and machines, but was deemed successful. The cost of the damages to the 
defences was estimated at about £30 million by the Home Secretary at the time, 
Maxwell Fyfe. In addition, telephone lines, electricity, gas, water, sewage and drainage 
had been disrupted, 24,000 houses and over 200 industrial premises needed repairs and 
                                                                                                                                     
Physical and Engineering Sciences 363, no. 1831 (2005): 1302. Some historical work has been done on the 
event, the most thorough but also oldest and geographically restricted is that written by County Council 
of Essex‘s senior assistant archivist, Hilda Grieve, The Great Tide : The Story of the 1953 Flood Disaster in 
Essex (Chelmsford: County Council of Essex, 1959). Shorter, more popular accounts are given in HJ 
Harland and MG Harland, The Flooding of Eastern England (Peterborough: Minimax Books, 1980); Michael 
Pollard, North Sea Surge: The Story of the East Coast Floods of 1953 (Lavenham: Terence Dalton Ltd, 1978); 
Dorothy Summers, The East Coast Floods (London: David & Charles, 1978). Until recently academic 
historians have paid little attention to the event. For this recent work see Frank Furedi, "From the 
Narrative of the Blitz to the Rhetoric of Vulnerability," Cultural Sociology 1, no. 2 (2007); Clare L. Johnson, 
Sylvia M. Tunstall, and Edmund C. Penning-Rowsell, "Crises as Catalysts for Adaptation: Human 
Response to Major Floods," in Flood Hazard Research Centre, Publications (Middlesex: Flood Hazard 
Research Centre, 2004); Alexander Hall, "The Rise of Blame and Recreancy in the United Kingdom - a 
Cultural, Political and Scientific Autopsy  of the North Sea Flood of 1953," Environment and History journal 
(forthcoming spring 2011). 
3 See e.g.  "Flood Warnings," The Manchester Guardian, Feb 5 1953, 4. The Met Office warnings are often 
not noted in secondary sources. 
4 Secondary sources have portrayed central government as not getting involved until Monday, leaving 
local people to fend for themselves during the weekend (often described as doing so heroically and 
successfully), but the Guardian reported that Prime Minister Churchill, as well as his Ministers of Housing 
and Local Government (Harold Macmillan) and of Health (Iain MacLeod) had been kept informed 
throughout Sunday and had been involved in organising the response via the government‘s regional 
offices. "Minister Acts," The Manchester Guardian, Feb 12 1953; "Statement Today by Mr Churchill," The 
Manchester Guardian, Feb 12 1953. In addition, the involvement of the army in the rescue officers implies 
state involvement, even if the response was organised on the ground. 
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32,000 people were evacuated. 160,000 acres of land were flooded by salt water and 
46,000 livestock died.5  
How and why did the government become a patron of storm surge science after this 
event? This change in patronage impacted on TI‘s continued surge research by 
establishing a particular framework. Secondary sources discussing the event have not 
analysed why the Waverley Committee was set up. For example, Clare Johnson, 
Edmund Penning-Rowsell and Sylvia Tunstall, who have compared the policy response 
to four major English flood events in 1947, 1953, 1998 and 2000, seem to assume that 
inquiries, like the Waverley Committee or the Bye Report after the flood in 1998, are a 
natural and good policy response after a major flood. They do not analyse why such 
inquiries were established after events in 1953, 1998 and 2000, but analyse in 
considerable detail the lack of such an inquiry after the one in 1947.6 However, the lack 
of an inquiry after the flood in 1947 and the delay of many months in setting up such an 
inquiry after the 1952 London smog disaster in which around 4000 died highlights that 
the creation of an inquiry was not necessarily a straightforward or obvious response to a 
weather-related disaster at the time.7 The quick creation of it, and, in extension the 
creation of the mechanisms through which TI‘s research was done after the event, 
requires just as much an explanation as does the lack of an inquiry after 1947. In 
addition, secondary sources have deemphasised the allocation of blame and 
responsibility as a reason for the government response to the event.8 For example, Peter 
Baxter argues there was a lack of public apportioning of blame to government and 
individuals ―[d]espite the absence of warnings and the deficiencies of defences‖.9 While 
Johnson, Penning-Rowsell and Tunstall link controversy to the creation of the new 
warning system, they do not link this to the creation of the Waverley Committee.10  
The scale of the event clearly had a key role in the government‘s financial response to 
the event, but I will argue that political pressure also played an important role in the 
                                               
5 Baxter, "The East Coast Big Flood." Baxter‘s figures and the estimate of cost are taken from the 
Waverley Committee‘s report, Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], 
Cmd. 9165 (London: HMSO, 1954), para 22. 
6 Johnson, Tunstall, and Penning-Rowsell, "Crises as Catalysts for Adaptation," 88-93. On 1947 see 
section 4.4.1, p 88-93. 
7 On the smog, see Whitehead, State, Science, and the Skies, 142. 
8 Baxter, "The East Coast Big Flood," 1306 & 1311; Furedi, "From the Narrative of the Blitz to the 
Rhetoric of Vulnerability."; Frank Furedi, "The Changing Meaning of Disaster," Area 39, no. 4 (2007). 
9 Baxter, "The East Coast Big Flood," 1310. 
10 Johnson, Tunstall, and Penning-Rowsell, "Crises as Catalysts for Adaptation," 79-82. 
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creation of the Waverley Committee and in extension the giving of grants to TI‘s 
research. There was in fact a substantial amount of discussion regarding the 
responsibility of the government after the event. While the leader of the Opposition, 
Clement Attlee, was supportive of the government‘s response effort and assisted it,11 
more leftist members of the Labour Opposition, led by Attlee‘s rival Herbert 
Morrison12 and Aneurin Bevan, did not hesitate to raise issues of blame. They 
questioned whether a government circular from 1952 limiting the use of steel for flood 
defences had caused weaknesses in them and whether the government was willing to 
incur expenses by requisitioning houses to use for the evacuees. In response the 
government defended its actions as sufficient.13 Throughout February and March issues 
like this bubbled up.14  
In late March the Opposition‘s questioning of the government‘s actions came to a 
crescendo. On the Monday after the event Prime Minister Churchill had declared ―that 
the catastrophe is one which will require to be treated upon a national basis and, 
broadly, as a national responsibility‖, a statement frequently discussed in the political 
debates following the event.15 On 18 March a statement to Parliament by Fyfe, Home 
Secretary and co-ordinator of the government‘s response, led to a lively debate, with 
questions and comments from several Labour members, saying that Fyfe‘s statement 
breached Churchill‘s earlier promise by not providing sufficient financial assistance.16 
After a few days the Opposition backed down, with Mr Edward Evans, the MP for 
flood-affected Lowestoft, declaring the government‘s actions ―timely, decent, and not 
ungenerous‖.17 Despite the end result, this and the earlier exchanges show that there 
were substantial debates regarding blame and responsibility, both past and future and in 
                                               
11 E.g. by ‗pairing‘ MPs. See also Attlee‘s positive statement on the response of the public: Hansard, 
―Flood Disasters‖, HC Deb 19 February 1953, vol 511, c1458, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1953/feb/19/flood-
disasters#S5CV0511P0_19530219_HOC_297,  accessed 23 July 2010 
12 He had been the Leader of LCC in the 1930s during the discussions regarding the funding of further 
surge research after 1928. 
13 "Refugees‘ Hosts to Get State Pay," The Manchester Guardian, Feb 7 1953; "Requisitioning to Receive 
'Most Urgent Consideration'," The Manchester Guardian, Feb 4 1953. 
14 See for example "Flood Losses," The Times, Mar 11 1953. 
15 Hansard, ―East Coast Flood Disaster‖, HC Deb 02 February 1953, vol 510, c1481, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1953/feb/02/east-coast-flood-
disaster#S5CV0510P0_19530202_HOC_231, accessed 23 July 2010 
16 "Mr Ede's Dismay," The Times, Mar 19 1953; "Labour's Challenge on Flood Relief," The Manchester 
Guardian, Mar 19 1953. 
17 "Labour Withdraws Charge against Premier," The Manchester Guardian, Mar 24 1953. 
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particular about the role of the government in the response, in the wake of the 1953 
event.  
The political pressure from these debates about blame was keenly felt by ministers and 
impacted on its financial policy regarding the event, making the Treasury seemingly 
more generous than it had previously been towards storm surge science, such as during 
the interwar debate with LCC. The impact of the opposition‘s noises on senior figures 
in government can be clearly seen in a secret memo to the Chancellor from the 
Financial Secretary, John A Boyd-Carpenter. Early on the Treasury had agreed to 
double whatever the public contributed to the so-called Lord Mayor‘s Fund, the key 
channel for distributing charitable aid to those affected by the flood. Initially the 
Chancellor, Richard Austen Butler, had wanted to stop these payments when the 
government‘s contribution had reached £2m. These contributions were now well 
beyond this sum, as while the Chancellor had been away Boyd-Carpenter and Second 
Secretary B Gilbert had decided any such stop would have been unwise, and Boyd-
Carpenter argued this was still the case: ―any attempt to do so would both provoke a 
major row and stimulate even greater demands that the Exchequer should accept 
liability for various forms of loss‖. It was ―politically impossible‖ to do such a thing.18 
They argued that providing more money to start with would lead to the Treasury‘s bill 
being lower in the end. The Treasury appear to have adopted the same attitude towards 
the implementation of the Waverley Committee‘s recommendations, such as the 
research TI did.  
Another example of the impact the political pressure had on funding issues is the 
Cabinet discussion of Fyfe‘s draft statement to Parliament, mentioned above, on 17 
March. The Chancellor questioned the high Exchequer liability: ―Is it really a national 
disaster‖? If it was, he agreed they must pay up. In response Fyfe argued that the event 
was ―unprecedented in our history‖, adding that the political pressure was ―v. strong‖.19 
This exemplifies how the scale and framing of the event as a ‗national‘ unprecedented 
disaster together with political pressure impacted on government funding. The main 
issue during the Cabinet debate on Fyfe‘s March statement was two possible paragraphs 
regarding reimbursements to be given to local authorities. Though the Chancellor 
                                               
18 ―Floods‖, memo by JA Boyd-Carpenter to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 14th Mar 1953, T 227/312, 
NA 
19 CC 20(53), Notebooks, Cabinet meeting held on 17th Mar 1953, minute no 10, CAB 195/11, NA 
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claimed to be willing to consider paying more than was implied by the less generous 
version, he did not want to promise it in advance. The Cabinet in the end chose the less 
generous of the two paragraphs, leading to the criticism from the opposition of Fyfe‘s 
statement mentioned above.20 The Treasury tried to limit the government‘s 
contributions, but felt there were stricter than normal limits imposed by the political 
difficulties such reductions could cause.21 This meant that much of the Treasury debates 
were more about allocation and organising of money than about putting severe limits 
on spending.22 The political pressure thus impacted on funding decisions, such as 
whether TI should get state funding for their work.  
These debates about funding were however only background to the Waverley 
Committee. Johnson, Penning-Rowsell and Tunstall have argued that a belief in the 
ability of science and technology to solve problems and inform policy, fostered during 
the recent war, meant that there was no debate regarding the funding of research or the 
capability of research to produce the sought-after answers after the 1953 event. They 
argue that the Waverley committee‘s recommendations, over which they say scientific 
members had a strong influence, were not openly debated or questioned but instead 
accepted because of this belief in science.23 This chimes with others‘ portrayal of the 
post-war period, with a substantial literature arguing for an increase in state patronage 
of research during the 1950s.24 Jon Agar has summarised this literature: ―The increased 
funding [of science] reflected the post-war regard for ‗boffins‘ and for rational planning, 
both popularly and within government‖, also arguing that this depended on and 
continued networks between government, military and academic science developed 
                                               
20 CC (53), 20th Conclusions, Cabinet meeting held on 17th Mar 1953, minute no 11, CAB 128/26, NA. 
See also C.(53) 104, ―Flood damage,‖ Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and Minister for Welsh Affairs, 16th Mar 1953, CAB 129/60, NA, which includes the alternative 
paragraphs. 
21 See also Minute on ―Flood Damage‖ by JG Owen to Mr Jenkyns, 16th Mar 1953, T 227/312, NA 
22 For examples, see documents in T 277/311, NA. These deal primarily with contributions towards the 
rebuilding effort and compensation to individuals and small businesses, and do not mention payments 
related to the warning system or the research. I have not been able to locate any Treasury files on these 
latter topics, but the costs for these were much smaller and there is nothing to indicate the overall 
argument did not apply to them too. 
23 Johnson, Tunstall, and Penning-Rowsell, "Crises as Catalysts for Adaptation," 84-85 & 115-120. 
24 Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats, ch 1, 16 & 21; Soraya de Chadarevian, Designs for Life : Molecular 
Biology after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch 2; Whitehead, State, Science, 
and the Skies, esp. ch 6; Edgerton, Warfare State, 103-107; Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 37-40. 
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during the Second World War.25 It is thus well documented that belief in science and 
planning as problem solvers was strong in Britain in the 1950s and that government 
investment in science and technology increased dramatically in this decade. 
However, the government‘s response to the 1953 flooding was not that of a believer in 
science as a problem solver. Instead the Cabinet used the supposed objectivity of 
science as a support mechanism to defend and protect itself from its political 
opponents.26 During a Cabinet meeting in mid-February, discussing the size of 
government contributions toward the rebuilding effort, Fyfe mentioned that he was 
going to announce the appointment of what became the Waverley Committee ―to 
consider what long-term measures should be taken to guard against a recurrence of 
flooding on the rare occasions when tide and wind conditions were the same‖ as during 
the event.27 Fyfe used the rarity of the event, as having happened ―3 times in 1,000 yrs‖, 
to argue that they ―must be careful to see how far we shd. go‖.28 Fyfe wanted to appoint 
an expert committee to ensure that the costs of the response to the event did not 
exceed the benefits by going too far in the building of further flood defences or the 
creation of a warning system, given the rarity of these events. The announcing of the 
expert Waverley Committee, which later suggested that TI should be contracted to do 
surge science work, did not reflect a Cabinet belief in science, but was instead a cost-
limitation exercise in response to the political pressure for high government assistance 
following the event. 
This section has introduced the impact of the event and argued that political pressure 
impacted on the political response to the event, producing a seemingly generous 
Treasury attitude and the creation of an expert inquiry, both in fact thought to be long-
term cost saving measures. I have downplayed the importance of beliefs in science and 
technology as problem solver at the Cabinet level. However, while the political pressure 
appears to have provided an unusually receptive Treasury response to funding requests, 
this does not explain the form of the framework within which TI did its work. This was 
instead contingent upon debates within the Waverley Committee and different 
                                               
25 Jon Agar, Science and Spectacle: The Work of Jodrell Bank in Post-War British Culture, vol. 5, Studies in the 
History of Science, Technology and Medicine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). 
26 Compare Ted Porter‘s argument that threatened or weak organisations (or scientific disciplines) are 
more likely to refer to objectivity and scientific rules than less threatened ones. Porter, Trust in Numbers. 
27 CC (53), 12th Conclusions, Cabinet meeting held on 17th Feb 1953, minute no 7, CAB 128/26, NA 
28 CC 12(53), Notebooks, Cabinet meeting held on 17th Feb 1953, minute no 7, CAB 195/11, NA 
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government departments, in which different beliefs in the value of science were an 
important consideration. The next section will look at the committee Fyfe was 
announcing, which eventually created a framework for further research into forecasting 
storm surges. 
 
7.2.1 THE CREATION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
OCEANOGRAPHICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL RESEARCH 
This section explains how the government‘s patronage of TI‘s surge science came to 
take the form it took and how a new framework for storm surge science was set up. It 
does this by outlining the creation of the organisation that commissioned the work, 
placing the Advisory Committee within a wider framework of departmental discussions 
regarding whose responsibility its research should be and what the value of it was. The 
end result was an Advisory Committee on Oceanographical and Meteorological 
Research under MAF. While the setting up of such a committee was one of the 
recommendations of the Waverley Committee, the creation of it actually came about 
slightly differently, with the report of a scientific sub-committee of the main Waverley 
Committee doing the rounds of various departments, eventually being picked up and 
implemented by MAF. The main effect of the Waverley Committee‘s final 
recommendation was the relatively minor one of making a scientist the chair of the 
proposed committee. The entire process exemplifies the contested nature of central 
government support of storm surge science and how the work later done depended on 
personal networks.  
The Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, the committee established by Fyfe, 
is usually called the Waverley Committee after its chair Viscount Waverley. Initially 
when the Hydrographic Department (Hydro) was consulted on the draft membership 
of the Waverley Committee it did not contain a ―tidal expert‖, something which 
Hydrographer Day and Commander WI Farquharson, the current Tidal Super-
Intendent at Hydro, were unhappy with. Arguing that this lack was likely to lead to 
questions of the legitimacy of the committee in the eyes of other scientists, the 
Hydrographer successfully suggested the addition of Joseph Proudman, whom he 
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already knew.29 While Proudman had stepped down as Director of TI in 1946, when 
Arthur Doodson took over, he had remained involved with TI.30 The final committee 
consisted of a mix of Lords, former politicians and civil servants, as well as engineers 
and four scientists.31 The Waverley Committee‘s terms of reference included examining 
the causes of the flooding, what lessons could be learned, in particular regarding 
physical sea defences, and whether a further warning system should be set up.32 These 
questions concentrated on scientific and technological matters, and also included 
planning-related matters such as how to organise the management of flood defence. 
The intervention of scientifically-inclined Departments such as Hydro, who ensured 
Proudman‘s place on the Committee, increased the scientific membership of the final 
version of the committee. 
The Waverley Committee issued two reports: first, an interim report in the summer of 
1953 on the development of a warning system, and, second, a final report in the spring 
of 1954, which included the report of a Sub-Committee suggesting the establishment of 
the Advisory Committee. These reports together with departmental discussions led to 
the creation of the framework that TI did its surge research within following this event. 
What was the reason for the research suggested by the Waverley Committee, what did 
they suggest should be done and how was the framework for this work then actually 
established?  
                                               
29 Documents in H 01041.53, UKHO. The phrase tidal expert was used repeatedly, see e.g. Minute by 
Hydrographer Day to Secretary, 13th Mar 1953 and Proudman to Farquharson, 13th mar 1953, both in H 
01041.53, UKHO.  
30 Proudman to Hobhouse, 19th Nov 1945, P744/4, LUA; and Hobhouse to Proudman, 21st Nov 1945, 
P744/4, LUA. LOTI, Annual Report 1946, 3. 
31 The names, titles and affiliations of the members of the Waverley Committee were Right Honourable 
Viscount Waverley GCB GCSI GCIE FRS, Dr GMB Dobson CBE FRS (Reader in Meteorology in the 
University of Oxford), Sir Donald Fergusson GCB (former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Fuel 
and Power, and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries), Mr RD Gwyther CBE MC (partner in Messrs. 
Coode and Partners, chartered civil engineer), Sir Claude Inglis CIE FRS (Director, Hydraulics Research 
Station, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research), Mr RG Leach CBE (partner in Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company, former Deputy Finance Secretary of Ministry of Food), Major Sir Basil Neven-
Spence (Lord Lieutenant of Zetland), Proudman, Mr AS Quartermaine CBE MC (President of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers and lately Chief Engineer of the Great Western Railway), Lord De Ramsey 
TD (Lord Lieutenant of Huntingdonshire), Professor JA Steers (Professor of Geography at the 
University of Cambridge), Sir Miles Thomas DFC (Chairman of British Overseas Airways Corporation), 
Sir John Wrigley KBE CB (former Joint Deputy-Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government), Mr T Yates CBE (General Secretary of the National Union of Seamen). Affiliations taken 
from Hansard extract ―Flood and Storm Damage‖ from 23rd Mar 1953, in MAF 135/341 and Hansard, 
―Flood Disaster Committee (Membership)‖, HC Deb 23 April 1953, vol 514, c1395, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1953/apr/23/flood-disaster-committee-membership, 
accessed 16th Dec 2010. 
32 Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], para 1. 
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7.2.2 THE REASON FOR RESEARCH: THE WARNING SYSTEM 
The Waverley Committee argued that the research it recommended would make 
forecasts done by the newly established warning system more accurate, i.e make them 
more like observed surges, and reduce the number of costly false alarms.33 An 
emergency warning system had been set up soon after the event.34 The Waverley 
Committee was asked by the government to produce an interim report regarding the 
continuation of the warning system, so that this could be organised for the following 
winter.35 The warning system suggested by the Waverley Committee was fairly similar to 
the emergency one. Hydro staff would be based at the Met Office forecasting office in 
Dunstable receiving special hourly tidal predictions from TI, tidal observations from 
gauges and meteorological information from the Met Office. Hydro‘s staff would then 
calculate a forecast of the surge using a version of Robert Henry Corkan‘s forecasting 
formula further developed by Hydro‘s staff, and put out warnings if necessary. The 
interim report with these recommendations was published in July 1953.36  
As can be seen in a memo to the River Boards, which would receive warnings under the 
system and needed to prepare, the government very quickly accepted the 
recommendations. In mid-August 1953, even before the government had officially 
accepted the report, MAF sent the River Boards a confidential memorandum telling 
them that the Government had accepted the interim report ―in toto‖.37  
 
                                               
33 The Hydrographer estimated that each cancelled warning or false alarm cost at least £1,000 for local 
authorities, the police etc. To him the aim of the research was to improve the ‗accuracy‘ of forecasts 
which in turn would enable him ―with confidence, to lower the margin of safety which he now applies,‖ 
so that there would be fewer costly false alarms. ―Waverley Committee on Coastal Flooding, Report on 
Oceanographic Sub-Committee‖, Note for [the departmental] meeting on 3rd Feb 1954, HW 287.54, 
UKHO 
34  Minutes of Cabinet Emergency Committee, H 01041.53, UKHO 
35 Cabinet, Official Committee on Emergencies, Sub Committee on the Setting Up of Flood Warning 
System, Minutes from third meeting, 24th March 1953, H 01041.53, UKHO 
36 Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], Appendix A,, Interim Report - 
July 1953. Flood warning system. 
37 Memorandum to river boards, 17th Aug 1953, ―Flood Warning System‖, MAF 222/306, NA. The lack 
of a warning system had been a common complaint voiced both by media actors and by others whose 
views were covered by the newspapers, for example, East Suffolk County Council and the jury at the 
coroners‘ inquests in King‘s Lynn and Canvey Island.37 While this controversy was one of the reasons 
why the warning system was implemented fast and as suggested by the Waverley Committee, as Johnson, 
Penning-Rowsell and Tunstall has argued, I would add that the government did this to avoid further 
political controversy and demands for funding. Johnson, Tunstall, and Penning-Rowsell, "Crises as 
Catalysts for Adaptation," 79-82. 
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7.2.3 FORMULATION OF A RESEARCH PLAN: THE OCEANOGRAPHIC SUB-
COMMITTEE 
The framework for TI‘s research came out of an Oceanographical Sub-Committee set 
up by the Waverley Committee on the suggestion of Proudman and the meteorologist 
on the committee, GMB Dobson. The Waverley Committee‘s original terms of 
reference did not allow it to make recommendations on future research, but the 
creation of a sub-committee made this possible.38 This sub-committee provides a good 
example of the Waverley Committee favouring planned research, especially as the sub-
committee‘s recommendations made it into the final recommendations of the Waverley 
Committee. By suggesting the sub-committee Proudman was able to ‗piggy-back‘ a 
research agenda for storm surge science onto the Waverley Committee‘s report. This 
suited the Waverley Committee, Proudman and TI, which was recommended as a 
research contractor to the state as a result of the close connections between the 
Institute, Proudman and Hydro.39   
The Sub-Committee‘s terms of reference included reporting on what research was 
needed to improve the recommended warning system and who should do this work.40 
Proudman chaired while the other members were the other scientists from the main 
committee, Dobson (Reader in Meteorology at the University of Oxford), Claude Inglis 
(Director, Hydraulics Research Station, Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research) and JA Steers (Professor of Geography at the University of Cambridge). They 
also consulted George Deacon and Farquharson.41 The scientists recommended further 
research and the creation of an Advisory Committee to co-ordinate the work. They 
identified seven specific problems and allocated these to TI and NIO, both represented 
directly or indirectly at the meeting.42 The focus of this chapter is on two of the 
problems TI were allocated: ―[t]he search for empirical formulae‖ to predict surges at 
                                               
38 Minute by JE Maher (secretary of the Waverley Committee) to Chairman, 22nd May 1953, MAF 
135/344, NA 
39 Correspondence between Proudman, Rossiter and Doodson, spring and summer 1953. Folder: 
Waverley Committee, Box 120, BA, especially Proudman to Rossiter, 24th Apr 1953, Box 120, BA. 
40 It was also ―to make recommendations on the location of tidal gauges on the coast of Great Britain‖ 
and consider whether statistics should be prepared from tidal gauge records on the frequencies of certain 
high water levels. I will not discuss this side of the work, as it is less relevant to the focus of the thesis. 
41 Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, Minutes of third meeting, 8th June 1953, MAF 135/341, 
NA and Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], Appendix B. The Sub-
Committee‘s one meeting was held at the Royal Society in June. Maher to Steers, 17th Jun 1953, MAF 
135/344, NA. 
42 Proudman represented TI‘s interests. 
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seven named ports along the East Coast as early as possible and ―[t]he search for 
formulae which will enable external surges, as recorded at Aberdeen, to be forecast 
from meteorological data‖.43 TI was then asked whether it was able and willing to do 
the suggested work, which it said it was, subject to finance of at least £2000 per year 
and time to fulfil its other responsibilities regarding tidal predictions.44  
In its report the Sub-Committee formulated a specific research programme aimed at 
improving the warning system, to be undertaken by TI and NIO. This specification was 
heavily dependent on existing networks and contacts, as well as on existing ideas about 
what research would be useful. For example, Proudman communicated with TI 
informally regarding the proposed research, suggesting they stress the need for research 
on statistical formulae in their submission of evidence to the Waverley Committee.45 In 
a supporting circle this was one the ideas then allocated to TI by the Sub-Committee. A 
noticeable exclusion from all this networking was the Met Office.  
Having shown that the suggested research was framed as necessary to decrease the costs 
of the warning system and improve its performance, and that the suggested research 
plan was formulated by a group of scientists including Proudman in close collaboration 
with the research institute‘s they suggested should do the work, we now turn to the 
establishment of the framework for the suggested research. 
 
                                               
43 Oceanographic Sub-Committee Report, undated, ca July 1953, document nr 18 in MAF 135/344, NA 
and Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], Appendix B. The 
recommended research allocated to NIO was studies of free and forced oscillations in the North Sea, the 
reaction of the sea surface to winds of different strengths and how surges and long waves were modified 
in shallow water. In the final version TI was allocated the tide-surge interaction problem (which is 
somewhat similar to the last of NIO‘s tasks), the production of analysis and hourly tidal predictions for 
the ports involved in the warning system, investigations of certain kinds of surge oscillations and doing 
similar work as that done for the North Sea for the other seas surrounding Britain. The interaction issue 
appears to have been added to this list before the final Waverley report, as it is not in the version of the 
sub-committee‘s report prepared in 1953. 
44 Doodson to Ministry of Housing & Local Government, 23rd Jul 1953, folder Waverley Committee, Box 
120, BA. See also correspondence in MAF 135/344, NA 
45 Correspondence between Proudman, Rossiter and Doodson, spring and summer 1953. Folder 
‗Waverley Committee‘, Box 120, BA, especially Proudman to Rossiter, 24th Apr 1953, Box 120, BA. 
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7.2.4 ESTABLISHING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE: WHICH DEPARTMENT 
WOULD LEAD? 
The Sub-Committee‘s recommended research programme turned into the Advisory 
Committee through a process of departmental negotiations, during which the value of 
the proposed research was debated and different views on the value of this kind of 
science were aired. After the sub-committee‘s report had been accepted by the main 
Waverley Committee, the chairman asked the Committee‘s Secretary, Maher, to bring it 
to the notice of the government.46  
The sub-committee‘s report then did the rounds of Whitehall, bouncing between 
different departments until MAF picked it up. The Home Office co-ordinated the 
report‘s Whitehall travels, but officials there said it did not have any other departmental 
interests in the proposed research.47 Indeed an Assistant Secretary in the Civil Defence 
Department, RF Wood, quickly pushed the report away from the Home Office by 
suggesting that the matter was not something that the Home Office could play a ―useful 
part‖ in. He implied that the report was overly academic and technical, and that the 
work would only possibly lead to indirect benefits to the warning system over the long 
term.48 The Admiralty was then asked to lead on the report. They responded that while 
they were ―flattered‖ to be asked and were ―competent to advise on the technical 
aspects of the report‖ they would not take the lead as they were not the right 
Department to decide whether the potential increase in protection to life and property 
was worth the expense and effort of the suggested work.49 They claimed to be too 
technical to lead – no doubt there were also financial or personnel considerations 
involved. Following this, the Home Office bounced the report to others, asking MAF, 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) and the Scottish Office to 
take over the lead on it .50 
 At this point the Permanent Secretary Alan Hitchman at MAF said they would lead on 
the implementation of the report. MAF seems to have decided to take the lead on the 
report with only little discussion. Assistant Secretary CHA Duke‘s first minute in the file 
                                               
46 Correspondence in MAF 135/344, NA, and Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, Minutes of 
fifth meeting, 6th Jul 1953, MAF 135/341, NA 
47 Minute by A Booth, 24th Sep 1953, HO 325/13, NA 
48 Minutes by RF W[ood], 14th Sep 1953 and 25th Sep 1953, HO 325/13, NA  
49 Jarrett to Allen, 28th Oct 1953, HO 325/13, NA 
50 Newsam to Milne, 18th Nov 1953, HO 325/13, NA 
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stated that ―since this Department is responsible for the sea defences of low-lying land 
and therefore has a major interest in seeing that information about tidal surges is as 
complete as possible I think we should take the initiative in this matter‖.51 In the 
interwar period the Treasury had argued that if the state became the patron of surge 
science this could lead to demands for funding of sea defences. Duke now argued that 
as the state, specifically his department, were responsible for sea defences, they should 
support the research – a symmetrical argument, but stated in the opposite direction to 
what the Treasury had feared. 
 There were briefly some discussions whether MAF or the MHLG should lead, with the 
latter arguing for joint leadership, but Duke pressed for MAF to lead as he thought 
MHLG‘s attitude to research left much to be desired, implying they were not keen on 
supporting research.52 He also ascertained that the Chief Engineer thought an increase 
in the reliability of the warning system was worth ―the relatively modest sum of 
£25,000‖, and argued for a meeting of concerned Departments.53 By mid January Duke 
confirmed to the Home Office that MAF would lead on the report.54  
It is clear that while the 1950s may have been a decade of strong belief in planning and 
scientific research as a problem solver, some departments and some officers believed 
this more strongly than others. In this case Duke at MAF was keener on scientific 
research than Wood at the Home Office, and Duke also thought MAF was ‗better‘ at 
research than the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.  The implementation of 
the sub-committee‘s research plan relied on arguments by officers such as Duke at 
MAF, who due to their established interests in sea defence were favourably inclined 
towards research in that area and also saw themselves as generally research friendly. 
 
7.2.5 ESTABLISHING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE: FUNDING 
Once MAF had adopted the report, they set about organising its implementation by 
calling a departmental meeting. Representatives of the Admiralty (including the 
                                               
51 Minute by Duke, 28th Nov 1953, MAF 135/324, NA 
52 Minute by Duke, 28th Nov 1953, MAF 135/324, and Sheepshank to Newsam, 8th Dec 1953, HO 
325/13, NA 
53 Minute by Duke, 11th Jan 1954, MAF 135/324, NA 
54 Duke to Wood, 13th Jan 1954, HO 325/13, NA 
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Hydrographer and Farquharson), MHLG, the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, 
the Met Office, the Scottish Home Department, and MAF attended.55 The 
representatives discussed the merits of the proposals ―from a technical point of view‖ 
and quickly appear to have agreed to advise Ministers to accept the Sub-Committe‘s 
recommendations.56 The report now had supporters who believed its arguments that 
research would improve forecasts and reduce costs, but funding was still an issue. 
At the meeting none of the Departments present claimed to be able to fund the work in 
its entirety, though all, especially the Met Office and Hydro, agreed to contribute.57 
Following the departmental meeting one of MAF‘s finance officers contacted the 
Treasury to discuss the matter, finding that they were ―more or less reconciled to the 
fact that any money for this purpose will have to be provided on this Ministry‘s [MAF‘s] 
vote‖. While MAF would need to seek Treasury authority for the grants, providing 
further details of the work proposed and the finances needed, they could assume that 
the principle of funding storm surge science had been accepted by the Treasury.58 
Formal Treasury approval was given after minor formalities had been sorted.59 For the 
rest of the 1950s MAF and Treasury financial support for TI‘s research on surge 
forecasting was not questioned. For example, while there were critical debates between 
a number of Departments regarding the funding of further tidal gauges in 1958-59, this 
debate did not affect the funding of the rest of TI‘s work.60 Central government was 
now a direct patron of storm surge science, especially TI‘s work on forecasting formulae 
for the warning system.  
                                               
55 The names, affiliations and titles (where known) of the representatives were: from the Admiralty SP 
Osmond (Principal) and Farquharson, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government HH Browne 
(Principal), the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation Mr FE Page, the Met Office Dr JM (James 
Martin) Stagg and Mr SB Peters (both Deputy Chief Scientific Officers), the Scottish Home Department 
Mr NJP Hutchison, and from MAF the chair CHA Duke (Assistant Secretary of Land Drainage and 
Water Supply Division), A Sparks (Assistant Secretary in the Finance and Accounts Division), EAG 
Johnson (Chief Drainage Engineer) and JE Maher (Principal in the Land Drainage Division). 
56 Documents in HW 287.54, UKHO, quote are from Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, 
Report of the Oceanographic Sub-Committee, Minutes of meeting held at 3rd Feb 1954. 
57 Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, Report of the Oceanographic Sub-Committee, Minutes 
of meeting held at 3rd Feb 1954, HW 287.54, UKHO 
58 Minute by Assistant Secretary, Finance and Accounts Division Sparks, 3rd Feb 1954, MAF 135/324, 
NA. See also documents in HW 287.54, UKHO. There were some discussions regarding how to pay for 
the installation of additional tidal gauges, primarily between MAF and the Ministry of Transport. The 
latter in the end agreed to pay with Treasury approval, see documents in MAF 135/324, NA 
59 Such as which sub-head the grants should be charged to and the provision of a minimal budget from 
TI outlining how much of the grant would be spent on different costs. Minutes and correspondence, 
October to December 1954, esp. Minute by Treadway, 8th Dec 1954, MAF 135/324, NA 
60 Documents from 1958 and 1959 in MAF 135/324, NA 
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The Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research met for the 
first time on 8 October 1954, in MAF‘s offices. Initially it had been suggested that the 
Advisory Committee should be chaired by MAF‘s Chief Engineer,61 but ―in deference 
to the recommendation in the Waverley Report‖ Duke suggested Proudman should be 
asked to chair it.62 This was agreed by the Departmental representatives and Proudman 
thus became the chair of the Advisory Committee. George Deacon represented NIO, 
Doodson TI, Commander CT Suthons Hydro and Dr RC Sutcliffe the Met Office 
where he was Deputy Director (Research). Suthons, who had been involved with the 
swell forecasting system during the war, was Principal Scientific Officer at Hydro and 
now in charge of the warning system.63 The interests of government departments were 
also represented by officers from the engineering departments at MAF, MHLG and the 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. Inglis represented DSIR.64 The terms of 
reference for the Advisory Committee were to co-ordinate oceanographic and 
meteorological research work in relation to sea defence, as recommended by the 
Waverley Committee‘s technical sub-committee.65  
With this the Advisory Committee was established and the Treasury had agreed to pay 
for TI‘s storm surge work; the state becoming a major patron of storm surge science. 
Once the overall responsibility for the report had been settled, the process of 
establishing the Advisory Committee appears not to have been contested, with little or 
no questioning of whether it was worthwhile or not. After MAF had taken it on, the 
arguments that the scientific research would reduce costs by reducing false alarms66 and 
increase the ‗reliability‘ of the warning system67 were given space and were effective in 
                                               
61 Minute by Hugh Gardner, 25th Mar 1954, MAF 135/324, NA 
62 Duke to Browne, 22nd Apr 1954, MAF 135/324, NA 
63 Documents from 1954 in H 01041.53, UKHO 
64 The departmental representatives were from MAF MR EAG Johnson, Chief Drainage Engineer, from 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government Mr AAL Lane, Senior Engineering Inspector, and from the 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation Mr RE O‘Malley, Harbour Engineer. The Committee‘s initial 
Secretary was Miss JD Duncombe from the Land Drainage and Water Supply Division of MAF. 
65 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 1st meeting held on 
Friday, 8th October, 1954, and agenda paper no 1 ―Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and 
Meteorological Research‖, Box 160, BA. 
66 ―Waverley Committee on Coastal Flooding, Report on Oceanographic Sub-Committee‖, Note for 
meeting on 3rd Feb 1954, HW 287.54, UKHO 
67 In addition to the Hydrographer‘s comments this had been how Proudman argued for the original 
research, see e.g. Minute by Maher, 22nd May 1953, MAF 135/344. For the Hydrographer‘s comments, 
see note 33, this chapter. 
67  Minutes of Cabinet Emergency Committee, H 01041.53, UKHO 
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securing support and funding.68 This was due more to Duke‘s eagerness for MAF to 
support such work than to the Waverley Committee‘s pressure.69   
 
7.3.1 QUESTIONING OF TI‘S PRACTICES 
What happened to TI‘s use of their particular practices when these were developed and 
judged within the new framework of the Advisory Committee? This section discusses 
the research TI did for the Advisory Committee on statistical forecasting formulae for 
the East Coast. It concentrates on how TI‘s practices were questioned, focusing on a 
debate between TI, Hydro and the Met Office which broke out in the mid 1950s 
regarding the calculation of winds. This follows on the discussion in the previous 
chapter of TI‘s choice to use geostrophic winds to do this calculation and analyses what 
happened when their particular practices encountered other, different, practices within 
the new framework of the Advisory Committee. TI‘s emphasis on correlation was 
criticised by the Met Office which favoured causal analysis. However, despite TI then 
suggesting that theoretically based research would lead to more ‗improvements‘ in 
forecasts than continued statistical work, its emphasis on statistical formulae remained 
at the end of this dispute, as the Advisory Committee asked them to prioritise such 
work. In 1957 TI presented their statistical formulae as finished, and as being as good as 
possible using this particular practice. After a couple of years usage the prime user, the 
flood warning system represented by Hydro‘s Suthons, agreed with TI that they had 
taken statistical work on forecasting as far as it could go.  
I will first look at the early continuation of TI‘s statistical practices until 1955, before 
turning to the contestations of it in 1955-6, and how TI then produced a set of 
forecasting formula which they and, after a couple of years, Suthons judged as the best 
                                               
68 This of course did not mean all agreed. Once Wood had been told of the outcome of the Departmental 
Committee he wrote ―This seems like a happy [illegible - route? minute?] out of one of our afflictions at 
least.‖ Minute by RF W[ood], 22nd Feb 1954, HO 325/13, NA 
69 Minute by Duke, 28th Nov 1953, MAF 135/324, NA. When the Waverley Committee at its last meeting 
in March 1954 were mistakenly told Treasury authority had not already been given for the suggested 
research work it threatened to ask the Home Secretary ―for an assurance that very early steps would be 
taken to authorise the research.‖ This provides an example of the committee‘s support of research. 
However, as this was a case of miscommunication, with the authority already given, it also clarifies that 
issues other than the Waverley Committee‘s pressure on the government were decisive for the Treasury‘s 
provision of funds to TI‘s research (such as avoiding a political backlash if they refused funding). 




possible statistical formulae. However, I will first introduce TI‘s key worker on the 
forecasting formulae during the 1950s, Jack Rossiter (1919-1972, full first name John 
Reginald). When the event took place Doodson, who had become Director of TI in 
1946,70 was severely ill with heart disease and not to be disturbed.71  Corkan, who had 
been Doodson‘s second in command, had died unexpectedly the previous year, leaving 
Rossiter to take control of TI‘s response to the flooding event.72 Rossiter had joined as 
junior assistant in 1937, after studying for his Higher School Certificate as a scholarship 
student at Liverpool Collegiate College.73 His father was a barber and illegal bookmaker 
and his brother the actor Leonard Rossiter.74 As money was short he was unable to 
attend university but while working for TI he studied part-time at the University of 
London, gaining an Intermediate BSc in 1939. During the war, between 1939 and 46, he 
served in the Royal Artillery, as an Instructor in Anti-Aircraft Gunnery and as a REME 
(Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineering) Education Officer.75 Before 1953 he was 
closely involved with mean sea level work at TI and his research work involved 
determining tidal charts using relaxation methods, i.e. work not directly related to storm 
surges. In 1947 he obtained a BSc Degree (first class honours), followed by an MSc in 
1956, with his thesis being on surges, and a DSc in 1961, all as an external London 
University part time student.76  
Rossiter, Proudman and Farquharson, at the Tidal Branch, initially assumed the 
empirical formulae Oceanographic Sub-Committee had asked for would be statistical 
ones, along the lines of Corkan‘s earlier work. In their discussions both Hydro and TI 
discussed statistical work, as did Proudman, who emphasised statistical formulae in 
correspondence with Rossiter: ―it would be valuable to have formulae like Corkan‘s for 
any pair of stations out of half a dozen on the east coast of Scotland and England‖.77 In 
their memos to the Waverley Committee Rossiter wrote about ―extensions of previous 
                                               
70 Proudman to Hobhouse, 19th Nov 1945, P744/4, LUA; and Hobhouse to Proudman, 21st Nov 1945, 
P744/4, LUA 
71 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 208 & 213. 
72 LOTI, Annual Report 1952, 5-6. 
73 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 182.  
74 "Rossiter, Leonard,"  in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2009); Jones, 
"From Astronomy to Oceanography - a Brief History of Bidston Observatory." 
75 Scoffield, Bidston Observatory, 188. 
76 Ibid., 216; NERC, Institute of Coastal Oceanography and Tides, 1971-72, Annual Report (Liverpool: NERC, 
1972), 6.   
77 Proudman to Rossiter, 24th Apr 1953, Box 120, BA 
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work‖78 while Farquharson wrote that Corkan‘s ―method should obviously be 
developed‖.79 This group of researchers, who knew each other well, assumed that TI‘s 
earlier practices should be continued and indeed wrote the continuation of these 
practices into the programme of work TI was then contracted to do. 
By these researchers the continuation of TI‘s practice was taken for granted as it was 
said to have previously ‗worked‘. In TI‘s submission to the Waverley Committee, 
Rossiter claimed that Corkan‘s formula produced ―satisfactory predictions‖ for most 
surges. A satisfactory prediction was defined as one in which ―the general trend of the 
residuals was calculated in a way which could have been done six hours in advance, and 
the general magnitude of the effect reproduced‖. Having defined Corkan‘s statistical 
forecasting formulae as satisfactory, Rossiter went on to assume that further such work 
could produce equally satisfactory results: ―There is no reason to doubt that 
investigations such as that for Southend ... will give correspondingly satisfactory 
results‖.80  
There is no indication that this assumption that forecasting formulae should be 
statistical, like Corkan‘s, was questioned by other members of the Oceanographical Sub-
Committee or the Advisory Committee at this point.81 However, other aspects of TI‘s 
practices changed, in particular how they calculated winds. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, before 1953 Doodson and Corkan had used geostrophic winds, which assumed 
the isobars were straight, to easily calculate the winds they correlated the surge with. In 
response to comments from Proudman and others, TI changed to using gradient winds 
which were somewhat more difficult to calculate but take the curvature of isobars into 
account. There is little material on this decision, but when recalling this initial 
questioning of TI‘s practices, Doodson claimed he had not felt that the refinement was 
necessary for work on statistical forecasting formulae based on correlation, but had 
accepted it to meet the criticisms from those like Proudman who Doodson argued were 
                                               
78 ―North Sea Storm Surges‖, Memorandum [for Waverley Committee] by the Liverpool Observatory and 
Tidal Institute, April 1953, Rossiter, Box 120, BA 
79 My emphasis. ―Waverly Committee: Terms of Reference Item No. iii, A Permanent Flood-Warning 
System‖, April 1953, H 01041.53, UKHO 
80 ―North Sea Storm Surges‖, Memorandum [for Waverley Committee] by the Liverpool Observatory and 
Tidal Institute, April 1953, Rossiter, p 5-7, Box 120, BA 
81 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 1st meeting, 8th Oct 
1954; Minutes of 2nd meeting, 14th Dec 1954, Box 159, BA. There are also no indications of any 
discussions of such matters in MAF‘s files of correspondence regarding the meetings, MAF 135/356 (1st 
meeting) and MAF 135/357 (2nd meeting), NA 
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concerned with ―mechanisms of action‖, i.e. causation instead of correlation.82 Rossiter 
had incorporated the use of gradient winds in TI‘s practices for constructing surge 
forecasting formulae. Judgements on TI‘s work by the scientists involved in the 
establishment of the Advisory Committee had thus led to TI changing their practices of 
calculation.  
 Overall TI‘s researchers continued their statistical work along previous lines with some 
changes.83 For example, they worked on a forecasting formula for Aberdeen,84 
something which Suthons repeatedly argued for.85 The members of the Advisory 
Committee were happy with the progress, ―not[ing] with satisfaction the progress 
made‖ with the research on the forecasting formulae at the spring 1955 meeting.86  
 
7.3.2 CONTESTED PRACTICES: CAUSATION VS CORRELATION  
However, by the autumn of 1955 problems were starting to appear. At a meeting of the 
Advisory Committee the apparent calm was shattered, when a debate regarding TI‘s 
practices of calculating winds broke out. Different approaches and practices collided, 
with the Met Office criticising TI‘s work for not taking into account causal relationships 
when estimating winds. Doodson instead claimed that had never been their intention, 
and that they had ‗only‘ ever attempted to produce forecasting formulae as fast as 
possible by correlating pressure gradients with the surge. This section will look in more 
detail at this debate between the different approaches to the problem. 
This debate was preceded by a refusal by the Met Office to do work on the stress of 
wind on water, i.e. the theoretical relationship which TI was said to be neglecting by the 
                                               
82 Doodson to Farquharson, undated, ca Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO  
83 They also changed how they reduced data to construct curves of residuals, replacing Doodson‘s 
graphical method described in chapter five with a new ―simple computative method,‖ which was said to 
be in a form already familiar to TI‘s computers, so making it easier for them to work with it, and did not 
require the use of a tide-predicting machine. This continued their emphasis on reducing the time and 
work involved in the calculations. ―Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute, Progress Report on Storm-
Surge Research (to March 31, 1955),‖ Paper 3(v) for 3rd meeting of Advisory Committee on 
Oceanographic and Meteorological Research on 28th Apr 1955, p1, Box 159, BA.  
84 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 3rd meeting, 28th Apr 
1955, para 4, Box 159, BA 
85 CT Suthons, ―Report on the Warning System during 1953/4‖, 28th Sep 1954, Agenda paper for 1st 
meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, 8th Oct 1954, and 
Agenda papers for 3rd meeting, 28th Apr 1955,  Box 159, BA. 
86 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 3rd meeting, 28th Apr 
1955, para 3, Box 159, BA 
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Met Office. In late 1954 the Advisory Committee asked the Met Office to help the 
Advisory Committee by researching the stress of wind on water. The Deputy Director 
(Research) there, OG Sutton, claimed that while the issue had been put on the 
Meteorological Research Committee‘s Programme, they were unable to conduct 
research into the problem currently due to the pressure of other work.87 In other words, 
while it had been put on the Met Office‘s agenda and would be treated in due course it 
was not an issue given high priority by the Met Office. While this was in part due to 
different priorities and emphasis on different practices, with the meteorological 
community at this time moving away from statistics towards computer-based numerical 
weather prediction, it may also have been linked to departmental politics.88 During the 
Departmental Meeting organised by MAF to establish the Advisory Committee Dr 
James Martin Stagg, one of the representatives of the Met Office and one of the key 
meteorologists involved in D-Day89, had ―expressed surprise‖ that the Office had not 
been consulted by the Oceanographic Sub-Committee while writing its report. At the 
time this was smoothed over by Johnson from MAF saying he thought the Met Office‘s 
involvement in the research had been assumed.90 While seemingly petty, it may be that 
the Met Office had negative feelings towards the Advisory Committee, based on this 
early lack of consultation, which influenced how it related to the Committee.91 
The debate regarding how TI should calculate winds began at the autumn 1955 meeting, 
when Rossiter asked for Met Office help with this as he felt he was not making the best 
use of the meteorological data.92 At the meeting Doodson also raised technical concerns 
regarding how TI‘s formulae were constructed, which brought the issues to light. He 
criticised the provisional formula for Aberdeen Rossiter had presented at this meeting, 
arguing that despite achieving a relatively high correlation coefficient of 0.84 it only 
explained about half of the storm surge. He attributed this partly to the inclusion of 
non-meteorological effects in the calculations of standard deviations and partly to 
                                               
87 Sutton to unnamed at Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries [probably the secretary for the Advisory 
Committee], 4th Jan 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO. See also documents in MAF 135/357 and MAF 135/358, 
NA 
88 Edwards, A Vast Machine; Harper, Weather by the Numbers.  
89 James Rodger Fleming, "Sverre Petterssen, the Bergen School, and the Forecasts for D-Day, " Proceedings of the 
International Commission on History of Meteorology 1, no.1 (2004). 
90 Documents in HW 287.54, UKHO, quotes from ―Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, 
Report of the Oceanographic Sub-Committee‖, Minutes of meeting held at 3rd Feb 1954. 
91 I have not been able to find any Met Office files to confirm this. 
92 Farquharson, minute to ADMO (FR), undated, ca Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO. Farquharson 
claimed the Minutes of the meeting provided a ―garbled account‖ of Rossiter‘s question. 
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difficulties in producing a good statistical formulae. Standard multiple regression 
techniques assume that the different explanatory variables, e.g. winds in different places, 
that are used to explain the dependent variable, e.g. the storm surge, are independent 
from each other so that one variable can be changed while the others remain the same.93 
According to Doodson, the correlation coefficients between winds at the different 
calculation points in the North Sea and the Atlantic and the surge in Aberdeen were low 
(below 0.6) but there was high inter-correlation between the different points, causing 
―uncertainties in the solutions‖.94 Doodson argued that as wind in one area tended to 
mean wind in another – the variables were not independent – the statistical approach 
did not produce good results. Doodson was arguing that more, different, research was 
needed to produce ‗better‘ formulae, which TI needed more funding and time to do. 
Doodson brought up the issues to argue for further support. 
However, raising these issues appears to have led to critiques of TI‘s practice. At this 
meeting even what TI‘s practices were seems to have been debated, especially whether 
they and Hydro were using similar enough practices in regards to the meteorological 
data. As one outcome of the autumn 1955 meeting, FM Berncastle, one of Hydro‘s 
officer involved in the warning system, visited TI and was shown how TI calculated the 
tractive force of the wind from isobars, in order that the warning system would be able 
to use a similar method.95 After this visit Berncastle produced a memo, giving details of 
TI‘s practices, and suggested that TI‘s methods be checked for their validity by the Met 
Office: 
The very great importance of this work to the nation, in saving life and securing 
property, which justifies the research now being carried out by other bodies 
would seem to justify further research on the part of the Meteorological Office 
                                               
93 Croxton and Cowden, Applied General Statistics, 741-742. As put by Johnson and Tetley: ―When the 
ranges of variable are mutually dependent … the correlation which arises is not of the simple type … and 
it is doubtful whether the correlation coefficient by itself is a valid measure of association in such 
cases.‖N L Johnson and H Tetley, Statistics: An Intermediate Text Book (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950), 165.  
94 ―Report on the work done at the Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute‖, Doodson, Paper 4(ii), 
Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 4th meeting, 4th Oct 
1955, Box 159, BA 
95 Rossiter to Farquharson, 15th Oct 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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if the mechanics of storm surges are to be fully understood and the best method 
of forecasting then derived.96  
Berncastle was implying that the Met Office ought to do more work for the Advisory 
Committee, for example by giving the issue higher priority in its research programme. 
He justified his pressure to divert Met Office resources towards Advisory Committee 
work by arguing such work was in the national interest. 
Put under pressure from both Rossiter asking for help and Berncastle, the Met Office 
appears to have taken umbrage at these attempts to get them to do the research they 
had politely but firmly refused to do. In response to Berncastle‘s suggestion that the 
Met Office evaluate TI‘s methods, JS Sawyer, the Senior Principal Scientific Officer in 
charge of forecasting research at the Met Office,97 explained he did not want to do any 
of TI‘s work for them. He did admit that if, but only if, ―a fundamental approach to the 
tidal problem based on theoretical relations between surface wind and stress on the sea 
is successful‖, then the Met Office would consider doing some research.98 Despite this 
refusal, a colleague of Sawyer‘s, JM Craddock, did in the end produce a two page memo 
giving the Met Office‘s thoughts on how to estimate the effect of wind stress on the 
sea, while Saywer was on sick leave. This memo listed a number of factors impacting on 
the wind effect that he thought TI ought to take into consideration in their work but 
provided little or no quantitative directions for how to take them into account.99 
Sawyers and others at the Met Office seem to have wanted TI to produce a theoretical 
rather than statistical model before the Met Office did research. They thought the 
research should be about causes, not statistical correlations.  
In response to Craddock‘s memo Doodson explained to Farquharson that they were 
not doing what the Met Office seemed to think they were doing. They were not 
estimating the wind on the basis of all possible causes, like the ones Craddock had listed 
                                               
96 ―Use of Meteorological Data for Storm Surge Research by the Liverpool Tidal Institute‖, Berncastle, 
undated, late Oct or early Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
97 John Mason, "John Stanley Sawyer 19 June 1916--19 September 2000," Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of 
the Royal Society 48(2002). 
98 JS Sawyer to Farquharson, 14th Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
99 These factors included issues such as the speed of change in pressure gradient and that the relationship 
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―Comments on correspondence between Dr Doodson, [LOTI] and  Cmdr. Farquharson, Hydrographic 
Officer, Dunstable‖, J M Craddock, undated, ca Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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in his memo, but instead correlating pressure gradients and surges, without considering 
the intermediate causes:  
I have very carefully avoided estimating the wind. I passed direct from the 
barometric pressure system to the surge. This letter is written by me and 
received by you but you do not speculate as to the intricate procedure by which 
it reaches you. So in many physical problems we have to pass by the stages, 
though we would always like to know these in detail, and in due course we shall 
do so.100  
Doodson thus emphasised that TI‘s work on storm surge forecasting was part of a set 
of statistical practices of calculation, producing correlations and not causal descriptions. 
While Doodson would like a more fundamental understanding, as far as TI‘s current 
work went, he saw it as just about statistical correlations. This was in opposition to the 
Met Office staff who clearly were much more keen on causal analysis.  
The correspondence stopped at this point, with TI firmly placing their formulae in the 
realm of statistical correlations, away from hydrodynamical causal physics. The new 
Advisory Committee framework brought together two different approaches to surges: 
one focused on correlation, statistics and calculations, the other on causal and synoptic 
analysis. These different approaches also represented institutional investments in 
different practices and research programmes, both financially and epistemologically. 
The Met Office‘s researchers refused to have its own resources diverted, instead arguing 
TI should do work of a different kind than it was currently doing. TI‘s researchers on 
their hand defended their existing practices, arguing that changing these would take 
much resources which TI did not have and that they could not causally analyse every 
surge: ―we have a hundred surges at each place and we cannot investigate all in 
detail‖.101  
At the following meeting in spring 1956 Doodson raised whether the Advisory 
Committee wished them to continue their statistical work or whether they should go 
down a more theoretical route. He questioned whether TI‘s approach, based on 
                                               
100 Doodson to Farquharson, 29th Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
101 Doodson to Farquharson, 29th Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO. The debate took place while Rossiter 
was working on his new formulae and at one point he wrote to Farquharson, asking him if TI‘s practices 
would have to change, as he did not want to do too much work on the Immingham formulae if changes 
were imminent. Rossiter to Berncastle, 10th Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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historical demands for quick forecasting formulae, was the best long-term approach, 
and suggested that research on surges had been ―hampered‖ by the emphasis on 
empirical formulae for immediate use. Instead he suggested that Rossiter should 
continue some work he had done on the six-point method (which Corkan experimented 
with in the previous chapter), arguing this showed promising results and had a ―better 
scientific basis‖. Doodson said this work had been put aside, both by Corkan and 
Rossiter, in order to provide simpler formulae for forecasters, and he called for the 
Committee to consider whether further such experimental work should be done by TI, 
suggesting it would lead to better forecasts more in the causal style favoured by the Met 
Office.  
To support his argument for investment in new practices, Doodson developed his 
technical critique of the statistical approach, discussing how the formulae depended on 
inter-correlated winds, thus being ―ill-conditioned‖.  According to Doodson, formulae 
that were simple enough to use in forecasting were ―somewhat unstable‖, fitting some 
samples well but other samples not so well while at the same time it was possible to vary 
the constants without much changing the fit. He argued this was not a problem if the 
meteorological data used by forecasters was ―sufficiently accurate‖ but even ―under the 
best conditions the uncertainties regarding wind velocity and direction are adverse to 
results which satisfy the research workers‖.102 He thus admitted there were issues with 
the calculation of winds but put the onus not on TI‘s choice of gradient winds but on 
the quality of meteorological data, which could not easily be improved.103  
At the meeting Rossiter outlined his work on using the six-point-method and its 
promising results, and reiterated that it had been ―reluctantly put aside‖ to concentrate 
on statistical formulae. He argued that these statistical formulae were reaching the limits 
in terms of accuracy and ability to predict: the ―least squares solutions ... would appear 
to mark the boundary line beyond which the ‗stationary conditions‘ type of formula 
cannot be improved‖. In other words, the statistical formulae were as good as one could 
get, without taking into account non-stationary, dynamical aspects of surges, especially 
                                               
102 ―Report on work done at the Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute,‖ Part A, ―General report‖, 
Doodson, Paper 5(iii) for 5th meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological 
Research on 30th Apr 1956, Box 159, BA 
103 This does not appear to have reignited any debates with the Met Office, whose data Doodson was 
criticizing, though Proudman was vary of the language in minutes leading to offense. Proudman to 
Enticott, 10th May 1956, MAF 135/363, NA and see note 106. 
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―the response of the water according to the time rate of change of the meteorological 
variables‖.104 Rossiter argued that new practices of calculation were needed to take this 
into account. 
Doodson‘s concerns regarding inter-correlated variables was real, but it was also set 
within the context of the Met Office‘s criticisms. Doodson‘s questioning of TI‘s 
practices were thus both a response to the technical difficulties with inter-correlated 
variables and to the Met Office‘s criticisms of their methods as insufficiently theoretical. 
With his question to the Advisory Committee, Doodson was asking the Committee to 
confirm whether they wanted TI to continue their statistical work or whether they 
wanted them to attempt more theoretical work, which would take more time and 
money. He was offering to do work on causes – more to the liking of the Met Office – 
instead of correlation, but also implying there were costs in terms of time and funding 
to do such theoretical work. In the face of this need for investment the Advisory 
Committee gave statistical forecasting formulae priority, but tried to have it both ways 
by suggesting that TI should also continue working on the six-point method if 
possible.105 There is no indication that this decision was contentious and TI continued 
their statistical forecasting work to produce forecasting formulae.106  
One thing the new framework of the Advisory Committee did was to bring together 
different actors who had different practices, leading to debates between the 
practitioners. How these debates went was partly shaped by the political and personal 
history of interactions, such as between the Met Office and the Advisory Committee, by 
historical choices, such as that of TI to use geostrophic and later gradient wind, and also 
by the different methodological approaches at TI and the Met Office, such as TI‘s 
emphasis on statistics versus the Met Office‘s emphasis on causal relationships. This last 
was the most fundamental issue at stake, but it was set within the context of many other 
                                               
104 ―Report on work done at the Liverpool Observatory and Tidal Institute,‖ Part B, ―Report on North 
Sea surge research‖, Rossiter, Paper 5(iii) for 5th meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and 
Meteorological Research on 30th Apr 1956, Box 159, BA 
105 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 5th meeting, 30th 
Apr 1956, para 6, Box 159, BA 
106 Proudman suggested to the Secretary of the Advisory Committee that use of the term ‗inaccuracy‘ 
could be offensive to the providers of the data, i.e. the Met Office, and suggested she use other terms 
(such as deficiency and gap) in the Minutes instead, but no other corrections were made to the minutes 
regarding the aspects discussed here by any of the reviewers (which also included the MAF staff who 
were on the committee, Spalding, Maher and Johnson). Proudman to Enticott, 10th May 1956, MAF 
135/363, NA  
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issues, particularly the investment of time and money necessary to change the practices 
used in the production of forecasting formulae. 
 
7.3.3 TESTING THE STATISTICAL FORMULAE 
During and after the debate with the Met Office Rossiter constructed statistical 
formulae for Aberdeen and the four East Coast ports that were part of the flood 
warning system. He presented these in 1957 and for the next couple of years they were 
used and tested by the warning system organisation. In the Interim Report of the 
Advisory Committee,107 prepared in 1957, TI claimed to have fulfilled the request for 
empirical formulae that the Oceanographic Sub-Committee had made, to the extent it 
was possible and useful. Following up on their earlier comments, they stated that ―it is 
improbable that further work on these lines would give better results‖, instead 
suggesting research of a more concentrated, regional nature, using the theory of 
decaying oscillations, i.e. the six-point method.108 TI thus declared their statistical 
formulae as good as possible and that it was necessary to change their practices to get 
further improvements, i.e. to further reduce the gap between predictions and 
observations. For the next couple of years TI were working on other research for the 
Advisory Committee.109 No further work was done on the statistical forecasting 
formulae for the East Coast, instead permission was granted to publish the results in 
1957.110  
                                               
107 As Proudman pointed out one reason for the report was to convince MAF that the Committee had 
―justified [its] existence.‖ (Proudman to Enticott, 18th Feb 1957, MAF 135/381, NA). It seemed to serve 
this purpose, with Under Secretary Basil Engholm deeming the progress of the work ―satisfactory.‖ 
(Minute by Engholm, 11th Jul 1957, MAF 135/381, NA) 
108 Interim report, attached to Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, 
Minutes of 7th meeting, 15th Apr 1957, Box 159, BA. The report was drafted by the Secretary from 
MAFF, with help from Proudman, Doodson, Deacon and Suthons. The drafting and finalising of the 
interim report appears to have been uncontroversial. The only interesting change to the sections 
discussed here was when Proudman changed the title of the section which discussed the performance of 
TI‘s new formulae from ―Accuracy of Surge Prediction Formulae‖ to ―Testing of New Surge Prediction 
Formulae‖ – an indication that issues of accuracy were sensitive to members of the committee, compare 
note 1066, this chapter. Draft interim report, amendments in Proudman‘s handwriting, MAF 135/381, 
NA 
109 For example investigating surges in the English Channel and on the West Coast, periodic oscillations 
following the main surge and tide-surge interaction in the Thames. 
110 J. R. Rossiter, "Research on Methods of Forecasting Storm Surges on the East and South Coasts of 
Great Britain," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 85, no. 365 (1959). Advisory Committee on 
Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 8th and 9th meeting, 11th Dec 1957 and 19th May 
1958, minute 9 (at 8th meeting) and 2(ii) (at 9th meeting), Box 159 and 160, BA 
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Between 1956/7 and 1958/9 Suthons tested TI‘s formula and their claims for it. Having 
compared the results of the old and new formulae during the season 1956/7 Suthons 
was cautiously optimistic, saying the new formulae had shown ―some improvement on 
the old for a few hours ahead for the ports on the open sea‖, but remarked the season 
had been quiet with no really large surges. Having calculated standard errors for the new 
prediction formulae, he concluded that for the southern ports the predicted and 
observed residuals agreed ―reasonably well‖, with standard errors of 0.5ft at Tyne, 0.7ft 
at Immingham and 0.8ft at Lowestoft, using 90 comparisons. However, the result for 
the Aberdeen formula he argued ―was not so good‖ with a standard error of nearly 1 
foot.111 Of course these judgements were not only about the numbers. Take for example 
the small difference in standard error at Lowestoft and Aberdeen (less than 0.2ft). There 
was a very fine line between ‗reasonably well‘ and ‗not so good‘, that was not just in the 
numbers, which were not that different. Instead this was also about supporting his view 
that more research was needed on a new forecasting formulae for Aberdeen, which he 
repeatedly argued for.112 He was continuing to argue for particular types of research to 
be done by TI. 
Over the next couple of years Suthons incorporated TI's formulae into the warning 
system and tested them further, using statistical techniques to produce formal numerical 
measures of the fit of TI‘s formulae.113 While he adopted TI‘s emphasis on comparing 
observed and predicted residuals, he added numerical, statistical estimates of this. This 
was a change of practice away from TI‘s visual judgements of the performance of their 
formula towards more formal numerical judgements. This was also a change from how 
Suthons had judged the performance of the early warning system by counting the 
number of false alarms in 1953-4.114 Both TI‘s and Hydro‘s earlier practices of judging 
                                               
111 CT Suthons, ―Report on the working of the Flood Warning Organization during the season 1956/7‖, 
2nd Apr 1957, p 2-3, Agenda paper for 7th meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and 
Meteorological Research, 15th Apr 1957, Box 159, BA. 
112 For example in his report in spring 1956, CT Suthons, ―Report on the working of the Flood Warning 
Organization during the season 1955/6‖, 14th Apr 1956, p2, Agenda paper for 5th meeting of Advisory 
Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, 30th Apr 1956, Box 159, BA. 
113 CT Suthons, ―Report on the working of the Flood Warning Organisation for the Season 1958/9‖, 27th 
Apr 1959, p 2, Agenda paper for 11th meeting of Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and 
Meteorological Research, 4th May 1959, Box 160, BA. 
114 CT Suthons, ―Report on the Warning System during 1953/4‖, 28th Sep 1954, Agenda paper for 1st 




the success of statistical formulae were thus amended when they were brought together 
through the Advisory Committee. 
In spring 1959 Suthons declared he had tested TI‘s formulae and agreed with TI on 
their performance. At the spring 1959 meeting of the Advisory Committee Suthons 
―said that the degree of accuracy achieved was probably about the highest that could be 
hoped for‖.115 At this point the person in charge of the warning system was by all 
accounts satisfied with the accuracy of TI‘s forecasting formulae, though he also 
supported work on other types of formulae. This is why 1959 is the endpoint for the 
thesis: the construction of statistical storm surge formulae at TI were said to have 
reached a high point.116 
 
7.4 PRACTICES OF CALCULATION AT TI: CALCULATING THE WIND EFFECT 
The debate about how to calculate the wind effect provides material for a final 
discussion about the practices of calculation TI used in their work on forecasting 
formulae. Berncastle‘s memo to his colleagues at Hydro (mentioned above) explained in 
detail how TI went about constructing the crucial estimates of wind drag. It was meant 
to enable those running the warning system to follow or amend TI‘s practice as suited 
them and consisted of a range of material: tables, scales, theory sheet, instructions both 
specifically for Hydro and for TI‘s computers and a summary bringing it all together.117 
For us this memo provides a window into some of TI‘s practices of calculating the 
contested winds. 
What did TI do to calculate their gradient winds? Firstly, they acquired the Met Office‘s 
Daily Weather Report charts and prepared empty data tables, with a number of labelled 
columns. A computer then began filling in this data table for a particular port, say 
Immingham, by reading off the barometric pressure at the specified port from the 
weather chart, by checking the isobars and if necessary interpolating between different 
isobars. The next step for the computer was to read off two pressure gradients at each 
                                               
115Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of 11th meeting, 4th May 
1959, para 4, Box 160, BA 
116 After this point they were being deconstructed instead of constructed, which brought in issues of a 
different kind to those this thesis has focused on. I hope to look further at these issues of controversy 
and debates after the conclusion of the thesis, see section 8.4. 
117 Berncastle memorandum, undated, late Oct or early Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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of nine points over the North Sea. This was done by placing a glass scale with the 
points and gradients marked on it on top of the Daily Weather Report, which as they 
were of a standardised format allowed standardisation of the scale. A paper version of 
the scale can be seen in figure 7.1. Having made sure the scale and the chart were 
oriented according to the written instructions (e.g. point E on the scale should coincide 
with 60 degrees north on the chart), the computer then calculated the difference 
between the pressure at the ends of the two lines that met at the point in question. 
These two differences, one east-west and one north-south gradient, were put into 
columns in the data tables. At this point the computer was told be ―especially careful to 
put in the correct signs‖. The last task for the assistant computer was to use another 
glass scale marked with arcs of circles with varying radii, selecting the scale curve that 
most closely matched the curvature of the isobar nearest each of the lettered points in 
figure 7.1, and write these radii down in another column.118  
The computer‘s work involved learnt skills of interpreting and following the 
instructions given to them, interpolating and calculating. A key skill was that of ‗reading 
off‘ values using different techniques and tools, such as the scale in figure 7.1 or the 
radii-scale. This involved carefully identifying the numbers by taking care to position the 
scales as instructed and then seeing, locating, and reading them. As part of this process 
there were decisions regarding which value to use, potentially out of several possible. 
Just like in measurements in laboratory science, there were many different skills and 
much work involved in measuring and deciding values in TI‘s work.119 
 
                                               
118 ―Instructions for reading-off barometric pressurs and pressure gradients, and isobar curvatures‖, sheet 
D of the memo ―Use of Meteorological Data for Storm Surge Research by the Liverpool Tidal Institute‖, 
Berncastle, undated, late Oct or early Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 




Figure 7.1: The paper version of TI‟s scale for reading pressure gradients off the Daily Weather Report 
included in Berncastle‟s memo120 
 
The data tables begun by the computer were then passed onto a more senior computer 
or to Rossiter, who converted the values tabulated by the assistant computer into two 
values E and N. This was done via intermediate values which were not necessarily 
written down and came from reading off numbers from three tables. These different 
tables represented component parts of a formula for calculating gradient winds. As the 
tables were pre-prepared, no actual computations were involved in converting the 
barometric gradients into E and N. Instead the numbers could be gradually converted, 
in three steps, by reading straight off the three tables. While this task could have been 
done by a junior computer with less mathematical training, the absence of an instruction 
sheet for them implies that the person at TI worked of the theory sheet and thus that it 
                                               
120 Sheet B of the memo ―Use of Meteorological Data for Storm Surge Research by the Liverpool Tidal 
Institute‖, Berncastle, undated, late Oct or early Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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was more senior member of staff who did the work. Perhaps it was not deemed 
worthwhile in terms of time to make this part of the research project into a routine 
procedure. 
The person doing these conversions probably sat with the three tables in front of them, 
converting the different numbers by finding the right location in the first table, moving 
straight to the next table to read off the next figure and then using the third table twice, 
once for each pressure gradient. Between the tables the numbers might have been kept 
solely in the head or by keeping a finger or pen at the location in the previous table. Not 
writing the figures down is likely to have produced fewer errors as there would be no 
transcription errors and it would certainly have been much faster. The end product, the 
numbers for E and N, could then be inserted into the formula for gradient winds, 
which were then calculated, probably using a calculating machine. 
The components of TI‘s practices of constructing statistical forecasting formulae are by 
now familiar. The work done at TI consisted of calculating or reading off numbers, for 
example from graphs such as tidal gauge records, meteorological charts or tables, and 
then writing these numbers down on particular documents. Finding the numbers for 
the data tables was done using various aids, in this case glass scales and the formulae 
tables, but often also including various calculating machines, including the tide-
predictors. As pointed out earlier the skill of reading off values was key. Checking the 
figures produced was another important part of the job, both for the initial computer, 
as seen in the instruction for the computer to check they put the correct sign for the 
pressure gradients, and also by others at a later stage. The end result was more numbers 
in more tables or in graphs. This kind of work was at the core of what TI did to try to 
make surges more predictable.  
An important part of the work of the researchers at TI was to work out how to use the 
theory, e.g. of gradient winds, and then to organise the data tables and calculation aids, 
such as the scales and the conversion tables in this case, for the computers to do the 
calculations involved. In order to calculate winds for their work on storm surges they 
not only had to work out how to calculate gradient wind in theory but also how to do it 
in practice, and then organise this work. This organisation was in itself work, for 
example figuring out which documents to use how and when, preparing these 
documents and materials such as the scales, and explaining the work to the junior 
computers. They also had to decide if it was worth making the calculations into such a 
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routine, as was decided not to do with the conversion of values into E and N above. 
Berncastle‘s memo provides an example of the work involved in organising chains of 
documents, as he wrote down instructions for which document to use when and how, 
see figure 7.2. To construct these instructions Berncastle first had to collect and 
organise the information and then write it up clearly, i.e. do work on the organisation of 
chains of documents. His memo made explicit the often implicit organisation TI‘s 
researchers did as a key part of their work.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the creation of chains of documents involved 
choices. Here I have emphasised the work involved in organising chains of documents, 
which involved many choices as well as time and effort. As a centre of calculation TI 
created and organised documents, but these documents had specific content, which had 
to be organised in specific ways to produce results (or supplements) and this 
organisation took work. Their documents did not just appear but were constructed with 
time, experimentation and effort.121 The ability to organise documents was of course not 
a special cognitive ability, but a learnt skill, as was emphasised when discussing 
Doodson‘s early career. 
In addition, as the debate regarding how to calculate wind shows, the choices and 
practices involved in constructing and organising documents could be contested. This 
was also discussed in the 1928 chapter, when the construction of documents and storm 
surges were contested between PLA and TI. The inevitable choice of particular 
practices of calculation, of particular ways of organising the work, for example of how 
to calculate winds, led to differences in approaches between different institutions. When 
such different practices were brought together, as they were in the framework of the 
Advisory Committee, such differences led to friction and contests between different 
approaches. There was competition between different centres of calculation, in this case 
the Met Office and TI, regarding what documents to organise and how to organise 
them, with TI being criticised for and made to justify their choice of gradient wind.  
 
                                               
121 It was similar in businesses, see JoAnne Yates, Control through Communication : The Rise of System in 




Figure 7.2: Berncastle‟s overview form/instructions
122 
 
In the construction of TI‘s chains of documents, such competition between different 
centres of calculation was important as one of the many contingencies discussed 
throughout the thesis that influenced the shape of the chains. Another example of such 
contingencies is the role of Hydro‘s request during the Second World War influencing 
TI‘s use of statistical methods. The shape of the chains in turn influenced the 
                                               
122 ―Use of Meteorological Data for Storm Surge Research by the Liverpool Tidal Institute‖, Berncastle, 
undated, late Oct or early Nov 1955, HW 287.54, UKHO 
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supplement or result achieved by the researchers organising the chain. For example, by 
the mid-1950s TI argued that the choice of statistics limited the results it was possible to 
achieve when forecasting surges and that new chains of documents would be necessary 
to get further supplements from the results. Such further supplements were defined as 
further reduction of the differences between predicted and observed residuals.  
 
7.5 CHANGES AT TI 
Around 1960 several things changed at TI. Rossiter introduced digital computers into 
storm surge work, Doodson retired and TI was taken over by the University. These 
developments form a suitable endpoint to the thesis and will be discussed in this 
section. 
TI started using new practices of calculation involving electronic computers in late 1959 
for work on tide-surge interaction. TI had worked on this problem of the highest 
possible combination of tides and surges given the potential interaction between the 
height of the water, tide and surge since 1928. Various work had been done since 1953 
using human computers, since when the issue had also been emphasised by Suthons as 
important for the warning system. Rossiter now introduced digital computers to the 
work and after he presented his initial findings in spring 1960 the Advisory Committee 
asked him to continue with the work.123 Doodson was generally not in favour of digital 
computers, repeatedly arguing against their use in periodic tidal prediction, saying they 
would be more expensive while producing less accurate results than the tidal predictor 
machines produced.124 However, when Rossiter first suggested using digital computers 
for this problem he reported that ―at long last‖ TI had found a computational problem 
(that of storm-surge interaction) that they considered worth using a digital computer 
                                               
123 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of thirteenth meeting 
held on Monday, 16th May, 1960, and attached report 13(v) ―Interaction between tide and surge‖ by 
Rossiter, Box 160, BA 
124 This had to do with the identification of high and low waters, which Doodson claimed was easy to do 
by eye from a curve produced by a predictor machine but less easy to programme a digital computer to 
do. For example, when asked during the BAAS meeting in Liverpool in 1953, see LOTI, Annual Report 
1953, 9.  
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for. This suggests that even Doodson had been convinced that new practices of 
calculation along these lines should be attempted.125  
In terms of this thesis, the implication of this work on interaction was that Rossiter was 
introducing new practices of calculation to TI‘s storm surge work. Digital computers 
were taking over from hand calculations; computer modelling from statistics. The 
availability of digital computers offered a new way to attack this particular aspect of 
forecasts, with TI‘s researchers again arguing that they could ‗improve‘ the surge 
forecasts by introducing new practices of calculation, though they needed funding and 
time to do this. While aspects of the statistically based work continued into the 1960s, 
TI‘s preferred method of investigation and its preferred practice of calculations 
changed, away from statistics.126  
This was not the only change taking place at TI. In May 1959, at the instigation of 
MDHB, discussions were begun regarding the future of the Liverpool Observatory and 
Tidal Institute‘s (LOTI‘s) future. MDHB wanted to divest their responsibilities, 
claiming this was for the good of the increasingly wide-ranging scientific work TI was 
doing. They wanted to ensure the ―valuable work‖ continued and increased, and felt the 
University would be better able to ensure this than MDHB after Doodson‘s eminent 
retirement at 70 years of age. In addition there were financial reasons: MDHB felt they 
should not be the only Port Authority to ―be financing research for the maritime 
nations of the world‖, i.e., they no longer wanted to pay for oceanographic research 
they felt was the interest of the state.127 While MDHB‘s decreased interest in LOTI was 
also linked to changes to the port and the local shipping industry in the 1950s, with 
containerisation beginning and the number of employed in these industries declining in 
Liverpool,128 these changes were not yet strong enough for finance to be the main 
motive for MDHB‘s decision to divest LOTI, especially as TI‘s income continued to 
                                               
125 Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and Meteorological Research, Minutes of twelfth meeting 
held on Monday, 9th November, 1959, Report 12(v), ―A further report on the interaction between tide 
and Surge‖, Rossiter, p 2, Box 160, BA 
126 This did not only happen at TI, of course, and in 1960 Rossiter received a request for co-operation 
from Professor Hansen at Hamburg University and some French workers, to do research on surges using 
electronic computers. This was also a sign of the increased international co-operation in the field of storm 
surge science, which was another change taking place. Advisory Committee on Oceanographic and 
Meteorological Research, Minutes of fourteenth meeting held on Monday, 24th October, 1960, Box 160, 
BA. 
127 Draft memorandum, 1st Jun 1959, P744/5, LUA 
128 Tony Lane, Liverpool: City of the Sea (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), 22. 
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increase in this period (see table 4.1).129 Instead their motive was linked to the types of 
work LOTI was now doing, as well as to the changing landscape of funding of research, 
e.g. increasing state funding and involvement in research.130 One part of this was TI‘s 
work on storm surges for MAFF. When NIO was established, MDHB had re-affirmed 
it wanted to stay a patron of LOTI, but they had now changed their mind, considering 
this patronage as providing benefit primarily to the nation, with the implication that it 
should be the responsibility of the state, not industry.  
However, while direct industrial patronage decreased, state patronage of TI did not 
increase with this move. Instead the University took over TI and the Observatory in 
December 1960, complete with the profitable but routine tidal prediction work. The 
existence of this work meant the University thought taking over TI would not have 
serious financial implications131 and that they did not need to apply for a grant from the 
University Grants Committee for LOTI in the foreseeable future.132 It was expected 
that the tidal prediction and analysis work, together with limited aid from the university, 
would pay for LOTI. TI‘s patronage structure thus remained dependent on indirect 
military and industrial patronage through the purchase of predictions, but this was 
combined with increased dependence on the university. In terms of governance, the 
new governing committee had only one member from the Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board, compared to five representatives before. The University contingent increased to 
seven from four while the NIO and Admiralty representatives remained one and two 
respectively.133 While the shipping industry retained some representation and 
patronage,134 the governance and patronage structure of LOTI which had lasted for 
thirty years changed, with the balance swinging away from industry, not towards the 
state but towards the university. The role of the Admiralty remained unchanged. 
                                               
129 Rates and dues received by MDHB increased steadily during the 1950s and into the 1960s. Mountfield, 
Western Gateway, 205-206. 
130 See e.g. de Chadarevian, Designs for Life, ch 2; Edgerton, Warfare State.  
131 The decision was taken by a committee consisting of Vice-Chancellor Mountford, the Dean of Faculty 
of Science (Professor of Oceanography Bowden) and five other professors. Mountford to Bowden, 24th 
Mar 1960, D498/2/4/3, LUA 
132 Correspondence in UGC 7/726, NA 
133 LOTI, Annual Report 1960 (Liverpool: C. Tinling and Co. Ltd., 1960). See also Mountford to Bowden, 
24th Mar 1960, D498/2/4/3, LUA. The Admiralty membership of the governing committee had 
increased from one to two in 1939. This had been compensated for by a reduction in representatives 
from the university, see LOTI, Annual Report 1939 (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1939), 5.    
134 Particularly spatial patronage, as MDHB continued to provide the Observatory building for the use of 
TI‘s successors until 2004. 
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The takeover followed discussions and consultations which provide examples of how 
TI and especially its patronage and governance structure were viewed by different 
actors. The institutional geography of oceanography in Britain was again debated, as it 
had been when NIO was being established a decade or so earlier.  All of those who 
were consulted by the University, the University Grants Committee and MDHB 
regarded the take-over as sensible, and indeed desirable. Many in fact expressed a sense 
that LOTI‘s current set-up was old-fashioned. For example, Proudman thought the 
previous model of governance, a scientific institution owned and run by businessmen, 
was ―a very fine one, but it belonged to a world that has gone‖.135  
Two Cambridge-based scientists were highly critical of TI‘s existing set-up. Edward 
Bullard, of the Department of Geodesy and Geophysics at Cambridge University, 
thought the Bidston site should be abandoned and that close co-operation with other 
Departments, especially Oceanography, was needed as ―work on tides is a somewhat 
narrow field‖.136 The chairman of University Grants Committee Sir Keith A H Murray, 
consulted his friend,137 the physicist Sir George Thomson, master of Corpus Christi 
College, Cambridge, who despite not knowing either Doodson or TI‘s work suspected 
the Institute was ―completely fossilised‖ and would become more so if it was run by the 
Government. He thus suggested supporting the take-over by the University.138  
While all approved of the University taking over, Deacon and Doodson both 
emphasised the need to retain work on predictions and links to industry. Deacon, who 
was very positive regarding TI,139 argued against merging LOTI with other departments 
and for maintaining close contacts with ―sailors and engineers‖, arguing that subjects 
like marine science needed the goodwill of industry as well as of science.140 When 
Doodson was asked to outline what research needs he saw in tidal science that could be 
filled by an Institute like TI, he emphasised theoretical work but also repeatedly 
underlined the ―intimate association‖ between the commercial work and the research. 
For example, in relation to surges he claimed that it was not even possible to know the 
height of a surge without precise hour-by-hour predictions (this was of course linked to 
                                               
135 Proudman to Mountford, 29th Oct 1959, P744/5, LUA 
136 Bullard to Mountford, 26th Oct 1959, P744/5, LUA 
137 Judging from the friendly greetings and informal tone of the letters. 
138 Thomson to Murray, 4th Jan 1959, UGC 7/726, NA 
139 The working relationship between NIO and TI, and between Deacon and Doodson, appears to have 
been good, despite the issues regarding NIO‘s establishment.  
140 Deacon to Mountford, 9th Nov 1959, P744/5, LUA 
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his definition of a surge as the residual of observation minus prediction). As such 
predictions were not produced during routine prediction work they could not be bought 
from elsewhere, meaning it was necessary to have constant access to a tidal predictor 
machine for TI‘s work on storm surges. In addition he argued the warning system‘s 
forecasters needed ―very trustworthy‖ predictions for their work. He concluded: 
―Research is thus intimately associated with [tidal] prediction‖.141 By linking the two 
Doodson was also providing an academic rationale to keep the important income 
stream of predictions going. 
Three state actors were involved: the University Grants Committee, the Ministry of 
Transport and the Admiralty. After Murray consulted Thomson, as discussed above, 
and also PMS Blackett, Professor of Physics at Imperial College, the University Grants 
Committee asked the University for some clarification of the reasons why it was 
proposed to keep TI independent of other departments. Having received such 
clarification, the University Grants Committee then supported the University taking 
over TI.142 The Admiralty emphasised predictions. Initially Hydrographer Collins was 
positive towards the merger, as long as there was no break in the provision of 
predictions, and indeed suggested nationalising the Institute.143 Later on in the take-over 
process, a new Hydrographer, Irving, was worried the university would de-emphasise 
predictions and asked them to re-affirm the 1923 agreement of three year‘s notice 
before ceasing to provide predictions.144 The Ministry of Transport‘s officers, who had 
consulted Irving, internally called the proposal ―entirely reasonable‖ and did ―not see 
any grounds for objection‖, but did not give the necessary permission from the Mersey 
Conservancy for the take-over until Irving had been satisfied.145 Only after the Vice-
Chancellor re-assured the Hydrographer that the 1923 agreement would remain valid 
and emphasised the close connection between the research work and the predictions 
                                               
141 ―Research on tides appropriate to a Tidal Institute‖, attached to [Mountfield? Illegible signature] to 
Mountford, 14th Jul 1959, P744/5, LUA 
142 Blackett supported the University proposal, but also raised some question marks regarding why LOTI 
was not being merged with the Department of Oceanography. In response to Murray‘s question to clarify 
this, Mountford said there was lack of space on campus and that one person could not manage the two 
sites, and also that LOTI was more likely to get a ―first class‖ Director if it was maintained separately. 
Murray to Mountford, 25th Jan 1959, Mountford to Murray, 29th Jan 1960, & Blackett to Murray, 21st Jan 
1959, UGC 7/726, NA 
143 Hydrographer Collins to Mountford, 16th Nov 1959, P744/5, LUA 
144 Hydrographer Irving to Vice-Chancellor Mountford, 10th Aug 1960, P744/5, LUA 
145 Law to Mountfield, 10th Aug 1960, MT 76/57, NA  
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(using Doodson‘s arguments discussed above)146 did the Admiralty give its support for 
the take-over. In turn the Minister of Transport gave his formal consent for the plan.147 
What these discussions show is that state patronage of oceanography was not obvious, 
even in this period of increasingly high state involvement in science, and neither did 
scientists agree on how to organise oceanography. The only state actor which showed 
any interest in increasing state patronage of TI‘s work was the Hydrographer, and that 
only briefly, which shows that the state did not see TI‘s oceanographic work as 
something that it was an obvious patron of any more now than it had previously been. 
As long as it continued to provide predictions to Hydro, the different government 
departments were not particularly concerned about TI‘s patronage or its governance 
structure, and were happy for the university to take over. Neither did academics ask for 
further state involvement. Instead arguments for increased state patronage came from 
industry, with MDHB wanting to reduce its involvement.  
In terms of the views of scientists, some outsiders, especially at Cambridge, were 
somewhat dubious of the quality of work being done at TI. Though they knew little of 
it they seemed to think that a small, relatively isolated institution with heavy 
involvement from industry must be ―fossilised‖ and was unlikely to be producing good 
work. They were arguing for a different kind of science, being done in larger institutions 
more closely connected with universities, not with the state or industry. Even 
Proudman thought LOTI‘s governance structure was outdated and limited the work the 
Institute was able to do. As chairman of the Advisory Committee he wrote that 
―[b]ecause of shortness of scientific staff the T.I. just cannot find time to do what we 
ask‖.148 However, he and others more closely involved with the work, like Deacon and 
the two Hydrographers, were much more positive of LOTI‘s work and clearly did not 
have a problem with the quality of science done at TI. Deacon‘s support of TI and its 
work is interesting, as his own NIO represented the type of larger institute with many 
connections to the state that have become seen as typical of oceanography, but he still 
clearly saw a role for an institute run like TI. This represents a belief in the science 
produced at other types of set-ups than those favoured by the Cambridge-based 
                                               
146 Mountford to Irving, 5th Sep 1960, P744/5, LUA 
147 Draper to Roberts, 21st Sep 1960, and Law (Acting Conservator of the River Mersey) to The General 
Manager and Secretary, MDHB, 28th Sep 1960, MT 76/57, NA 
148 Proudman to Mountford, 29th Oct 1959, P744/5, LUA 
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scientists. The most desirable governance and patronage structure of oceanography was 
not self-evident or uncontested in the UK in 1960, which will be further discussed 
below and in the thesis conclusion. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
Rather than there being little or no political debate about blame and responsibility after 
the 1953 East Coast Flood there was substantial political pressure on the government, 
which responded to this by providing relatively generous funding and also by setting up 
the expert Waverley Committee. Enlisting experts had two benefits for the government: 
it meant the opposition could not complain it was not doing enough as long as the 
government did what the experts said, while also ensuring that it was not doing ‗too 
much‘. For example, the Waverley Committee emphasised cost-benefit analysis 
regarding flood defences, limiting the expense on these compared to what other 
political actors had argued for.149 While the politicians were using the experts, the 
Waverley Committee of course also had its own agenda, parts of which were markedly 
shaped by one of its scientific members, Proudman. The research programme his 
Oceanographical Sub-Committee designed was picked up by one section of MAF that 
claimed to be more inclined towards scientific research than other government 
departments. MAF provided a supportive base within central government for storm 
surge science and the Advisory Committee, which became the framework for TI‘s work 
on this subject throughout the 1950s.  
The new framework led to an intensification of TI‘s work and increased scrutiny of 
their practices, both by themselves and others. Together with issues of departmental 
politics this led to TI‘s practices being questioned. The questioning focused on how to 
measure and calculate winds and also how formulae could best be found – through 
statistical or other approaches. This debate also provides another example of how TI‘s 
choices of organising documents into particular chains bound them just as much as they 
connected them. Eventually, after the Advisory Committee had asked TI to prioritise 
statistical formulae, they constructed formulae which they proclaimed were as good as 
the statistical approach allowed. They also stated that other chains of documents needed 
                                               
149 Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], para 4.  
 274 
 
to be constructed to get further improvements. These claims of ‗success‘ were of course 
contextual and contingent, but as this thesis focuses on TI‘s attempts at making surges 
predictable through statistical formulae, which they and Suthons at this point thought 
they had done, this together with TI‘s move away from statistical practice marks the end 
of this thesis.  
This chapter has discussed the role of state patronage of both storm surge science and 
of TI generally. Most history of oceanography has emphasised a large increase in 
government patronage of oceanographic research in the 1950s and particularly focused 
on naval patronage. Similarly it has been argued by David Edgerton that the increased 
research funding in agricultural departments such as MAF in Britain in the 1950s had 
military over-tones of ensuring agricultural self-sufficiency.150 However, while storm 
surge science saw a radical increase in state funding after the 1953 event, I have found 
no evidence this was linked to military needs. It was instead linked to political pressure. 
The Treasury‘s unusually generous response after the event and, by implication, towards 
the research, was shaped by this pressure from opposition politicians. This response by 
the Treasury was in stark contrast to the interwar situation. Then the Treasury 
consistently saw storm surge research as a local concern which it did not want to pay 
for, fearing that paying for the research would lead to requests to pay for flood 
defences. Now the issue was turned on its head, with opposition pressure leading to 
increased state funding for flood defences, and the Waverley Committee aimed at 
balancing or mitigating these costs. As a recommendation of that Committee, and 
framed as hopefully decreasing the costs of false alarms, TI‘s research received central 
government patronage, not to fulfil military needs but within a context of political 
contests and discussions between the government and the opposition and between 
different government departments. 
While Hydro was involved in the warning system, they were in a sense as much clients 
of the same patrons as TI, running the warning system for other state actors. On the 
other hand, through their involvement in the Advisory Committee, where Suthons 
suggested lines of research to TI and NIO, they returned to the kind of patronage they 
had had of TI‘s very early work where they influenced the lines of research without 
paying for it. The patronage of storm surge science after the East Coast Flood was a 
                                               
150 Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, 37-40; Edgerton, Warfare State, 103-107.  
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complicated mix without clear borders between civil, military, academic and, to a lesser 
extent, industrial patronage.151 It involved not only monetary support but also other 
kinds of patronage, such as influence over the content of research projects and the 
relationships between Hydro, Proudman and TI through which the Institute got 
involved with the Advisory Committee. 
Apart from the increase in funding from MAF for storm surge work, TI‘s general 
patronage structure remained as before until the late 1950s. With the take-over in 1960 
TI‘s overall patronage structure moved towards university patronage, not state 
patronage, which again contrasts with the existing literature on the history of 
oceanography.152 Case studies such as this one and that of Ronald Doel et al‘s provides 
nuances both to the history of oceanography and to Edgerton‘s idea of oceanography as 
a state science.153 It was not self-evident or uncontested that oceanography should be a 
state or military concern in the UK in 1960, and when it was a state concern, as it 
became in the case of storm surge science, the links between central government, 
military, academia and industry were complex.  
  
                                               
151 Contrast with Doel, Levin, and Marker, "Extending Modern Cartography to the Ocean Depths: 
Military Patronage, Cold War Priorities, and the Heezen-Tharp Mapping Project, 1952-1959." 
152 Weir, Ocean in Common; Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War; Doel, "Constituting the Postwar 
Earth Sciences."  
153  Doel, Levin, and Marker, "Extending Modern Cartography to the Ocean Depths: Military Patronage, 
Cold War Priorities, and the Heezen-Tharp Mapping Project, 1952-1959."; Edgerton, Warfare State, 112. 
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CHAPTER 8, CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that TI attempted to make storm surges more predictable by 
contingently introducing particular statistical practices of calculation which produced 
chains of documents. These chains connected changing sea levels to TI‘s mathematical 
analysis, enabling TI‘s researchers to attempt forecasts of surges. These chains also 
bound TI‘s researchers, limiting their future choices and work. TI‘s researchers 
constructed such chains of documents to forecast surges to fulfil promises to or 
contracts with patrons. Such promises and contracts were in turn linked to flooding 
events as well as other events and processes, such as wars, wider patronage and political 
disputes. This conclusion will summarise and analyse my key findings, discuss 
alternative approaches to the thesis and suggest some further work. 
 
8.1 HISTORY OF OCEANOGRAPHY 
8.1.1 THE CONTESTED PATRONAGE OF OCEANOGRAPHIC SCIENCE 
I have repeatedly discussed the patronage structure of TI and of storm surges science at 
TI during this thesis. Both were complex, involving a range of academic, industrial, 
military and government, both local and central, patrons. TI‘s patronage settled into a 
particular pattern in 1929, which though it was debated around the time of NIO‘s 
establishment remained similar until 1960. This was a triangular patronage structure: 
Liverpool University provided connections to academia, a room and a small grant, 
MDHB provided a more substantial grant, a building and connections to the shipping 
industry, and Hydro provided a secure, long-term source of income by purchasing tidal 
analysis and predictions and influenced the running of TI and its research programme 
by being on the governing committee. In addition TI received income from other 
sources, such as the sale of predictions to almanacs and other clients, and project work, 
such as what they did on storm surges for LCC and MAF. Both naval and industrial 
patronage was clearly important for TI, not only for income but also for the governance 
of the institute. In addition, while the thesis has not focused on this after chapter four, a 
key part of TI‘s research programme was  to develop methods of tidal predictions and 
analysis, so there were obvious links between TI‘s programme of work and the 
patronage it received from naval and merchant shipping sources.  
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From 1928 onwards the development of patronage of storm surge science was 
somewhat different to that of TI. The Institute‘s work on storm surges then went from 
having local industrial patronage and a focus on correcting tidal predictions for 
meteorological effects, to having local government patronage and a focus on forecasting 
floods. In the 1930s the civil state repeatedly refused to become a patron of surge 
science. However, during and after the Second World War both the UK and US Navies 
appropriated TI‘s surge work in different ways. While Hydro may not have provided 
any further resources, its interest in TI‘s work during the war led to a shift in TI‘s 
practices of calculation towards statistics. This interest was part of the wider patronage 
relationship between Hydro and TI. Following the 1953 storm surge event, the 
patronage structure of storm surge science in the UK, including at TI, became focused 
on the state, especially MAF, but a large number of actors – state, military and scientific 
– were involved in the work. While the funding came from MAF and the Treasury, the 
requests that shaped the research programme came from Hydro, which was in turn 
running the warning system primarily for the benefit of local and central government. 
Patronage of storm surge science was a complex mix of military, industrial and state 
support. Like in the rest of TI‘s work there were substantial links between the patronage 
and the work. This was not only in response to Hydro‘s request during the war but also, 
for example, when the initial interest in both positive and negative storm surges, 
prompted by the needs of TI‘s shipping patrons, was retained when the patronage 
shifted towards local authorities interested in the positive surges that can cause flooding. 
In many ways TI was an untypical scientific institute, for example in its small size and its 
triangular patronage structure with a high dependency on contract work, both repeat 
contracts and short-term ones. Especially initially, Proudman and Doodson tried to get 
support wherever they could think of for their Institute, applying to BAAS, the Booths, 
DSIR, LSOA and Hydro. Their sometimes planned, sometimes improvised, institution 
building strategy resulted in an organisation balanced between the industrial, academic 
and military worlds. In terms of comparators, TI was somewhat like the Co-operative 
Research Associations set up by DSIR, but unlike many of them it soon stopped 
receiving grants from that organisation. It was also focused on a topic of research as 
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opposed to the needs of an industry more generally.1 Other organisations that received 
limited grants from DSIR may be potential comparators. Studying institutions like TI 
provides insights into which patrons were sufficiently interested in a particular topic to 
support research work on it, how this changed over time and how such patronage 
influenced the work done by the researchers. In addition, one can study how the 
interests of different patrons and researchers were negotiated, what the balance of 
power between patrons and researchers were and what kind of rhetoric TI used to gain 
patronage.  
While I for convenience have sometimes talked about state, military and industrial 
patronage, I have also tried to break these categories down as much as possible, as TI‘s 
patronage was not from ‗the state‘ or ‗the military‘ but from specific departments or 
even specific people within such departments. Both the patronage of TI and that of its 
storm surge science depended on personal networks and institutional politics. This was 
not only between TI and its patrons, but also between different patrons whether actual 
or potential, as between the potential patrons LCC and the Treasury, or MAF and the 
Home Office, or actual patrons, as between MDHB and the University. In addition 
institutional politics existed within patrons, as within Hydro when they discussed 
whether to give TI their contract in 1923. To understand the patronage structure of a 
discipline, an institute, or one part of that institute‘s work, it is necessary to trace out the 
complicated dynamics at play. For example, while oceanography as a whole in Britain 
saw a rise in naval patronage after the Second World War, this went primarily to NIO, 
while TI remained much as before.  
While TI was a small and perhaps unusual organisation, the story told about it in this 
thesis suggests that other sources of patronage of physical oceanography could fruitfully 
be considered in addition to the existing emphasis on naval patronage, especially in the 
1940s and 50s. While civil and military patronage of TI and storm surge work increased, 
particularly in the 1950s when MAF became the main patron of storm surge science, a 
range of actors were constantly involved. Between 1919 and 1960 different kinds of 
patrons and patronage interacted with TI‘s storm surge work in different ways. This was 
sometimes obvious, as during the creation of the research inquiry after the flooding in 
                                               
1 Rose and Rose, Science and Society, 45; Varcoe, Organizing for Science in Britain; Hull, "War of Words."; 
Clarke, "Pure Science with a Practical Aim."; Ian Varcoe, "Co-Operative Research Associations in British 
Industry, 1918–34," Minerva 19, no. 3 (1981). 
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1928 by the Sub-Committee of the Conference when the Admiralty got TI involved. At 
other times such interactions between patronage and science were more subtle, such as 
the shift to gradient winds during the early stages of the Advisory Committee‘s work, or 
sometimes very little, such as the small role industrial actors played following the flood 
event in 1953. In order to understand how patronage affected oceanographic science 
overall it is necessary to look at different kinds of detailed case studies, including all 
sources of patronage.2  
 
8.1.2 THE CONTESTED NATURE OF OCEANOGRAPHY 
As discussed in the introduction, Eric Mills has recently written a history of physical 
oceanography, concentrating on the study of ocean currents using a particular 
dynamical mathematical framework first developed in Scandinavia at the end of the 
nineteenth century. While he emphasises contingencies in the uptake of this approach, 
he argues that the dynamical approach made oceanography a quantitative science and 
formed an important part of the origin of modern oceanography through its influence 
on the textbook The Oceans published in 1942.3 The history of TI, as described in this 
thesis, adds another dimension to Mills‘s narrative of the origins of modern 
oceanography. In Britain, which Mills does not discuss, there appears to have existed 
different traditions of mathematical oceanographic work in the interwar and post war 
period. Doodson and Proudman were part of a mathematical tradition stemming from 
the adaptation of Laplace‘s work in Cambridge. TI came out of this tradition coupled 
with the context of the First World War. NIO instead came out of the context of the 
Second World War, with George Deacon also closer to the tradition of European 
dynamical oceanography.4 Deacon was keen on The Oceans and thus represents the 
                                               
2 In part the difference between my findings, emphasising a range of patrons, and those historians of 
oceanography that focus on naval patronage, comes down to differences in approach. For example, 
Weir‘s book concentrated on the links between the Navy and oceanography, which obviously made him 
pick out naval patronage, while Hamblin concentrated on international co-operation, thus focusing on 
larger scale research programmes. My approach has instead focused on the detailed interactions between 
patrons at a small institute and for a particular strand of their work, which has meant that I have 
concentrated on the complications and multiplicities in their patronage. The different approaches 
produce complementary pictures of the history of oceanography. 
3 Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet. 
4 Deacon and Laughton, "Of Seas and Ships and Scientists," 34. 
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tradition which Mills portrays as the foundation of modern oceanography.5 However, 
TI continued in existence and Proudman and Doodson contested the NIO‘s 
concentration on Deacon‘s kind of oceanography. 
In Britain in the twentieth century there has been several different approaches to 
physical oceanography, such as dynamical oceanography from Scandinavia, the tradition 
stemming from Laplace which much of Proudman‘s and Doodson‘s theoretical work 
fell into, and TI‘s statistical approach to storm surge forecasting. This complicates the 
story of the origin of modern oceanography, at least for Britain. If the assumption that 
dynamical oceanography was the eventually successful variety of oceanography holds, 
what made that version ‗win‘ and TI‘s approach ‗lose‘? Both during the establishment of 
NIO and the university takeover of TI the nature of oceanography in Britain was one of 
the issues at stake. The type of oceanography that should be practiced at NIO was a key 
aspect of the debate regarding its establishment and during the University takeover of 
TI the kind of institution that would produce ‗good‘ oceanographic research was also 
raised. These debates illustrate that the nature of oceanography was not obvious to 
those who were involved in deciding the future of UK oceanography in the 1940s and 
50s. The ‗ascendancy‘ of modern, dynamically-inspired, oceanography was contested 
and contingent in Britain. In addition, even Deacon, whose NIO belonged to the 
‗winning‘ variety of oceanography, argued for the continuation of TI as a different kind 
of institution that could and did produce good oceanography. 
This also raises the issue of the definition of ‗modern‘ British oceanography. Did 
dynamical oceanography in fact ‗win‘ – was it the origin of modern oceanography? I 
would argue that British oceanography is less monolithic than a singular origin in 
dynamical oceanography implies. Jacob Darwin Hamblin has discussed the importance 
of contestations between different oceanographers in relation to international co-
operation in oceanography in the 1950s, describing it as a debate between physical 
oceanographers (such as Proudman, Doodson and, according to Hamblin, Deacon) and 
those arguing for a wider definition of oceanography.6 The debates about what 
                                               
5 Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet, 273. In a memo to the 1944 Royal Society discussions on the 
establishment of NIO, Deacon claims he is making full use of ―opinions expressed‖ in Sverdrup‘s The 
Ocean, as well as in Bigelow‘s Oceanography and Kemp‘s Oceanography in relation to the fluctuations of Marine 
Animals. Appendix by Deacon, prepared for meeting on 1st Mar 1944, labeled Appendix to 67, H 
02455/43, UKHO. 
6 Hamblin, Oceanographers and the Cold War, 100-116. 
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oceanography should be, how it should be organised and who should pay for it did not 
end in 1960 in Britain – in fact, they are ongoing to this day. A number of different set-
ups involving versions of TI and NIO have been tried, the most recent being a merger 
of the National Oceanography Centre in Southampton (NIO‘s successor) and the 
Proudman Oceanography Laboratory (TI‘s successor) in April 2010. While both share a 
title they remain in their previous physical locations.7 The post-war institutional 
geography of British oceanography has remained unresolved – the settlement of NIO 
near London did not settle the debates. To understand the history of British 
oceanography I believe historians need to pay further attention to the wide range of 
approaches Harald Sverdrup included within oceanography and The Oceans.8 Paying 
attention to contestations regarding the meaning of oceanography may not only help us 
understand the development of international oceanography, as discussed by Hamblin, 
but also that of ‗national‘ oceanography.  
 
8.1.3 FURTHER WORK: THE HISTORY OF BRITISH TWENTIETH CENTURY 
OCEANOGRAPHY 
Both these two sources of complexity – non-naval patronage of oceanography and the 
contested nature of oceanography – could be further addressed by a study of the history 
of oceanography in the UK in the twentieth century, including TI, NIO and other 
institutions such as the Department of Oceanography at Liverpool, the Department of 
Geodesy and Geophysics at Cambridge and research stations involved in biological 
oceanography. It may also want to include institutions like the National Physical 
Laboratory and the Hydraulics Research Station, as well as naval research stations. Such 
                                               
7 Focusing on Bidston-based oceanographic work, in summary the development between 1960 and 2010 
looks like this: the set-up with the University, created in 1960, only lasted until 1969, when the Institute of 
Coastal Oceanography and Tides was created through a transfer of TI to the Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC). That lasted until 1973, when the Institute of Oceanographic Sciences replaced it, being 
formed through a merger of existing institutions including the former TI and NIO. In 1987 the Wormley 
(former NIO) and Bidston (former TI) laboratories were de-merged, with the Bidston one named 
Proudman Oceanographic Laboratory (POL), remaining under NERC. In 1994 POL‘s place within NERC was 
reconsidered, with it falling under the Centre for Coastal and Marine Sciences (CCMS), together with some 
other oceanographic laboratories in Plymouth and Dunstaffnage, but not the Southampton successor of 
NIO. In 1997 CCMS completely absorbed POL, but in 2001 CCMS was disbanded and POL re-emerged, 
still funded by NERC but independent. In 2004 POL moved from Bidston to the campus of Liverpool 
University. Jones, "From Astronomy to Oceanography - a Brief History of Bidston Observatory." Also 
various Annual Reports and NOC‘s website, http://noc.ac.uk/, accessed 08 June 2010. 
8 Compare Mills, The Fluid Envelope of Our Planet, 264. 
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a study could analyse the debates between practitioners of different types of 
oceanography (e.g. Proudman, Deacon and Bullard) and analyse in more detail the 
tensions involved in establishing the institutional geography of contemporary 
oceanography in Britain. In addition, such a history could provide further insight into 
how oceanography came to be defined as it is, through disputes and discussions, and 
the role of military and state patronage of oceanographic science, providing more details 
on exactly why and how the state‘s role increased. This would further develop the 
history of British oceanography in the twentieth century and extend the existing US-
focused debates regarding patronage in oceanography. 
 
8.2.1 PRACTICES OF CALCULATION 
The thesis has followed the attempts of a small, specialised Institute to make previously 
unpredictable water movements calculable, reducing it to (what was thought to be) 
predictable patterns on paper. TI attempted to make more predictable previously 
unpredictable aspects of the sea, be they surges or shallow water effects, by using new 
practices of calculation to produce specific chains of documents. The practices of 
calculations that TI used were at least to some extent new to tidal science. For example, 
from his work experience in London and elsewhere Doodson brought with him habits, 
skills and techniques, such as the use of new types of mechanical calculators and ways 
of organising calculations, which he used to increase the amount of calculations and 
thus residuals and constituents that could be managed when analysing tides. Later TI 
was able to use this work to secure patronage in different ways, so the introduction of 
new practices of calculation had tangible results in terms of institution building.  
The thesis has shown in some detail how TI‘s workers used practices of calculation to 
attempt to make storm surges predictable, for example describing, in chapter five, how 
TI‘s workers put together data, re-inscribed it into tables and graphs and constructed 
surges. Through this use of particular practices of calculation they constituted surges as 
something calculable – something that could be made into numbers and calculated with. 
This work constituted storm surges, as defined by TI as residuals, into entities. Before 
this they had been unpredictable (according to George Howard Darwin) meteorological 
effects; now they had been constituted as storm surges that could be calculated. 
However, they were not yet deemed predictable – something that could be forecast 
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through calculations. In 1928 TI‘s forecasts of surges were deemed to need further 
development to be deemed satisfactory, but their definition and construction of surges 
were accepted by others involved in the project (e.g. LCC, Hydro and Met Office). 
There is thus a difference between making something calculable and making it 
predictable, and more work was needed for the latter. 
TI‘s use of particular statistical practices of calculation eventually made surges more 
predictable, but in a specific way: through a multiple regression correlation formula. 
When TI returned to the project of making surges predictable in the late 1930s they 
experimented with various methods. In the end they chose one particular way, statistical 
correlations, as it was felt this way would produce forecasting formulae fast. This need 
for speed was linked to a naval request for a way of forecasting meteorological effects 
on the German North Sea coast. This request led to TI using particular statistical 
practices, as opposed to continuing the development of the six-point method, so 
influenced the work and the forecasting formulae in a particular way. TI‘s researchers 
understood prediction of surges as the calculation of a correction to tidal predictions 
using a statistical formula. Only after sustained use of the formulae and intensive 
research in the 1950s did TI question this use of statistical practices, and then as much 
in response to criticism from others.  
To produce statistical formulae TI constructed chains of forms. Throughout the thesis I 
have emphasised how the organisation of documents into such chains involved choices 
and work by TI‘s researchers. Both the organisation and the choices sometimes limited 
future choices and the potential shape of future chains of documents. It also influenced 
what ‗supplements‘ – results with which they could achieve something – the researchers 
found, if any. The choices made in constructing chains of documents could also be 
disputed. For example, TI‘s choice to calculate winds in particular ways became 
disputed in the 1950s. Their choices were contingent on issues such as the labour 
involved in the calculations and criticisms from others involved in the establishment of 
the Advisory Committee. The initial choice of geostrophic winds for these calculations 
limited the choices of surges Corkan could use to calculate the coefficients in his 
formula for the wind effect, as in order to be ‗well-conditioned‘ the surges he picked 
needed to meet the criteria for geostrophic wind (of course Corkan‘s emphasis on 
producing a ‗well-conditioned‘ formula was another choice). This meant that the choice 
of using geostrophic winds, which appears primarily to have been based on ease of 
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calculation, impacted on the results TI produced by influencing the results his formula 
produced. The documents TI produced appeared only with much work and many 
constrained choices which influenced the results they got in unpredictable ways. 
To analyse chains of documents it is necessary to find documents that combine 
intelligibility with ‗rawness‘. The Bidston archive contains a reasonable amount of such 
material, at least from after 1929 when TI moved to the Observatory, in part perhaps 
because it has not yet been weeded by archivists.9 However, locating and interpreting 
such material was still a major challenge during this project, especially given the 
mathematical nature of much of the material and the inevitably partial nature of archival 
traces. Completely ‗raw‘ material can be difficult to make sense of, necessitating the use 
of documents such as Berncastle‘s memo to aid in this, but the difficulty in doing such 
analysis is offset by the potential insights it can provide. Through this thesis I hope to 
have showed that an attention to practices of calculation and the practices of making 
chains of documents within centres of calculation can give a detailed understanding of 
how a phenomenon such as storm surges was made more predictable. TI‘s researchers 
contingently produced statistical formulae through particular chains of documents that 
made surges predictable in particular ways, as a residual to be added to tidal predictions 
and found through correlation with pressure gradients. Such studies of the contents and 
organisation of documents help historians to understand in more detail how scientists 
have tried to order the world, using different practices of calculation.10 In addition, by 
paying attention to the choices and work involved in creating chains of documents I 
have attempted to extend Bruno Latour‘s ideas about such chains, by emphasising that 
such chains are constituted through contingent practice which influences the shape of 
the chain produced. Much more work could be done in this area upon location of 
suitable archival material. 
 
                                               
9 The archive was donated to Liverpool World Museum in 2004when TI‘s successor moved from Bidston 
to the University campus. Only minimal reorganisation, such as numbering of the archive boxes and 
creation of a basic finding aid, has taken place since then. 
10 A similar point is made in Campbell-Kelly et al., The History of Mathematical Tables, 13., where the authors 
argue that ―the internal structure of tables … tell us much about how people have selected, classified, and 
manipulated quantitative data at different times and places.‖  
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8.2.2 FURTHER WORK: THE ‘DIFFUSION’ OF STATISTICS 
Studying TI‘s work has analysed how statistics was used in the twentieth century on a 
particular phenomenon and how this changed over time. Change in practices of 
calculation were contingent on many events and processes, such as wars, the politics of 
patronage and earlier practices, e.g. what Doodson had learnt in London or TI‘s 
definition of surges as residual. Such events and processes influenced how TI used 
statistics, and thus how statistics travelled to the Institute‘s work, but this topic needs 
further work.  
An area of potential for further work highlighted by this thesis is thus twentieth century 
history of statistics, in particular how this technology of calculation travelled from Karl 
Pearson‘s UCL into the natural sciences. Much of the history of statistics tends to finish 
with the establishment of mathematical statistics of Francis Galton, Karl Pearson or R 
A Fisher, claiming that their ideas and techniques were then stripped of their context 
and became expertise that was exported to almost ‗everywhere‘.11 While there has been 
some work on the use of statistics in social sciences and select natural sciences, e.g. 
biology and physics, there does not seem to have been substantial work on the actual 
‗diffusion‘ of these ideas – the diffusion and ‗stripping‘ of context (e.g. of eugenic 
concerns) has not been problematised.12 However, as much work in history of science 
has shown, the ‗diffusion‘ of scientific ideas is not straightforward.13  
While some work has been done on the impact of Pearson‘s work abroad, little seems 
to have been done on the travel of statistics within the UK.14 Doodson‘s usage of 
statistical work is one example of how Pearson‘s ‗disciples‘ took up and used his ideas in 
other fields. LJ Comrie would be another example, who like Doodson emphasised the 
                                               
11 Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance, 69, 272-274; Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers, 104. 
Francisco Louçã, "Emancipation through Interaction – How Eugenics and Statistics Converged and 
Diverged," Journal of the History of Biology 42, no. 4 (2009). 
12 Stigler, The History of Statistics; MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain; Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-
1900; Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers; Gigerenzer et al., The Empire of Chance; Hacking, The Taming 
of Chance; Magnello, "Karl Pearson and the Establishment of Mathematical Statistics."; Magnello, "The 
Non-Correlation of Biometrics and Eugenics: Rival Forms of Laboratory Work in Karl Pearson's Career 
at University College London, Parts 1 and 2." 
13 For an example from mathematics and physics, see Warwick, Masters of Theory. 
14 See e.g. E. Seneta, "Karl Pearson in Russian Contexts," International Statistical Review 77, no. 1 (2009); C. 
G. Borroni, "Understanding Karl Pearson's Influence on Italian Statistics in the Early 20th Century," 
International Statistical Review 77, no. 1 (2009); D. R. Bellhouse, "Karl Pearson's Influence in the United 
States," International Statistical Review 77, no. 1 (2009).  
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organisation of large scale computation and the use of calculation machines.15 However, 
this emphasis may not be the same for Pearson‘s other students. While some work has 
been done to trace the initial destination of some of his students – the way Doodson 
went to UCL, picked up the mathematics and then took it elsewhere was a common 
pattern – further work along these lines could be a way at looking at the diffusion and 
transformation of mathematical ideas.16 What did Pearson‘s disciples do, especially 
those who did not stay in mathematical statistics? How did they use the techniques they 
had learnt, if at all? What fields did they go into?  
As many social scientists are taught at least some statistics, this is an area of 
mathematical practice that ought to be more accessible to those who wish to study 
practices of mathematics than, for example, the construction of proofs. This type of 
mathematics is also obviously material through the production of tables and documents 
and use of machinery, such as calculation machines. At the same time it is an example 
of ‗esoteric‘ expert knowledge that seemingly spreads without effort and has become 
much used. As such it would be a suitable project to study how a particular set of 
mathematical ideas have been universalised, to the extent that they have. 
 
8.3 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE THESIS 
This thesis has focused very closely at storm surge science at TI and how they made 
surges predictable in a particular way. While this has allowed attention to details of TI‘s 
practices of calculation and their complex patronage, it has limited my view to how TI 
and to some extent their closest allies understood storm surges. In order to understand 
how the British have interacted with storm surges more generally a wider view would be 
necessary as TI‘s work was one, but only one, aspect of this. Another aspect, with a 
much longer history than TI‘s, is the history of engineered coastal defences and research 
into such defences. The Waverley Committee treated this as a complementary but 
separate aspect of storm surge science.17 A different committee was set up to manage 
research into this area, which the Advisory Committee on Oceanographical and 
Meteorological Research was not in close contact with. However, for a fuller 
                                               
15 Croarken, Early Scientific Computing in Britain. 
16 MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain, ch 5.  
17 Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding [Waverley Committee], esp. para 4. 
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understanding of the interactions between the British and storm surges, and how the 
first tried to govern the latter, historical work on the science of flood defence and the 
links between this science and policy is necessary. Work in this area would be 
particularly interesting as there has been a marked shift away from ‗hard‘ defences 
following the 1953 event towards the current policy of ‗managed retreat‘. 
I would also have liked to look further at reception issues, for example what other 
scientists outside TI‘s ‗set‘ thought of their work. If time had allowed I would have 
explored this by attempting to locate further sources in this area. Two particular groups 
of interest are BAAS and the Royal Society, which published various work by TI‘s 
storm surge researchers.18 Another aspect of reception is how TI‘s formulae were taken 
up and adapted by forecasters, and how these warnings were in turn taken up by those 
who received them. TI‘s work produced forecasting formulae, not forecasts. Their 
formulae needed further work to result in forecasts. Due to word count constraints it 
has not been possible to discuss how TI‘s formulae were taken up by the storm surge 
warning system. They adapted and developed them during the winter of 1953-4, before 
the Advisory Committee had been formally established, as well as later. While the 
warning system used TI‘s formulae, these formulae were transformed by that use, thus 
providing a case study of travelling formulae. In addition, the warnings produced by this 
system did not travel unhindered or unchanged, and how they were communicated and 
used by experts, such as the river boards the warnings was sent to, and non-experts, 
such as politicians or residents, would be important issues for a broader history of 
storm surge forecasting.19 It would also have been very useful to know more about the 
potential use of TI‘s formulae during the Second World War. If more information could 
                                               
18 For example, Robert Henry Corkan, "The Levels in the North Sea Associated with the Storm 
Disturbance of 8 January 1949," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A 242, no. 853 
(1950); Arthur Thomas Doodson, "Tides and Storm Surges in a Long Uniform Gulf," Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London. Series A 237, no. 1210 (1956); J. R. Rossiter, "The North Sea Storm Surge of 31 
January and 1 February 1953," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A 246, no. 915 
(1954). 
19 Compare Hooke and Pielke Jr., "Short-Term Weather Prediction: An Orchestra in Need of a 
Conductor."; Pielke Jr., Sarewitz, and Byerly Jr., "Decision Making and the Future of Nature: 
Understanding and Using Predictions."  
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be found on whether TI‘s formulae were used this could put a different light on the 
extent of naval patronage of storm surge science.20 
Another issue that deserves further exploration is how TI judged formulae as successful 
or not. For example, how was a residual curve judged to be close enough or too far 
from the observation curve to be a ‗good‘ prediction? The researchers at TI presumably 
discussed this face to face as such discussions have left few archival traces. While figure 
6.1 is an exception of sorts, the graph in this picture was used by TI as much as 
evidence of external surges as of a judgement regarding success – the finding of new 
types of residuals was as much a result for TI as the sufficient closeness of the final 
formula was. That discussions regarding judgements of the distance between curves, or 
success versus failure, were made in person rather than on paper also points to the 
importance of conversation in mathematical practice and research, which is another 
potential further topic of investigation. 
 
8.4 FURTHER WORK: CHANGING CHAINS OF DOCUMENTS 
In addition to the suggestions regarding further work discussed above, an obvious topic 
for further work coming out of this thesis would be to look at developments in the 
1960s and beyond regarding storm surge forecasting. In the 1960s the tripartite system 
involved in the warning system, consisting of TI, Hydro and the Met Office, suffered 
severe strains. An argument broke out between TI and the other two regarding the 
warning formulae. Who should develop them, the scientists at the Institute or the 
forecasters based at the Met Office? How should they be developed, for scientific 
quality or practical use? What was a ‗trustworthy‘ prediction in the 1960s and how could 
it be produced? The argument was intensely acrimonious and eventually TI lost control 
over the development of statistical storm surge forecasting. In the 1970s they regained 
control by developing digital computer models to forecast surges (i.e. introducing new 
practices of calculation) and this computer-based warning system was put into 
                                               
20 In this case the document trail went cold immediately, as the only UKHO reference to the work that 




operation in 1978.21 It has since continued to be developed, often by researchers at TI‘s 
successors, to become the system that is running today. 
I would like to follow up on this episode, which would involve further sets of 
theoretical literature than those used for this thesis. Historians of science have focused 
on disputes like this as fruitful sources for understanding how science functions. 
Controversies are interesting to historians and STS scholars as they make visible 
assumptions and relationships that are normally invisible. In this case this includes how 
findings could or could not be replicated by different actors and the status of the 
different actors involved with the warning system, such as the role of ‗the scientists‘ and 
‗the forecasters‘. The controversy raised issues of how storm surge science should be 
conducted, as well as what it was. Further developing this episode would also follow up 
on issues raised in this thesis, such as the role of patronage in storm surge science, and 
would also add to the existing literature on scientific controversies, often focused on 
disputes regarding laboratory experiments, as this dispute focused on the role of field 
measurements and calculations. This controversy brought to the fore practices of 
calculation instead of laboratory practices. Studying it would further develop my 
argument that storm surge scientists constructed particular chains of documents making 
consequential and contingent choices, by analysing how their chains changed. 
  
                                               
21 The narrative in this paragraph is based on material in the Bidston Archive, especially correspondence 
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TI‘s financial ledger provides an overview of the organisation‘s patrons in the 1920s and 
how these changed. The table below illustrate this development, while the figure 
displays it graphically.1 Initially TI relied heavily on donations from the Booths and 
other shipping men, with grants from DSIR also playing a prominent role. When the 
Booth‘s funding ran out in 1923, other shipping men from LSOA took over. In 1923-24 
DSIR's grants stopped, donations increased further and commercial income started 
coming in. This was also the time TI bought a tidal predictor machine for £1541, with 
funds donated mainly from different shipping men and companies (£1200) but also 
BAAS (£300). The predictor expenses and donations are not included in the table and 
graph below. In the years following this purchase and the 1923 agreement with Hydro 
to supply them with tidal predictions the income from commercial work continued to 











1921 600 250 633   
1922 300  400   
1923 300  400   
1924    1200 390 
1925    1000 453 
1926    800 632 
1927    500 778 
1928    500 1003 
Appendix: Table of TI‟s income 1921-28 from various sources, in £3 
 
                                               
1 The ledger begins in 1921, not when TI was established in 1919. While there are some mistakes and 
discrepancies in it, there are no signs of bias or systematic errors. For example, in 1924 the individual 
donations add up to £1200, while the summary gives total donations as £1250. The latter figure has been 
corrected. 
2 Tidal Institute Ledger, S2147, LUA 




Appendix: Graph of TI‟s income 1921-28 from various sources, in £4 
  
                                               
4 Tidal Institute Ledger, S2147, LUA 
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